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ABSTRACT 
In this thesis, I will argue that one of the ways to think about the concept of homelessness and 
its relationship to violence is to trace the concept as it emerges in key theoretical texts of 
critical intellectuals who find themselves both in and outside the Western homeland.  In 
attempting to do so, I limit this thesis to three key theoretical articulations from which the 
concept of homelessness can be extracted: the works of Sigmund Freud, Franz Fanon and 
Michael Foucault. In bringing to bear the life and work of these individuals, the hope is to 
conceive of the relationship between violence and homelessness in new and unforeseen ways. 
I propose to bring an informed interdisciplinary and gender perspective to bear on the concept 
of homelessness. Accepting the supposition that the body can be seen as a site of homecoming, 
I explore the question of who owns the body. This exploration is undertaken through an 
examination of the advocacy slogan, ‘my body, my business’, and the placement of the Afrikan 
sex worker alongside Freud, Fanon and Foucault. The Afrikan sex worker in this work is a new 
feminist potentiality in much the same way that homelessness offers new postcolonial 
possibilities. 
While much of postcolonial criticism has centred on the problem of the colonized subject’s 
relation to the home, there has not yet been a sustained undertaking of the history and meaning 
of the concept of homelessness and, more importantly, its relationship to the experience of 
violence in the contemporary world. The history of homeless people tends to be recorded 
through surveillance and documentation by those institutions responsible for providing 
discipline, punishment, shelter and cure so as to ‘save’ and ‘rescue’ them. These responses, 
particularly when done systematically, can become frameworks that hold the homeless person 
ransom to a particular language game of ‘truth’, thereby restricting the homeless person’s 
movement and possibility of finding a voice. 
Deriving a concept of homelessness from the life and work of Freud, Fanon and Foucault 
allows for new insights. These thinkers offer a view of homelessness that is productive for 
thinking against the grain of dominant orthodoxies. This contrasts with the implication of 
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pathologization of homelessness which arises in the frameworks of dominant political, 
therapeutic and social work approaches.  
The creation of homelessness also recalls the attendant violence of its experience. I argue that 
the space of homelessness needs to be contextualized. When homelessness is imposed, as with 
torture or a tsunami, there is a closing down of space; but when chosen, as with the 
transgendered sex worker who leaves her home and community due to threats, impositions and 
judgements, homelessness may paradoxically open up space. Drawing on the insights from 
these theorists, I also suggest that the concept of homelessness may at a symbolic level serve 
rather as a powerful space of resistance to hegemonic practices of belonging, offering a way of 
destabilising dominant patriarchal, heteronormative and Western constructions of home. 
The thesis concludes that homelessness cannot be kept outside the boundaries of the home; and 
neither can the homeless be fully assimilated into the homeland, as something within the home 
is irreducible to any ordering of things. The border, boundary and intersections of home and 
homelessness are blurred, forever incomplete, as the home finds itself ceaselessly stained and 
crossed with the uncanny, that is, the ‘unhomely’. Home, as noted by Delia Vekony (2010), is a 
site of hospitality. It is a space to think, play, and dream, eat, make love and raise children. But 
it is also a stage upon which the state apparatus, global economy, monotheistic religions and 
patriarchal order assert control over the body. Homelessness has been constructed as a material 
experience for many: a site of terror, abandonment and lack of direction. It is often experience 
it as free falling or as the mental foreclosure of space. Yet I underline another dimension of 
homelessness: as an experience of liberation. This ‘camping on the borders’ allows for a 
disruption of identification, a state of refuge from the demands of others and a form of nomadic 
thinking. Within any home setting lurks the uncanny, what cannot be housed, likewise within 
any homeless setting a becoming-at-home is possible. Both home and homelessness hold the 
possibility of terror as well as a comforting, exciting retreat and escape.  
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CHAPTER ONE 
INTRODUCTION AND MOTIVATION 
Homeless, but not speechless 
 
I am homeless, 
penniless. 
So, I ask for your pennies 
countless. 
 
There are the times when I feel pointless 
Useless, powerless to do anything 
To/for/about/with 
These heartless 
See-me-nots 
who are clueless to my faceless existence 
 
One penny your charity is shameless 
My life worthless 
My journey…reckless 
Don’t worry: my passing will be painless. 
 
(Anonymous, 2003) 
 
Introduction 
This work will attempt to engage critically and imaginatively with the writings of Freud, Fanon 
and Foucault to interrogate the concept of homelessness and its relationship to violence. 
Homelessness and violence are two of the biggest issues confronting humanity. More and more 
people worldwide find themselves living in hostile, threatening and burdensome conditions in 
which sustainability, fulfilling basic needs and self-expression become monumental struggles. 
Violence forces millions of people and animals to either endure impossible living conditions or 
leave their homes and seek refuge elsewhere. This violence could be war and torture, gender 
based violence, child abuse, domestic violence, homophobia, racism, sexism, slavery, 
environmental degradation, oligarchies (family-based, corporate or religious) or the 
criminalization of certain groups of society, such as sex workers, refugees, the poor and other 
marginalized people.  
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The past two hundred years have seen a huge increase in the number of people and animals on 
the move, forced to seek refuge from violence. The result of inherent structural inequalities 
within the market economy, patriarchal heteronormativity and the oligarchic elites is the 
growth of homelessness. This manifests as both the physical lack of abode and as the psychical, 
ideological and discursive level of being ‘othered’ and made to feel an outsider, as well as the 
increased polarity between the lives of women and men, and wealthy and poor, in many parts 
of the world, especially Afrika
1
. People are required to leave their homes due to hunger and the 
quantitative and qualitative expansion of inhospitable and onerous living conditions, such as 
environmental degradation brought about by urbanisation and global warming. Innumerable 
people resign themselves to shortened life expectancy and a second class status. Those humans 
who do not feel at home in their families or homelands due to their poverty, underclass status, 
gender, religion, ethnicity, sexual orientation or choice of work, end up stigmatized and 
displaced.  
The changes over the past two hundred years can be linked to the shift from rural and pre-
industrial social systems to a system based on globalization of the market. There has also been 
a continuation of structures associated with oligarchy (be it corporate, military, religious or 
family-based
2
) and meritocratic control by the ruling elite, influential classes and educated. 
These structures have precluded the rights of others or, worse, have resulted in a growing 
underclass and increasing homelessness. These changes also speak directly to the present-day 
economic crisis caused by unscrupulous speculation and reluctance to regulate banks and the 
stock market, as well as a massive intensification of consumerism
3
 and the economic policy of 
austerity which disproportionally affects those previously reliant on a range of benefits, 
                                                                                                                                                                                        
1
 The spelling of ‘Afrika’ with a ‘k’ is a political statement. It follows the work of Mafundikwa (2004). Moreover, 
it is worth noting that most Afrikan languages spell Afrika with a k. Thus I use the spelling ‘Afrika’ and ‘Afrikan’ 
throughout the text.  
 
2
 This refers to the passing down of privileges through family bloodlines, as is seen in much of the Middle East.  
 
3
Economist Paul Ellis-Smith (2011, personal communication) states: “We have brought up a generation, Gen Y, 
who want instant gratification ... encouraged not to wait for anything. So we now have a generation of people who 
will not wait to have the latest toys, be it cars or iPhones. They are not the ones totally responsible but they 
represent the ethos of the Western world today. Accordingly, rather than save for something, everything is bought 
on credit. The West has borrowed itself into oblivion. It is not the economic system at fault, as many would like to 
believe ... but rather a mass lack of EQ at a societal level. Thus, in Ireland, everyone wanted a holiday house. 
Everyone maxed out their ability to borrow at unrealistically low rates and the banks borrowed and the 
governments borrowed and suddenly the world was over borrowed and could not fund anymore growth – and the 
tower came crashing down.” 
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including for housing. Other major contributing factors to the loss of home for many people are 
the homogenization of Western middle-class values and corrupt governments, together with the 
continued acceptance of heterosexuality, male-dominated family homes and religious 
intolerance.  
While the perpetuation of the myth of the middle-class nuclear family as the norm is usually 
associated with right-wing conservative politicians, we see the rise of the nanny state, run by 
left- and right-wing governments, that equally privileges certain forms of normative families 
and home. When it comes to propagating policies that structure the home around the nuclear 
family, more and more we are seeing a convergence in the ideologies of the mainstream left 
and right.  
This acceptance of male-dominated, heterosexual, nuclear homes and the upholding of 
oligarchic rule has resulted in the binary of home and homelessness attaining a ‘taken-for-
granted’ status. This thesis deconstructs this binary. It points to the fact that the binary of home 
and homeless – those in and outside the homeland – are not as clear-cut as popular culture 
presents. Of particular interest in this thesis are the ways in which those on the outside – people 
who are outcast and feel homeless – may marginalize and cast out others. This can be through 
re-enactment (abusing others in the way that one has been abused) or collusion with some of 
the values of the oppressive group which sit comfortably with already-held beliefs.
4
 
Understanding internalised self-oppression, as well as oppression of the oppressed by other 
oppressed people, is a key area of investigation in this thesis. Fanon’s work in this respect is 
elaborated in Chapter Four of this thesis.  
                                                                                                                                                                                        
4
 Consider the following three examples. I recently witnessed conversation in a sauna after a gym work-out where 
a black, working-class man from Caribbean decent was complaining about Muslims, only for him to discover that 
one of the people in the sauna was a Muslim from West Africa. The conflict seemed to resolve when the two men 
united in their shared dislike female boxers. Bonding around shared values of what it means to be a man enabled 
them to tolerate their religious and ethnic differences. In another instance in the early 1990s, I overheard a 
conversation in a working-class gym in the middle of Finsbury Park. A Nigerian man asked the Jamaican manager 
why so many men kept on going in and out of the nearby public local toilet. The manager replied, “They are gay 
and they are having sex in the toilet.” The Nigerian replied, “That is impossible as some of them are black!” 
Thirdly, a few years back, I was deeply moved when, following the death of the baby of a sex worker, I witnessed 
a group of women leave to do sex work in the bitterly cold winter in order to get money to bury the child. Yet one 
of the same women later wanted to get a gangster to cut the face of the bereaved mother because she was thought 
to be more attractive and was taking business away from her. Lastly, while it is apparent to many people that 
Israel has committed and continues to commit gross human rights violations, condemnation of this nation-state 
should not be used as an excuse to attack Jews and perpetuate anti-Semitism.  
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This thesis articulates a more critical framework for engaging with home/homelessness through 
unpacking the contributions of the works of Freud, Fanon and Foucault. A case study is also 
discussed in order to reflect on a particular group who have been constructed historically as 
being on the margins of societies and are frequently also, in material terms, homeless. This case 
study allows not only for an illustration of the arguments made earlier but also serves to 
illuminate some of the blind spots in the works of Freud, Fanon and Foucault. Insights about 
home and the homeless gained through this case study are located alongside the contemporary 
and popular explanations of home and homelessness and the institutional policies and 
procedures for dealing with homeless people and those deemed ‘other’, such as sex workers.   
Freud, Fanon and Foucault, by virtue of being Jewish, black and homosexual, were positioned 
as outsiders. But at the same time in the course of their lives and identifications as middle-
class, male, medical practitioners and academics, they risked alienating others, especially in 
their engagement with female sexuality. In the reading of Freud, Fanon and Foucault in this 
thesis, trends within their work which subvert the binary and derogatory modes of thinking that 
erect inflexible oppositions between home and homelessness, are identified. The thread linking 
the home and homeless with ‘normality’ and ‘deviance’ is fully explored. 
What unfolds in this work is an exposure of some of those practices in which speaking and 
‘thinking for the other’ takes place. This ‘thinking’ is often a disguised manifestation of white, 
middle-class, patriarchal, Western and/or heteronormative fears and anxieties which are 
projected on the other. The challenge is to subvert those practices, be they name-calling, 
stigmatization, crude discriminatory practice or the silent contest with those structures which 
perpetuate these abuses. For example, when I was involved in the setting up of the African Sex 
Worker Alliance, a key theme was ensuring that the alliance would always be authentically sex 
worker led. Yet the difficulty that the Alliance continues to be challenged by is that leadership 
frequently assume the right to speak on behalf of all Afrikan sex workers and marginalize a 
range of voices in this unitary representation.  
My aim is not to attempt to explain homelessness or to arrive at a singular causation of 
homelessness. I am concerned here more with how homelessness has been represented and 
understood, what causation has been attributed to it, and how that causation reflects larger 
regulatory, oppressive and violent frameworks of human life. While not engaging with causes 
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of homelessness, my thesis is based on an understanding of the complexity of historically 
contextualized frameworks in which homelessness both emerges and is understood. My 
concern is to challenge the way in which the construction of homelessness as a social problem 
has led to a slippage that denies the agency of homeless people through ascribing homelessness 
to various causes (usually personal psychological or economic factors). Homelessness cannot 
be attributed to any one single determining factor. This is despite the fact that most homeless 
hostels in London will cite specific factors such as alcohol or drug addiction, mental health 
challenges or domestic violence as the presenting concerns, while in many Afrikan cities 
poverty and war are referenced as the primary determinates.  
Homelessness is tightly determined by a shifting global and local socio-political and economic 
context. For example, in the 1980s, squatter camps in South Africa and the activity of squatting 
in London were seen as acceptable practices and sites of protest. Today legalization rules 
against these practices. The homelessness person no longer finds a solution to homelessness 
but ends up with a criminal record. Thus the contexts and meanings of homelessness are 
constantly shifting and changing.  
This work will also highlight how contemporary hegemonic practices of urban living result in a 
territorialising of space. As noted by Njoki Mwaniki (2012), “the hegemonic city through 
governance and dominance is territorialising; which is to say it is the enforcing of codes and 
rules by the dominant culture that subjugates and objectifies the other. Simultaneously the 
objectified other comes to accept the rules and codes as ‘normal reality’ or ‘commonsense”. 
I argue that the complex alignment or overlapping of certain dominant discourses and the 
interplay of structural dynamics and networks in our globalized society plays a determining 
factor in homelessness
5
. The interplay of different structural factors and the ensuing networks 
that are put in place determine homelessness. What we see at play is interrelated networks – 
judicial, medical, educational, military, technological, policy formulation, employment 
practices, policing and social care. The effect of these overlapping and interrelated networks is 
                                                                                                                                                                                        
5
 Consider a statement on causes of homelessness by Shelter, a homeless organization in the UK. See 
http://england.shelter.org.uk/campaigns/why_we_campaign/tackling_homelessness/What_causes_homelessness). 
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the production of places, in which the person has no mental and/or mental space into which 
they can retreat – a definition of both homelessness and violence.  
The causes of homelessness are over-determined. Central are those discursive practices and 
discourses that bring into being a structural network that represses, disavows or forecloses the 
possibility of subjectivity and of being human. In this regard, the legacy of a social order that is 
orientated around the Names of the Father
6
 (monotheism and patriarchy), alongside the logic of 
capitalism, slavery, urbanization, nationalism, colonization and institutionalization of certain 
so-called ‘problem citizens’ (as seen in children’s homes, mental asylum, prison and the army7) 
produces extreme violence. This in turn results in restricted and censored thoughts, voices and 
physical movement. What is common to all the above – capitalism, patriarchy, urbanisation, 
colonization, nationalism, monotheism and slavery – is an impingement of space and an 
appropriation of the body of the other.  
The manifestation of this impingement is the construction of a scene
8
 constituted around 
ownership – such as property rights, housing, real estate, land ownership and control over 
another’s body – and a set of identifications which are based on exclusion, for example, gender 
based violence, homophobia and naming and shaming (shown through the use of words such as 
‘foreigner’, ‘mad’, ‘junkie’ or ‘drunk’. The scene is also structured by those ‘language games9’ 
                                                                                                                                                                                        
6Lacan revised Freud’s concept of the Oedipus through the introduction of the concept of the Name-of-the-Father. 
With the Oedipus, the authority of the father as a symbolic law is registered. There is a submission to the Name-of 
-the-Father with the effect that there is a symbolic castration and privation of the means to have direct access to 
the jouissance of the (m)Other and a reduction of drive satisfaction. The Name-of-the-Father bars access to the 
desire of the (m)Other. It is a law founded on a prohibition –  the incest prohibition. The Name-of-the-Father 
conditions the child’s inauguration into an-Other scene (the public exchange circuit of symbolic speech). This 
movement enables the child to re-present him/herself from a different perspective, a third position outside the 
mother-child dyad. The function of the father is to give the child symbolic words in exchange for the loss of 
imaginary oneness. 
 
7
 In 1994 I assisted Sally Baldwin, a staff member at Just Ask Counselling and Advice Centre, to conduct research 
around the causes of homelessness in London. The study involved going to different homeless hostels and 
speaking to both homeless persons as well as staff. The study concluded that the highest percentage of individuals 
ending up homeless came from institutional backgrounds, which included children’s homes, mental institutions, 
the army and prisons.  
 
8
Richard Klein (2012, personal communication) refers to the scene as a scenario which is symbolic-imaginary. It 
is in a scene that a social bond and a constituted identification are established. This structure is described in mask 
cultures in the work of Levi-Strauss. What drops outside the scene are abject objects which include marginalised 
speaking beings. 
 
9
 A particularly useful reference when looking at the ways in which different discourses (‘language games’) 
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that frame the roles and scripts of those who take the stage and those who drop out of the sites 
of representations. This is not to say that personal factors don’t play a part, but rather that we 
need to understand the way these personal factors are structured by the local context and wider 
socio-political and economic global setting. Simply put, both the causes and social meanings of 
homelessness cannot be understood without an analysis of the politics of the body and the 
impingement of space. Causation is not my concern at all in this thesis, I am concerned rather 
with the social meanings which determine social responses and further violences against 
homeless.   
It will become clear in this work that the way in which the body is impinged upon and 
appropriated by capitalism, patriarchy, urbanisation, colonization, nationalism, monotheism, 
oligarchies and slavery can be understood through the concept of apparatus, as elaborated by 
Giorgio, Agamben and Foucault. Agamben (2009: 2) summarizes apparatus as follows: 
It is a heterogeneous set that includes virtually anything, linguistic and non-linguistic, under the same 
heading: discourses, institutions, buildings, laws, police measures, philosophical propositions, and so on. 
The apparatus itself is the network that is established between these elements. The apparatus always has a 
concert strategic function and is always located in a power relation. As such, it appears at the intersection 
of power relations and relations of knowledge.  
The alignment or overlapping of these taken-for-granted and dominant discourses with the 
resulting networks of power in our globalized society, function firstly as linguistic and non-
linguistic practices that operate on the body and secondly, as space that structures the habits 
and movements of that body. This can be as a result of many overlapping elements, including, 
to mention but a few, the juridical, educational, military, religious and socialization within the 
home. 
In summary, freedom of movement, objectification, the lack of unsustainability and intolerant 
communities have become central concerns facing humanity, concerns that irrevocably and 
radically call into question what constitutes a home and who the homeless are. The 
battlegrounds within all these struggles are the body as well as the loss of space within which 
                                                          
compete for a monopoly on the portrayal of history, is Wittgenstein’s idea that we can speak of a form of 
reasoning which is not only subject to a particular grammar of thought, but which asserts its explanations as both 
the cause and truth. In this regard, also see Bouveresse (1995). I am suggesting Wittgenstein’s concept of language 
games is read alongside Foucault’s conceptions of truth.  
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the body is able to move freely and without inhibition. This is a struggle between “bodies that 
matter”, as Judith Butler (1993) puts it, and bodies that are confined, impinged upon, reduced 
to flesh and to surface appearance or seen as meat, as well as bodies that are objects of fear and 
disgust, or forms of cheap and dispensable labour. Moreover, this is not just any particular 
body, but those bodies deemed to be invisible, less than human, without rights or respect, or 
without access to food, shelter, healthcare, education and the law. In this work, I therefore 
define ‘homeless’ in the broadest sense possible, as not just those without shelter but as those 
who have been homeless within normative and hegemonic frameworks of social life and who 
are on the margins (and therefore denied a sense of being at home in social and psychological 
terms).  
The socio-political and economic context shapes and overrides so-called ‘individual 
determinates’ in the shape and form homelessness takes. At the same time, it is argued 
throughout this thesis that it is imperative to allow people to find their own voices to tell their 
stories. It is in the paradoxes – the sites of intersection, and the spaces within and between the 
movements from the local to global networks, universal to particular, from the personal 
psychodynamics to historical structures, and vice versa – that Freud, Fanon and Foucault’s 
stories of homelessness find a voice and a place to dwell. 
 
Motivation 
The broad goal of this thesis is to explore the relationship between violence and homelessness, 
while the specific focus of investigation is the concept of homelessness and its links with 
violence and violation as it appears in the life and work of Sigmund Freud, Frantz Fanon and 
Michel Foucault. The question for this work is, “How do Freud, Fanon and Foucault add value 
to the exploration of the relationship between homelessness and violence?” The thesis makes 
special reference to violence against women and the ways women find agency in the face of 
violence. The key example to be explored is sex work. The hope is that this research may 
inform the linking of theory, practice and politics as it is applied to work with homeless 
persons.  
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Before proceeding further, a self-location will be made, being an elaboration of 
autobiographical information as well as a sharing of professional experiences. While this thesis 
is theoretical, it is deeply motivated by personal work and political concerns. A number of 
personal experiences thus inform this work, a few of which I elaborate now. Firstly, my having 
a brother with a learning disability has given me an intimate insight into the dynamics of 
feeling like a second-class citizen and having to endure the label ‘abnormal’. Secondly, 
watching my mother bring up a family as a struggling, single, working-class woman has given 
me a deep appreciation of the struggle of such mothers and the patriarchal violence they face. 
This includes my mother’s brief engagement in transactional sex to survive, which at the time I 
bitterly judged but now realize enabled her to feed my brother and me. It further includes my 
mother’s active support of a domestic worker, Sally, who was subjected to police brutality, 
especially when her boyfriend slept over. Thirdly, growing up in Bellville in Cape Town 
during the apartheid era, I often witnessed extreme brutality and violence directed towards 
blacks and mixed race people – referred to at that time as coloured – but also, more generally, 
violence against women, homosexuals and children (including child sexual abuse), regardless 
of race. Witnessing these displays of brutality and violence on many occasions from a very 
young age and throughout my childhood and youth, has never left me and continues to inform 
the work I do. Fourthly, my identifying as Afrikan
10
, in a South African context where many 
whites and blacks refuse to respect this position, gives me an understanding of what it feels to 
be a foreigner in my country of birth, as has the experience of watching xenophobic violence in 
South Africa directed towards my close friends and loved ones from other parts of Afrika, such 
as Kenya, Uganda and Zimbabwe. Lastly, having had my father end his life as a homeless man 
– brutally attacked and, a year later, murdered – my interest in this topic is not only abstract.  
The effort to come to terms with homelessness and violence has punctuated my working and 
personal life to the extent that I experience some kind of kinship with those homeless people 
referred to in the thesis. 
My professional life has been dedicated to social problems that intersect with the challenges of 
the home and homelessness. What has stood out for me throughout my work is the intersection 
between violence and homelessness. I have consistently experienced the challenges of moving 
                                                                                                                                                                                        
10
 I do not see myself as black, but as Afrikan.  
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from theoretical to political, and then practical engagement with these issues. Dominant in all 
my work is the synergy between homelessness and violence, a theme that has consistently 
emerged regardless of the presenting concerns or the location of the work (Cape Town, South 
Africa; Denver, United States of America; or London, United Kingdom). It is a problem that 
falls both within and outside the parameters of ‘care’, and that raises broader political and 
conceptual concerns. Put another way, before one can begin to think about the theory and 
practice of creating space for the person to find a voice, one needs to understand, to use 
Foucault’s terms (Foucault 1997), the specific “technologies of care” that frame the space in 
which theory and practice gets constructed. In other words, prior to any intervention, 
framework or partnership work, we should allow for a more sustained genealogy of 
homelessness. What flows from this will hopefully inform questions of advocacy, clinical and 
community practice with respect to addressing violence and homelessness, and their complex 
intersections.   
Violence and homelessness are two themes I have frequently encountered in working with 
people subjected to violence, such as survivors of war and torture, the street homeless and 
those living in hostels. This I also experienced when working in childcare (with children in 
children’s homes, unaccompanied minors, children with learning disabilities, sexually 
exploited youth, youth engaged in survival sex, and children’s recreational programmes in 
impoverished inner-city areas), as well as in the addiction and mental health field. I found the 
same themes in my work with HIV, lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgendered, intersex, queer and 
sex-working communities. What is apparent is that concerns around homelessness are not 
focused within only one group – those classified as homeless – but can manifest in different 
ways.  
Homelessness has been most manifest in my work not only with the street homeless, those with 
chronic addictions, asylum seekers and refugees, but also in my experience of working with 
male, female and transgendered sex workers, youth engaged in survival sex, youth enslaved 
into debt bondage, and torture survivors. For example, in a three-day research workshop with 
transgendered sex workers, what I discovered as part of the research team was that those who 
ended up living on the streets described the build-up to their homeless existence as founded 
upon feeling homeless in the world and being without any sense of belonging. It is this point of 
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ambiguity, the personal sense of displacement and subjective location that captured my interest. 
The challenge is to constantly negotiate how the physical location of homelessness is linked 
with personal and psychological sense of not belonging. Moreover, the point of crossover, flux 
and production between these mental and physical spaces, between physical location and the 
personal sense of not belonging, needs to be understood. 
The motivation for this work is built upon the need to explore these areas of confusion, as well 
as lessons drawn, primarily from four pioneering  projects that I have been involved in: the 
counselling service of Just Ask, an outreach project providing therapy on the street to homeless 
persons living near Victoria Station in London; the work of the Sex Worker Education and 
Advocacy Taskforce (SWEAT)
 11
  in South Africa; the establishment of an African Sex Worker 
Alliance
12
 (ASWA) across four Afrikan countries; and the Trauma Centre project for ex-
political prisoners and torture survivors in the Western Cape Province of South Africa. In an 
attempt to move thoughtfully within these spaces, I drew heavily upon the work of Freud, 
Fanon and Foucault, and at the same time became interested in the way in which these three 
foundational theorists’ own lives and scholarship intersected with issues of home and 
homelessness.  
My experience is one in which there is often an unavoidable ‘breakdown in translation’ 
between what the policymakers, donors, NGOS and service users think is happening. While 
this breakdown in translation may be inevitable, the challenge is to engage in a process of 
‘translation’ that moves back and forth as opposed to one that is imposed top-down. In the 
language of James Clifford (1992), these “travelling theories” do not cross borders well. It is as 
a result of these concerns that my key research question was framed: how do Freud, Fanon and 
Foucault add value to an exploration of the relationship between homelessness and violence? 
My research question is based firstly on the assumption that they do in fact add value and, 
secondly, that this can be helpful in thinking about the relationships between the worlds of 
theory, practice and politics. This is a conjecture informed by my having personally found it of 
immense help to draw upon the thinking of the three theorists in my attempts to work with 
                                                                                                                                                                                        
11
See www.sweat.org.za. 
12
See www.africansexworkeralliance.org. ASWA was a UNFPA, Ford Foundation and Oxfam Novib funded 
project aimed at the understanding of survival sex amongst youth and the training of youth leaders in four Afrikan 
countries. 
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people subjected to violence and homelessness. These theorists have also guided me in my 
pondering on broader questions around what violence and homelessness are, and what the 
nature of the relationship is between the two. However, helpful as it may be, I argue that a 
certain rigor and interrogation of this assumption is needed. For example, is my attachment to 
Freud, Fanon and Foucault simply a personal attachment without theoretical, practical or 
political weight? Or do they in fact add value to the building of bridges between theory and 
practice within the field of my particular professional concerns?  
In summary, this thesis is a testimony to the work I have had the privilege of being involved in. 
It has been such a rich experience to have been engaged in exciting and pioneering projects and 
working alongside dynamic and committed individuals and partnerships.
13
 It has been a deeply 
                                                                                                                                                                                        
13 As regards my personal work experience and engagement with homelessness persons, resulting in an interest in 
constructing a working model that can cross borders, it began with work in a cold weather shelter, called Neville 
House. The space was constituted by many different organizations. What I learned from this experience was that 
therapy could take place in unconventional settings and in situations, contrary to which the theory stated was 
possible. To be precise, we had a counselling room in the cold weather shelter but very few people initially came 
for counselling, so we went onto the corridors and started spending time in the wet rooms. This then resulted in 
people moving from this room, usually in a state on intoxication (drug or alcohol) into the therapy room. 
Sometimes they would pass out in the counselling room. Yet what I discovered is that something of this 
experience would be remembered and these individuals would come back when sober, thank us and then continue 
the conversation that began. It was this selfsame group of individuals – who invited us to engage in an informal 
therapeutic group discussion in the wet rooms – who requested that we (Just Ask Counselling and Advice Service) 
continue the work on the streets after the project close.  
The demand for therapy on the streets came from the service users.   Thanks to the bold and pioneering support 
and guidance provided by the director this work was made possible. We then compiled a wonderful team to 
undertake the work onto the street as well as key partnerships with other services. The work was pioneering and 
years later I discovered won an award, but the real reward was the privilege to have been involved in this cutting 
edge work, therapy on the streets for the homeless. Keys to the success of the motivation and enthusiasm of a 
wonderful team of individuals who were willing to take a risk and do something that had not been done before, 
partnership work, creation of spaces to think and responding to something that the client group themselves had 
asked for.  
Support and management structures and procedures needed to be created to ensure the work could take place and 
continue. Davina Lilley showed bold leadership at Just Ask making the work possible and allowing us to create 
thinking spaces. These structures create thinking spaces which enable the front-line workers to stand back and 
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reflect upon the work and to process the experience. Perhaps the most challenging aspect of this work is what it 
evokes for the individual counsellor. The way this material gets processed will often make or break the work. We 
created an envelope to contain some of the anxiety. It becomes a shared sense of responsibility and thinking 
experience. We adopted the following methods of containment. 1) Personal therapy encouraged, supervision 
provided. 2) Team training. 3) Hand over meetings. 4) Provision of reading around the work. 5) Writing up of 
one’s thoughts. 6) Staff development. A useful policy we developed was to break up the work into a 2:1 ratio. For 
every two hours face-to-face work, one hour is used to process the work. 
We all felt that we were involved in something new, exciting and racial and this carried us along as we made it up 
as we went along. The key stages we came up with were the following. Stage One (Making Contact) 1) Working 
in partnership. 2) Getting to know the area and community. Stage Two (Reaching Out and Breaking the Ice) 1) 
The provision of recognition and acknowledgment of the humanity of the other.  2) Participation. Stage Three 
(Encounter and Engagement). 1) Advice. 2) A sharing of time. 3) Emotional off-loading/dumping. Stage Four 
(Establish a working pact). 1) Establishment of rapport. 2) Adding flesh to the bones. Unpacking of stories and 
tuning into the client’s world and developing a relationship with the client’s relationship to being-in-the-world 
(exploration and elaboration of the client’s world). Stage Five (Primary Counselling). Developing an 
understanding of the inner and outer face of the clients demand.1) Building a story and taking a life history. 2) 
Problem definition and solution-focused frameworks. 3) Living through pain with the client. 4) Living through 
repetitive crisis. 5) Building a safety net. Stage Six (Establishment of Transference). 1) Core counselling. 
Some of our partners, especially St. Mungos, played a key huge role in the success of the project. The importance 
of partnerships cannot be overstated and became so central to my thinking. The partnership model we came up 
was heavily influenced by Pip Bevan. It involved the belief that counselling the street homeless does not take 
place in a vacuum. Before one can begin to think about the face-to-face interactions between counsellor and client, 
it is essential to realise that the counselling setting and boundary is a space created through multi-disciplinary 
work. Counselling the street homeless is first and foremost a team approach and work which must take place in 
conjunction with other organisations. Any illusion of being able to go it alone, as a form of personal omnipotent 
crusade, is a dangerous illusion and collusion with an idealised and ideal solution. In other words, it is fantasy of 
providing saving. It is an illusion which may mirror a defensive strategy some clients engage in, that is of splitting 
the world into good and bad objects and idealisation of the good. Multi-organisational partnerships offer an 
integration of the ‘figure-ground gestalt’ which enables one team to come into the foreground, at a given time, to 
do a specific piece of work, while the other team(s) maintain the frame in which the work takes place. Providing 
counselling to the street homeless is not possible without a multi-disciplinary partnership of Outreach Workers, 
Project Workers, Resettlement Workers, Primary and Mental Health Workers, GP¹s and often Substance 
Addiction Workers. The presenting client profile is one of duality of need, or of multiple needs. 
 
The importance of responding to what clients want is so important and will make or break the project work. As 
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regards the question of when counselling can take place, the first question that needs to be addressed is whether or 
not the environment is receptive to counselling. This is relevant at a number of different levels. Firstly, and 
perhaps most importantly, there is the issue of institutionalization. A large percentage of homeless people we 
worked with had experienced some form of institutionalization (for example, children’s homes, armed services, 
prison, and mental health settings). This means that not only may they have grown up in institutional 
environments but also that the services may have responded to that individual in an institutional manner. The 
effects of institutional living have been well documented, for example the idea about mental patients learning the 
role of a mental patient can be applied to the homeless context. This means that people on the streets may well 
take on the role of a homeless person as well as identify with some of the images projected onto the category of 
homelessness. These negative identifications require certain self-reinforcing behaviour, which in the context of the 
homeless results in the living out of internalised self-oppression. The individual thus subjects him/herself to the 
same set of prejudices that form the con-text that narrates the story of that individual life. The individual is 
scripted into and entrapped within a set of private conversations which are informed by public beliefs. In extreme 
situations the private discourse makes it very difficult for the individual to communicate in socially acceptable or 
intelligible ways and form a social tie. There is a breakdown in communication and understanding, with the result 
that the individual feels and is marginalized. 
It can be argued that repeated exposure to an almost invariable structure of the institution closes down the capacity 
for (self) thoughtfulness. There is, rather, a constant struggle for that individual not to think the other’s thoughts. 
The individual gets caught up in a double-bind which entails engaging in manipulative practices that go with 
playing the institutional game. This creates a form of conversation in which the helping services and the client try 
to out-manipulate each other. The end product seems to be that of a public (political) ideology/story about abuse 
of social services by the homeless. Bryony, manager of Neville House Cold Weather Shelter, says of counselling, 
“You will never get counselling to work in an institutional environment where there is fear to speak, to disclose, as 
this repeats negative experiences from within psychiatric settings. You need to empower the resident group first, 
so that instead of perceiving counselling as something that is done to you, it becomes something that you 
participate in.” It is to shift from power to potency and potentiality. 
It was as a direct result of personal learning that, when I returned to South Africa and took up the coordination of a 
project with ex-political prisoners, many of them people who testified at the Truth and Reconciliation 
Commission, I was able to apply the lessons learnt. At the time of taking up the project, my mandate was to either 
recommend the shutting down of the project or else reinvigorate the project. My work began by making contact 
with ANC comrades I had known while a member of the Athlone branch, in particular Steve Carolus, who in turn 
put me in contact with others. At the same time I began to undertake one to one psychotherapy in the townships 
with people who could not get to Cowley House (Trauma Centre for Survivors of Violence and Torture). It was a 
result of this one-to-one work as well as the networking, which my college Jill Sloan helped me plan and think 
through, that we reached a point where we could pilot a meeting at the Trauma Centre.  
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humbling experience to have been exposed to life at the edge, filled with pain, struggle, despair 
but also resourcefulness, courage, humanity and agency. This thesis is an attempt to pause and 
reflect on this.  
 
Why Freud, Fanon and Foucault? 
Why Freud, Fanon and Foucault, one may well ask?  Over and above the way Freud, Fanon 
and Foucault assisted my own professional work and the impression they have left on my own 
thinking and arguably much of global knowledge –specifically related to issues of power, 
oppression, inequality – over the last century and a half; in their theories and work I find a form 
of praxis in which the application and enactment of ideas occurs in a practical, ethical and 
politically engaged manner. Further to their thinking each of these men spent dedicated time on 
the ground engaging with suffering and with homelessness in one sense or other. Speaking of 
Fanon, Nigel Gibson (2011: xi) captures the mood of this commitment: 
These concepts, he believed, would emerge not from secluded contemplations on philosophy, but through 
reflections on, and engagements with, ‘real’ movements of those excluded, marginalized and 
disenfranchised masses, namely the damned of the earth, struggling for social change….Like Gramsci, 
Fanon believed that there was an intimate connection between knowledge and action. Without the 
‘knowledge of the practice of action’ produced by ‘living inside history' he argues, there is nothing by a 
fancy-dress parade. 
Borrowing a term from Robert Young (2003: 138) that he uses to describe a postcolonial 
strategy, namely translation, I will argue that Freud, Fanon and Foucault are engaged in 
translation in very imaginative and politically committed ways. Moreover, at a practical level, I 
have found that they provide me with tactics, strategy and ethics. My work with the street 
homeless, refugees, youth and sex workers has involved co-constructions with the service users 
that attempted to open up space for people to be seen as active agents and partners in change as 
opposed to passive objects to be acted upon. With the ex-political prisoners and torture 
survivors in the Western Cape the work drew upon a mix of healing rituals intrinsic to the 
group as political activists and Afrikans, as well as traditional Western therapeutic skills. In 
practice, this resulted in the creation of advocacy and therapeutic spaces which drew on ways 
in which the struggle against apartheid and for transformation post-apartheid acted as a home 
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and as a site of therapy. By this I mean the construction of ritualistic spaces that offered 
therapeutic effects beyond the stated goal. Working for the health and human rights of sex 
workers it was the effect of national and regional sex worker led partnerships that enabled 
spaces to open up for sex workers to find a voice and challenge human rights violations. With 
the street homeless in London it was often simply bearing witness without intruding that 
change came about
14
.  
In these projects there is a process of translation in which grassroots concepts and ideas 
surface, challenge and demand comprehension and engagement, which in turn results in a 
particular revision and new constructions, a kind of organic evolution into something not 
anticipated. In this movement between theory, practice and politics, conceptualised as three 
circles that overlap, the point of convergence is the body
15
, the material, psychological and 
symbolic.  
This leads me to conclude that it is imperative to begin with a multi-disciplinary bridge 
building exercise between the world of academia and those working on the so-called front line, 
the coalface of homelessness and violence. This is arguably lacking or inadequate. It has been 
my experience that when bridges are constructed, sites of translation open up, space to think 
that move one beyond sites of paralysis or instant reflective response in reaction to stimuli. 
This is needed as those at the coal face are often reactive
16
, sometimes stop thinking and being 
reflective, and instead find themselves ‘treading water’ trying to stay afloat in the midst of 
never ending demands and challenges
17
.There is simply no space to think and in many 
situations, it is akin to what Wilfred Bion (1989) talks about, when he mentions an “attack on 
thinking”. The result is a prevailing anti-intellectual environment in which a ceiling is set on 
                                                                                                                                                                                        
14
 These ideas come directly from the work of Fanon but can also be found in the ideas of Freud and Foucault. I 
am indebted to Gordon Isaacs, Richard Klein, Chris Oakley, Pip Bevan and Trevor Lubbe who provided me with 
supervision around this application. 
 
15 Following Lacan we can speak of the body as symbolic, real and imaginary. This representation of the body can 
be seen as revision of Aristotle in which the body suffers from thoughts, as flesh and as a soul. 
 
16
 This refers to pressures resulting immediate responses, action as opposed to thinking through in a thoughtful 
planned and reflective manner what acts are required.  
 
17
 Strangely, more and more academics will testify to a similar experience trying to stay afloat in the midst of 
never-ending demands and challenges and finding the academic environment becoming anti-intellectual! 
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what ideas are permissible, determined by internal staff dynamics and vested self-interests. 
Describing these processes, organisational consultant Phillip Boxer (1996, personal 
communication)
18
 states that the organisation functions like a Mafia, it is there to service the 
interests of the ‘family’, the self-interests of those staff who hold the organisation ransom to 
their needs and set a “strategic ceiling” on what can and cannot be thought and acted upon. 
On the other hand, some academics and intellectuals disengage and get lost in theoretical 
abstractions and deceptions that are not grounded in practice
19
. We can picture this as a 
graveyard of thoughts, or what Lacanian theorists like Mark Bracher (1994) describes as the 
discourse of the master
20
. While this picture can be construed as overstated in that it may lend 
itself to the construction of a straw man argument, it is nevertheless a pertinent insight into to 
the idea that the academic environment is becoming more of a production factory with a pre-set 
curriculum and micro management from above, caught up in day-to-day regulation, as opposed 
to transmission of ideas and opening up space for thought while NGOs are becoming more and 
more machines used to manage behaviour and pacify the discontented to accept their lot.  
In the worst case scenarios we have donors who function like imperialists and impose an 
agenda. NGOs who are there to meet their needs as opposed to the needs of the client and who 
do not honestly engage with the donors and manipulative and dishonest clients. The net effect 
is miscommunication and the playing of games alongside genuine attempts by some concerned 
individuals to make a difference.  It is within these (impossible) paradoxes that social care, 
healing and further suffering unfolds.  
It can be argued that there is an ellipsis in the way homelessness is investigated. Some 
postcolonial theorists like Nigel Gibson (2011) are building bridges between the world of 
academia and that of the homeless; for example his theoretical work on squatter camps in 
KwaZulu Natal assists the homeless leaders think through different strategies. The work of 
Gibson is pioneering and cutting edge, representing a partnership between academics, street 
homeless and Fanon. However, there are many postcolonial theorists, who have interesting 
                                                                                                                                                                                        
18
 Also see The drivers of organisational scale on lacanticles-dot-com. 
 
19
 The one site where the engagement with theory, practice and politics is well documented is in the field of 
feminist and gender studies. 
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things to say about violence not in dialogue with organisations running services for the street 
homeless and vice versa. This should be a standard practice. For example, feminist intellectuals 
arguably have much to learn from those feminist activists whom are standing at the front line 
alongside their sex work sisters, ironically, often having to push back and hold their ground in 
the face of violent and self righteous attacks from other feminists. We need to build upon those 
attempts to bridge the world of academia and that of practice and politics. I argue that Freud, 
Fanon and Foucault, both through their subjective historical narratives and their body of work, 
offer us valuable conceptual tools to engage with in bridging this troubling divide of practice 
and theory.  
This trans-disciplinary work will make use of a dialectical method of research investigation, 
informed primarily by postcolonial and feminist. As outlined it is also informed by and draws 
upon personal work experiences and the voices of different homeless people. The aim is to 
engage critically and imaginatively with the work of Freud, Fanon and Foucault with a view to 
develop an understanding of homelessness not just as a material condition but as a 
psychological experience as well as a conceptual and discursive category operates to exclude to 
exclude and marginalize particular groups of people such as sex workers, street children or 
people with drug or alcohol addictions. The primary concern of the thesis is to move beyond 
binaristic understandings of home/homelessness 
 
Contextualizing homelessness work 
Having spent over ten years working with the street homeless in London, my first schooling in 
the United Kingdom (UK) literature was as a member of a research and counselling team 
looking into the causes of homelessness (Baldwin, Conolly, Dimitropolou, Harper and Lilley 
1997)
21
.
 
What we discovered, consistent with other Western research findings, for example in 
the United States of America (USA), was that most street homeless people in London come 
from backgrounds of institutional living – children’s homes, mental asylums, prison and the 
                                                                                                                                                                                        
21
 As part of the Just Ask Research team we explored the needs of homeless people in cold weather shelters as well 
as documented the therapy undertaken within cold weather shelters. 
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army
22
. What was very clear to me at that time was the so-called push factors resulting in 
homelessness in London are very different to those in Afrika. In Afrika, as Walter Rodney 
(1974) spells out the determinate is colonial underdevelopment, poverty, corrupt governance, 
war and the refusal to grant land rights. Homelessness in Afrika can be read alongside the 
manner in which Afrika was under-developed by Europe and the way in which present-day 
self-interest is maintained.
23 
In our research what was discovered was that many homeless individuals in London come from 
violent and cruel backgrounds that entrench certain habits. Their actions are considered 
unacceptable and abnormal as they deviate from what is considered normal. The personal 
tragedy that characterizes the lives of many of the street homeless in London is one in which 
institutional existence follows a family breakdown. The result of this breakdown is that the 
person is removed from the family and placed into care. Other contexts facilitating 
homelessness are hospitalization for mental health issues, prison or people from a military 
background. Movement between these different institutions – hospital, prison, the army and 
homeless hostels– seemed higher amongst those from the child care system.  
In reviewing the homeless literature what is especially notable is that a large body of writing in 
the UK comes from research conducted by different charities like Crisis
24
 committed to 
working with the homeless as well as government funded research on issues of homelessness. 
The government determines the parameters from which the evidence is obtained. In other 
words, theoretical development is forced into a particular trajectory.
25
 This process negates a 
grassroots engagement or even a rendezvous with academia in that it is a top down approach.  
                                                                                                                                                                                        
22
 See Coalition on Homelessness and Housing in Ohio (2006-09-17). Homelessness: The Causes and Facts. 
Retrieved 2006-05-10; Vanneman, Reeve, "Main Causes of Homelessness", University of Maryland; Levinson, 
Encyclopedia of Homelessness, article entry on Causes of Homelessness: Overview by Paul Koegel, pp.50-
58.http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Homelessness 
23
 For example, in Nigeria and other parts of Afrika there are those who benefit from not having roads, railways 
and electricity and as such hinder and stop these developments.  
 
24
 http://www.crisis.org.uk 
 
25
 In contrast to the official positions that frames NGO interventions and UK government policy it is interesting to 
compare this to Wikipedia (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Homelessness). While Wikipedia also talks about the lack 
of housing as a central concern, the point of divergence is to engage with homelessness as both a social category 
and as a global problem. They estimate that there are approximately 100 million people worldwide who are 
homeless. 
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Moreover, while the researchers may be very critical of the government, they tend to have the 
same points of departure in their analysis.  
These texts may be understood as emerging out of an engagement with the homelessness 
legislation first passed by the British parliament in 1977, as well as the 1996 and the 2002 
Housing Act. The major focus and goal was to reduce rough sleeping
26
 and to end the long-
term use of Bed & Breakfast hostels for homeless families with children. The result is a group 
of policies and priorities for preventing homelessness as set up the Homelessness and Housing 
Support Directorate in 2004, within the Department of Communities and Local Government 
(CLG) and the 2005 Office of Deputy Prime Minister’s publication called Sustainable 
communities: settled homes; changing lives–  a strategy for tackling homelessness. In April 
2008, ten years on from the publication of the Social Exclusion Unit report into rough sleeping 
there was once again the renewed commitment to the original goal to drive rough sleeping 
down as close to zero as possible. This action was supported by the anti-social behaviour 
legislation in which outreach was now conducted by teams who worked alongside the police. 
The homeless person was given a so-called choice, to either go into treatment, into a hostel or 
to be given an anti-social order with the threat of imprisonment.  
Currently, with the fall of the Labour government there were been renewed attempts, this time 
by the Conservative government, to regulate homelessness by inhibiting squatters and 
travellers occupying land and refusing to allow people to sleep on the streets.  This occurred 
alongside the proposed Welfare Reform Bill which radically changes the way the state support 
is paid to the jobless, disabled and children which could result in increased homelessness.  
If an outreach worker encounters somebody sleeping rough, reading the literature on how to 
intervene, the person is pre-judged and seen as pathological or at the very least, damaged, in 
some way. Moreover treatment is imposed, in which a law enforcement officer often stands 
alongside the outreach worker. The ‘reference page’ of my own schooling in how to work with 
the homeless would index the following key areas: a legal definition of homelessness, 
                                                                                                                                                                                        
26 This refers to those who city dwellers who sleep outdoors, for example in doorways, parks. In contrast and with 
reference to who are the homeless, Wikipedia offer the following list of people: beggar, derelict, forgotten man, 
freight train hoppers, hoboes, internally displaced persons, itinerants, mendicants, rough sleepers, schnorrer, street 
children, tramps, vagabond and vagrancy.   
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guidelines on working with substance misuse, mental and physical health challenges, best 
practice models, how to work with potentially dangerous clients and violent situations and a 
resource directory to make referrals
27
. As with government policy around homelessness, these 
readings/guidelines do not come about from a grassroots engagement. Work with the homeless 
is tightly controlled by legislation that aims at regulation. It is imposed care with a clear 
agenda, get off the streets and get back into work.  
Returning to London in 2012, the agenda has shifted once more. While the work is guided and 
paid for by the Supporting People guidelines that each borough has to adhere to, work with the 
homeless is in truth framed first and foremost by budget cuts. Very few homeless people – 
regardless of the progress made in terms of reintegration into society, building of life skills – 
end up with a flat. In most cases people are moved between hostels, custodial care, if they 
behave in a criminal or anti-social manner. Some individuals will end up in the private rental 
scheme. In addition to this the talk is of cutting benefit provision and also moving more and 
more people outside of London. One of the policy recommendations is to sell social 
accommodation in the affluent areas to the private market and to build accommodation for the 
homeless in the outlying boroughs on the edge of London. The model proposed is similar to 
what occurs in Paris. Simply put, there is less money invested in homelessness, more policing 
of the unruly homeless who break laws, like using new technologies like tags.  
In Foucault’s terms, we can talk about the creation of docile bodies through closely observing, 
supervising and regulating the activities of the homeless body(1979: 151, 152). The placement 
of the homeless within an institutional context thereby inserting a rhythm of time and space 
punctuated by hostel codes of conduct and health and safety orders which must be obeyed. 
There is the constant pressure of supervision and demand to march to the rhythm of a new set 
of constraints all in the name of giving the person shelter and food. Simply put, it is an ethic of 
saving the mad, bad, poor and sad from themselves and a practice built on managing behaviour 
and people society deems to be challenging.  
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 As an example of the above, consider Cooper’s (1997) All in a Day’s Work: A Guide to Good Practice in Day 
Centre Manual I was expected to read, as a manager of a day centre for the homeless in Camden. This included 
the following contents – introduction, safety, user participation, volunteers, equal opportunities, health care 
provision, developing links with mainstream services, resettlement, team work, communication and support, final 
thoughts, methodology, further reading. This manual, while allowing for service user engagement, none the less 
still constricts the work to tightly defined guidelines. While I found it a useful manual, my concern was that it did 
not question or consider other possible engagements with the homeless.   
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As further verification of the repetition of the same themes in the way homelessness is 
considered, one need only consult the web pages and publication section of some of the major 
homeless organisations in London, like Centre Point,
28
 St. Mungos,
29
 or Supporting People
30
 
home pages. Again the reference is on ‘ending’ homelessness, housing, support and care in re-
integrating the homeless into society. I am not saying that these practices are not sometimes 
very helpful. I am not against re-integration of the homeless into society if this is what the 
person wants, but when it is a situation of forced assimilation it raises a range of serious ethical 
and political questions. In addition homeless support and care in London is caught up in dirty 
politics and there is a lot of dishonesty as to what is really at play. It seems that for many policy 
makers, the homeless are seen as a burden on society. In other words, a reparative ‘band aid’ 
approach alongside double-talk is dominant and any attempt to understand the roots of 
homelessness and to address the larger social context which has marginalised and made 
homeless a range of different people is avoided. One could instead ask if the situation should 
also be one of re-integration of society with homelessness
31
.  
Lastly, as proof of this narrowly confined approach to homelessness, which seldom questions 
what homelessness is and who determines when something is a home, consider a day in the life 
of somebody working in accordance with the supporting guidelines. What she will be engaged 
in is the provision of life skill assessments – health, budgeting, dependency, social skills, 
independent living skills, equality and diversity issues, career and educational needs and 
mental health assessments. The aim is to agree to a support plan whereby the person learns life 
skills that will enable them to adapt to societal demands. This work, while adding value in 
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 ww.centrepoint.org.uk 
 
29
 www.mungos.org 
 
30
 www.homeless.org.uk/supporting-people 
 
31
 A dishonesty prevails.  Ian Duncan Smith Secretary of State for Work and Pensions highlights how some 
individuals are better off on benefit than those working. He then concludes that fairness needs to prevail, people 
get trapped in the benefit system and as such the Government plans to cut public spending. I can understand if he 
concluded that we need to attempt to address exploitation of the benefit system as well as changing incentives in 
favour of work, but why imposed undue hardship on those, for example people with mental health problems, who 
are already suffering. Is this what the Government means by care in the community? Furthermore, how are the 
rich sharing the burden of the present economic crisis? Cutting housing benefits will only increase the power of 
land lords; it will not help those threatened with homelessness. The conditions urged onto the underclass are 
unrealistically harsh and it is not those individuals who have misused the benefit system that has got the UK into a 
financial crisis but the banks, stock markets and a refusal to regulate financial practices. 
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some situations, is often imposed and can be seen as, in the language of Foucault’s (1979: 146) 
as the “art of rank”, a “disciplinary technique” used to create docile and compliant bodies. It is 
within this context of the dominant pathologizing and regulatory approach to homelessness, 
evident in the example of the UK context presented here but no doubt hegemonic in many 
other contexts, including our own in South Africa, that this thesis addresses a more a critical 
and theoretically grounded approach to homelessness and its relationship to power and 
violence.  
 
Homelessness in the context of the postcolony 
Following Fanon, colonisation is seen as the key concept needed to understand the closing 
down of space, to be given a history and identity under the demand to assimilate. Moreover, as 
noted by Kelly Oliver (2004: 19), “with colonialism and slavery, it is not just one's 
consciousness that is possessed by the Other, but one's body is property owned by the Other. 
The Negro suffers in his body quite differently from the white man. Within Fanon's analysis it 
is not just the body but also psychic space that is colonized by the white Other.” 
For Oliver (2004: 49) “the colonization of the body and of the material world is also always the 
colonization of psychic space. Colonialism attacks the bodily schema of the colonized”. This 
takes place as a result of both physical and psychic colonisationas well as the turning of the 
colonized city into replicate of the Western class determined metropolis – called globalisation. 
Oliver (2004: 8) notes “colonial authority is founded on a contradiction between denying the 
internal life, mind, or soul to the colonized, on the one hand, and demanding that they 
internalize colonial values, on the other; the colonized status as human yet not human.”As 
such, she concludes that “overcoming alienation, then, is not simply a matter of reconciling 
universal and particular, but rather a matter of resisting the particular universal forced on the 
colonies by the colonisers”(Oliver 2004:8). The colonized are placed in a double bind, either 
one assimilates and internalizes the master’s values or else one is excommunicated to the 
outside.  
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I will argue, following the argument of Premesh Lalu (2000, personal communication) that the 
homeless, like Afrikan colonized, have had too much history imposed on them. This refers to 
the top down historical process in which the ‘great men’ who conquered Afrika imposed their 
history onto the people as well as negated both the manner in which local people go about 
history, for example an oral tradition, as well as the content. The rich history of Afrika before 
colonization is both buried and distorted to fit into a Eurocentric perspective. Afrika is given a 
European history, for example, seen to be without rationality until the great conquerors 
liberated them. It is a process of indoctrination in which a set of Western identifications and 
reference points constrained persons to a predetermined European perspective.  
The game of “giving history” (Lalu 2000, personal communication), identity, and memory, 
within a modernist tradition, is a nationalist, colonial and patriarchal agenda.
32
 It seeks out 
shared imagery – what Benedict Anderson (1991), referring to national identity, defined as “an 
imagined community” –and by implication an identity of nation state. Put another way, can we 
read the giving of history to Africa in a similar way that psychiatry has given history to the 
mad and homeless? By revealing the different ways given history is constituted – a hegemonic 
project which is incapable of producing a morality that was other than self-referential – so I 
hope to expose the given histories attempt to impose a rational scheme on the world by 
pretending that it would keep the irrational at bay. The homeless do not need to be given more 
history or fixed places within which to reconfirm certain identity constructions of the nation 
states. Instead what we need is the unfolding of transitional, paradoxically, ‘uncanny’ spaces 
within which the homeless body can dream, play, dance and move and question. What is 
needed is a questioning and opening up of space to think, play and dream in a world that is 
determined by a market forces and non-thinking, what Adorno calls instrumental reasoning. 
Fanon (1986: 232) incisively cries out, his concluding words of Black Skin, White Masks:  “Oh 
my body, make me always a man who questions!” 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                        
32 Also see Premesh Lalu’s (2000) The Grammar of Domination and the Subjection of Agency: Colonial Texts and 
Modes of Evidence a piece where he argues against a project of recovery and for reading the constitutive margin 
of the archive. Lalu’s argument about history and its relationship to Afrika can be applied to the history of 
homelessness. He challenges those historians who want to give Africa a history, and argues instead that history, 
especially of colonization, be understood as a system of constraint. 
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Intersections of violence and homelessness in global contexts 
Violence, according to Vittorio Bufacchi (2005), can be seen as both an act of force that causes 
harm and is destructive in an intentional way as well as conceptualised in terms of the verb ‘to 
violate’, meaning to infringe, or transgress, or to exceed some limit or norm.  More and more 
we live within places that involves impingements due to a host of factors. Examples of this 
include the current production of diseases, environmental warming and the economic crisis. 
Other examples include the stigmatization and brutalization of outsiders, like ‘foreigners’, sex 
workers, and the endless production of arms to profit from war. Consider the following 
(symptomatic) expression of the ways violence and homelessness overlap:  
 Firstly, the destruction of sacred and indigenous land, houses, housing estates and 
homelands is big businesses. What we see, similar to the colonization in the eighteen 
hundreds, is land occupation, be it through war, enforced town planning and forced 
removals or simply the buying up of land of the poor and indigenous populations by 
real estate, market forces. China’s buying up of large parts of Afrika, is a good example 
as is the pushing of the poor outside the inner centres of London due to increased 
rentals and cutting of housing benefits to pay back the national debt. The most evident 
and crude example of this is the Iraq war in which a select few multi-national 
companies profited from having to re-build the country after the extensive bombing of 
Iraq. This is what Naomi Klein’s (2007) The Shock Doctrine unpacks. The predatory 
advancement of capitalism through the exploiting and use of military, social, economic 
and natural disasters to the advantage of a select few. It is not simply exploiting an 
opportunity but supporting unscrupulous actions and policies which go far beyond a 
legitimate response to disaster. 
  Secondly, we are facing a global economic crisis based, in part, on credit speculation 
and the refusal to regulate the stock markers and banks. We saw an initial investment in 
home ownership followed by the loss of homes due to an inability to meet mortgage 
payments. The response of some states, for example the UK, is to use money set aside 
for social security benefits to pay off these debts. The poor end up paying the costs of 
the ways stock markets and banks went about doing their business. As Madeleine 
Bunting (2008,unpaginated) puts it:  
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In a crisis sparked by the world's rich will have the poor paying the highest price. In the past 
month, the U.S. and Europe have been humiliated by the catastrophic failure of their own 
economic rules, and have been forced to rip them up. The double standards of western interests 
have been starkly exposed – - their bail-outs are exactly what they have refused, repeatedly, to 
allow other countries to do in similar crises. Those who will pay the heaviest price for the 
foolhardiness of deregulated financial capitalism are among those who are least responsible, as 
the Brazil's President angrily pointed out last week. 
 Thirdly, with more and more animals and people worldwide living in grave, stark and 
unsympathetic living spaces we see the production of strange hybrids and new 
behaviour amongst animals and humans.  
 Fourthly, these inhospitable living spaces, ‘concentration camps’, are the incubation of 
disease as evidenced by the intensive farming of animals which is thought by some to 
be at the heart of the swine and bird flu. As the journalist Felicity Lawrence (2009, 
unpaginated) argues: 
It is no coincidence that this threat to global human health should have emerged from that 
particular state, as Michael Greger, director of public health at the US Humane Society and 
leading author on the history of bird and animal flu explains: ‘North Carolina has the densest pig 
population in North America and boasts more than twice as many corporate swine mega-
factories as any other state. With massive concentrations of farm animals within which to 
mutate, these new swine flu viruses in North America seem to be on an evolutionary fast track, 
jumping between species at an unprecedented rate.’ Novel human disease is the toxic debt of 
today's industrial livestock farming 
 Lastly, there is a violence involved in the subtle domestication of the body, the creation 
of docile and compliant body that gives up on what it desires.  In this regard 
colonization of the body needs to be understood as something that most people fights 
against while homeless can be depicted as the desire for flight or fight this colonization. 
To elaborate the above I draw upon the work of Mwaniki (2012) who observes “the 
hegemonic city through governance and dominance is territorializing which is to say it 
is the enforcing of codes and rules by the dominant culture which is subjective and 
objectifies the other. Simultaneously the objectified other comes to acceptance the rules 
and codes as ‘normal reality’ or ‘commonsense’. What we observe and experience is 
the movement through space as ‘normal reality’ or ‘commonsense’ but this space is 
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structured and regulated through rules and codes”. Through regulation and dominance 
the body is made docile in the form of bodily gestures and mannerisms, which are 
internalized ‘commonsense’”. Mwaniki (2012) observes the subtle and different ways 
different spaces in London –  Southwark, St James, Strand and Soho – are coded and 
territorialized and how simple actions, like  people trying to climb upon the lions at 
Trafalgar square in London, can be read as a battle against docility, an action which is a 
microcosm of latter process at play in society. Against this conformity, Mwaniki (2012) 
observes “A line of flight is delirious which is to go off the rails, to no longer follow 
common sense which is something demoniacal, which is a space of interstitial”.  
These examples also point to an over investment in the virtues of so-called enlightened 
thinking and the belief in rational progress, endless growth and so-called development. In the 
name of science, progress, development we see a quest to master and control nature and 
inventions that have brought into being forces of change which may no longer be able to be 
regulated by those in power. Within many scientific advancements – for example new forms of 
power generation, genetically modified food, cloning, and so on, something remains un-
thought (for example, the enigma of nuclear waste) and outside of this ordered rational system, 
a site of potential chaos, evident recently in Japan.
33
 This is something Adorno and Horkheimer 
(see Van Reijen1992) highlight by noting that reason is not able to control the scientific forces 
of change it sets in motion (Van Reijen 1992: 33). Adorno and Horkheimer further point to the 
“attempts to control and dominate nature” also result in “attempts to dominate other human 
beings” as well. Bernstein (1991: 4) informs us that the work of Adorno and Horkheimer’s 
Dialectic of Enlightenment charts the self destruction of the Enlightenment: 
Its central claim is that the very self same rationality which provides for humankind’s emancipation from 
the bondage of mythical powers allows for progressive domination over nature, engenders, through its 
intrinsic character, a return to myth and new, even more absolute forms of domination. 
One obvious manifestation of this attempt to dominate nature is patriarchy; but a more subtle 
one is the shift within the British National health, social care and therapeutic world, where 
there is more and more emphasis on regimentation, regulation and the management of 
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 Freud similarly noted, quoting Charcot: “Theory is good; but it doesn’t prevent things from existing.” 
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behaviour and symptoms. One can ponder if this is the legacy of the male construction of 
therapy, seen within the colonial dimensions of psychoanalysis. 
Eco feminists who link this desire to control nature, in the name of scientific advancement, to 
patriarchy, point to a male arrogance in this process that shows an indifference to the 
destruction of nature. One example of this is the domestication of foreign lands, seen as empty 
through the insertion of highways, and the introduction of cars so as to advance the initial 
colonial exploits and extend the reach of capital.  Moreover, this domination of nature framed 
within capitalist scientific discourse can be seen to mirror or at least parallel the way people 
from the so-called Third World are subject to domination which in turn parallels the way 
women and children and the elderly are oppressed in families and the way people oppress 
animals. Following this line of argument, there appears to be a convergence of capitalism, 
nationalism, patriarchal and Western rationality and the colonization of space in the production 
of homelessness. It is a production process that grants certain subjects value, meaning and 
worth, while the lives of the underclass and marginalised and animals are deemed to be without 
worth and significance. These are the unfortunate ones who live outside the walls, borders and 
gates of the ‘home’ and often do not have access to the law. 
Trevor Lubbe (2010, personal communication) argues that it is important to consider the 
borders of the ‘home’ within the current economic depression and role that home ownership 
plays in the mind of many. Land and home ownership is seen by some to be central to the 
speculative economic development, especially over the past 10 years, arguably replacing the 
value that gold once played as the grounding measure of economic stability. Banks capitalized 
upon the housing market. We saw banks borrowing from other banks to enable them to provide 
home ownership loans, which helped to fuel a boom in the housing market. We saw the 
collusion of banks, stock markets, economic academics and governments. The result was 
endless consumerism. Consumers in turn began purchasing new homes on credit often using 
their existing homes as collateral when buying another home or undertaking home investment. 
The net result was a housing market in many parts of the world, like the UK, which went sky 
high with first time buyers finding it impossible to enter into the playing field.  
Lubbe (2010, personal communication) continues to argue that the explanations of the ‘credit 
crunch’ fail to make any mention of the fact that the US and its NATO allies have been at war 
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since March 2003, a war within a region that supplies 40% of the world’s oil. He concludes 
that this omission suggests there is a denial of this war as a significant background influence on 
the current faltering of global capitalism. Moreover, alongside this there is a denial in thinking 
about or even mentioning the deaths, the 4.5 million orphans and over 100,000 houses 
destroyed since the invasion.  
Better to push it out of your mind. The Englishman’s home is his castle, and perhaps this becomes truer 
when the castle needs to be a fortress – a fortress against war anxiety. But like ‘Homeland security’, if the 
problem is a deeper one, then a boom in the housing market, driven by mania, merely creates a false 
sense of security. And so in a deeply ironic way this has turned out to be the case  
In summary, we live in a world in which most people no longer consider the possibility of an 
alternative to capitalism, what Francis Fukuyama (1992) examines in his book, called The End 
of History and the Last Man. Robert Pollin (1996) describes Western capitalism since the end 
of the 1960s as the Leaden Age, one characterized by high interest rates, high levels of private 
indebtedness and highly speculative financial markets alongside a decline of regulatory 
controls and frequent financial crisis periods. Our current world economic order can be said to 
be built on a false sense of security, unsound economic theories and ideology and belief in 
endless economic growth and collusion of the big men and women, the new sovereign who live 
by different rules and are governed by different laws. Such a context has facilitated ever new 
forms of violence and homelessness, psychical and material, globalized and local, and that 
require new understandings by both researchers and activists/practitioners. 
 
By way of Freud, Fanon and Foucault 
This thesis engages critically with the writings of Freud, Fanon and Foucault to interrogate the 
construction of home and homelessness. In this conversation with Freud, Fanon and Foucault 
not being at home in the world and not-belonging come into view as central to their 
autobiographies and epistemologies.  
All three of these men have made a substantial impact on nineteenth and twentiethcentury 
thought and have been widely discussed and commented on by other theorists. Through an 
exploration of their life and work, this study traces their subjective location and personal 
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relationship to the Western homelands, simultaneously as ‘insider’ and ‘outsider.’ This 
uncertain relationship to the homelands, it will be argued, emerges out of a tension and 
paradoxical position where they are each in different ways seen as ‘other’ – Jew, black, 
Homosexual, yet also as Western, middle-class and educated male bodies Freud, Fanon and 
Foucault inhabited a privileged position. 
Through an investigation of the concept of homelessness as it emerges in the lives and 
theoretical texts of these three key writers we arrive at the question of the body, the lived body 
that writes texts, acts and experiences the effects of multiple and habitual forces of 
dispossession, destitution and displacement as well as oppression, appropriation and 
colonization. The body (be it physical or conceptual), as Deleuze points out, is made up from 
“habitually patterned forces that sustains itself through its powers to affect and be affected by 
the forces surrounding it” (cited in Lorraine 2005: 160). 
In the course of thinking about these displaced bodies and their physical and mental location 
what we observe is that Freud, Fanon and Foucault can be read as bodies and minds that 
pushed in the direction of the postcolonial and uncanny
34
while at the same time they were 
confined to and/or even contributed to perpetuating the colonisation of space. We arrive at the 
question of how the constitution of the body, in this regard, male or middle-class or Western, 
potentially casts a shadow, a blind spot, over other bodies, women or the poor or those in the 
global South.   
In exploring their personal sense of displacement and stigmatization and how this affected their 
thinking and the work they produced, what emerges is an uneasy relationship between 
subjective locations and their theoretical positioning. In unpacking the simultaneous lack of 
insight into the problem previously referred to alongside the clearing of ground for a new plan 
of existence, a new understanding of home, homelessness and its relationship to violence 
potentially coheres. It is my supposition that as bodies both 'inside' and 'outside' the homeland 
Freud, Fanon and Foucault are subject to the continual threat of displacement or worse, 
disembodiment. In response to this each of them in different ways produced a radical and 
ironic body of knowledge that reframes and deconstructs the Western architecture of thought. 
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 If there is a postcolonial, then it is a postcolonial that contains something uncanny. 
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This practice puts into question the constitution and binary opposition of the home and 
homelands. In the push towards the postcolonial what emerges is the choice of an abstract 
homelessness, state of dwelling that defies the restricted confines of the colonial space. It is 
what Richard Klein (2006, public lecture) refers to as the “atypical citizen who can exist both 
in and outside the scene due to taking up an ironic subjective” position in the world. 
Sigmund Freud, Franz Fanon and Michel Foucault are selected specifically because in their 
uncertain relation to Western homelands within which they invariably operate, I argue that a 
new understanding of homelessness surfaces that enables us to think about the relationship 
between homelessness and violence in contemporary society. What will be shown is that the 
relationship between violence, homelessness and the hoped for emancipation from the chains 
of constriction, is complex and not a straightforward linear process. For Freud, Fanon and 
Foucault their subjective location is linked with the subversive aspects of their thinking but at 
the same time they reproduce certain dominant discourses by virtue of their investment in 
bourgeois society or hegemonic masculinity. What is addressed in their life projects is a work 
posted beyond the colonial setting, one that opens up space in the face of violence and that 
allows for a new understanding of the displaced and marginalised body. At the same time, I 
argue that as male bodies, privileged through patriarchal power, they simultaneously show a 
lack of insight, certain blind spots to issues of gender and female sexuality in particular that 
restricts their ability to think a truly transformatory postcolonial space.  
 
By way of sex work 
Engaging patriarchy, understood as a system of constraint, violence, a form of colonisation of 
the mind, a process of being given a history and identity, is pivotal to this work. As such the 
location of this work and in which the insights of these theorists will take place is informed by 
a postcolonial feminist lens.  
The theories of Freud, Fanon and Foucault are grounded in an encounter with grass root 
feminist concerns through a case study on sex workers. The focus area, sex work is a contested 
space both socially and within feminist scholarship and activism, arguably a focus area that 
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divides the feminist community since sex workers continue to endure a lack of support from 
many within the feminist movement. While not wishing to rehash feminist critiques nor engage 
with a feminist analysis of sex work here, I am concerned rather to attempt an application of a 
more critical lens on homelessness, as generated from the theorists under study, to the 
particular terrain of homelessness that is articulated by sex work.  
The question may be asked why one should focus on sex workers in a discussion on 
homelessness. Firstly, most literally, many Afrikan sex workers are physically without homes; 
secondly, the mass murders of sex workers, stigmatization, and normalization of hate crime 
towards sex workers and the internalization of this violence results in an erasure of physical 
and mental space. Sex workers simply disappear and legal redress is ignored. Thirdly, sex work 
as an occupation remains stigmatized in many societies, including the Afrikan context, and 
given the dominant constructions of ‘correct’ female sexuality, sex workers remain constructed 
as ‘fallen’, ‘loose’ women, marginal and therefore without home in ‘respectful’ society. It is for 
these reasons that one of the first challenges in work with Afrikan sex workers is to overcome 
barriers and create safe and creative spaces, adopted homes where sex workers can find a 
voice, both as a sex worker as well as a woman, trans-woman or –man, man or simply person.  
The focus on sex work in this thesis constitutes an attempt to apply a more critical lens on 
homelessness as developed in the first few chapters, and indeed to interrogate the value of 
these theorists’ work in relation to a site of homelessness that arguably also speaks to the blind 
spots in their work argued above. Another reason for focusing on sex work is that it clearly 
highlights the issues at stake when support and intervention is framed by a rescue, 
rehabilitation and assimilation political discourse. Sex work, perhaps more than any other field 
I have worked in, exposes a political ethic in which the aim to save and reform people, is one in 
which sex workers are treated as passive objects in need of our pity. The net effect as I have 
found in my personal work is that the sex worker is silenced.  
 
Guiding remarks 
Before approaching the life and work of Freud, Fanon and Foucault a few guiding remarks 
need to be made that emerge out of my framing of home and homelessness. Firstly there is my 
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bias towards the need for a spatial analysis. The use of a spatial analysis is something that 
surfaces from my reading Freud, Fanon and Foucault, all of whom present spatial metaphors 
alongside and as part of their theoretical arguments. Secondly, I argue that the debates around 
what is homelessness are akin to debates and struggle in defining space. Homeless space 
speaks of different geometrical areas. Attempts at a definition of homelessness force us to 
reconsider the way we think about space, as has Tschumi (1994), not as a form of Euclidean 
geometry or even as part of set theory –the relation of parts that do not fit into the whole. We 
need instead to think about homelessness using different topological models, for example, as 
something uncanny
35
 and as a fold: “The fold announces that the inside is nothing more than a 
fold of the outside” (Sullivan 2011, unpaginated).  
When homelessness is forced upon another it functions as a site of terror, abandonment, 
without direction, a free falling anxiety and mental foreclosure of space, but at the same time, 
when it is a chosen reaction to this impingement it can be an experience of liberation, a 
camping on the borders of identification, state of refuge from the demands of others and a form 
of nomadic thinking. As I will argue in the thesis, homelessness has the potential to open up 
spaces that are more fluid, lived and invented as compared to spaces which are subject to 
impingement, control and appropriation.  
Placing the accent on space, or topography as Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari (1987) do, the 
aim is to think about homelessness in terms of the political space as opposed to the “detached 
realm of post-structural semiotics” (Spencer  2011: 33). Homelessness can be seen as 
                                                                                                                                                                                        
35 It seems to be that the ‘turning’ of the familiar into something unfamiliar produces something uncanny. To be 
precise, it is not so much the movement from the familiar to the unfamiliar that produces an uncanny experience 
as it is the turning of the familiar into something unfamiliar. The uncanny makes evident something which ought 
to have remained hidden but which has now come to light and in so doing puts into question the familiar and what 
was taken for granted. The uncanny leads into the world of ‘shadows’ and unnerving ‘doubles.’ The uncanny is 
umhemilich (unhomely) which is the opposite of heimlich (homely) and heinisch (nature). Heimlich belongs to the 
house of family – familiar – but with the experience of the uncanny there is a movement from within the familiar 
to the unfamiliar. Something within the familiar needs to been seen thereby adding the ‘unfamiliar’ dimension to 
the familiar, making it uncanny. The little addition seems to reframe the taken for granted and familiar as strange, 
foreign and haunted space. The addition element making the familiar scene unfamiliar is the destruction of the 
heimlickkeit, the sense of homelessness. As a young child and witnessing brutal white male – including both 
extended family members and the police – violence inflected on older black men and mixed race women I was a 
foreigner in my own land. From that moment onwards I could no longer see things in the same way. Sadly when 
witnessing the xenophobic violence in apartheid SA, including intimidation of my partner and friends by black 
male Xhosa men, I once again experienced this sense of been a foreigner, this destruction of destruction - what 
was heimlich becomes unheimlich, the homely space a familiarity becomes uncanny. Please see the work of 
Royle, N. (2003). 
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something that gets produced, as does all space, if we accept the arguments of Henri Lefebvre 
(1991) who presents us with a Marxist approach in which space is perceived as something that 
“every society produces”(Lefebvre 1991: 53). Lefebvre (1991: 39) invents a conceptual triad 
by which to understand the production of space: “spatial practices”, “representations of space”, 
for example knowledge, signs, codes and “representational spaces”, embodying complex 
symbolisms. In this conception the “perceived”, the “conceived” and the lived space overlap 
(Lefebvre 1991).  Moreover, Lefebvre (1991: 46) argues that “relations between the three 
moments of the perceived, the conceived and the lived are never either simple or stable”. The 
challenge is to understand how they overlap. What we have at play is a mixture of diverse 
elements: the space of planners, social engineers, the police and street wardens alongside the 
use of the body within that space as well as images, symbols used to make sense of this space. 
How homeless places get represented, be it in terms of art, literature, the media or academia 
warrants consideration.  In thinking about Geopolitics Klaus Dodds (2007: 46), drawing upon 
the work of feminist writer, Donna Haraway, three forms of representation are identified, 
namely: 1) mass media, cinema, novels, cartoons; 2) foreign policy, bureaucracy, political 
institutions; and 3) strategic institutions, think tanks, academia. The first leads to popular 
geopolitics, the second to practical geopolitics and the third to formal geopolitics. These three 
forms of representation converge in creating geopolitical maps of the world, spatializing of 
boundaries and dangers which in turn lead to geopolitical representations of self and other. 
What is of interest to me is the points of intersection and cross over, say between class, race, 
gender or the different ways people will speak about homelessness.  
A further guiding comment is to flag that this work privileges the body as the site of 
investigation. Following Margaret Lock (1993) there is an imperative to accept that theorizing 
the body is seen as crucial to this work. Without a theorizing of the body, we are unable to 
comprehend the relationship between homelessness and violence. In this work the body will be 
theorised as an instrument upon which techniques of the body are carried out.  This occurred 
for Foucault (1979: 137) when discipline became the “general formula of domination”. 
Discipline produces tame and “docile bodies”. These techniques of the body are carried out 
through particular socialization, rites of passage, that result in the incorporation of particular 
cultural habits. They are imposed upon the body in a subtle way via the overlapping of the 
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effects of education (within the school and home), care (within the hospital and home) and 
work (factory and home). The overlapping effects include the surveillance of the body and 
organization of its movement by structuring the spaces (architecture) within which it moves as 
well as what occurs in these spaces. For Foucault (1979: 141) this occurred through the 
meticulous observation of detail and enclosure and restriction of the bodily movement within 
certain functional spaces.  
The concept of the body being structured by internalized and repetitive habits– learned bodily 
expressions and patterned or habituated movements– while coming from the work of Mauss is 
elaborated by Foucault (1979) in Discipline and Punish. Following Foucault and Mauss the 
body can be seen to undergo a socio-cultural mapping as there is both imitation of action and 
shaping, which is imposed from without onto the body and which in turn maps one’s sense of 
time and space. This occurs, as Foucault (1979: 149) points out, through controlling the 
activities of the body and more importantly establishing the rhythms of the body and regulation 
of the “cycles of repetition” of these rhythms thereby ensuring the body marches to the beat of 
those who control the space within which it moves. The individual borrows a series of 
movements, which constitute it and the form of the body. This is how symbolic rites and 
everyday habits create patterned movements, individually and collectively.  
The gestures of the body, what Foucault (1979: 152) refers as the correlation of the body and 
the gesture is structured via a whole host of overlapping different disciplinary procedures 
(mothering, taking of language, schooling and becoming productive). This process starts with 
infancy, by the manner in which the infant responds to the demands of the other – when to eat, 
how to defecate, what can and cannot be shown in public, speaking correctly and behaving in 
accordance with the norms and values of the culture and society. This is what Freud calls the 
structuring of the erotic zones. The body becomes a home, structured by special habits (from 
habitus in the work of Aristotle) and patterned by habituated disciplinary movements. The 
taking on of habits, most notably language habits, brings the body under the effect of universal 
symbols.  
As noted by Dreyer Kruger (1980: 94) the human body cannot be seen in linear descent from 
the animal: “Something has to be added as well as subtracted. Man as a body is unspecialized.” 
Unlike animals whose perception of the world is predetermined and restricted to that segment 
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with which its body interacts, humans have a multitude of relationships to the world that exist 
outside of the immediacy of their body
36
. While these multiple relationships present endless 
possibilities, the invention of new relationships, the body is restricted and structured. The body 
is restricted and structured by those habits, for example use of the internet and mobile phones, a 
form of language, that are inscribed upon the flesh, via techniques of the body. These habits 
provide covering, a hide, habitat that provides familiarity and comfort but at the same time they 
erase the possibility of multiple relationships with the world and existing outside the 
immediacy of these bodily rituals. Ritual and habit become prescriptions that contain and 
confine. The body becomes structured by habits which get written onto the flesh of the body, 
an atomised body – seen as something I own, my individual biography37. 
The homeless body is par excellence an example of what Foucault calls bio power – subject to 
surveillance, institutionalized through disciplinary technologies thereby producing docile 
bodies. The body restricted by both the spaces within which it moves as well as the ways it gets 
represented, representations which shape the body and inform the habits the body engages in. 
Yet in many incidents the homeless body refuses to become docile, nor in this reading, 
assimilate. In this regard it is interesting to think about these sites of resistance alongside Veena 
Dass (2000) and Seremetakis (1993: 121, 122) who attempt to identify strategies of resistance 
that emerge and subsist on the margins for example the death laments in the Maniat rituals. 
These death laments involve a “crying one’s fate,” a confession and are “crucial for the truth-
claiming strategies of Maniat women when in conflict with various aspects of the social 
structure.” It is considered indispensable to the legitimationof the discourse and way of 
demanding a witnessing. Seremetakis (1993: 123) 
Pain as an institutional, jural and political idiom constructs a subject by fusing emotional/physical states 
with ideological organization of the social structure…I believe that the use of pain by the subject in order 
to challenge and manipulate institutions points to the possibility of socio-political resistance.   
                                                                                                                                                                                        
36
 Ruger (1979: 38) argues that there is intimate interlocking between a person’s bodiliness and their spatiality. 
Following Merleau-Ponty, Kruger (1979: 91) it is theorised that we perceive through our body as the body is 
“never an object in space in the same way as things are objects in space. Our body is not a thing which is enclosed 
within it, but the body is our point of view of the world.” The body is a lived, experiential and active body that 
goes beyond the boundary of the skin. 
 
37
 See Antze, P and Lambek, M. (1996) Tense Past: Cultural Essays in Trauma and Memory for an elaboration of 
this. 
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Sites of excess, in this case, female excesses not only present a challenge to hegemonic order 
but demand to be witnessed. As Veena Dass (2000: 205) puts it: “Through complex 
transactions between body and language, they were able both to voice and to show the hurt 
done to them and also to provide witness to the harm done to the whole social fabric.”  Bodily 
dissent and their lines of flight taken with the hope of opening up of space, in this work, 
become an answer and form of healing to the questions forced on people by violence and 
homelessness. Seremetakis (1993: 149) concludes that with the performative deployment of 
pain there is a need to “detach self and body from the residual social contexts” which is a 
prelude to the strategic re-entry of women “into the social order on their own terms.”  
Freud, Fanon and Foucault offer us new spatial and historical constructs. Their work calls for 
the placement of history and geography alongside each other, something that Foucault alluded 
to in his writings on space. Edward W. Soja (2003: 11) spells out the implications of this, 
namely the need for “a practical theoretical consciousness that sees the life world of being 
creatively located not only in the making of history but also in the construction of human 
geographies, the social production of space and the restless formation and reformation of 
geographic landscapes: social being actively emplaced in space and time in an explicitly 
historical and geographical contextualization”. 
It is also notable that the space and time that framed the life and work of Freud, Fanon and 
Foucault is one in which we see the emergence of an extended investment in travel and 
communication technologies. Stephen Kern (1983: 214) argues that the travel and 
communication technologies that surfaced during 1880 and 1918 not only structured the 
evolution of Western culture and global capital, but that global capital and Western culture in 
turn shaped the development of these communications and travel technologies. 
In the complex interaction between need and technological invention, it is difficult to identify one or the 
other exclusively as causal. The railroad responded to economic need and in turn had an enormous 
impact on economic life. In a similar manner electronic communication related to the creation of 
worldwide markets. 
For Kern (1983) the development of the global market and new experiences of time and space 
were coupled and interminable, bouncing off each other and fashioning each other, each 
dimension being an extension of the other with the result that new spaces open new 
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technologies – railways, ships, telecommunication – which in turn allow for access to new 
lands and resources that feed the production of these technologies.  The net effect of this is as 
noted by different postcolonial writers is that non-Western land becomes something that is seen 
as empty, to be consumed, appropriated as land, labour, and resources to feed modern 
technology and be reinvested in the means of production so as to yield greater profits and allow 
for further development. 
Development was based on the vision of eighteenth century Europe, including its religious and 
philosophical world view. This development saw the expansion of industry, free market 
economies and investment in technological advancements that supported this extension of 
reach and belief in the need for never ending progress. This spreading out and growth 
modernization was seen as synonymous with progress but in truth, as Ziauddin Sardar (2003: 
300) remarks  it was a violence, what he calls “development led imperialism” that 
systematically and consciously suppressed traditional cultures and tried, with some success, to 
replace them with their own cultural traits and patterns. Sardar rightly remarks that 
“civilization as we know it has always meant Western civilization.Civilised behaviour and 
products ofcivilisation have been measured by the yardstick of the West.” Technological 
advancements enabled this process of conquest and insertion of Western values.  
Kern (1983: 213) asks us to consider how technology and culture interact. The answer for him, 
it seems, is that technologies structure our experience of time and space and thereby fashion 
cultural tongues, for example the way people speak about their experiences, both within the 
Western homeland and beyond. He offers us the illustrative metaphor used by Zola, who 
compared railways to a human beast, “lying across the earth” with its limbs, thereby ending the 
“sanctuary of remoteness”, sucking farmers and others into the mainstream of national and 
international markets by uniting land masses and sea lanes into a single commercial unit. Kern 
(1983: 1) points out that within Europe 
Technological innovations including the telephone, wireless telegraph, x-ray, cinema, bicycle, 
automobile, and airplane established the material foundation for this reorientation; independent cultural 
developments such as the stream-of-consciousness novel, psychoanalysis, Cubism, and the theory of 
relativity shaped consciousness directly. 
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It is imperative to underline that Freud, Fanon and Foucault cannot be understood outside these 
technological changes and the urbanization and colonization of the planet. Urbanization, which 
has been taking place for two hundred years, dramatically increased during their lives with the 
result that city life vastly changed during the life of each of these men. It was during the 
eighteenth century, with uncontrolled migration towards big cities that city planning gave way. 
Towns quickly expanded developing into cities while rural areas collapsed. With business 
coming under the control of industrial capitalism and later finance capitalism people were 
pushed from the rural areas into cities. Over-population resulted in makeshift accommodation 
being built by the immigrant working class resulting in shanty towns on the outside of the city 
–or example in Paris and London. In other words Freud, Fanon and Foucault, as inhabitants of 
urban space, were surrounded by images of homelessness. Moreover, concepts like anomie and 
alienation, as did new disciplines like sociology, came about as a direct response to the need to 
understand the new urban context.   
Before this the city in the West and North was assembled through clearly marked boundaries, 
which outlined an enclosed space. Now, if, as Spiro Kostof (1985) informs us, Western cities 
began as fortified places into which the population could retreat in times of danger, a closed 
form with hard edges, surrounded by nature, how did one find safe sanctuary within the 
modern urban city? With the changing structures of the city in the West, Njoki Mwaniki (2002, 
personal communication) points out that what lay within the city became a site of danger as 
much as that which lay outside the city. As such new boundaries and divisions needed to define 
what constituted life inside and outside the city, as well as what consisted public and private 
space.  One such boundary coming into being during the life time of Freud, according to 
Mwaniki (2002), was the creation of the park, green space, into which one can retreat and find 
a health sanctuary.  
According to Mwaniki (2002) the emergence of these green spaces represented the divisions of 
health and dirt, the hygienic park in contrast to unhygienic dangers associated with going into 
'darkest' East London. The creation of the health sanctuaries reaffirms a class division between 
the world of middle classes and the working class living in East London. Anoop Nayak (2003) 
supports this argument by highlighting how Victorian historiography is “littered with 
depictions of urban areas as ‘dark’, ‘dirty’, and ‘dangerous’ zones. Indeed, the sojourn to the 
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English urban interior was directly compared with journeys into Central Africa” (Nayak 2003: 
76). What we see is a convergence of terms, as ordered by patriarchal constructions –women, 
Africa, dark, dirt, unhygienic and poor.  
During the life time of Freud, Fanon and Foucault, the world began to unfold as one large 
urban space organized by the needs of capital. Serge Chermayeff and Christopher Alexander 
(1963) draw my attention to the manner in which European cities of the past possessed forms 
and characteristics which were peculiar to that place. There was clarity of form and a direct 
response to simple limited pressures, such that cultural continuity and technological change 
combine to establish a planning and building method. With industrialisation and the lack of 
town planning, the growth of the city took on a life of its own with land coming under the 
control –lack of control – of private interest and the demands of capital. Open space was seen 
as a commodity to be divided into units for buying and selling. As John Nash noted, suburban 
development was not so much a response to the actual demands on a swelling urban 
population, but about property developers making money. 
Eric Hopkins (1979) points out that landowners would cram as many houses as possible on the 
land available to maximise profit. This method of building economically resulted in lanes of 
terraced houses in narrow streets, sometimes with infilling taking place, which was the 
squeezing in rows of houses across the back garden of existing houses. The effects of this 
process, urbanization and lack of control over the use of open spaces, resulted in a breakdown 
of the physical and symbolic boundaries of the city, as well as traditional social boundaries, 
roles and traditions. The city was no longer primarily a site of security, but was controlled by 
the interests of capital.  
Following Chermayeff and Alexander (1963), it can be put forward that the city is not a 
coherent response to pressure but the result of conflicting, indirect and direct pressure, one in 
which an urban environment grows out of diffuse and contradictory needs without any clear 
organization outside the needs of the market. The net effect of expansion, as pointed out by 
Anthony D. King (1990), is a global space in which the world has increasingly become one 
large, interdependent city organized through a single, interacting and interdependent urban 
system, even though flows between its various component parts are immensely uneven. He 
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goes on to state that the “shift to urban industrial capitalism at the core is part of the same 
process as the shift to agricultural and mining capitalism in the periphery.” (King 1990:5). 
While the effects of urbanization and advent of capitalism are universal and similar, there are 
also marked differences in that non-Western countries also experienced the effects of 
colonization and brutal racism alongside the advent of the global market. Soja (2003: 110) 
following Wallerstein concludes that the capitalist world revolves around different 
dichotomies. There is “class (bourgeois versus proletarian)” and there is “economic 
specialization within a spatial hierarchy (core versus periphery)” and a “semi-periphery, a 
middle class”. Soja (2003: 104) following Mandel asks if we can conclude that “geographically 
uneven development is a necessary as well as contingent feature of capitalism”. 
Sonja (2003) points out, following Mandel and Lefebvre, that capitalism has been able to 
survive and grow by producing and occupying space in which regional underproduction is an 
integral part of this process. Following King (1990), I argue that capitalism capitalises upon 
“political and economic conditions of imperial dominance” (King 1990: 8) and promotes the 
homogenization of the “International style.”King (1990: 78) talks about this homogenization in 
terms of “imported concrete monoliths,”  monuments to consumerism, in architects assumed 
the role of missionaries by using Western design and building materials –  for example steel –  
at the expense of organic building materials and indigenous methods. Moreover, the actual 
buildings and town planning are all geared towards meeting the needs of the industrial centre.  
King (1990) sees the so-called centre and peripheral urban systems as interlinked. He argues 
that the modern urban context from its inception with the shift from mercantile capitalism to 
‘pure’ capitalism comes about through control of the production of primary products and raw 
materials from the peripheral for the industries of the core. For King (1990) the developments 
in the metropolis consist of a shift from agriculture economies in Europe to urban based 
industrial economies and mining capitalism. The industrial economies that centralised 
production in the West, especially Britain, depended on the raw materials from its colonial 
possessions. “Colonial cities were the major links between core and peripheral economies 
during the period of imperialism, articulating the flow of capital, people, commodities, and 
culture that flowed between them” (King 1990: 7). In a very real sense, they were global pivots 
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of change, instrumental in creating the space in which today’s capitalist world-economy 
operates. 
King (1990: 15), following Wallerstein, observes that the colonial city represent the 
introduction of Western urban forms into non-Western countries as a result of both “the 
expansion of Europe” and “the expansion of the capitalist mode of production” As such King 
(1990: 15) concludes: 
In at least two senses, all cities can be described as colonial: at the local level, the powers that form them 
organize their hinterland and live off the surplus the non-urban realm provides. At the global level, existing 
cities organize the surplus both of their own society as well as that of others overseas (see also Johnston, 
1980: 67-76); the local relationship of town-to-country becomes the metropolis-colony connection on a 
world scale (Williams, 1973). 
As such if homelessness can be said to be an urban phenomenon then it is also one which 
cannot be thought of outside of the history of colonization, something that becomes apparent in 
the work of Fanon and Foucault. From this we can conclude that in writing about Freud, Fanon 
and Foucault we are in fact writing about urbanization and the role that colonization plays in 
the construction of urban space and homelessness. Each of these writers was constructed by 
urbanization and colonization. It is the backdrop to my understanding of what unfolds, or stated 
differently, their work is a fold within the folds of urban and colonial time and space.  
 
Overview of chapters and structure of the text 
Through this exploration there will be an attempt to say something about the ways in which the 
identities of the homeless get written about in relation to the marginalized sectors of society. 
The work will begin by pondering the difficulties of definition. As will be seen the concept of 
homelessness is spatial in material, discursive and psychical terms. It can be seen to coexist at 
many different levels at the same time, the physical lack of abode and/or as previously 
mentioned the psychical, ideological, discursive level of being ‘othered’ and made to feel 
outsider. This is internalized dislocation.  
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This thesis will include a discussion on the difficulties of drawing upon the literature dealing 
with the concept homelessness, less with the view of giving an overview of the literature, but 
more as a way of pointing to a gap within the literature itself.  As stated above, there is a hiatus 
between work ‘on the ground’ and ‘theoretical work’ resulting in very disparate knowledge 
productions that do not speak to each other. This breakdown or lack of synergy in 
communication is a key rationale for the study. 
I will then develop a concept of home, homeless, homelessness and violence as it emerges in 
the work and life of Freud, Fanon and Foucault. The final section of this work will be to 
unpack a Freudian, Fanonian and Foucaultian reading of home, homeless, homelessness and 
violence as applied to a specific marginalised body, that of the sex worker. The work will 
conclude by asking what this tells us about the relationship between violence and 
homelessness.  
Chapter One has served to introduce the reader to the underlying motivation for undertaking 
this study, as well as the expression/intent of the broad goal of the work. This presented the 
reader with the central research question: “how do Freud, Fanon and Foucault add value to the 
exploration of the relationship between homelessness and violence?  
It also presented a secondary, but nonetheless important research question – boldly stating that 
this research may inform the linking of theory, practice and politics – with special reference to 
sex work, and this question is driven by my professional experience.  
Chapter Two provides an overview of key literature framing the dominant academic and 
programmatic focus on homelessness and in particular readings a social worker or outreach 
worker in London would encounter when working with the homeless. The chapter argues that 
one needs to look at homelessness in a different manner, one that does not only focus on the 
management of problematic behaviour and as a housing problem. Following the architect 
Cedric Price (2003: 73), who observes the manner in which housing, houses, house and home 
are assumed, if not equivalent, at least inextricably the same, I will try to rethink the historical 
form of home, homeless and homelessness. In an endeavour to sidestep the fixed 
categorisation, the concept of homelessness is approached from different angles by questioning 
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the binary of home and homelessness and unpacking the origins of the word home, house, habit 
and shame. 
This chapter also contextualises homelessness and its relationship to violence. It introduces 
historical and contemporary discussions around the themes – and concludes that forms of 
structural violence and [its] manifestations in poverty and destitution is a key driver to the on-
going state of homelessness. 
Chapter Three is a critical overview of Freud in the context of homelessness and that which is 
“uncanny” and challenges the concept of patriarchy as the overriding driver in the construction 
of the meanings of “home”. The chapter aims to yields a hitherto unchartered dimension of 
Freud:  “his lack of home and his construction of home” – and concludes with a narrative that 
provides insights into Freud’s concept of marginalisation and homelessness.  
In this chapter the non-European Sigismund Schlomo Freud is placed alongside Freud the 
colonizer the male scientist who colludes with those patriarchal projects attempting to colonize 
the space of the other/world – Afrikan, women.  To further elaborate upon the non-European/ 
‘non-citizen’ I need to turn to the life and work of Freud as it is, in part, a response to a history 
of racism, nationalism and homelessness. I show the reader that it is imperative that we 
remember that Vienna was part of imperialist Europe, part of movement that would come to 
decree (white Aryan) racial supremacy. The material gains of slavery and colonial conquest, 
supported by evolutionary theories, the work of the missionaries and church, gave birth to 
white Aryan racial supremacy in Germany and Vienna. Freud was to observe the effects of this 
‘civilizing mission,’ racism towards the non-European, for example Jews and blacks, and 
racism both within and outside of Europe. Alongside the rise of anti-Semitism, once again 
placing homeless at the heart of Jewish identity, and the scramble for Africa, which began in 
the mid-1870s with the purpose to colonise the ‘Dark Continent,’ we have exhibitions, as noted 
by Sander L. Gilman (1993), of a African family in a zoo in Vienna and other scientific 
examinations of the non European (Jew and black). Freud’s response to these events is 
ambiguous and inconclusive.  
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In Chapter Four, through the lens of Fanon, violence and homelessness are scrutinised in 
spatial terms – and in the context of colonisation as a psychological and material process –
contributing to violence and homelessness.  
Working with Fanon’s concept of alienation and taking seriously Fanon’s view of the centrality 
of torture in the process of colonization I seek to understand the experience of having no 
mental and/or physical space within which to retreat as the point at which violence and 
homelessness converge. Fanon’s work as a psychiatrist, exemplified by his work at Hospital 
Bilda and Charles-Nicolle, will be used as an example of how to give the homeless body space 
to be and speak back. 
The chapter explores Fanon from a dual perspective, namely as a critical theorist/activist, and a 
clinical doctor, and extends into a symbolic dialogue between Fanon and Afrikan homeless 
men. The chapter concludes with revealing the verisimilitude of the “experience” of space and 
how racism, colonisation and heteronormative constructs, influence the spatial depictions of 
violence – ultimately devouring the space – leading to displacement. 
In the fifth chapter, I turn to the work of Foucault. I wish to attend to the historical construction 
of the binary home/homelessness and its relationship to another binary, that of normal and 
abnormal, and to the concept of sovereignty. Home, Homeland, Home Office, as the modern 
site of sovereignty, will be presented, not only as politico-economic space, but as the birthplace 
of the modern state in which violence is the midwife of this process.  While homelessness 
presents us with the production of places in which people are acted upon, as discussed in the 
proceeding chapters, resulting in de-naturalized citizens, a sub-species; when homelessness is a 
choice, we have space to produce the “atypical citizen” (Klein 2006), “secular critic” (Said 
2000), or the subjectivity that forms part of the subaltern project. In an endeavour to side-step 
the fixed representations of homelessness, for example, the ‘damaged goods’ and destitute 
categorisation, the concept of homelessness will be approached from different angles. I wish to 
inquire into the productivity of the concept of homelessness in the light of the statist 
pathologisation of the homeless.  
Chapter Six explores a stumbling block in the work of Freud, Fanon and Foucault, female 
sexuality. Without reproducing yet another commentary on the gender problematic within their 
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respective work, I focus on one particular site of sexuality and of homelessness, the sex 
worker, as somebody both in and outside the nation state and who appears as a marginal figure, 
a footnote, in the work of Freud, Fanon and Foucault. The concept of sex worker is explored in 
each of their work as well as used to expose the limitations of their work in theorizing feminist 
postcoloniality. The aim is not only to provide a critique but also an interrogation of the value 
of their thinking on homelessness within a particular site of homelessness. As such the location 
of this work and in which the insights of these men will take place is informed by a post- 
colonial feminist lens.  
In the concluding chapter, Chapter Seven, I attempt to bring together the central themes that 
emerge in the thesis. The binary of home and homeless will once again be questioned by using 
Richard Klein’s (2011, personal communication) re-working of Lacan’s division scene/world 
and the paradox of moving from to, be it from colonization to post-colonization or from home 
to homelessness. In synthesising key conclusions I ponder upon contemporary spatial urban 
geography that outlines the convergence of violence and homeless and ask if it is inevitable or 
not, that the opening up of space for one person, community, necessarily becomes the closing 
down of space for another?  Instead the reader will be pointed in the direction of Deleuze and 
Guattari’s concept of interstice, that what lies between things does not designate a localizable 
relation going from one thing to the other and back again, but a perpendicular direction and 
transversal movement.  
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CHAPTER TWO 
CONTEXTUALIZING AND DEFINING HOMELESSNESS AND ITS 
RELATIONSHIP TO VIOLENCE 
Introduction 
So as to set the scene and elaborate the conceptual problems with the meaning of home, let 
alone homelessness, let us begin by considering Cedric Price’s (2003) framing of the problem 
in which too often housing, houses, house and home are considered, if not equivalent, at least 
inextricably the same. This may not be so, as demonstrated by Price (2003: 73) below: 
HOUSING 
 An assumed continuous societal need?  
 An assumed variable societal appetite?  
 A convenience and/or necessity?  
 A constituent of social servicing?  
 A desirable expensive extra? 
 An alternative to subsidising people?  
 A market-controlled consumer product?  
 A ‘natural’ resource of a ‘developed’ country?  
 A method of population control 
 
HOUSES 
 A quantifiable item related to a particular demand?  
 A national assist determinable through population and affluence counts?  
 An artificial l conglomerate signifying a social grouping?  
 A series of commodities?  
 A prerequisite of a static society?  
 A collection of land-anchored products?  
 A constituent of a ‘balanced’ community?  
 An incentive for continuity of labour resources?  
 
HOUSE 
 A 24-hour living toy?  
 A commonly desired possession?  
 A container for intermittent human activity? 
 An attractive form of public and/or private investment?  
 An heirloom?  
 A guarantee of respectability?  
 A store for personal belongings?  
 A readily available (mobile?) private amenity?  
 A static distorter of the 24-hour cycle?  
 A part of a home?  
 
HOME 
 A non-locational self-choice (if over eighteen years) 
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 Collective living condition?  
 A convenient socio/administrative unit?  
 A displacement tendency?  
 A person-to-person multi-purpose exchange condition?  
 A collection of houses, and other useful containers?  
 A statutory unit?  
 An assumed consumer of houses?  
 A privately financed hospital and restaurant for friends?  
 
Housing thus saturated with implications of such questions is seen in a ‘problem solving’ context to be 
infinitely regressive. Why should anyone assume that such a display of intellectually edible concepts will 
ever reduce, when challenged with hunger for somewhere to LIVE? If housing is emotionally so absurdly 
non-redundant then, in order to enable use-producing work methods, it appears rational to embrace 
EXPEDIENCY as the nearest miss to correct that can be expected for design tool. 
From the above, it is clear that home is not a clear-cut concept. The aim of this chapter is to 
devise a working definition of homelessness. To produce a definition of homelessness, we need 
to deconstruct the binary co-ordinates of home/homelessness which form part of the broader 
game of dichotomies. The reader will be shown that the word homelessness functions in much 
the same way that other secondary terms – like homosexual, black and woman – serve as 
means to prop up privileged signifiers –heterosexual, white, male. 
Looking at the etymology of key words linked to home/homelessness, what emerges is the 
concept of being covered or uncovered, thereby conflating homelessness with being uncovered, 
naked, and shameful. Such an etymology foregrounds the long association of homelessness 
with shame and moral decay.At the centre of the home and homeless sites is the body. This 
body moves between two poles of experience. There is the body which is covered and takes for 
granted its covering and the naked and shamed body. The shamed body, it will be shown, is 
framed by habits that are seen as bad.  
The chapter concludes by looking at the paradoxes and complexities of homeless. 
Homelessness is presented as a site of complexity in opposition to those approaches that 
narrowly define and approach homelessness as a housing or psychological problem, with the 
result that the more abstract dimensions get lost. The literature on homelessness reflects this 
bracketing out. The literature on homelessness tends to either have a very narrow focus, for 
example, a focus on purely psychological factors or documenting the experiences of Irish street 
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drinking men in the Camden area in London, rather than engaging in a broader contextuali-
zation of homelessness, as with acknowledging shanty towns in the South as a response to the 
demands of the global market forces.  
The writings on homelessness can be seen to exist on a continuum, starting with a narrowly 
defined focus and easily identifiable issue – street homelessness and rough sleeping – then 
moving towards a broader and looser definition and understanding of homelessness, like 
asylum seekers, displaced indigenous people, globalization and subaltern voices. The axiom 
driving the more narrowly defined approaches to homelessness (at least in the UK as outlined 
in the last chapter) is rehabilitation, assimilation and management of behaviour. This approach 
is top-down and deeply limiting, focused on micro-management and surveillance. This kind of 
approach is potentially violent in that it constitutes thinking for the other, as well as restriction 
of space and self-determination.  
 
Critical framing of homelessness 
Before I attempt to offer a paradoxical definition of homelessness, what needs noting is the 
manner in which the term homelessness is constructed within the game of binary oppositions 
so as to uphold certain assumptions. In this regard we can draw upon and learn from the 
manner in which other dominant oppositional terms such as the heterosexual/homosexual 
binary have been constructed. In this regard, I apply the deconstructive methods of Foucault.  
To produce a definition of homelessness, we need to deconstruct the binary co-ordinates of 
home/homelessness which form part of the broader game of dichotomies. Steve de Shazer 
(1993: 87) quoting Derrida, comments: “Western languages have always been structured in 
terms of dichotomies or polarities: predicable/unpredictable, voluntary/involuntary, 
male/female, speech/writing, presence/absence, problem/solution, and so forth. These opposites 
are not usually seen as equal and thus the second term is a fallen or corrupted version of the 
first and therefore suppressed”. 
The word homelessness functions in much the same way as other secondary terms like 
homosexual, black and woman: as means to prop up the privileged signifiers –heterosexual, 
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white, male. Home seems to be so thoroughly built into everyday interaction that it results in 
what Barthes (1972) refers to as a “naturalization” of the symbolic order. The taken-for-granted 
manner in which these narratives and conversations take place designates and reifies home to 
the status of the unexamined and unquestioned natural order of things. This privileges a 
particular arrangement of signifiers, recruiting each person or subject into a set of 
predetermined (usually heterosexist, patriarchal, Western, bourgeois) assumptions about the 
world.  
The words homosexual, homeless and woman are not  stable or autonomous terms but a 
supplement to the definition of the heterosexual, home and man. They thus serve as a means of 
stabilising heterosexual, male and home. The binary terms, in which homelessness as a word 
exists as a predicate giving reference to something other than itself, is the game of ‘othering’: 
the reproducing, rationalizing, legitimizing and sanctioning power inequalities. To elaborate 
upon this, let us draw an analogy between homelessness and home as with the binary 
heterosexual/homosexual.  
Consider David M. Halperin’s (1995: 44) deconstruction of the binary heterosexual/ 
homosexual: 
Preserving and consolidating its internal contradictions at the same time as it preserves and consolidates 
its own ignorance of them...The heterosexual/homosexual binarism is itself a homophobic production, 
just as the man/woman binarism is a sexist production. Each consists of two terms, the first of which is 
unmarked and unproblematised – it designates ‘the categories to which everyone is assumed to belong’ – 
whereas the second term is marked and problematised: it designates a category of persons whom 
something differentiates from normal, unmarked people. The marked (or queer) term ultimately functions 
not as a means of denominating a real or determinate class of persons but as a means of delimiting and 
defining – by negation and opposition – the unmarked term. 
Following Halperin’s (1995) deconstruction of heterosexuality/homosexuality, we can 
similarly conclude that the function of homeless is a projection, an incoherent construction that 
functions to stabilise and to consolidate the accepted meaning of the home by supposedly 
encapsulating everything that is other to or different from the home. In so doing, the home is 
naturalised and taken for granted. Home becomes a given that does not need to be explained, 
an essentialist notion; that is, a ruse that disguises what is really taking place. Home defines 
itself without problematising itself; it elevates itself as a privileged and unmarked term by 
 
 
 
 
51 
 
problematising homelessness. Home thus depends on homelessness to lend it substance. By 
deconstructing the binary of home and homeless, we aim to reveal the assumptions on which 
the model is based. Chang and Phillips (1993: 100) state: “As these are revealed, you open up 
space for alternative understandings.” Michael White (1993: 34) summarises: 
Deconstruction has to do with procedures that subvert taken-for-granted realities and practices: those so-
called ‘truths’ that are split off from the conditions and the context of their production; those 
disembodied ways of speaking that hide their biases and prejudices; and those familiar practices of self 
and of relationship that are subjugating of person’s lives. Many of the methods of deconstruction render 
these familiar and everyday taken-for-granted realities and practices by objectifying them...According to 
Bourdieu, exoticizing the domestic through objectification of a familiar and taken-for-granted world 
facilitates the ‘re-appropriation’ of the self. 
Homelessness is defined by negation and opposition, as much as everything that is home is not. 
It functions as a predicate to give reference to something else other than itself. The homeless is 
an identity without an essence. Understanding and defining homelessness can be “realised only 
in and through discursive practices” (Epston 1993: 170) which surround the term 
homelessness. As such, a definition of homelessness cannot be thought of outside a specific set 
of problematics: a set which rallies against and challenges idealist constructions and nationalist, 
rationalist homecoming projects, and instead points to different subaltern spaces. Following 
Foucault, I argue that these spaces can be seen as knowledge from below (the hidden histories), 
as what is seen as ‘unqualified and disqualified knowledge’ and regarded as in opposition to 
nationalist chauvinism, the mythologies associated with Eurocentrism and the ‘grand governing 
narratives’. These grassroots perspectives, as demonstrated in the 2011 London riots and Arab 
Spring, challenge the history that is determined by the perspective of the winners (the big men). 
This history, gospel until the recent economic crisis, preached the mantra of endless growth 
and the certainty of progress.  
Following a Lacanian reading, we can argue that home attempts to function as a ‘proper name’, 
designating a specific entity. Name and noun become the same, and designate a place of origin 
in the ‘natural’ order of things. Home operates as a master signifier in symbolic discourse, as 
the primary term. Home is a vital reference point for subjectivity as it holds together and 
buttons down identity. It forms part of a neighbourhood of proper names that surround the 
construction of male, Western, heterosexual, middle-class identity. The recognition of these 
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primary terms is only possible through the reproduction and repetition of these unifying traits, 
like ‘heterosexual’, that enable the person to dis-identify and distance him from that which falls 
outside the domain of the proper names. To be a subject in the world involves a literal 
inscription in the symbolic world of proper names, which operate as a superego code of future 
conduct by imposing a prohibition on enjoying the use of the body (or parts of the body) in acts 
which fall outside the domain of certain discourses, such as men loving men, street drinking 
and sex work.  
The naming process that the marginalised battle against is a moral order in which people exist 
as part of a social process that denies a subjective naming experience. Each marginalised child 
undergoes a similar process of oppression to that of other marginalised groups. The 
marginalised individual is shamed through the inability to comply with the code of conduct that 
goes with what is identified as the norm, such as proper names and primary terms. The 
individual who feels homeless due to his love of other boys, soon realizes that his presence 
inflicts a wound upon the ideal family. At the same time his deviance is what preserves the 
identity of the group through becoming a target of socially permissible violence. Public scenes 
of contempt, ridicule, derision, debasement, name-calling and abuse result in a marking and 
stigmatizing of the body with shameful images. The body of shame does not belong; its place is 
relegated to the margins of society, outside of self-definition. If the question of ‘who I am’ 
revolves around shameful signifiers, the person, when confronted with the look of the other, 
feels exposure and embarrassment. In the look of the other, she has to embrace something of 
her being that lies outside the signifying chain of order, becoming in effect a faceless object. 
The person dies of shame. 
Homelessness in the broader configuration I am suggesting is an untold history, one that 
introduces interruption and suspending of the homogenous manifestation of the Western home 
and family as the only possible outcome of history. In this regard, we need to consider the 
insecurity of the history of ideas and why Western theory is both incapable of producing a 
theory and definition of homelessness (since it is the discourse of home), and is also therefore 
precisely the place to undertake this challenge. In this, homelessness rewrites the history of 
Western ideas, and leaves us with little option but to dwell in its ruins. 
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Home has become a limit point in our comprehension: some mythical familiarity into which we 
fit without question. Following Foucault’s (1986) Archaeology of Knowledge, I can speak 
about the home and homeless as mythical representations and a readymade synthesis of 
unexamined links, resulting in division, classification and normative rules that institutionalise 
the home as something intrinsic and inherent within the fabric of all societies. Put another way, 
to question the taken-for-granted representation of the home is to problematise narratives about 
the family, childhood, attachment, personal development, safety, security and familiarity. The 
mythical Western home ends up as universally recognisable: the given and taken-for-granted, a 
material unity, a master signifier, and a coherent network of inter-related discourses seen as 
self-evident. 
What seems to ‘unite’ this very diverse group of people under the category of homeless is not 
primarily the experience of homelessness, nor the receiving of public services designed to 
contain the category. Rather it is primarily how this experience can be understood, managed 
and organised through the assumption that there is something essentialist – natural, given, 
taken-for-granted – about having a home. As will emerge through unpacking of the work of 
Foucault, to talk of homelessness, like madness, is to expose the modern starting points of 
Western civilisation, a form of rationality that made division and rule possible. The category of 
madness/homelessness gives Western reason and its so-called derivative, normality, a 
privileged status. Upon closer inspection, the category of the home can be seen to function in 
much the same way that the classification of normal did in the past. When questioning the 
binary home/homeless, one can ask if this opposition is in fact a resurfacing of the old game of 
divide and rule, a continuation and transformation of the normal/abnormal divide.  
Home/homeless is presented as part of some dualist ordering system, resulting in static 
categories such as purity/impurity. As Irene Gedalof (2003: 100) following the work of Sara 
Ahmed argues, we need to challenge “the association of home with notions of fixity.” There is 
an ongoing process of rehearsal and reconstitution of a sense of home and community that is 
worked through encounters with “the stranger within”. Gedalof (2003: 100) draws on Avtar 
Brah’s (1996) notion of ‘diaspora space’, describing how we are engaged in a continuous series 
of encounters between staying put, arriving and leaving. Gedalof (2003: 101) states: 
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Home is produced through a constant process of adjustment, transformation, negotiation, redefinition – a 
never-ending, ongoing work to reproduce the appearance of stability and fixity that is part of the 
imagined community, whether that is being thought about in terms of nation, ethnicity, race, religion, etc. 
And when I think about it in connection with women’s ‘useful bodies’ and ‘useful’ embodied practices, I 
can’t help but think of the never-ending reproductive work that is done (mainly) by women. The daily 
rituals of caring, cleaning, feeding as well as the culturally specific emotional kin work that is always to 
be redone, necessary but never completed, serve to provide the appearance of sameness and stability in 
ever-changing contexts. 
 
Homelessness and the question of definition 
When homelessness is defined narrowly and approached as a housing or psychological 
problem, the more abstract dimensions get lost. The framing of homelessness as a 
philosophical and political question, as has occurred in the writing of Nietzsche, Heidegger, 
Adorno, Agamben, Arendt, amongst others, does not sit comfortably alongside the official 
government and NGO publications. In other words, the United Nations is not interested in 
presentations which speak about homelessness as part of the postmodern condition or as 
existential crisis.  
Below I shall unpack how homelessness has been historically understood, providing the 
cornerstone of the definition that I will assume for the rest of the thesis. The etymology of key 
framing terms in the discourse on home and homelessness provides much insight into meanings 
of homelessness. I look more closely then at how home and house, as markers for the meaning 
of homelessness, have been shaped over time and how this links the home to words such as 
cover, clothe, hide, and homeless to words like uncovered, naked and shameful.  
The origin of the word home comes from the old English word ham meant ‘place where one 
lives, house, village’ (Ayto 1990: 285). Ayto (1990: 285) informs us that the last of these 
words: 
 survives only in place-names (such as Birmingham, Fulham), and it is the ‘house, abode’ sense that has 
come through into modern English home. Its ancestor was prehistoric Germanic khaim -, which also 
produced German heim, Dutch heem, Swedish hem, and Danish hjem. It is not clear where this came 
from, although some have connected it with the Latin word civis, ‘citizen.’ 
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Mish (1983: 577), editor of Webster’s Dictionary, devotes almost a full page to the word home 
and related terms like homecoming, home-body, home-bound, home-bred, home-built, home 
economics, home front, home grown, homeland, homely, home-made, homemaker; yet this 
dictionary excludes homelessness. In the Webster’s definition of home, the Greek word koiman 
(to put to sleep, a cemetery) is included alongside more conventional usages like domicile, 
house, habitat and headquarters.  
Soanes and Stevenson (2004: 681), editors of the Concise Oxford English Dictionary devote 
over a page to the word home and its derivates. Again, homeless does not get defined but is 
mentioned as a derivate. One of the many descriptions that stands out for me here is the 
definition of home as the place where one lives permanently. As with sleep and cemetery, there 
is something very static and rigid in this description.  
Another interesting observation, as noted by Morris (1971), is the origins of the word 
economics. Consider the following comment by Morris (1971: 287): “If words did not change 
but kept the meanings of their root words, the home in home economics would be superfluous. 
The word economics from the Greek oikos, house, and nemein, to manage, originally meant 
household management, just about the same thing as home economics today.” Morris (1971: 
368) also notes that the original expression attributed to Edward Coke – “for a man’s house is 
his castle” – concludes with, “and one’s home is the safest refuge to everyone.” 
The origins of the word house are uncertain. Ayto (1990: 288) argues that the furthest it can be 
positively traced into the past is to a prehistoric Germanic: 
 “...khusam, which also produced German haus, Dutch huus (probably a close relative of English husk), 
and Swedish hus (descendent of Old Norse hus, which provided the hus-of English husband). Beyond 
that, all is speculation: some have argued, for instance, that khusam came from an Indo-European keudh: 
‘cover, hide’, source of English hide, hoard, and hut. 
This needs be linked back to the concept of being covered or uncovered, thus associating 
homelessness with nakedness and shame. 
Let us look at the word khusam which comes from an Indo-European keudh (meaning cover, 
hide). The Online Seslisozluk Dictionary (www.seslisozluk.net) informs us that the 
entomological origin of hide comes from the Sanskrit kuharam (cave) related to keu (to cover). 
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The word hide is defined as follows by the Online Etymological Dictionary: “to hide, conceal, 
preserve, hide oneself; bury a corpse from hudjan, from keudh and keuthein, root keu. With 
keudh – cover, hide - there is a link to dress, a covering of the body. The reference is to an 
outward condition or appearance, as with clothes and also an inward condition. The key seems 
to be kem: to wrap, cover, and conceal.” 
(http://www.utexas.edu/cola/centres/lrc/ielex/PokornyMaster-X.html). 
I shall now place this word khusam(cover, hide) alongside the word habit which Ayto (1990: 
270) defines as follows: 
Etymologically, a habit is ‘what one has.’ The word comes via Old French abit from Latin habitus, 
originally the past participle of the verb habere (have). This was used reflexively for ‘be,’ and so the past 
participle came to be used as a noun ‘how one is’ – one’s mental ‘state’ or ‘condition.’ Subsequently this 
developed along the lines of both ‘outward conditioning and appearance,’ hence ‘clothing,’ and ‘inner 
condition, quality, nature, character,’ later ‘usual way of behaving.’ This proliferation of meaning took 
place in Latin, and was taken over lock, stock, and barrel by English, although the ‘clothing’ sense now 
survives only in relation to monks, nuns and horse riders.  Derived from Latin habitus the verb habitare 
originally literally ‘to have something frequently or habitually,’ hence ‘live in a place.’ 
Ayto (1990: 281) notes that hide, related to conceal, comes from the Germanic khudjan and 
probably produced English hoard, huddle and hut. He also notes a link to skin and covering.  
If a house, habitat and habit can be linked to that which covers one, a hide, a dress, then what is 
the inverse of this: to be without a hide to cover oneself, or without a dwelling? Interestingly, 
the link to shame becomes apparent via the entomological link to the word kem as argued 
earlier. Ayto (1990: 471) defines shame as follows:  
Shame is a general Germanic term, with relatives in German scham, Dutch schaam, and Swedish and 
Danish skam. Their common ancestor is a prehistoric skamo, a word of unknown origin.” (Ayto1990: 
471).  
In exploring the different online etymological dictionaries, it was noted that shame and hide are 
linked. The link comes from words to covering oneself, from the word kem. In this regard, it is 
also worth noting the overlap with the word keudh (keuthein: to hide, conceal), from keu (to 
cover, conceal).  
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The unpacking of these key words highlight the links of home/homelessness to notions of 
being covered/uncovered, and therefore conflates homelessness with being uncovered, naked, 
and shameful. In an attempt to offer a provisional working definition, home will be defined as 
‘hide’ and heimlich38, in bringing into play the German, while homelessness could be seen 
unheimlich, that which is ‘uncovered, naked, shame.’ At the centre of the home and homeless 
sites is the body. This body moves between two poles of experience. There is the body which is 
covered and takes for granted its covering, and the naked and shamed body.  
The body of shame has historically been located as the dwelling place of that which lies outside 
the social bond and an enigmatic signifier of alterity: that which is without a hide, to have a bad 
habit, one not accepted within the social order, something abject and cast out. This argument 
strengthens the assumption of the enmeshment of the notion of home with hiding and 
homelessness with shame. To be seen as lacking and without is shameful. Home and clothing 
are intimately linked; they cover naked life and death, like the cemetery. When flesh of the 
body and its movement towards death is exposed, something uncanny surfaces which disrupts 
our primary boundary-making experiences, sometimes called socialization. For Richard Klein 
(2012, personal communication), this is to be associated with misidentification, which makes 
the scene they take for granted – which provides a sense of boundary, which they identify with 
and feel at home within – foreign and invasive. Home and homelessness is therefore part of a 
broader discussion around the sociology/politics of borders and the contours and structuring of 
the body. The website border poetics (http://borderpoetics.wikidot.com/border-formation) 
offers the following description of borders: 
Borders are constructed through a continual process of bordering, in which categories of difference or 
separation are created. Border formation has traditionally been viewed as a top-down process in the hand 
of power elites. A more dynamic view of bordering allows for the possibility of bottom-up agency.  
Home and homelessness also bring into question borders, boundaries and the spatiality of 
urban existence. As David Frisby and Mike Featherstone (1997: 140) observe “space is divided 
                                                                                                                                                                                        
38
 This is the German for the word uncanny which the Webster Dictionary defines as 1. Having or seeming to have 
a supernatural or inexplicable basis; beyond the ordinary or normal; extraordinary. 2. Mysterious; frightening, as 
by superstitious dread; uncomfortably strange. Nicholas Royle (2003) opens his book entitled The Uncanny with 
the following definition: “The uncanny entails another thinking of beginning: the beginning is already haunted” 
(Royle 2003: 1). It is the “revelation of something unhomely at the heart of hearth and home...The uncanny has to 
do with a strangeness of framing and borders, an experience of liminality” (Royle 2003:1).  
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into pieces which are considered units and framed by boundaries – both as a cause and an 
effect of the division”. Frisby and Featherstone argue that “society is characterized as inwardly 
homogeneous because its sphere of existence is enclosed in acutely conscious boundaries”. The 
homeless become an anomaly in that they disrupt the conventional ways urban space is framed.  
In this regard, consider Frisby and Featherstone’s description of the bridge and door(1997: 172, 
173). The bridge is seen as a “connection between what is separate”: it “overcomes the 
separation of its anchor points. The factors of separateness and connectedness meet in the 
bridge.” A door is: 
(...a)linkage between the space of human beings and everything that that remains outside it.” “It is 
absolutely essential for humanity that it set itself a boundary, but with freedom, that is, in such a way that 
it can also remove this boundary again, that it can place itself outside it…Thus the door becomes the 
image of the boundary point at which human beings actually always stand or can stand.”  
In conclusion, the home and house have become a way of inscribing mental and physical 
borders onto the body. Home and house are part of the geopolitics of space. Simply put by 
Foucault (1980: 149): “A whole history remains to be written of spaces which would at the 
same time be the history of powers.” 
Home and homelessness can be physical, but the notions can also be symbolic or political, such 
as homeless in your own home and homeless in your own homeland. Homelessness reveals the 
unheimlich within the familiar, a space which shows the traumatic realities that lie within 
home, homeland and citizenship. The home, urban city or nation state is fractured by places of 
economic crisis, stagnation, disposition and displacement. Despite clearly drawn borders and 
physical boundaries, to shut away the public viewing of homelessness, the homeless come into 
public attention when filling up spaces like job centres. Fran Tonkiss (2000: 123) speaks of the 
Job Centre as “bleakly unheimlich, it is the opposite of home and certainly not a living 
space.”The work of the Job Centre is to learn to wait. It acts as a double to the factory where 
they do the “work of waiting....the unemployed become objects of hygiene and moral 
regulation” (Tonkiss, 2000:124). 
For the most part, the normative response to homelessness involves an attempt to ensure that 
the homeless remain outside the public eye or invisible. John Law and Ivan da Costa Marques 
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(2000: 120) observe that there are “two forms of invisibility. That which is not seen because it 
is unknown. And that which is not seen because it is known too well but does not belong”. The 
homeless person is seen, but denied familiarity, making him invisible. 
 
Apparatus and oikonomia 
By way of concluding the discussion on definition, I wish to explore Giorgio Agamben’s 
question, “What is an apparatus?” Following Foucault, Agamben (2009: 2) summarises 
apparatus as follows: 
It is a heterogeneous set that includes virtually anything, linguistic and non-linguistic, under the same 
heading: discourses, institutions, buildings, laws, police measures, philosophical propositions, and so on. 
The apparatus itself is the network that is established between these elements. The apparatus always has a 
concert strategic function and is always located in a power relation. As such, it appears at the intersection 
of power relations and relations of knowledge. 
Agamben (2009: 6) further follows Foucault to note that apparatus underlines what is at stake 
in the relation between the individuals living being “and those set of institutions, processes of 
subjectification, and of rules in which power relations become concert.” Agamben (2009: 7) 
tells us that apparatus, for Foucault, is the infliction of the universal (State, Sovereignty, Law 
and Power). However, this is not what is central; neither is the policing element nor the 
technologies of power. What is central is the “networks that can be established between these 
elements” (Agamben , 2009: 7), such as the networks between the juridical, military and 
technological, and the way these networks operate at both a linguistic and non-linguistic way.  
Agamben (2009: 8) traces the origin of the term apparatus. He turns to the Greek term 
oikonomia which signifies “the administration of the oikos (the home) and, more generally, 
management”. He notes that the term oikonomia was taken over by Christian theology in which 
god entrusted the economy, the administration and government of human history to Christ. 
Agamben (2009: 12) sees Foucault’s uses of the term apparatus to capture this historical 
administrative dimension alongside Heidegger’s Gestell of technologies that install and order 
man (a set of practices, bodies of knowledge, measures and institutions that aim to manage, 
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govern, control and orient behaviours in ways that are thought to be useful). This is captured in 
the term oikonomia.  
Agamben (2009: 13) concludes that the result is two kinds of beings: living beings and 
apparatuses in which living beings are incessantly captured. He gives the example of the 
mobile phone as a way that people are captured and how they are remodelled by the use of the 
phone. Through apparatus, the person attempts to nullify the animalistic. For Agamben (2009), 
the apparatus interrupts the relationship of a living being’s relationship to itself by way of 
division, separation between being and the actions of the machine. The apparatus attempts to 
consume and take over all aspects of life, and to govern over and colonize every field of life so 
as to create docile submission. The end of history is this aimless motion of the machine, but the 
machine faces elusive elements that remain ungovernable. 
I argue that the home has come to function as the primary site of the apparatus and at one level 
it is the manifestation of the apparatus. This is called socialization, which, as noted by Mwaniki 
(personal correspondence, 2012), is “always at the compromise of the individual and therefore 
speaks to a greater number where structured systems of values of a culture are central.” Yet in 
spite of the machinelike operations of apparatus, something remains ungovernable or does not 
fit with the socialisation process that continues outside the home. This other element becomes 
the uncanny, unhomely element within the home. Many homes ironically, and thankfully, as 
noted by Vekony (personal correspondence, 2010) show hospitality to the unhomely element 
which is what makes them a home. In this sense the home is a paradox: in one regard, it is 
fixed, through an apparatus that tries to transform the living being into a set of prescribed 
habits; but at the same time, the home allows for something simultaneously daemonic in the 
form of the body that dares to move and question.  
 
Bad habits 
While working with the street homeless in London, I tried to reconfigure the way I thought 
about homelessness through the concept of ‘bad habits’, thereby framing homelessness from a 
spatial and experiential perspective. The argument proposed (Harper 1999, 2001) is that so-
 
 
 
 
61 
 
called bad habits, including past perceptions of institutional care, cast a fearful shadow over 
what it means to be in the world. When the individual inhabits a dwelling or “house of being” 
(Heidegger 1992) which is constructed with words, events and undertones that signify despair, 
hate, lies and deception, these unspoken realities return to haunt, disturb and unsettle the 
individual’s perception. The individual inhabits a bad place, a kind of ‘spook house’ which 
offers no solid foundation to anchor the daily habitation, yet at one and the same time sets in 
place certain bad habits
i
, in that patterns of behaviour are set up which can be deemed as 
counterproductive to that person’s best interests. Moreover, the daily customary childhood 
habits of many homeless people sustain a particular experience of the body/self that names and 
labels the person as delinquent, outsider and abnormal; and places them alongside others 
deemed to be in need of correction. This results in a self-fulfilling prophecy  
Bad habits are not as clear-cut as people imagine. As any addict will confirm, they are 
paradoxical. For example, when observing a homeless man standing in front of a mirror and 
speaking to himself in the most abusive terms about his addiction to alcohol, what became 
apparent is that his drinking is in fact an attempt to escape this critical voice, an attempt to 
provide momentary relief as he rushes to the nearby off-license and then gulps down his cider. 
However, when the effects of the alcohol subside, the relief is replaced with an even more 
critical attack and remorseful self-hatred. He is caught in a double bind marked by excessive 
anxiety. The habit is bad in that it leads him back into a tormenting space that is impossible to 
bear, as he ‘eternally returns’ to the same scene. The net result of this situation is to find 
oneself isolated, alone and cut off from the world, experiencing a terror and desperation which 
is unbearable and impossible to endure. In the most extreme cases, this would be having no 
space that can function as a sanctuary. There is no safe place in which to dwell, but instead a 
never-ending project of attempting to create a secure dwelling through the use of alcohol or 
drugs which momentarily numbs the person and lessens the overwhelming anxiety. Getting 
through each day becomes a monumental struggle and is not something to be taken for granted.  
In my own work (Harper 2001), I stress the shaming effects of being told one’s habits are 
unacceptable. Moreover, when there is an inability to engage with others, sometimes due to a 
lack of social skills and not knowing how to play the game, the person feels like a freak, alone, 
untouchable and an outsider. Alongside this inability to play the game of fitting into society 
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and a lack of basic skills, there is often difficulty in establishing socially acceptable intimate 
relationships. One particularly debilitating manifestation of this is an overwhelming sense of 
mortifying shame and embarrassment. When the habits learned offer little protection, the 
person ends up feeling raw, vulnerable, highly sensitive and troubled by the smallest crisis. In a 
sense, such people die of shame, since they are essentially not covered by a psychic skin 
behind which they can hide.  
This line of reasoning leads me to conclude that homelessness could in effect be a site of 
retreat. It is based on the assumption that some individuals who have suffered gross privation, 
deprivation and abuse, try to create a kind of lifestyle that functions as a sanctuary, a place of 
oblivion (possibly drug- or alcohol-induced) where there is no intrusion. It is something that I 
have witnessed time and time again.  
The person wanders off wanting to be left alone. In an attempt to protect this constructed 
sanctuary, the person will avoid situations which take them out of the context they are familiar 
with, as this produces disorder. As a way of holding it together – keeping things in context – 
during moments of conflict, the person may act out that which they cannot think. The 
individual may feel overwhelmed and ill-prepared for the apparently trivial demands placed 
upon him/her. The effect of not being able to respond to the demands and reliving past pains 
results in the person being unable to think, digest and process experiences.  
The original text of some homeless individuals is one of their occupying a nameless position in 
which they were not in control of their bodies, as with child abuse. The person becomes a 
sacrifice in interplay of various double binds and abusive games which entrap the individual 
and leave them without choices. The person is driven crazy in that she is a pawn in a puzzle 
and subjected to the needs of others: she is forced to play a particular role in a drama 
constructed by others. She is reduced to an object of pleasure for the other without consenting 
to take up this position. In this scenario, there is a negation of that person’s individuality, a use 
and abuse of their bodies and an invasion of their subjectivity through thoughtless acts and 
violent and intrusive impositions. What the person often finds impossible to bear is that there is 
no escape from their body. It betrays them and makes them feel things that they cannot endure. 
If control over one’s own body, and “especially control over physical access to one’s own 
body”, is the root of self-determination and identity construction, as Andrea Dworkin argues, 
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then if one’s body is no longer one’s own and is slave to the needs of others, one in effect no 
longer exists (Dworkin 1989: 243). 
In order to think about the relationship between violence and homelessness, we are presented 
with the challenge of fleshing out the concepts of embodiment, dwelling, house, housing, 
building, home, homelands, homelessness and violence.  
In reviewing the dominant discourse on homelessness, primarily that which guides intervention 
work with the homeless, it is evident that the conceptualisation and history of homelessness is 
one surveyed and recorded by those institutions that aim to discipline, cure and save the 
homeless. It is articulated by those who grant themselves the right to speak on behalf of the 
homeless and assume they know what is in their best interests. These disciplines see 
homelessness as a housing, social or moral problem which is attributed to socio-economic, 
criminal and psychological factors. The result is a criminalisation and pathologisation of the 
homeless.
39
 
Those who act upon the homeless as passive objects, as opposed to active agents of change, see 
the homeless person as she or he who deserves our love, pity and fear. This is analogous to 
what Antonio Negri (2003) calls the poor person, considered “not as a subject but object of 
love” (Negri, 2003:209). This attitude, according to Negri (2003) is one of the greatest evils 
perpetrated by Christian philosophy. Beyond the fear and pity, homelessness, as with sex work, 
is something the public want out of sight.
40
 
 
The paradoxes and complexities of homelessness 
The lives of many homeless individuals, including sex workers, are often experienced as 
chaotic by those who work with and alongside them. In this environment where there are 
confusion and unpredictable causes and effects, the trouble is knowing what to do and what in 
fact you are doing. One response is to simply narrow the focus or ‘bracket out’ things outside 
of your understanding and control and focus. The literature on homelessness reflects this 
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 A similar approach prevails in the way sex workers are infantilised. 
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 At the same time homelessness must be within sight so as to unite the community. 
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bracketing out. This literature tends to either have a very narrow focus – for example, a focus 
on purely psychological factors or documenting the experiences of Irish street drinking men in 
the Camden area in London – or be part of a broader discussion, as with shanty towns in the 
South as a response to demands of the global market forces.  
Homelessness is a site of complexity. In this regard, I argue we can use Phillip Boxer’s (1996) 
analysis of organizational division into simple, complicated, complex and chaotic. In each of 
these sites, the cause-and-effect relations shifts, “moving from a repeatable, perceivable and 
predictable” simple situation to one “not so easy to predict because they are spread over time 
and space”. With complex systems, the “cause-and-effect relations become apparent only in 
retrospect” while in a chaotic system “no cause-and-effect relations are perceivable’. In further 
application of Boxer’s understanding, it is argued that the organizing force can either be global, 
local or edge driven.  
It is important to challenge the binary picture of homelessness. In this regard, I find three 
separate publications by New Internationalist (NI) helpful: Brave new world (1996), Street 
children (2005) and Squatter town: the South’s urban explosion (2006). In these works, the 
concept of homelessness has a broad focus, thereby enabling one to engage with its 
complexities. The articles range from a discussion on displacement, indigenous persons, 
squatter architecture, police violence towards children and people living in cages.  
Gabriela Barbosa (2006), who lives in a so-called squatter community, challenges the doom-
and-gloom depiction of squatter existence as nasty, short and brutish and offers a picture of the 
favela as alegria (joy) due to the sense of community. Barbosa (2006: 4) describes her 
existence as follows: 
When I come back to the communidade it is like a tribe – everybody knows me, and people talk to each 
other and kiss and hug and genuinely take care of one another. In the favela I feel safe and recognized; I 
have the freedom to be who I am without having to meet other people’s prejudices of how people like me 
are supposed to be. To live in a communidade means an extension of one’s home. No-one will ever go 
hungry because there will always be an open door and gesture of solidarity 
Robert Neuwirth (2006) opens up the possibility of a restructuring of the way architecture is 
thought about and how buildings get constructed and by whom. He tells us that there are a 
billion squatters worldwide (one in six people on the planet), yet there is a lack of recognition 
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of the very imaginative ways in which dwellings within which to shelter are created. The 
bourgeois home remains the norm and yardstick by which we understand home. Richard Swift 
points out that the resilient squatter of Bangkok “want their own style of building; not to make 
all the houses the same” (Swift 1996: 11).  
As argued by Mwaniki (2004), Gabriela Barbosa (2006), Swift (1996), Neuwirth (2006), Hall 
(1996) and Gibson (2011), it is imperative that the creative attempts made to survive, build 
shelters and create communities, sometimes with a clearly defined ethics and politics, need to 
be acknowledged. We need to grant recognition to alternative housing and home possibilities. 
The attempt to delineate one definition of house, home or family is not only an absurdity but 
deeply undermining of personal and community agency. 
Acknowledgment of agency does not negate those socio-economic and political factors that 
result in homelessness. In this respect, David Ransom (1996) argues that children do not 
become homeless – they are made homeless. The literature points to complexity in which one 
is challenged to move beyond either/or thinking but instead ensure the possibilities of opposing 
opposites simultaneously existing. In this regard, consider Mark Kramer’s work which focuses 
the homeless issue on the manner in which capital is constructed and the interlinking effects of 
urbanization, structural violence and poverty. He places the issues of colonial city construction, 
urbanization in the global south, issues of having no title and no land as the primary 
determinates in the construction of having no home. (Kramer 2006) 
In summary, these debates return us to the questions of how to frame homelessness, who 
defines what a home is, when somebody is homeless and what a homeless site is.
41
To 
appreciate these complexities and paradoxes of homelessness, we must approach homelessness 
from different and multiple perspectives, economic, architectural, social, cultural, gendered, 
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 Consider Wikipedia’s definition of homeless sites: “Outdoors, on the ground or in a sleeping bag, tent, or large 
cardboard box, in a park or vacant lot. Shantytowns improvised shelters and shacks, usually near rail yards, 
interstates and high transportation veins. Derelict structures: abandoned or condemned buildings. Squatting in an 
unoccupied house without the owner`s knowledge or permission. Vehicles: cars or trucks are used as a temporary 
or sometimes long-term living refuge. Public places: bus or train stations, airports, hospital lobbies or waiting 
areas, and 24-hour businesses such as coffee shops. Homeless shelters. Inexpensive boarding houses.Residential 
hotels and Inexpensive motels. 24-hour Internet cafes are now used by over 5,000 Japanese "Net cafe refugees".  
Friends or family: Temporarily sleeping in dwellings of friends or family members ("couch surfing"). 
Underground tunnels such as abandoned subway, maintenance, or train tunnels are popular among the permanent 
homeless.” (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Homelessness). 
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and so on. Put another way, thinking about the homeless cannot occur outside the current 
debates on urbanization, globalization, and structural violence, architecture of urban space, 
colonization of building materials, indigenous design methods, ecological and economic 
concerns, urbanisation, industrialisation, space and the construction of the body. 
 
Playing God: the saving of street drinkers and sex workers  
The present policies and practices are addressing homelessness from the perspective that it is 
something which can be removed by building houses or re-education. Moreover, when these 
approaches become institutionalized as the primary intervention, they become frameworks that 
hold the homeless person ransom to a particular ‘language game of truth’ and thereby fix how 
homelessness is thought about and what occurs when encountering what is imagined to be 
homelessness. This work will explore the need for an alternative formulation, one that is not 
bound to the strictures of therapy and correction, prohibition and sanction. As a symptom, 
homelessness arguably signifies the trauma of dispossession and displacement and how 
citizenship and belonging is currently performed within a global context.  
The above calls for a comprehensive, systematic and fine-tuned genealogical conceptualization 
of the relationship between homelessness and violence, in which we need to be particularly 
sensitive to the accepted manner certain bodies become conceptually constructed, stained by 
the culturally received markings of otherness and the determination of Western treatment 
frameworks as the global yardstick, as seen, for example, with the term post-traumatic stress 
disorder and the ensuing critical incident trauma debriefing (Young 1995).   
When opening up the definition of homelessness, we are forced to rethink some of the key 
issues that society grapples with in this context: alienation, issues of who owns the body, 
deviance, what constitutes an outsider, stigmatization, the architecture of urban space, and life 
between buildings, unregulated market forces and the postcolony. At the same time, we need to 
make room to think about what occurs when the streets, squats or shanty towns, referred to as 
‘slums’, are seen as home and as sites of resistance, or simply creative ways of dealing with 
difficult situations. As pointed out by Njoki Mwaniki (2004), in the so-called slums we have 
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‘architecture without architects’ and what is sometimes referred to as slum-architecture: homes 
built using recycled building material and designs from necessity, designs that put into question 
what constitutes the home and who the homeless are. Moreover, following Mwaniki’s 
argument, this challenges us to rethink not only the manner in which architecture is defined but 
how we see public and private space (Mwaniki 2004).  
Architecture is conventionally defined as the coming together of art, design and building 
science. Is this definition still applicable? That which constitutes life between buildings and life 
inside the home can no longer be clearly set apart. When so-called private acts are lived out in 
public space, life between buildings is no longer exclusively determined by questions of 
transition from the private to public domain. 
Nigel Gibson (2011), a grassroots intellectual who works with the homeless, draws our 
attention to the either/or thinking about homelessness. The homeless are presented in either 
very bleak terms or in heroic terms, without a point of crossover. As noted above, we have the 
very narrow presentation of slum dwellers framed by United Nations Habitat reports
42
 and the 
popular Planet Slums by Mike Davis (2006). 
As Sansom (2006) notes, in Davis’s context, slum dwellers are presented in very bleak terms, 
befitting of Dickens or Conrad. While in no way wanting to underscore the human disaster 
caused by the economics of neo-liberalism, as pointed out by Davis (2006), Gibson (2011) 
correctly feels it is important not to lump all those living in informal settlements together. He 
further emphasizes the autonomous practices that people develop out of necessity and in dire 
situations. “It is also in these autonomous spaces that that both potentially radical and quite 
reactionary social and cultural practices can develop and be contested” (Gibson 2011:168). He 
also points to the ironies of shack existence in South Africa. Prior to the fall of apartheid, shack 
settlements were celebrated by anti-apartheid organizations because they transgressed and 
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As a result of ongoing urbanization and globalization, close to 50 per cent of the world’s population now inhabit 
urban space. Moreover, in 2003, the UN-HABITAT Global Report on Human Settlements estimates that nearly a 
billion people – close to 32 per cent of the global urban population - are living in slums. In sub-Saharan Africa, 
the estimate is close to 72 per cent. It is further estimated that the overall figure may well double within thirty 
years. Today 70 to 80 per cent of the world’s population live in urban areas, moreover, we now have 21 mega-
cities - cities each with a population over 10 million. Available at 
http://www.unhabitat.org/content.asp?typeid=19&catid=555&cid=5373 
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contested the apartheid geography of control (Gibson 2011:169). However, now they are an 
eyesore and a hindrance to the city’s respectability as world class. The result is forced 
removals.  
Citing the Abahlali shack dwellers
43
, with whom Gibson (2011: 169) has clearly worked very 
closely, we are told that they do not simply want houses:  
They do not want to be administrated from above, nor do they want power, which would subject them to 
such administrative power from above. They want to change how things are done. In other words, they 
are struggling not merely for ‘delivery’, but for a vision of a different kind of politics. My point here is 
that the importance of Abahlali is a challenge to the post-apartheid elite, local government functionaries, 
NGO paternalism, as well as the strongmen in the shanty towns based on its self-organization and its 
participatory democratic practices. 
What transpires in this thesis, following a close reading of the work of Freud, Fanon and 
Foucault, is that we arrive upon rather ‘queer and troubled places’. We have the ships of fools 
alongside the slave ships and burning of witches, as well as the brothel alongside the mental 
asylum and football stadium (the modern day cathedral of the world). The ship of fools, slave 
ship and burning of witches are presented as examples of colonization of the mind and body. 
This is homelessness at its limit point. The placement of the brothel alongside the mental 
asylum, church and football stadium speaks to a struggle to situate those unspoken pleasures 
and excesses which refuse to be hemmed in by patriarchy and the disciplining of the body.  
Some of the spaces sited above (the ship
ii
, brothel, colony, mental asylum) fall within 
Foucault’s description of the theory of heterotopias, a concept also used by both Edward Ed 
Soja and Cesare Casarino
44
, who elaborate upon modernity and postmodern geographies. The 
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See abahlali-owner@lists.riseup.net 
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Casarino (2002: xxix) project, an engagement with the force of formless and the unrepresentable, the cracks, is 
important to this study. “If the vicissitudes of the binarism of identity and difference have been the main 
protagonist of the history of modernity, and if the explosion of difference from within the bottomless depths of 
identity is one of the defining chapters of that history, there is a sameness that has yet appear on the stage as the 
nonmodern unthought at the very heart of modernity.” Casarino (2002: xxvii) following Benjamin he is interested 
in space as a potentiality “in which one may become other than what one already is”. Moreover rather than 
reassuring and reconfirming everything that he is, he is drawn to a whole other space in which he may live 
otherwise.  Casarino following Deleuze notes that Foucault tried to teach us the indignity of speaking not only for 
others but ourselves as well. To explain this Casarino (2002: xxiii) points out how forms of representation have 
become the commodity form.  He notes that “to the extent to which something is representable and nameable it is 
already part and parcel of history as status quo, while the forces that disrupt such a status quo are refractory to any 
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concept of heterotopia is the key to understanding the queer space I arrive at. According to 
Michael Foucault (1998: 179-184) describes the heteropia as 1) a ‘place without geographical 
co-ordinates’, 2) a ‘different place compared with ordinary cultural spaces,’ with a ‘precise and 
specific operation within the society’, but at the same time is culturally specific, 3) a space that 
can ‘juxtapose in a single real place’ spaces that are ‘incompatible in themselves’ 4) often 
‘connected with temporal discontinuities’ that can either involve an ‘absolute break with their 
traditional time’ or involve the ‘accumulation of time’, linked ‘to time in its most futile, most 
transitory and precarious aspect, and in the form of the festival’, 5) a ‘system of opening and 
closing that isolates them and makes them penetrable at the same time’; and 6) a space which 
‘function(s) in relation to the remaining space’ to open up and creating a different kind of space 
or creating a space of ‘illusions that denounces all real space.’  
 
On the relationship between violence and homelessness 
Since the focus of this thesis is on understanding homelessness and its links with violence and 
abuse, it is imperative to unpack the rationale for such a focus.What surfaces from the 
homeless readings is the centrality of structural violence and its manifestation in poverty and 
destitution as key to the reproduction of homelessness. The identification of homelessness as a 
problem and as and its enmeshment with violence is not new. For example, as noted by St. 
Mungos, a homeless organization in the UK: 
As long as historical records have been kept, Britain has had a homelessness problem. As far back as the 
7th century, the English king Hlothaere passed laws to punish vagrants. William the Conqueror forbade 
anyone to leave the land where they worked. Edward the First ordered weekly searches to round up 
vagrants. The numbers of vagrants has risen and fallen, and precise figures are hard to come by, but we 
know that 16th century estimates put the numbers of vagrants at 20,000 or more. And it was in the 16th 
century that the state first tried to house vagrants rather than punish them. It began introducing bride 
wells - places meant to take vagrants in and train them for a profession, but which in reality were dirty 
and brutal places. By the 18th century workhouses had replaced the bride wells, but these were intended 
                                                          
form of representation”. He concludes that to “the extent to which representation does take place, it needs to be 
understood and studied as the by-product of a forever incomplete and forever renewed process of exploitation of 
the unrepresentable.” 
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to discourage over-reliance on state help. At best they were spartan places with meagre food and sparse 
furnishings - at worst they were unsanitary and uncaring (www.mungos.org/early_history).  
Homeless people throughout history have suffered abuse, prejudice and discrimination of all 
kinds due to interrelated factors. In this regard, consider Philip Alston’s Hardship (1998: 
www.unicef.org/pon98/indust1.htm) in which he states that, throughout history, homelessness 
has been a haunting human fear. It has a very particular contemporary economic manifestation 
in that today, in the heart of the most industrialized and opulent centres of the world, many 
people have ‘no place to sleep tonight, had no place last night and will have no place tomorrow 
night’(www.unicef.org/pon98/indust1.htm). Moreover, he notes that while it might be tempting 
to assume that homelessness is tied to a specific catastrophic event such as war or famine (due 
to the fact that in every century, disasters, whether the result of human actions or of nature, 
have left behind troops of wanderers: men, women and children with no space to claim as their 
own), today the stark reality in some of the world's wealthiest countries is that the homeless do 
not benefit from this wealth.
45
Violence, it needs to be acknowledged, is a hugely fraught area 
which people have addressed in diverse and philosophically divergent ways. There are multiple 
perspectives on violence, from biological determinist assumptions of the inherent violence of 
people, to more psycho logistic and historicist notions of repression to social and political 
framings of violence. In this thesis, I draw in particular on notions of structural violence in 
theorising the link between homelessness and violence. Violence has been understood as key to 
the project of colonisation and the development of Western and Northern civilisations. 
The legacy of colonization and slavery is as close as one gets to a system of total violence and 
subjugation. With the crude and vulgar display of violence, the exploited are shown up, shamed 
and put in their place with the intention of inculcating an atmosphere of submission and 
inhibition. Once the individual is taught his/her place, then moral policing can replace rifle-
butts; but the aim is the same: to create submission and maintain submission. It is this which 
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 In this regard consider another irony, namely, that the life expectancy or mental state of poor black child 
growing up in poor sections of an affluent city like Chicago or even London is comparable in some ways with that 
of a child growing up in Calcutta and child soldiers in Africa? In high-violence communities in Chicago, 89 per 
cent of third-and fifth-grade children have heard gunfire where they live, 38 per cent have seen a dead body 
outside, and 21 per cent have had someone threaten to shoot them (Kostelny and Garbarino, 1998). These statistics 
are closer to what children living in war zones experience than they are for children living “at peace” (Kostelny 
and Garbarino, 2001: Chapter 9). 
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Fanon describes in great detail, as ad liberandum. It is also something that we not only enacted 
by the coloniser but those who follow and service the coloniser, as outlined by Achille 
Mbembe (2001) in the Postcolony in a chapter entitled The Aesthetics of Vulgarity.  
According to Fanon (1990), the colonisers (oppressor) and colonised (oppressed) do not share 
the same violence. The oppressor impinges upon the other’s world and imposes a new order 
which attempts to negate all that was native and familiar to the person. The coloniser 
(oppressor) rules by violence, a system of rule characterised by violence from beginning to 
end. From a phenomenological lived-experience, all the actions of the coloniser (oppressor) 
can be interpreted as involving acts of violence as the position of master/slave is never 
questioned and is violently reaffirmed within all these acts. As such, all the colonised 
(oppressed) know of the colonisers (oppressor) is violent rule. This pervades the nature of 
almost all interaction. It is out of these violent encounters that internalised self-oppression 
comes about as well as the re-enactment of this violence against other minority groups.
46
 
This violence is both structural, through the systems set in place to oppress (unequal access to 
the same resources), and directed via the exhibition and crude display of violence on the part of 
the oppressor. Fanon argues that to unravel this subjection and enslavement everything that 
went before needs to be turned upside down. To remove what went before involves the use of 
violence and force to overcome the prohibitions which have being imposed on the subject and 
made his/her world very narrow. My reading of Fanon on this point is to argue for the need to 
break down the constriction imposed, what Transactional Analysis (Bern, 1973) calls the 
triangle of victim, persecutor and rescuer. Psychological liberation needs to occur alongside 
reclaiming land rights. In other words, we need break the stereotyping of homeless people as 
fixed immobile and passive objects; or we risk removing their agency and continuing the 
perpetration of violence on the homeless. We need to be cautious in imposing absolute and 
totalizing pictures. 
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For, example disempowered Xhosa men in Cape Town without regular employment, often from single parent 
families, who will out of boredom, frustration and entitlement rape women living in the same townships thereby 
reasserting power and enacting revenge. Mwaniki (2005) notes how some Xhosa men in Cape Town will sexually 
harass women black women on the streets of Cape Town but leave white women alone. In Johannesburg Xhosa 
men behave very differently. 
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The understanding that violence is structured by social forces is drawn on within this work. 
Lawrence and Karim (2007: 6) remind us that for Hegel, Marx, Engels and Fanon, violence is a 
structure: 
Violence is a fundamental force in the framework of the ordinary world and in the multiple process of 
that world. Engels argued that the economy is a fundamental force of subjugation, that capital has a logic 
of its own that justifies the use of whatever means are available to achieve economic prosperity...Engels 
cites the history of warfare, suggesting that each military innovation is both instrumental for economic 
gain and threatened by it. 
This line of reasoning, they tell us, results in the conclusion that “violence does not exist prior 
to structure; it is inherent in certain day-to-day practices and speaks of the subjugation of the 
proletariat by the owning classes”. The authors however are more circumspect and conclude 
that that violence is always historically contingent, intrinsic to social structures and possibly 
the human condition. In this regard we can consider the work of political scientists, like 
Jackson and Jackson (1997) who identify the following as violence-prone groups: criminals, 
nihilists, nationalists with narrow particularistic goals and broad goals. The actions of these 
groups are informed by ideology, leadership, organization, demography, operations, 
communications, weapons, funding and external support. Moreover, they note that the actors 
(individuals, groups and state) and targets (political crime, terrorism, assassinations, internal 
security and law enforcement) can characterize political violence in different ways. 
Reflecting on the above, we need to pause and once again ask: what is violence, what counts as 
violence; and is violence a product or a process? Lawrence and Karim conclude that violence is 
always a process; it is cumulative and boundless, always spilling over and recreating new 
norms and collective understandings (Lawrence and Karim, 2007:12). They go on to say: 
“Violence as process is often not recorded because it is internalized; it becomes part of the 
expectation of the living, whether framed as revenge or as fear, but, most important, its creation 
must remain transparent, its instrumentality evident beyond all attempt to reify or essentialize 
both its origin and its function.” (Lawrence and Karim 2007: 12). For them, the central starting 
point in understanding violence is context: “Violence always has a context. Context shapes not 
just the actors or victims but also those who represent them. What is celebrated in one place 
may be mourned in another place” (Lawrence and Karim 2007: 1). 
 
 
 
 
73 
 
Importantly in understanding the relationship between home/homelessness and violence is the 
notion that, in violence, there is a ‘penetration of the space’ of the other and bringing about a 
disruption and damage of that space. It can take place by distortion, infringement, or 
profanation as with stigmatisation or simply the refusal to grant medical care to impoverished 
areas. At the same time, we must acknowledge that the ways of expression of violence are 
plural and even creative, as in certain forms of art expression or dancing. Violence is a way to 
make people react with passion or fear yet too the production of a fear and paralyses inhibits 
them, in the sense of retrenching them into a non-space. A non-space is exactly the opposite of 
a space (where you can express yourself, where there is movement, place to dream, play, 
speak, think and create a new order in the sense of being part of the change, being one of the 
actors). Violence is further arguably productive of a particular space since it is a force field 
made up of interrelated acts that ‘produce a very distinctive kind of space’. This force field 
gives violence its meaning; it is the context in which violence is produced. What is common to 
these interrelated dimensions is ‘the closing down of space’ and what is characteristic each of 
these interrelated dimensions is ‘the production of places in which the other has no mental or 
physical space into which they can retreat, move and express’ themselves without fear and 
impingement.  This is very clearly elaborated in the work of Fanon and Foucault as will be 
unpacked later. 
My thesis is that violence is the production of places in which the other has no mental or 
physical space into which they can retreat and move. In this work, I will see and use the 
concept of violence and homelessness in spatial terms. Moreover, from the above we can 
conclude that homelessness and violence are linked in multiple ways. Those considered not to 
be at home are abused and violated. Whether not at home in a nationalist sense or a normative 
sense (i.e. because they do not fit into notions of heteronormative family), they are open to 
subtle forms of violence from stigmatization, prejudice, and ‘othering’ to more overt forms of 
violence like physical abuse and violence (such as murder and rape). In each of the acts, there 
is a loss of space to retreat into.  
When the home – mental, physical, spiritual or material space – is under attack, regardless of 
the source of violence, be it from within or without the home, there is a demand for submission 
of space, a giving up of space. Home as a site of retreat, is emptied out by the weight of 
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violence. Homelands, my home, my sanctuary, the place from which I come into the world is 
swallowed up by the impact of direct and indirect violence through a forced removal, a taking 
away of the space to express a personal rhythm, different sites of enjoyment and from which to 
feel safe to enter out into the world.  
The extreme manifestation of this is torture and rape. Rape is a form of dehumanisation and 
colonization and extension of male power rather than an act of lust as commonly understood. 
In this regard it is important to consider the fact that rape always goes hand in hand with war 
and the invasion of one country or group by another. With torture and rape the person can no 
longer be a subject of intentionality, no longer able to construct their own representations of 
what it means for them to be a person, but instead they function as a cast out object, homeless. 
In this regard, I would like to mention the work of Nancy Fraser (2009) and Martha Nussbaum 
(2001) and the notions of recognition.  
What we can take from the above, placed alongside the work of Achille Mbembe, Henri 
Lefebvre and Giorgio Agamben is an elaboration of what Sibley (1995) calls the “geography of 
exclusion.” Homelessness is a very specific manifestation of “time-space compression”, 
(Massey 1992:7) namely, the production of spaces in which the other has no space –no mental 
and/or physical space within which to retreat.  Having no mental and/or physical space within 
which to retreat will be seen as the point at which violence and homelessness converge.  
Doreen Massey (1992), who highlights the contributions of economic geographers to the 
debates about home, notes how home and being homeless, is linked to questions of place. 
Location-locality and identity are explained as a response to change, the living through a period 
of economic upheaval, dislocation, fragmentation and break down of “what were once local 
coherencies” (Massey 1992:3).  The emphasis of the argument is the entry into a “new and 
violent phase of time-space compression” (Massey 1992:3). Time-space compression is 
explained in terms of a move from organised to disorganised capitalism, modern to 
postmodern, from industrial to post-industrial, the emergence of multinational, transnational 
and global internationalization of capital. A new world order built upon new technologies of 
communication and ways of doing business.  
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Massey (1992) in effect is offering an understanding of violent time-space compression within 
a Marxist reading. She concludes that the effect of these overlapping powerful forces is a new 
sense of home “produced by capital which comes from somewhere else” (Massey 1992:5). The 
new ordering of space transgresses the old earth boundaries bringing about a rupture of the 
previous link between culture and place. Home is no longer a singular and bounded unique 
entity. Moreover, as Roger Rouse (1992) suggests, the old paradigms, within which people 
situated themselves, for example, via identifications with a mother-tongue, fatherlands, cultural 
identity or even home, are becoming inoperative. So saying, from one perspective one can 
approach the overlap of violence and homelessness within the model of time-space 
compression via the notion of modern homeless migrants living within shifting and blurred 
spatial configurations which remap the architecture of the home and which impinge upon local 
boundaries. As noted by Collins (1995), the changing experience of space and globalisation of 
certain technologies has radically transformed the way people can occupy space and time. We 
are living in an information-saturated culture in which individuals have to renegotiate their 
sense of identity because the excess of signs has necessarily destroyed any coherent sense of 
space and time
47
.  
 
Conclusion 
This chapter has unpacked how historical and contemporary definitions of home and 
homelessness function within a binarism in which home is valorised as the privileged 
normative marker and homelessness is othered, stigmatized and pathologised. Etymological 
work foregrounds the long association of notions of home as with ‘hide’ and heimlich, and 
homelessness as unheimlich, that which is ‘uncovered, naked, shame.’ Iadopt this ambiguous 
and troubling construction of home as ‘hide’ and homelessness as ‘uncovered’ as a way of 
provisionally defining home and homelessness within contemporary contexts that operate 
                                                                                                                                                                                        
 
47
 Indeed, Guy de Lancey (2012, personal communication) argues that time itself may become a heavily contested 
scarcity in the twenty-first century and we may even begin to see economic or military struggle arise over the 
contested interpretation and experience of time. Already the planet is being divided into economic zones that 
operate according to different spatio-temporal co-ordinates, with entire zones demarcated outside standardized 
temporal-economic activity. Resistance to standardized time may well be a site of future struggle. 
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within such a binarism, reproducing then the marginalization and ‘othering’ of the homeless 
and the normative and idealized notion of home. The chapter also placed the body as the 
central concept needed to understand homelessness as the body moves between two poles of 
experience, namely, covered and uncovered (heimlich and unheimlich). Arriving at this point 
leads us into the work of Freud who pushes psychoanalysis in the direction of the uncanny,. 
Through the practice of free association, we arrive upon the site of the uncanny. For Freud, the 
practice of psychoanalysis provided the wandering homeless Jew with a symbolic home.  
This study unearths homelessness as existing along a continuum: at the one end, as a state of 
torture, to be dispossessed and destitute and excluded, specifically the production of negative 
space; and the other end, as something uncanny (unheimlich). Within the latter conception, we 
are pushed in the direction of James Joyce’s atypical citizen, which, as put forward by Klein 
(lecture, 2006), is “the best we can hope for.” Moreover, says Klein (2006), to achieve this 
“heresy” is the duty of every analyst. It is a Freudian, feminist and postcolonial duty to drive 
against the demand of the nation state that all its citizens assimilate to the same set of values 
and that this regulation is built into the Health Professions Council, police and home office.  
Homelessness thought about in a lateral way can be seen in terms of strange loops. In this 
instance, homelessness can be thought about through the use of topologies and descriptive 
illustrations, such as the Möbius band, or as a fold within a fold. At the one extreme (one fold) 
we have forced homelessness and at the other end (another fold), chosen homelessness. 
Understanding the point of intersection, the joining of the two surfaces, such that they become 
one and the same surface, is our challenge. In the rest of the thesis, I look to the work of these 
three theorists, filtered also through the lens of their subjective location in home/homelessness, 
to meet this challenge. 
With Fanon, we will further elaborate the way in which violence operates in the production of 
places in which the other has no mental or physical space into which they can retreat and move.  
Freud and Fanon, as will be shown, reach an impasse, namely, an inability to let go of the 
father as the central mechanism by which to create security and a sense of covering in the face 
of nakedness.  
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CHAPTER THREE 
FREUD: FOR OR AGAINST HOMELESSNESS? 
 
Introduction 
I have never got over the longing for my home (Freud, cited by Grubin, 2005, p. X)  
While Bruno Bettelheim (1990) claims that it is not by chance that psychoanalysis came of age 
in Vienna, Peter Gay (1996) rightly contends that as much as Vienna was conducive to the birth 
of psychoanalysis so too does Freud offer us a valuable testimony to the times in which he 
lived and the class which he belonged to. This includes, as will be argued in this chapter, the 
offering of important insights into the question of the relationship between identity, home, 
migration, racism, homelessness and violence. 
This chapter will argue that in the work of Freud we find identification with nationalist, 
colonialist, masculinist self-constructions. Young Freud identified with generals, explorers, 
archaeologists and anthropologists, as noted by Ranjana Khanna (2003), but in later life, 
possibly as a result of loss, war and anti-Semitism he was no longer able to maintain this 
identification.  If he does identify with anybody in his old age, it is with Moses
48
. In developing 
my argument I shall draw heavily upon the arguments of Sander L Gilman (1993) who is of the 
belief that Freud thought of himself as black and that pyschoanalysis is a response, in part, to 
anti-semitism. 
The goal of this chapter is twofold: firstly, to reread the life and work of Freud from the 
perspective of homelessness. The term homelessness will be linked to the concept of the 
uncanny (unheimlich). The second goal is to provincialize psychoanalysis. To provincialize is 
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 For Freud, the Moses who is described in the Old Testament of the Bible is only one of two bearers of this 
name. While the Bible tells of how the first Moses was murdered, Freud postulates that the second Moses went on 
to establish a monotheistic religion based the cult of Aton, practiced by the Pharaoh Amenotep IV. Perhaps Freud 
identified with both. Perhaps he saw something of a double, something uncanny in this construction. 
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what Khanna (2003), calls the parochialization of European Enlightenment narratives so as to 
understand them both contextually and ethnographically. In line with the work of Richard 
Klein (2000, personal communication), this thesis aims to move beyond the Name of the Father 
– patriachy – as the overridding determinate in the contruction of home.  
 
The pre-Oedipal world of Sigismund Schlomo 
Sigismund Schlomo Freud (1856 – 1940) did not begin his life in Vienna but in Freiberg, 
Moravia. It was a staunchly Catholic rural market town well known for its pilgrimages to the 
Virgin Mary. Young Sigismund Schlomogrew up in a closely-knit extended family in which 
the Freud family all lived in very near proximity to each other. This community existence was 
similar to the traditional living arrangements found in the Jewish ghetto
49
 from which both his 
parents came
50
. Psychoanalytic historians try to understand this period of Freud’s life through 
the use of Freud’s self analysis. These narratives are focused on Freud’s attachment to his 
mother and nanny
51
. 
                                                                                                                                                                                        
49
 The word Ghetto originates from Venice’s ‘Ghetto’ where all Jews were forced to live and were locked in at 
night.  It was an iron foundry (ghetto). 
50 Freud’s mother Amalie Nathansohn who was born in 1835 and lived in Brody in north east Galicia as well as 
lived in Vienna with her parents when she was a child and witnessed the 1848 revolution in which Jewish 
university students played a role (Appingnanesi 1992: 14). 
51 One argument revolves around the death of Freud’s brother and supposition that this resulted in his mother 
Amalia becoming depressed and unavailable.  Freud’s brother, Julius, was born when Freud was eleven months 
old and died eight months later. Julius, Amalia’s second child, was named after her brother who had died shortly 
before the birth. As the family lived in a single room, Freud may have been exposed to his brother’s death.  The 
death of Amalia’s son and brother within such close proximity to each other has lead to the supposition that she 
was emotionally unavailable to young Sigismund Schlomo. It is speculated that the nurse maid became a mother 
substitute. The employment of a nursemaid, especially as the family was not well off, is said to supports the claim. 
However it needs noting that the nanny was employed by Freud’s half brother Emanuel Freud and his wife Maria. 
Deborah Margolis (1995 ) goes so far as to argue that Freud suffered from abandonment fears, resulting in a life 
long clinging to his mother with love and hate whilst at the same time longing for the protection of his father 
against the engulfing tendencies of his mother. This viewpoint is in opposition to the position put forward by other 
biographers that Freud was treated as the chosen child and that he had an especially close relationship with his 
mother, resulting in a sense of self confidence and ability to overcome obstacles.  
The evidence contradicting the absent, neglectful mother hypothesis is the fact that Amalia would have been part 
of the family business, hence the need for a nursemaid. Secondly, we simply do not know how she and the family 
coped with the bereavements, something not out of the ordinary during that time period. Moreover, if it was solely 
a nuclear family, the ‘two-mother’ proposition would hold more validity but extended family networks do not 
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What is absent within these interpretations is 1) an understanding of the manner in which rural 
Jewish community existence functioned as a buffer against the hostile Christian world, a 
protection which was lost to some extent in Vienna; 2) the effects of being subject to a divided 
world – split between the modern secular Jew of the Enlightenment versus the so-called 
primitive Ostjuden.  
Instead of trying to verify or refute the absent mother theory
52
, what is of interest to us is how 
the Freud family renegotiate the meaning of home upon entering Vienna.  In 1859 Freud leaves 
Freiberg and arrives in Vienna, capital of the large Austro-Hungarian Empire, where he would 
remain until his exile in 1938. Freud, as noted by his son, never quite felt at home in Vienna
53
. 
He was not ‘bodenständig’54 but instead he remained a ‘Zugeraster’55 an outsider (Furst 
2001).Clearly, leaving Freiberg, a small market town existence, will have involved a crisis 
                                                          
function in the same manner as nuclear families in the provision of material care and as such it is limiting and 
culturally insensitive to reduce Sigismund Schlomo early life to a two-body/mother-child nuclear (family) setting 
even if Freud advocates that we do so. 
A further point of intrigue is the surprising finding that during this time period Sigismund Schlomo was taken to 
church several times a week by the nanny, which, as Paul C Vitz (1993) notes, is strange as even in most Christian 
homes at the time it would have been unusual, but in a Jewish home, however liberal it would have been quite 
striking. Vitz (1993) goes so far as to claim that the nurse maid, a devout Catholic woman, secretly baptized 
Sigismund Schlomo.  
Another line of speculation is that either his father or mother or the nurse sexually abused Sigismund Schlomo and 
that Amalia had an affair with her step son Phillip. The affair is improbable, as it is behaviour which was not 
consistent with the conduct of religious Jewish women living as part of an extended family network. What is more 
likely, as suggested by the correspondence with Fliess, is that Sigismund Schlomo was eroticized and possibly 
even sexually abused by the nursemaid. If this is true, it is unclear what the effect of this is on Freud and if he 
experienced her behavior as sex abuse.  
 
52
 This is not to negate the fact that the theorizing of presence (fort) and absence (da) plays a central role in 
Freud’s thinking, for example, in the paper Beyond the Pleasure Principle. 
 
53
 In my research I came across a quote by one of Freud’s sons in which he stated that his father never felt at home 
in Vienna. I have not been able to retrace the reference. What I did come across was the work of Burke (2006) 
who contends that Freud’s art collecting can be seen to reflect a deep insecurity and childhood longing for the lost 
ideal, the idyllic existence Moravia, the longed for home. Burke contends that Freud never felt at home in Vienna 
and that his antiquities were objects of mourning. 
 
54
 Rooted in the ground - the Austrian legal term for a person’s belonging to their birthplace, Lilian Furst “Freud 
and Vienna” http://www.vqronline.org/articles/2001/winter/furst-freud-vienna/ 
 
55
 ‘Zugeraster’ in Viennese dialect; the word; a corruption of ‘zugereist’ (travelled there) was the common 
denotation for immigrants, particularly for the East European Jews who flocked to the city in the late 19th and 
early 20th centuries. Lilian Furst “Freud and Vienna” http://www.vqronline.org/articles/2001/winter/furst-freud-
vienna/ 
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marked by a multitude of losses, including a reconfiguration of the meaning of home due to a 
sense of displacement. As an aside we can ponder if Freud’s involvement in the Tivoli 
children’s home in Vienna came about as a result of knowing what it is like to be displaced56. 
This move from the idyllic countryside to Vienna involved what Richard Klein (2006, personal 
communication) calls a crossing, a move away from the extended family/community of the 
Shtetl Yid towards the Westernised bourgeois Jew. “From Sigismund Schlomo to Sigmund 
Freud, which is, in fact, a movement from the complexity of an extended family, where the 
Oedipus is ambiguous to a modern nuclear family, sold to him by the goyim
57
, in which 
Oedipal relations are simplified.”(Klein 2006, personal communication). Within the Freudian 
structure, the extended family and community existence, Gemeinschaft is transformed into a 
structural writing of four terms - child, mother, father, phallus - regulated by a psycho-dynamic 
understanding of nuclear family arrangement and formulated as the law (in the Name of the 
Father) that opposes the desire (for the mother).  
Compare this understanding of the movement from rural to urban setting with Freud’s 
contemporary, Ferdinand Tonnies (1855-1936). For Tonnies (1887) the movement from 
Gemeinschaft to Gesellschaft involved impersonal relations and self-interest, governed by 
bureaucracies and large industrial organizations, replacing relationships based on the interests 
of the community and family and the shared sense of place, belief and kinship (Tonnies 1963). 
The three-year time span that Freud outlines as pre-Oedipal and the beginning of the Oedipus 
can be seen, in an analogous manner, to roughly correlate with the period of his life in Freiberg. 
The significance of this for Freud, using his own logic, is that the Freiberg years of an Ostjuden 
and of an extended family existence, can be read as analogous to what Freud calls the 
prehistoric epoch and savage societies. For Freud the pre-Oedipal years are equivalent to the 
prehistoric and primitive. For him the lives of children, neurotics and savages correspond. The 
development of the individual repeats the phases of development, evolution, of the human race 
- ontogeny replicates phylogeny. Consider Freud’s bold claim: “Those whom we describe as 
savages or half-savages; and their mental life must have a peculiar interest for us if we are right 
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 Anna Freud’s involvement in children is probably the central determinate. 
57
 Gentiles 
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in seeing in it a well-preserved picture of the early stage of our own development” 
(Freud,1915: 53). 
When Freud discusses the prehistoric savage man he is in fact talking about the Ostjuden and 
his own extended family existence. As such the crossing into Vienna for Freud, it seems, 
involved a movement from primitive man – the savage Ostjuden, and Dark Ages - into the Age 
of Enlightenment and Jewish liberation, structured around the Name of the Father, for Freud 
the Emperor. This movement, explained below, involved many crossings for Freud. With the 
migration to Vienna from Freiberg something repressed, unconscious – the Ostjuden –casts an 
uncanny shadow over the white nuclear family life in Vienna and what constitutes the home. 
 
Vienna: Father Joseph and the world of male conquest 
This renegotiation of the meaning of home came about due to a profound repositioning in the 
world for Freud. This repositioning in the world was not only due to the move from a small 
rural community and extended family existence to a modern city such as Vienna, but was also 
caused by the more marked and direct impact of the emerging ideology of nationalism, a 
shifting cultural map due to modernity and the changing face of capitalism that were strongly 
felt in the city. The Freud family, as part of the massive influx and movement of immigrants 
from across Europe, entered Vienna at the height of imperialism. It was an aristocratic age, the 
world of kings and queens, of emperors and of male conquest, discovery and assertion of a 
patriarchal order.  
The movement from Freiberg to Vienna was over-determined and could be understood as 
including many crossings for Freud: pre-Oedipal maternal space into a patriarchal social order 
determined by the father
58
, unbound space to bound space,the move from rural to urban, from 
Ostjuden to secular Jew, wandering Jew to German nationalist, extended family and 
                                                                                                                                                                                        
58
 Within the Freudian reading it is a movement from unbound space - a part object pre-Oedipal primitive world - 
into structured bound space, structured by the complex dynamic relationship between four terms – mother, child, 
father and phallus – in which patriarchy is determining and in which the law in Name of the Father reconfigures 
what went before.  Richard Klein (2006) refers to this as movement from ambiguous oedipal configurations to that 
of the clear Oedipus centred on the Name of the Father and phallus. The clear Oedipus is a reduction, attempt to 
provide order into what is seen as chaos – female desire. 
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community networks to a nuclear family context, Yiddish to German, Dark Ages to the 
Enlightenment, animism and religion to science, Afrikan (Egyptian) to European, working 
class to aspiring bourgeois existence, God the father to the Emperor as father, male (patriarchy) 
order to different kind of male (patriarchy) order
59
. 
As part of this movement from the Dark Ages to the Enlightenment we have the putting into 
question of traditional religion. Consider the effects of Emperor Franz Joseph’s attempt to 
break the stronghold of religion, in particular the Catholic Church, such that the role religion 
played, including the sanctity, retreat that religion previously provided for some, was now put 
into question. Franz Joseph’s attack on the pre-Enlightenment religious ordering of the world 
was a threat to both Catholics and orthodox Jews but for different reasons. For Jews it was to 
dislodge religious signification and place more of an emphasis on ethnic dimensions of being a 
Jew. For many Jews, Jewish culture would now become the site of retreat that religion once 
provided. Put another way, the metaphorical and symbolic home created in part through 
scholarly pursuit, through Talmudic studies and religious rituals, was confronted with a new 
reference point, German nationalism, modernity, Enlightenment and bourgeois existence.  The 
structure determining the new Jewish home, decreed by Franz Joseph, attempted to wipe out 
the old reference points and place belief in him, the new father, as the new reference point. 
The timing of the entry of the Freud family into Vienna coincided with this brief and intense 
era of political liberalism and emancipation of Jews that resulted in the decree in 1861. This 
granted Jewish people political and economic rights not previously held. It drew to a close in 
the 1880s. It was a unique moment in Jewish history, a moment full of promise and anticipation 
of new beginnings. This time period of political liberalism and social reform in Vienna created 
economic possibilities and brought about a massive wave of Jewish immigrants, in particular, 
Ostjuden. During the 1860s it is estimated around 17,541 of those who came from the east 
crammed into the overcrowded Jewish quarter of Vienna, Leopoldstadt
60
, which was 
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 The most consistent variable in the movement from a rural Jewish existence into Vienna is the rule of men.  
However, as Gilman notes the Jewish male and his masculinity where under attack. Gilman argues that Freud 
projected the projections onto Jewish men onto hysterical women. 
60
 Spiro Kostof (2004) observes that with the shifting boundaries of Vienna it became increasingly difficult to keep 
the imperial court and upper classes isolated from the working class. In 1857, a year before Freud moved to 
Vienna, Franz Joseph ordered the abolition of the enclosure and fortification of the inner city and in its placed 
construct the great Ringstrasse, which for all its urban civility did not in fact unite the centre and periphery, such 
that the old military boundaries where replaced by a sociological - class and ethnic – belt (Kostof 2004:53). 
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partitioned off from the rest of Vienna. The Freud family, who moved to Vienna in 1859, were 
amongst the immigrant and rural Ostjuden who poured into Leopoldstadt (Klein 1985:9) in the 
hope of finding work and a life free from oppression, and the pogroms
61
. 
Emancipation
62
 brought about complete equality and justice before the law, freedom of faith, 
movement, choice of occupation, right of ownership and residence. Jews were no longer 
subjected to scrutiny by the military police, nor to economic restraints or restriction of 
movement, and were allowed to possess property as well as have unlimited occupational 
choices (Klein 1985:4). Preceding these laws, there was a long history of persecution of Jews 
in Vienna and Europe resulting in homelessness. The history of Jewish persecution includes 
Jewish people being forced to wander stateless, live apart and wear distinctive clothing. They 
were forcibly evicted and often killed. We can recall here the Pileum Cornutum of 1267, by 
which Jews were forced to wear a cone shaped headdress in addition to a badge. By 1625 Jews 
were forced to move into ghettos. The persecution of Jews in Vienna formed part of a European 
historical anti-Semitism that was centuries old. Christianity fuelled this hatred and drove 
forward anti-Semitism (Gilman and Katz 1991:15). 
In the seventeenth century there was the propagation of the stereotype of the ‘Wandering Jew’ 
– a homeless person doomed to wander the earth without a home as punishment for killing 
Christ. Homelessness in this equation is equivalent to sin. Outcast, excommunicated Jews were 
subject to direct and indirect racism, to a chain of hostile acts built upon stereotypes and myths, 
for example, generalizing from a single case to all Jews, this resulting in unchallenged name 
calling, prejudices, discrimination, harassment, victimization and structural violence.  Not 
having the same access to the law, Jews, like refugees, gypsies and sex workers in many parts 
                                                          
Interestingly, as noted by Bettleheim, in 1881 the Ring Theatre burned down with a great loss of life, the Empire 
decreed that on the site of the destroyed theatre there should rise a new residential building called Suhnhaus 
(House of Atonement). The greatest Viennese architect of the time designed the building. Despite the rent being 
beyond Freud's means he moved in. Freud was then to receive a letter from the Emperor as his child was the first 
born in the building “bringing life into a place where so many lives have been lost.” (Bettleheim 1990: 11, 12). 
61
 This term designates attacks against Jews and other ethnic minorities living in Europe. It is from the Russian 
word pogrom denoting a massive and violent attack and destruction of people, their homes, business and religious 
centres. 
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 Emancipation begins in the 1800’s and accelerated with the decrees, during Freud’s life time. With the liberal 
National Basic Law of 1867, new administrators put into play the most liberal steps ever taken in the history of the 
empire. 
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of the world today, were seen as legitimate targets of violence.  
The Jew was subjected to many hateful projections. There was overt and covert disadvantaging 
of Jews due to oppression, systemic institutional racism and misuse of power
63
. The overall 
effect was one in which many Jews lived in fear and were subjected to violence and expulsion 
from their homes resulting in physical and mental homelessness (New Internationalist 2004).A 
further dimension of this homelessness included the colonization of mental space and 
internalised self oppression in which Jews, like the Irish, can be seen as the colonized 
Europeans. An extreme example of this colonization was in 1421, many Jews were forcibly 
baptised, which formed part of a wider campaign to destroy the entire Jewish community. They 
were people who were deemed backward due to their reluctance to embrace modernity. As 
Cuddihy (1974: 64) argues: 
Freud came out of the Jewish Middle Ages only to enter the Jewish middle classes, entering a highly 
developed and developing Europe, coming from behind, like Marx; he developed a modernization 
‘complex.’  The very ’backwardness’ of shtetl Yiddishkeit gave its sons a kind of perspective from 
behind....To accept the achievement of Western modernization at its own self-estimation, would have 
been to downgrade themselves…What was normal in the shtetl Gemeinschaft looked bad in the 
West…The problem renews itself again and again, as ‘Jewish Emancipation’ occurs…Freud and Marx 
will have elements of this Hegelian developmental model within their work which allow for universal 
assumptions. 
 
Assimilation or excommunication 
Vienna, a proudly modern city with its newly established institution of the coffeehouse, where 
the elite would meet and exchange ideas (Furst 1994), was hostile towards newcomers. This 
modern city - “modern with the connotation of “unprecedented’” (Miller 1997: 59) - could not 
have been more of an extreme contrast to the Ostjuden ghettoes from which the Freud family 
came. The Viennese Jews found themselves split into different camps, 1) East/West as well as 
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 Further examples of Christian persecution include historical revisionism in which Jews were presented as the 
demonic other - the ‘black Judas’ responsible for the death of Jesus. There was the murder of Jews, on route to 
‘liberate’ Jerusalem from Islam, in the 11th century, by the crusaders. The Inquisition that established the notion of 
blood purity - anybody with an eighth Jewish blood was considered impure, even if they converted to Christianity. 
There was the blaming of the Jews for the plague that ravaged Europe in the Middle Ages, this leading to mob 
lynching all over Europe. 
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2) Modern/Orthodox. This split was ideologically informed, on the one hand by the Reform 
movement, as advocated by people like the German Abraham Geiger
64
, and, on the other hand, 
by people like the orthodox rabbi, Samson Hirsch, who staunchly opposed the Reform 
movement
65
. There were also those in between, like Isaac Weiss who taught at the Vienna 
religious school, the Beit Hamidrashand believed in a combination of tradition and secular 
culture.  
While Vienna, at its liberal moment, seemed to offer freedom, emancipation and the possibility 
to put down roots, at the same time came at a huge cost, namely, of having to assimilate into 
Christianity and to discard many dimensions of Jewish identity, thus facilitating a cultural 
homelessness. So-called Jewish emancipation began at the end of the eighteenth century. In 
France Robespierre believed Jews needed regeneration as they were born into degradation. The 
Constituent Assembly in France provided for total emancipation of Jewish people in 1791 
(Cohn-Sherbok 2002:182). In the nineteenth century France took on the role of so-called 
protector and emancipator of Jews throughout Europe. Yet as Cohn-Sherbok (2002: 182) 
reminds us that in Napoleon’s view, Jews were: “objectionable people, chicken hearted and 
cruel…caterpillars, grasshoppers, who ravage the country side”. The ‘solution’ to prevent Jews 
from having a deleterious effect on society lay in the abolition of Jewry by dissolving it into 
Christianity (Cohn-Sherbok 2002:183). 
In other places in Europe, like Italy, Jews were forced to live in ghettos, while in Vienna the 
Germanic Federation discussed the Jewish question and agreed to grant Jews those rights 
accorded by the French under Napoleon. In sum, emancipation meant assimilation, the 
breeding out of Jewishness (Cohn-Sherbok 2002:184). 
For the secular Jew trying to assimilate, any reminder of the past was met with hostility due to 
a fear of, once again, being cast out, stigmatised and homeless. For Jews coming to Vienna - as 
with Muslim people in the UK today – pressure to discard one’s ancestors and identify home 
with the nation-state was immense. In effect, people were faced with a double bind to either 
                                                                                                                                                                                        
 
64
 One of the founders of the Juedisch-Theologisches Seminar  in Breslau, the first reform rabbinical seminary in 
Central Europe. 
65
 Compare his philosophical texts, Horeb and Nineteen Letters of Ben Uziel, and his commentaries on the Bible. 
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assimilate and lose their cultural heritage or maintain their cultural heritage and become an 
outcast. Diller (1991:15) describes such duality and the limited success flowing from it:  
To assimilate meant making oneself acceptable to mainstream society, and this required not only rejecting 
Jewish tradition, but also meticulously changing ones appearance, behaviour, language, and general 
demeanour to mimic gentile ways. But even these efforts were no guarantee of social acceptance. 
 
Self-betterment: a man of virtue 
The Vienna Freud grew up in was one fondly presented by the Viennese as the cultural capital 
of Europe. The development of these products of high culture - schools in medicine
66
, art 
history and music - mirrored the political transformations of Europe and colonization of the 
world (Carl Schorske 1979: xxvi). This argument concurs with Christopher Lane (1988) who is 
of the belief that the developments in high culture could only occur through Europe’s 
relationship with the colonies. 
The Viennese intelligentsia and bourgeois elite of the late nineteenth century took pride in their 
scientific explorations and venerated the products of so-called ‘high culture’. Their exploration 
of science included a fascination with the ‘abnormal’ - mental illness and sexual problems – 
and their excessive snobbery manifested itself amongst other things in acute attention to a 
                                                                                                                                                                                        
66 Psychoanalysis is a product of the new age in both a political, economic and technological sense. The new age, 
said to be founded upon events like the wars of the 1700’s, industrial revolution, the birth of the textile industry in 
1760 with Arkwright’s spinning machine and steam engines also saw the beginnings of modern medicine due to 
medical advances, including Boerhaave pioneering of medical chemistry. Psychoanalysis grows out of these new 
develops, alongside developments in literature. Within the field of medicine there was a move away from the 
authority of the book and move towards examination of actual patients, as well as the development of bedside 
manner. For the first time the poor were regarded as having the right to medical treatment. The first case histories 
developed in hospitals in which doctors could compare progress of different patients suffering from the same 
diseases. Auenbrugger developed a new form of diagnosis, the taping a patient’s chest and listening to the sound 
as a way of judging the internal condition. Pathology developed as a new science as a result of the work of 
Morgagni. This resulted in the post-mortem examinations to compare the internal effects of the disease with the 
case histories of the patient. A relationship between disease and changes in bodily organs took place. Hunter 
founded modern surgery and his pupil Jenner found the science of immunology through the development of 
vaccines against small pox. This gradually lead to improvements in the insanitary slums of the growing industrial 
cities and improvement of water supplies, more effective sewage disposal systems and compulsory notification of  
infectious disease like TB. If one is to unpack the discursive elements implicated within these advancements - 
medical chemistry, bedside manner, examination of actual patients, case histories, and new forms of diagnosis, 
pathology and post-mortem examinations - at the very least one could speak of a the development of a new system 
of relationships in which the working class now find themselves privilege to have their internal world examined 
and noted upon by the representatives of the age of Enlightenment. 
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person’s social standing and their appreciation of the ‘fine’ things of life. Stefan Zweig, a Jew 
and friend of Freud, writing about this time period, comments on the Viennese desire for 
artistic supremacy, and the desire of poor people and Jewish people to be culturally accepted. 
As Zweig (1943: 21, 27) elaborates:  
There is hardly a city in Europe where the drive towards cultural ideals was as passionate as in Vienna. 
Precisely because the monarchy, because Austria itself for centuries has been neither politically ambitious 
nor particularly successful in its military actions, the native pride had turned more strongly towards the 
desire for artistic supremacy. 
A Viennese who had no sense of art or who found no enjoyment in form was unthinkable in ‘good 
society.’ Even in the lower circles, the poorest drew a certain instinct for beauty out of the landscape and 
out of the merry human sphere into his life; one was not a real Viennese without a love for 
culture….Adapting themselves to the milieu of the people or country where they live is not only an 
external protective measure for Jews, but a deep internal desire. Their longing for a homeland, for rest, 
for security, for friendliness, urges them to attach themselves passionately to the culture of the world 
around them. 
In the case of Freud’s experience, the demand to assimilate needs to be comprehended from the 
perspective of the newly emerged bourgeois culture. Bourgeois culture, with its advocacy of 
‘high culture’, believed self-betterment to be a universal ideal that everybody should subscribe 
to. The demand for such self-betterment occurred alongside the distinction that was made 
between private lordship and public lordship, or, as it was also expressed, the distinction 
between the ‘affairs of the individuals’ and ‘public affairs.’ Achille Mbembe (2001: 36) argues 
as follows: 
(this shift of) ... affairs of  individuals should be dissociated from the affairs of the ecclesiastical power, 
or that the affairs of the ecclesiastical  power are not the same as the affairs of the secular power, led to 
the establishment of laws with the purpose of, on the one hand,  to put an end to the power of customs, 
traditions, and authorities perceived as  unjust and tyrannical, and, on the other, to secure an area of 
private freedom by distinguishing it from public sovereignty; this is the context in which the notion of 
civility emerged, standing in opposition to the notion of barbarism and, through barbarism, cruelty and 
tyranny It is in this sense that the origins of the idea of civil society lie in the debate over the relationship 
between right and force. 
Whereas, previously, the community functioned as an extended family/home, now the home, in 
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its turn, became identified with private affairs
67
. This not only marked a clear distinction 
between public and private life, but transformed the status of communal existence. The aim 
was to secure an area of private freedom by distinguishing it from public sovereignty; home 
ownership offered itself as a private space into which men
68
 could retreat and feel safe and 
secure.  
Public sovereignty occurred in the context of civility, which was believed to stand in opposition 
to barbarism.  The public/private divide went hand-in-hand with the emergence of the 
bourgeois classes and their way of living, which allowed for greater privacy. It also went hand-
in-hand with the construction of the concept of the unconscious. To be part of this new world 
order was not solely determined by economics, but it also meant taking on and succumbing to a 
new set of values and moral code of conduct. Up until the eighteenth century European 
society’s image was intricately linked with class divisions, which took its shape, not only 
around a range of material issues such as property and contracts, but also around relations of 
subordination and violence. As Mbembe (2001:36) puts it: 
[U]ntil the eighteenth century, the general image of society was inseparable from the conflicts dividing 
the various classes of men. These conflicts coalesced not simply around issues such as property (who has 
exclusive and absolute right to use, enjoy and dispose of what), successions (to whom should a 
deceased’s estate be transmitted), contracts (on what conditions are agreements between individuals 
valid) or civil status. They also touched on the forms that relations of subordination and violence 
assumed. 
Mbembe (2001) points out how this society then developed law in order, initially, to deal with 
such issues of subordination and violence in particular, but soon law, thus developed, would be 
applied to a broader range of issues in civil society. The new laws were initially chiefly 
concerned with any act of violence, of crime or murder, but they very quickly came to embrace 
other areas such as the correct codes of conduct. Thus it can be said that at the origin of civil 
society is an attempt to control violence. 
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 A space still controlled by men. 
 
68
 It is questionable as to how much safety private space provided for middle-class Western women, especially 
considering the extensive literature demanding a space women could call a room of their own without having to 
committee suicide or go insane. Consider another contemporary of Freud’s, Adeline Virginia Woolf (née Stephen; 
25 January 1882 – 28 March 1941). 
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Mbembe (2001: 37) tells us that: 
According to Norbert Elias, civility is inseparable from court society and transformations of the European 
absolutist state. Court society was characterised by, amongst other matters, the lack of distinction 
between public and private life (the sphere of the intimate and the secret), and the distance that had 
constantly to be maintained between the king or queen and his or her nobility, between master or mistress 
and domestics. 
Mbembe (2001: 38) informs us that civility inseparable from issues relating to the court and to 
transformations of the European absolutist state. He shows that the critique of the state, law, 
and society pursued all through the eighteenth century took place in parallel with another line 
of criticism: the critique of manners and vices and the ability of the emerging “bourgeois elites 
to imitate the manners of court nobility.” Civility, or etiquette and rules of ceremony reshaped 
affectivity, i.e. the general state of how emotions and the practices they are assumed to 
determine will be regulated in society. Such affectivity, for instance respect for rules, 
censorship of feelings and control over spontaneous impulses constituted the cardinal rules of 
civility. This ideology evolved into a range of ideas of what constituted refinement, sociability, 
and rules of courtesy and urbanity. Amongst the competing bourgeois elite, the ability to 
present as a person (usually seen as man) of breeding and refinement offered them a platform 
from which to imitate the manners of court nobility
69
, thereby opening up previously 
inaccessible career possibilities. These moral codes functioned as a binding agreement, a 
control of conduct, and unofficially society was now regulated, in part, by the demands of high 
culture (Mbembe 2001: 36-38) and identification with the ideals of the upper classes. This 
culture, notions of civility was also male, with femininity functioning as something excessive, 
irrational, unthinkable and dangerous.  
Donald Sassoon (2006) argues that the bourgeois were driven by an inferiority complex 
towards the aristocracy, on the one hand and by their own desire for success on the other. These 
two aspects, combined, resulted in an expansion of the middle classes, helped along by factors 
such as the emerging market for self-improvement books. Sassoon (2006) notes that there was 
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 This form of indirect government, in the sense of Foucault’s govern mentality, layout the domain - civil society - 
lying between the private sphere of the family and the official sphere of the state as suggested by G W Hegel. It 
leads to Western distinctions around what was public and private and how to conduct oneself in public. Simply 
put, to tame and groom, what Freud speaks in relation to the constructing of the social bond, the production of 
shame and disgust. 
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a resulting abundance of books on themes such as how to increase one’s cultural capital - and 
on rules about how to speak and write correctly, and how to behave towards one’s peers and 
one’s inferiors.  Sassoon (2006) observes that this expanding market, accompanied by new 
routes of access to a new form of capital, cultural capital, via print material, opened its doors to 
new entrants. Thus there was an opportunity for the hitherto excluded.  
In this context the Jewish population “took their chance with remarkable success” 
(Sassoon2006:20) and soon they were overly represented, compared to other ethnic groups, in 
the various professions which demanded a university education and a certain social standing. 
Needless to say, the ways of the Ostjuden would have been an embarrassment and also threat to 
those presenting themselves of being of a certain social standing. Not surprisingly Freud too 
wanted to take his chances and be part of the bourgeoisie’s world of male high culture.  
Freud displayed tastes, which were resolutely Victorian and Anglophile, provincial, 
conservative (Lewes 1998: 24, 89) and male. These values he assimilated resulted in him 
allegedly refraining from talking to his children about sex and reprimanding one of his sons, 
Oliver, for masturbating. Overtly, Freud seems to have conformed to the Viennese 
preoccupation with decorum and fitting male etiquette. His meticulous presentation of himself 
conformed to the modern dress code of the day. Such bigotry and provincialism was in tension, 
however with Freud’s belief in the freedom of thought and in universalism – a contradictory 
trait he shared with the Jewish community (Bettleheim 1956: 243) and his willingness to listen 
to and be guided by women like Fanny Moser
70
 and advocate for the rights of homosexuals.  
Clearly, we have the Freud who presents himself to the world as the male scientist and doctor, 
Freud the open minded, liberal and radical thinker but also the provincial and conservative 
middle-class man. William Reich in an interview with Eissler speaks of Freud as somebody 
who “lived a very calm, quiet, decent family life’’ (Reich 1967: 20). At the same time Reich 
(1967: 21, 60-63) speaks of Freud as somebody deeply frustrated and alone.  
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 Fanny Moser, a strong willed person who may have killed her husband, basically told Freud to stop imposing 
the hypnotic method, to shut up and “let her tell me what she had to say. I fell in with this.” (Appingnanesi 1992: 
95). In truth it seems it was not so much a willingness but involved a monumental struggle for Freud (perhaps 
counter-transference) in which he struggles against the desire to impinge upon the mental space of women, so 
much so, that it is argued that in the case of Dora the ‘cure’ involved her having courage to walk out of the 
treatment. 
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He gave up his personal pleasures, his personal delights, in the middle years…. As if he had to ‘bite 
something down.’…First, he was caught with his pupils and his association. He couldn’t move any more. 
And, second, he was caught personally…He was alone and lonesome…  
Freud had a severe conflict with Judaism. Here, he was bound down, too. On the one hand, out of protest 
against the persecution he suffered he had maintained very bravely and very courageously that he was a 
Jew.  But he wasn’t. Freud was not a Jew… He didn’t want to a Jew. Never. He wasn’t Jewish. I never 
felt he was Jewish… A Jew is somebody who behaves in a Jewish way, either nationally or religiously, 
who is bound up with his customs, who speaks the Jewish language, who lives in it, thrives in it, and so 
on…Freud was really German. His style, his thinking, his interests, everything was German. And, here he 
was torn apart. On the one hand he was a Zionist. On the other hand, he was German.  
Finally, for Reich (1967: 66) his lasting impression of Freud was that of a “caged animal. And 
that’s what he was. Any man of his greatness, of his vivacity, of his spirit, who knew what he 
wanted and landed where he did would have behaved like that, like a caged animal”. 
There is however Freud the private man. This is the man of dreams, the writer and politician 
who speaks out on the rights of homosexuals and takes women’s suffering, seriously. Then 
there is the older Freud who differs from the young Freud who acted without shame in 
following his desire to discover and reveal the unconscious. There is in later years an even 
older withdrawn man who spends more and more time pondering the Jewish connection to the 
Egyptians. Here we have the withdrawn Freud, suffering from the loss of his daughter and 
living with cancer, a person deeply devoted and connected to his beloved dogs. There is no one 
singular Freud; instead he is truly psychodynamic, filled with ambivalences and contradictions, 
but in a way that enables him to be hugely productive and insightful.  
Within these contradictions and in his encounter with female desire lies the life and work of 
Sigmund Freud.  Moreover, when Freud speaks about the withdrawal of outside investment 
from the world back into the ego, it is possible this retreat includes a longing to feel at home. It 
is this longing for sense of home
71
, that is to say, a desire to overcome a sense of dislocation, 
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 But what does home refer to? A host of supporting statements, as noted by Edward Said (2003), indict that this 
was not a longing for a Jewish state, something other biographers contest by pointing out Freud’s son’s 
involvement in Zionism and a personal dedication to Herzl in a book Freud gave him. This contested ground in 
which Zionist and non-Zionist battle over where to scatter Freud’s remains, incorrectly assume that the debate is 
about the state of Israel. Home in Freud becomes the uncanny. 
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that casts an uncanny shadow over Freud‘s life in Vienna and yearning to be able to live with 
the contradictions that made up his life and produced his genius.  
 
The international division of labour and the question of homelessness, 
migrancy and being a refugee 
Freud’s life has many features similar to the present day immigrant and refugee. Immigration 
offered opportunity of economic survival, but also involves an identity crisis and the disruption 
and reconfiguration of previous family and cultural arrangements. Myrna-Ann Atkins and 
Dijana Rizvanovic (2001: personal communication) note that the process of acculturation 
which faces the immigrant and refugee family brings with it major family disruption in which 
past cultural traditions no longer function as a resource as they did before. Many families - and 
possibly Freud’s family included - simply do not survive this challenge and a disjuncture 
between the values of the parents and young people opens up, as does sometimes occur 
between the husband and wife. 
What has been overlooked in thinking about Freud is the question all refugee and immigrant 
children face: where and how to situate the home and how to link the question of dwelling to 
identity. In understanding the time period in which Freud matured, specifically the response of 
secular Jews and gentiles to Ostjuden, a parallel can be drawn with the conflict Muslim 
children experience in London today with the demand to assimilate. It can be speculated that, 
for the landless East European Jews in the eighteen hundreds, the Jewish community (kehillah) 
and its cultural/ritual practices functioned as a vital resource and a form of self-governing that 
enabled them to cope with displacement and find a sense of home. However, for the young 
Sigmund, like the contemporary refugee or Muslim children in London, the old ways and 
customs were not welcomed and were seen as that which stopped them from getting ahead. The 
dress code of the Hasidic Ostjuden, beard, robes and hair styles, akin to the present day veil of 
the Muslim, was a red flag to the community at large and an unwelcome reminder to the 
assimilated Jew that dimensions of their ethnicity, religion and ancestry, would not be tolerated 
and could not be assimilated.  
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The Freud family formed part of the poor ‘rural exodus’, which, as Antonio Gramsci (1971: 
357) reminds us in his Prison Notebooks, needs to be understood in “precise economic 
terms…understood from the point of view of the international division of labour.” While the 
one overriding factor which determined the influx of Jews into Vienna was political 
emancipation, the other was economic. Jewish liberation, while called emancipation, it was not 
emancipation as this is commonly understood but a demand to assimilate.  The international 
division of labour, Freud lived through, was a time epitomized by the rapid growth of industrial 
capital. The profits of capital were brought about through manufacturing - especially, but not 
only in Britain that laid claim to being the ‘Workshop of the World’. It was a time period 
marked by imperial trade relations and financial capitalism. Economic growth went hand-in-
hand with racial discrimination. With reference to the Enlightenment, it is important to 
remember that in spite of the positive elements that Freud favoured, i.e. the loss of faith
72
 in 
traditional religious authority as the determining force for getting ahead, it was through the 
Enlightenment that racism was institutionalized. The concept of race, which entered Western 
thought as part of the scientific
73
-ideological
74
 classificatory system, of the 17-century and 
Enlightenment map of the world, was reinforced by theories of degeneracy and binary 
classification that created practices of exclusion and ideologies that justified violence and 
exploitation.  
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 From the perspective of the orthodox Jew he or she who does not fulfil the Torah way of life is not a fulfilled 
person and instead is not fulfilled. Is it possible that Freud took god out the equation but still tried to create a 
Torah way of life through the psychoanalytic community? 
 
73
 Most notably the botanist Carolus Linneus classification of all known organisms into two large groups: the 
kingdoms Plantae and Animalia. 
 
74
 This process builds upon the divisions that emerge with the Renaissance art which not only brought into being 
new definitions of space – for example the ‘hole in the wall’ and ‘eye witness’ (linear) perspective - through the 
embrace of geometry but also saw the advent of high cultural in which the author/artist is a noble profession and 
no longer a medieval craft. The authors of ‘high culture’ become those with a higher perspective able to classify 
the world and build the ground for science and colonization. Science and colonization becomes the means to 
classify objects due to a higher perspective of the world that parallels Western Rational (High) culture. Through 
the Enlightenment racism was institutionalisation. For Vekony (2011: 20) the art work and its ‘divine 
resemblances' brought about a belief in the “artist messiah”, a genius with “exceptional talent soaring above the 
constraints of the human mind and language....The idea of the artist messiah, the elevated status of the work of art 
supported by formalist criticism and the concept of the genius, were all put into practice by the institution of the 
modernist museums.” Vekony (2011: 39). These colonialist institutions fit with what Foucault calls the human 
sciences claims to scientifically know the truth about, people. 
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It was a historical period in which industry demanded new technologies and new ways of 
organising work. The labour market had replaced feudal obligations, with the result that older 
notions of mercantile protectionism gave way to ‘free trade’ and a culture of competition. 
Expansion became subordinate to the demands of commerce, industry and growth of Imperial 
rivalries. While Europe had measured its wealth in terms of gold and silver storage, in reality it 
was black gold - slavery and cheap exploitable labour and new exploitable lands - that played a 
decisive role in transforming commercial capitalism into industrial capitalism.  
Profit through investment meant that industrial capitalism evolved into an economy driven by 
financiers who administrated the shape of industry. The growth of Imperial rivalries (1875 -
1945) and the expansion of Europe, alongside the subordination of commerce to industry 
demands meant that commercial rivalry assumed the more dangerous form of national rivalry 
with the implied and applied threat of the state forced to defend the ‘national’ interests 
(Panayiotopoulos and Capps 2001: xx). 
Gone were the feudal days in which peasant labour and taxes to the Crown gave the poor a 
right to landholding (Panayiotopoulos and Capps 2001: 15), that is to say, a home as part of 
their bondage. For those not born into the owning class, or not able to force their way into the 
emerging professional middle classes, homelessness loomed large. The result was a shift in the 
parameters of bondage from that of the landholding home to the homeland in which the 
Vaderland offered the ‘common people’ employment possibilities and by implication a home.  
The advances of global capitalism as noted by King (1990) brought about the international 
movement of labour and a spatial patterning of relationships taken by a particular mode of 
production and capitalist accumulation and urbanisation. For Marx, as stated in the Communist 
Manifesto, the spectre haunting Europe. Urbanization brought about a new design of cities, 
often of an arbitrary dimension, following the demands of capital and the need to 
accommodate, as well as exploit, the influx of people to the cities. In the past, cities in the West 
possessed forms and characteristics which were peculiar to each city. With the pressures of the 
new industrial age and the economic markets the formation of the city took on a shape that 
served economic interests as opposed to that of the inherent shape particular to the city 
(Chermayeff and Alexander 1963: 51). 
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Freud had moved from a small rural setting and an extended family arrangement into a large 
city subjected to new economic pressures and structural arrangements, including the physical 
environment in which he lived - on the outskirts of the city - away from the centre. Despite the 
arbitrary development of the city due to economic demands, the outsider, foreigner, found 
themselves confined to the outskirts of the city with the hope - promise of emancipation – that 
they could cross the line and join the new order of economic privilege, provided that Freud 
assimilated and discarded his past. This included disowning his father, so as to adopt a new 
Western and middle-class patriarchal order.  
 
Coming out as a Jew 
It is the fact that the colonized are oppressed by the preformed stereotypical image of themselves 
propagated by the colonizer that makes their alienation unique. They are not only thrown into a world not 
of their making, they are thrown there as those incapable of making meaning, as those whose meaning 
has already been defined as abject and less than fully human (Oliver 2004:26). 
Identification within a Lacanian reading is premised on a misidentification, a forced symmetry 
that attempts to cover over the gaps of asymmetry (Lacan: 1977). We can see such a 
misidentification with Freud, given the way he negates his past and instead constructs his 
identity, his sense of self, through identification with the bourgeois European man of science. 
Through taking on the attributes of the bourgeois European men of science, Freud, unlike the 
black person, was able to hide what made him an outsider and potentially an outcast, homeless, 
that is: he could to some extent hide his Jewishness.  
Marthe Robert (1974) refers to Freud as a “man of two cultures,” the culture he inherited and 
the acquired culture (Robert 1974: 59).We can draw a comparison here between Freud and 
W.E.B. du Bois, a pioneering Black Consciousness writer. W.E.B. du Bois the author of Souls 
of Black Folk, like Freud, struggled with being the foreigner within. Du Bois’ cry: “Why did 
God make me an outcast and a stranger in my own house?” (Du Bois 1994: 2) could have been 
Freud’s, without of course the reference to God. Freud probably did not know about his 
contemporary, but his struggle with being a man of two cultures and feeling like a stranger 
within his homeland, can be reframed by Dubois’ concept of Double Consciousness, whereby 
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one’s sense of consciousness is dramatically affected through seeing yourself through the eyes 
of the other. As Du Bois (1994: 2) puts it:  
It is a peculiar sensation, this double-consciousness, this sense of always looking at one's self through the 
eyes of others, of measuring one's soul by the type of a world that looks on in amused contempt and pity. 
One ever feels his twoness, --an American, a Negro; two souls, two thoughts, two un-reconciled strivings; 
two warring ideals in one dark body, whose dogged strength alone keeps it from being torn asunder. The 
history of the American Negro is the history of this strife, – this longing to attain self-conscious 
manhood, to merge his double self into a better and truer self. 
Du Bois is contented to be both Afrikan and American, not so with the young Freud. Dennis 
Klein (1985) presents the young Freud as somebody especially sensitive to social rejection. 
Klein (1985: 42) informs us that when his close friend Weiss committed suicide in 1883, Freud 
spoke of a “horror”’ and “shame” about being a Jew, a feeling built upon the fear that the act of 
suicide by a Jew would re-affirm the low estimation of Jews. Not wanting to stand out as a 
Jew, or more precisely, as an Ostjuden, Freud, went so far as to adopt anti-Semitic views in his 
adolescence. As noted by Klein (1985) upon entering university he changed his name and 
joined the radical German student society – Leseverein der Deutschen Studenten (1873) – 
which represented German interests at the university. He remained a member of this society 
until it was dissolved - two years later - in 1875. 
Freud deeply identified with the Enlightenment project and modernity.  He was especially 
proud of his command of the German language and in fact was probably one of those Billroth 
cited as a masquerading German, the equivalent of the contemporary coconut– brown outside, 
white inside. He attempted to break away from his Ostjuden heritage, which he called an ‘alien 
race.’ Through changing his name he attempted to negate his Ostjuden origins.  
Sigmund Freud was named Sigismund
75
 Schlomo Freud, after his grandfather rabbi Schlomo 
Freud, who in turn was the son of the rabbi Ephraim Freud. With the erasure of Sigismund 
Schlomo there is, for him, a return, in an analogous way to Hamlet’s ghost - the return of the 
lost, dead father, the return of and confrontation with something uncanny that haunts him. The 
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 The name Sigismund has both Jewish and Catholic signification; there was Sigismund the king of Poland who 
defended the rights of Jews in Lithuanian and St Sigismund the patron saint of Bohemia who killed his first born 
son, but in repenting found the Holy Spirit (Vitz 1998: 42). 
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ghosts of Schlomo and Ephraim return to haunt him and disturb his identification with the 
European men of science as will be unpacked later. Freud’s question, it seems, similar to 
Hamlet, is whether ‘to be or not to be’ a Jew. What does not get erased is the centrality of the 
father.  
The Ostjuden entity becomes an uncanny site for Freud, the foreign body that Freud wants to 
situate as belonging to the pre-history of mankind. Freud tried to force his wife Martha to go 
against her Jewish religious and family tradition by consenting to eat ham and to write to him 
on the Sabbath. In his own home no religious ceremony, for example, the ceremonial lighting 
of candles, was tolerated.  He enjoyed presenting himself as somebody who grew up in 
complete ignorance of everything that concerned Judaism, but, at the same time, as claimed in 
his correspondence with Marie Bonaparte, in 1920, he also liked to see himself as somebody 
who had never “denied his Jewishness.”76 
Emanuel Rice’s (1990) careful investigation reveals that Freud came from an Orthodox Jewish 
background and, contrary to prevailing opinion his family retained many of the traditional 
religious practices to the end of their lives. His father Jacob had attended a Yeshiva (Talmudic 
academy) in his youth and was a scholar of the Holy Writ. The family did not adhere to the 
Reform Jewish movement, nor were they assimilated Jews. Clearly then, Freud had a more 
traditional Jewish upbringing than he openly admitted (Rice 1990: 7). Rice (1990) concludes 
that Freud and his biographers have minimized the extent of his religious background and its 
influence on him. For example, Freud’s claim that he could not read Hebrew is refuted by 
evidence which shows that Freud was exposed to Hebrew, both during his childhood and his 
adolescence. Religious instruction was mandated by the government and moreover, he excelled 
in these areas of study (Rice 1990: 46). 
Not only was Freud selective in his representation of his own past, but as Gilman (1993) notes, 
also overlooked the primacy of what it meant to be a Jew for Jewish clients of his, as with the 
case of Anna O and with Schreber. Schreber’s psychosis embodied many of the racial 
stereotypes put onto Jews, but Freud could not (fully) understand this (Gilman 1993: 138-145). 
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 This claim is true to the extent that Freud was trying to recast what it meant to be Jewish. As a highly modern 
individual, his redefining had  nothing to do with the Ostjuden. 
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Bertha Pappenheim (Anna O), after her analysis with Breuer, translated some major Yiddish 
works and became involved in a world that situated Jews as speakers of Yiddish. She was 
highly involved in fighting against white slavery in rescuing East European Jews, probably 
Ostjuden, forced to work in brothels.
 
In my view, however, Theodor Lewis goes too far though in presenting Freud as a self-hating 
Jew. Rather, what needs to be emphasised here is the prejudiced attitudes of the Viennese 
middle class, often shared by assimilated Jews, towards the Ostjuden immigrant families, was 
wide spread. Understandably such attitudes had a negative effect on the self-esteem of the 
Ostjuden. What must be understood is that Jewish emancipation was accepted on condition that 
Jews assimilated. This prejudicial demand for Jews to assimilate resulted in a pressing need on 
the part of the Viennese Jewish middle class to overcompensate: to try and be especially 
German, in a sense more German than the Germans themselves, in their cultural and 
intellectual interests. Many Jews of this time, proudly German, were loyal to the Empire and in 
some situations the most patriotic of citizens
77
. With Freud too, then, we see aspects of such 
overcompensation
78
. 
It is not difficult to imagine that during this time period it must have been very difficult for 
those who wished to publicly identify themselves as Jews. Such identification would have been 
further complicated by lack of clarity of what exactly it meant to be a Jew
79
. At the same time 
it needs to be asked why indeed Freud should have identified as Jewish rather than German. 
These questions of choice on identity and of how to define self confronted Freud - as all 
refugee and immigrant children will testify as they ponder the different identifications of their 
parents on the one hand and their new homeland peers on the other.  
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 In Germany in 1860, there were 6,200 Jews, in 1870, there were 40,200 Jews, and in 1880 there were 72,600. 
Over twenty years the Jewish population had grown from 2, 2 to 10.1 percent of the total population. From 1900 
(147,000 Jews) to 1910 (175,300 Jews), following ethnic anti-Semitism, assimilated and baptized Jews where the 
largest group. Most of these 175,300 Jews were part of the German population, including the Eastern Jews, whose 
Yiddish was regarded as German. (http://www.porges.net/JewsInVienna/1HistoricalBackground.html) 
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 Gordon Isaacs (2010, personal communication) argues that a similar process exists within the gay community 
who want to be seen as similar to the heterosexual community. 
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 John Stratton (2000:  9-11) asks what does it meant to be a Jew. Is it a question of religion, and if yes, which 
one, Orthodox or Conservative or Reform or Hasidic?  Is it a question of language and/or ethnicity and/or cultural 
identification, ‘Ghetto thinking,’ self identification? Is it a question of race? 
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A strong case can be made then that what we see, in part, being worked out within the rhetoric 
of psychoanalysis, is a complicated answer to the stigmatisation of the Jew - especially the 
Jewish male (Gilman 1993: 8). Of course this does not mean that psychoanalysis can be 
reduced to Freud’s Jewish identity80. Psychoanalysis, in its own right, has developed as a new 
field in science, or perhaps art, or the creation of new spaces through ritual enactment, which 
has radically changed approaches in the West, as to how to deal with mental suffering and 
everyday self understanding. The intention is not to try and negate psychoanalysis as an 
important therapeutic intervention and space of discovery and self, subject transformation.  
Although psychoanalysis occupies a historical space, it produces new spaces, revolutionizing 
history; it is in this regard that Freud opens up new space. Moreover, this means that 
psychoanalysis can be approached via a spatio-analysis (Lefebvre 1995: 404), one that pushes 
in the direction of the ‘unheimlich,’ uncanny space. This un-homely space is similar and 
different to what Foucault calls a heterotopia, a system of opening and closing which cannot be 
fixed and which breaks with traditional time and produces a state of being elsewhere with loose 
or no geographic coordinates. It is a different space, a sanctuary that offers indemnity for 
individuals who are on the margins, borderlines of society and as such in crisis in respect to the 
society around them (Foucault1998: 179-182). 
Reading a writer like Klein (1985) who traces what it meant to be a Jew for Freud, what is 
interesting is that Freud seems to have moved from a state of youth during which he had 
absorbed the prejudices of gentiles towards the Ostjuden, to the later position, as a grown man, 
where he had come to believe in Jewish superiority. Jewish pride and interestingly, this belief 
in Jewish superiority arguably developed in the face of increased anti-Semitism.  Clearly Freud 
was aware of anti-Semitism, but as Gilman (1993) intimates a quantitative and qualitative shift 
needed to come about for Freud to identify as a Jew. This is not to say that, at any particular 
time he disassociated himself completely from Judaism. However, he had to experience 
professional disappointments in order for him to turn back, like the prodigal son, to the Jewish 
community and ask for the active support of this community. This coming out as a Jew, using 
Gordon Isaacs’ (1992) analogy with the ‘coming out’ process of gay men, involved a 
mourning, the loss of not being part of the norm. Without this mourning process, one cannot 
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take on the gains of the newly adopted, often marginalised identity (Isaacs 1992). What occurs 
is internalised self-oppression and the production of shame-based identities
81
. 
Generally, the homosexual boy or lesbian girl is born into a heterosexual family setting, 
different to their own sexual orientation. In the case of the immigrant or refugee family, as with 
Freud, the analogy works well, as he would have seen his parents as belonging to a world 
different and antagonistic to the world he identified himself with. Clearly, for most of his life, 
Freud saw himself primarily as German and it was only in 1926, at the age of sixty, that he 
publicly came out as a Jew. The process leading up to his coming out thus took a long time. In 
that year, Freud wrote: 
My language is German. My culture, my attainments are German. I considered myself German 
intellectually, until I noticed the growth of anti-Semitic prejudice in Germany and German-Austria. Since 
that time, I prefer to call myself a Jew. (Peter Gay 1988: 448). 
What is striking about this statement is not the shift from German to Jew, but why it took Freud 
so long to notice anti-Semitic prejudice. Freud will later state that “membership of the Jewish 
race pushed him from the beginning into the ranks of opposition and ostracism from the 
majority” (Zanuso 1986: 85) and that he had already felt himself to be a Jew earlier, under the 
impact of an outbreak of German anti-Semitism which occurred during his university days. The 
question remains, if indeed he felt himself a Jew at such an early stage, why did it take him so 
long to explicitly articulate his Jewishness? Freud’s humour captures his struggle with what it 
means to be a Jew
82
. 
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 Gordon Isaacs (2010, personal communication) does not see sexuality as fixed, but as something fluid, a process 
in which one is always becoming, in Butler’s terms, a performance.  
 
82 Consider Freud’s Joke Book, a text which as Gilman noted contained racist jokes about Jews, in particular, 
Ostjuden. Freud’s racist jokes were not limited to Jews, but included his ‘Negro Joke’ which he repeatedly shared 
with his inner circle. The ‘joke’ involved reference to his American patient as "his Negro." The original joke can 
be traced back to a cartoon in 1886 in which Fliegende Blätter depicted a yawning lion muttering twelve o'clock 
and no Negro (Jones 1957: 151). Freud identified with both the lion and the Negro, hence the enjoyment of the 
joke. By siding up with his superego he can laugh at the persecuted Ostjuden/Negro and at the same time, through 
a distancing tactic, he can enjoy an Ostjuden/Negro being fed to the lions rather than a secular Jew suffering this 
fate? The joke also aims to displace the power (money) of America upon which he came to depend on. 
The Negro joke of 1886 falls within a time period in which the iconography surrounding Freud was overtly racist 
and violent. For example, Freud would have come into contact with the representations of Sara Bartman and Franz 
von Bayios’ The Servant. These portrayals of blacks, in particular females, presented the so-called primitive as 
abnormal. Sara Bartman, who was from South Africa, was exhibited all over Europe, over a five year period, until 
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Freud’s coming out can be compared to Jean Amery’s (1998) response to anti-Semitism. 
Amery, in coming out as Jew, drew an analogy between the lived experience of the black man 
as Fanon portrayed it and his own indelible experience as a Jewish inmate of a concentration 
camp. Freud, on the other hand, deflected away from issues of culture, be it black or Jewish 
culture. Instead Freud, in his attempt to confront alienation and oppression, placed the 
emphases on the centrality of the phallus and the Name of the Father. Whereas Amery, 
following Fanon, came up with subcategories of racial oppression, Freud devised strategies to 
deal with the intolerable, repression, disavowal, foreclosure.  For Amery it as not only the 
Nazis who tortured him into having to identify as a Jew, but the world insisted that he be 
Jewish. While Freud’s experience of anti-Semitism clearly cannot be equated to that of Jean 
Amery, it does seem that, similar to what was the case with Amery, it was Freud’s experience 
of anti-Semitism that made Freud a Jew. Sartre goes so far as to assert: 
The Jew’s life is nothing but a long flight from others and from himself. He has been alienated even from 
his own body; its emotional life has been cut in two; he has been reduced to pursuing the impossible 
dream of universal brotherhood in a world that rejects him. (Bernasconi 2006: 61) 
After Freud’s graduation, he tried and failed to establish himself as a scientist, and despite a 
vast range of pioneering and very innovative inventions within the field of science, he was 
unable to achieve intellectual respectability, in all likelihood, because he was Jewish. As a 
response to these disappointments and the experience of discrimination, he retreated into the 
Jewish community and joined the newly formed Jewish fraternity, the B’nai B’rith in 1897. 
This organisation offered Freud a secure refuge where he was accepted and surrounded by like-
minded scholars, mostly doctors. B’nai B’rith functioned as a home and platform to test out his 
psychoanalytic ideas, via an occasional series of lectures he would deliver at the weekly 
                                                          
she died. She was not given the right to burial, but dissected and used, by Cesare Lombroso in 1893, to advocate 
the theory that black females possess not only a primitive sexual appetite but also abnormal genitalia.  Another 
example of this violence is the exhibition of an Ashanti family in a cage next to animals from the Amazon in the 
Viennese’s Zoo in 1896 (Gilman 1985: 111). The irony of Viennese proclaiming Vienna as the cultural capital of 
the world and simultaneously exhibiting Africans in a cage in a zoo was not only lost on them, but it seems to 
have fed into a particular view of cultural superiority.  
As with his Negro and Jewish jokes Freud identifies with both the coloniser and colonised, European and non-
European, with the latter identification appearing and disappearing in and beyond the margins of the text. Freud’s 
identifications work through a metonymic substitution: the coloniser, male, is given phallic status whilst the 
oppressed becomes a non-phallic object, what Lacan calls object a. Via a process of metonymic substitution, the 
savage and the Ostjude take on equivalence as non-phallic objects in the work of Freud.  
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meetings.  Out of the alliances and activities of this club the psychoanalytic movement began 
to take shape, starting with the Wednesday evening club meetings
83
. 
It seems that, for some time, Freud may have felt that B'nai B’rith on its own sufficed, without 
the need to establish a psychoanalytic society. Moreover, it was only in 1902, after a five year 
period of activity, that psychoanalysis as a discipline was founded. Six years later, in 1908, the 
first non-Jew entered the psychoanalytical society. Dennis B. Klein (1985) correctly argues 
that, without Jewish solidarity psychoanalysis would not have existed. Again, using Isaacs’ 
(1992) analogy with the way the gay community functions as an adopted home, a home of 
choice, the psychoanalytic society can similarly be seen as an adopted home and site of retreat - 
in this case not of homosexual or lesbian ‘outcasts’, but of Jewish people who were feeling the 
effects of discrimination. It is possible to conclude that both the B’nai B’rith and the 
psychoanalytic society replaced, for Freud, the extended family, the home he had lost as a 
result of having moved to Vienna.  According to fellow B’nai B’rith member, Braun “Freud 
felt at home” in the B’nai B’rith (Klein1985: 85). Throughout the remainder of his life Freud 
continued to use the B’nai B’rith as a sounding board and he remained active in this 
organisation until his death. Sometimes he even tested new ideas in the B’nai B’rith before 
taking them to the psychoanalytic society to explore such ideas.  
An additional analogy can be drawn between this retreat of Freud into the B’nai B’rith and 
Freud’s description of the state of retreat into narcissism, self love, withdrawing into the self 
once external object investment had failed. Such withdrawal of Freud into the B’nai B’rith was 
happening, according to Carl Schorske (1961), in a context where the Hapsburg Empire in 
particular and Europe in general were both tearing apart, on the one hand, on the issue of 
nationality and, on the other, on class lines (Schorske 1961: 181). In fact, Bruno Bettelheim 
(1956) is firmly of the opinion that, with the rise of anti-Semitism, it became clear that the 
emperor was not master of his own house and that it was this fact which inspired Freud to 
develop the idea that the ego was not master in its own house (Bettelheim1956: 12). This 
implies that Freud felt homeless or else that something uncanny existed within the home.   
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 Ironically, those who surrounded him were Ostjuden - Franz Alexander, AA Brill, Joseph Breuer, Sander 
Ferenczi, Ludwig Jenkels, Hans Kelsen, Herman Nunberg, Theodor Reik, Hans Sachs, Isdor Sadgar and Sabina 
Spielrein. 
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At the end of Freud’s life, as a refugee in London, he seems to identify with the Egyptian 
Moses
84
 who is trying to find a home. At the same time the ‘cultures’ of  consciousness, pre-
consciousness and the unconscious - manifested as conflict between the id, the ego and the 
superego – what Lacan called the divided subject, can be read as a metaphor for being  neither 
here nor there, as  being a stranger in one’s own home or as experiencing reality as uncanny.  
 
A very modern racism: nationalism and psychoanalysis 
History is a hymn to white people, and all us others have been discovered by white people who may or 
may not (they suppose) permit us to enter history (Baldwin 1985:80). 
Modernity in the late nineteenth and early twentieth century was not only characterised by 
unprecedented population explosion, mass migration, cultural exchanges and transformation of 
traditional social patterns, but also saw the invention of “novel forms of bureaucratic control” 
and the development of “new surveillance techniques designed to accumulate more information 
about nationals while keeping undesirables out or locked up (Steger 2005:33).Freud lived 
through the emergence, from 1830 to 1880, of three great powers, Germany, Italy and the 
Austria-Hungary Empire as well as the formation of other states like Belgium and the Ottoman 
successor states like Greece, Serbia, Romania and Bulgaria. This time period involved a radical 
shift from a folkloric tradition, with no particular national implications, to a society based on a 
militant national idea (Hobsbawm 1990). 
Eric E.J.Hobsbawm (1990) draws our attention to the fact that the form of nationalism from the 
period of 1880 to 1914 was significantly different to the preceding Mazzinian phase. For 
Hobsbawm (1990) what characterised this new form of nationalism was that, alongside the 
typical national sentiment popularized by Mazzini, race and language became the central and 
decisive factors in the determination of nation-state movements. The common language - 
forming the basis for high culture and its literature - not only enabled people across political 
and geographic borders to be united in a nation state but also gave rise to administrative 
possibilities (Hobsbawm 1990). It was a time in which the nation-state became the homeland.  
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 He also seems to identify with the Moses who gets killed. 
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Hobsbawm (1990) notes that in 1884 the concept of ‘Tierra’ (homeland, ‘the place, township 
or land where one is born’) and its broader sense of patriachica, the little fatherland, became 
synonymous with the meaning attached to nation state. With the overlapping of nation, volk, 
fatherland (patriarchy), origin, language, race and ethnicity, we see the murmurings of modern 
patriotism, to surface in the next century, in which patria comes to define “our own 
nation”(Hobsbawm 1990: 15). From the year’s 1876 to1881, the time period coinciding with 
Freud’s studies, European nationalism was supported by an intensification of identity politics. 
Both outside and inside Europe Freud was to observe the effects of these identity politics and 
its ‘civilizing mission’ - racism - towards the non-European and sexism towards women. 
Racism escalated and directly impinged upon his life while a student and as he began his 
career. Freud began his studies in 1873, not graduating from medical school until 1881. 
Alongside his medical studies he also engaged with philosophy, in particular the work of 
Brentano. The philosophy Freud would have encountered, was pioneered by men who not only 
challenged the preceding order and ushered in new ideas, but males who also held crude brutal 
racist world-views - views which no doubt both reflected the popular sentiments of the time as 
well as influenced the construction of these viewpoints themselves. This was also the case with 
psychiatry
85
 with its violent racial and sexist history, for example the diagnosing of women’s 
alleged excesses as illness.  
The recurrent theme in the writings of Hume, Kant, and Hegel and Locke is that the Afrikan is 
incapable of human thought, particularly of the concept of the universal (Graham 2002:  7, 8). 
This becomes a justification for the enslavement of the ‘savage’ Afrikan (Graham 2002:  7, 8). 
Hume (1748) stated that Afrikans are naturally inferior to Europeans. Kant argued that the 
capacity for human rationality can be determined on the basis of skin colour. Hegel, in his 
lectures on Philosophy of History and on the Philosophy of Right, characterised Afrika as 
devoid of any history and merely a wasteland filled with lawlessness and cannibalism. Kant, in 
his Philosophische Anthropologie, concludes that the Afrikan can only be educated, that is 
trained, as servants (slaves). The Afrikan can only be educated through physical ‘training’ 
which involves coercion and corporal punishment. In fact Kant goes so far as to teach us how 
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 For further elaboration of race, nationalism and mixed race identity refer to The ‘Tragic Mulatto’ revisited: Race 
and nationalism in the nineteenth century. (Raimon 2004). 
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to flog the Afrikan into submission
86
. Consider Emmanuel Chukwudi Eze’s (1997: 116) 
observation: 
Kant advises us to use a split bamboo cane instead of a whip, so that the Negro will suffer a great deal of 
pains (because of the Negro’s thick skin, he would not be racked with sufficient agonies through a whip) 
but without dying. To beat the Negro efficiently requires a split cane rather than a whip, because the 
blood needs to find a way out of the Negro’s thick skin to avoid festering. The African, according to 
Kant, deserves this kind of ‘training’ because he or she is exclusively ideal, lazy. 
Racial hatred for Hegel and Kant was not limited to the Afrikan but included Jews. For Kant 
Judaism was not a religion, but merely a union of people. Kant was of the opinion that Jews 
had to be rid of their Judaic spirit so as to mend their ways. He wanted Judaism to cease to 
exist; they need to convert to Christianity (Cohn-Sherbok 2002: 193). Hegel, like Kant attacks 
the Jew as a “corruption” and as somebody who needs to be set apart from all other groups 
(Gilman 1988: 106). Hegel informs us that‘the Jew “was at a lower rung on the hierarchy of the 
human races” (Gilman 1988: 111). 
Hegel, who compared Jews to non-Jews, concluded that for Jews there is “nothing but physical 
dependence, an animal existence, that can only be secured at someone else’s expense, and 
which the Jews received as their portion.” Elsewhere Hegel declares that “The Jewish 
multitude was bound to wreck his (Jesus) attempt to give them the consciousness of something 
divine, for faith in something divine, something great, cannot make its home in a dunghill” 
(Cohn-Sherbok 2002: 193). In sum, Hume, Kant, Hegel and Locke, supported by the theories 
of psychiatry and of evolution, and no doubt other theories as well, upheld concepts like 
degeneracy, with regards to Afrikans and non-Europeans, that helped to institutionalise the 
Western scientific and philosophical perceptions of European cultural and racial supremacy.  
Such European supremacy translated into day-to-day existence. Freud observed the backlash 
against the rise of modernity and resentment amongst those groups threatened by the rise of the 
educated Jewish middle class. For example, in 1873 with the European Stock market crash, 
Jews once again became the scapegoat. In 1876 violent anti-Semitic attacks on Jewish medical 
students at the University of Vienna took place. Freud formed part of those hated Jewish 
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students who made up almost one third of all university students and who constituted more 
than 40 per cent of the medical students in Vienna. This uprising was aided by rhetoric of 
Billroth. Christian Albert Theodor Billroth, the founding father of modern abdominal surgery 
and close friend of Johannes Brahms, who famously described Brahms’s First Symphony as 
“all rippling streams, blue skies, sunshine, and cool, green shadows”, was equally famous for 
his anti-Semitism. In 1876 he spoke out against the large number of Jewish medical students 
and challenged the success of assimilation, arguing that immigrant Ostjuden lacked “our 
German sentiments,” which were based on “medieval Romanticism.”  
Billroth stated that he felt “the gap between purely German and purely Jewish blood to be just 
as wide as the gap a Teutonic may have felt between himself and a Phoenician”. For Billroth 
no Jew or Afrikan can ever become a German; what they called Jewish-Germans were simply 
nothing but Jews who happened to speak German and happened to receive their education in 
Germany. He was of the strong opinion that even if Jews could write literature and think in the 
German language more beautifully and better than many a genuine Germanic native, during 
national battles they will not feel German the way “we do”. (Gilman 1993: 18).87 
In the same year that Theodor Billroth came out with his anti-Semitic remarks - 1876 - Leopold 
II created the International African Association to decide on the division of Afrika. Freud 
would have been aware of the “Scramble for Africa” (1871-1912). Moreover, Sir Henry 
Stanley, somebody Freud admired, was financed by Leopold II. Following Rajana Khanna 
(2003), a case can be made for identification on the part of Freud with Stanley and a situating 
of psychoanalysis alongside the adventure novel. What Stanley did in reality, the authors of the 
adventure novel did on a fictional level. The adventure novel was hugely popular during this 
period and speaks of the unofficial mapping of Africa. Stanley’s job was to broker (steal) land 
deals and keep European imagination filled with heroic tales from the “dark continent”.  
Richard Phillips (1997) points out that the scramble for Africa was also a scramble to map the 
world so as to colonise and consolidate imperial power. “Adventure stories constructed a 
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 Freud’s life and work crossed paths with Christian Albert Theodor Billroth’s proclamations. Freud loved the 
German language. He disliked music and was involved in ‘surgical’ dissections as part of his research in 
discovering the sex of eels. In 1889 Billroth stated: "Society is becoming more and more neurotic, and this is due 
to alcohol and tobacco.” Incidentally, Freud remained a cigar smoker even through his cancer, not buying into the 
theories that cancer was a Jewish disease (Gilman 1993:18). 
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cultural space in which imperial geographies and imperial masculinities were conceived” 
(Phillips 1997: 12). The adventure novel, including psychoanalysis as part of this tradition, as 
Phillips (1997) contends, following Victor Turner, corresponds with liminal space, but at the 
same time mapped a world view that placed Europe as the imperial centre and colonies like 
Crusoe’s island at the margins (Phillips 1997: 13, 17). 
It was a period which saw the rise of biological racism. As Foucault puts it, the state was no 
longer the instrument that one race used against another, but instead became the protector of 
the superiority and purity of that race within its borders. Racial purity, with all its biological 
implications, skin colour for is instance, replaces the idea of race struggle, for example Saxons 
against Franks, due to a shift from law to norm, from races in the plural to race in the singular, 
from emancipation of a people, to a concern with purity and sovereignty. State sovereignty thus 
becomes the imperative to protect the race and its economic interests (Foucault 2003: 81). 
The transformation of race struggle into biological racism was enabled by those ideologies 
upholding slavery and by colonization. Biological racism, slavery and colonization were 
justified by a belief in a Christian ‘civilizing mission’. Presented as children in need of support, 
the uncivilised races, lower classes and women were seen lacking and in need of ‘training’ in 
the Kantian sense of the term described above. The triumphant history of the West presented 
itself as a benign providence that kindly shows the ‘children’ the light so that they can emerge 
from darkness. Underlying this Christian ‘civilizing mission’ was a white masculine 
heterosexual moral supremacy and a Western economic order based on the appropriation of the 
other.   
The civilizing mission involved the colonisation and appropriation of the minds and bodies of 
others and their forced assimilation. The popular metaphor of this time period was the 
adventure novel, depicting Western men as those who tame the dark continents. However, 
underlying this metaphor, we can see the convergence of the Ships of fools and the slave ships, 
as well as a depiction of the East end of London (a site of poverty) and women as dark 
continents.  
In other words, we see the overlapping of colonisation in a geographical sense, where the 
model gets re-imported back from other continents to Europe itself on the one hand and the 
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overlapping of colonisation of physical space as well as of psychic space
88
. Foucault (2003: 
103) describes such overlapping in the geographical sense, where colonial models transported 
to other continents were brought back to the West itself: 
It should never be forgotten that while colonisation, with its techniques and its political and juridical 
weapons, obviously transported European models to other continents, it also had a considerable 
boomerang effect on the mechanisms of power in the West, and on the apparatuses, institutions, and 
techniques of power. A whole series of colonial models was brought back to the West, and the result was 
that the West could practice something resembling colonisation, or internal colonisation, on itself. 
Fanon, as noted by Oliver (2004: 26) also describes the overlapping of colonialism between the 
psychic and the physical space: 
Fanon insists that colonisation does not just operate on the land or the body but also and always on the 
psyche of those oppressed…The success of the colonisation of a land, a nation, or a people can be 
measured through the success of the colonization of the psychic space. Only through the colonisation of 
psychic space can oppression be effective. 
This new economic order and moral hierarchy spread and transformed old divisions inside and 
outside of Europe. New divisions were introduced into previously united ethical or religious 
communities.   
 
Did Freud believe himself to be a coloured?  
A child is made in its parent’s image. But to the world that sees only in Black and White, I was made 
only in the image of my father. Yet, she has moulded me, created the curves and contours of my life, 
protected me with every painful crooked bone in her body. She lives inside of me and cannot be 
separated. I may be reflected in her image, but my mother is mirrored in my soul. I am my mother’s 
daughter for the rest of my life (Ifekwunigwe1999: 147). 
Moses was an Egyptian – probably an aristocrat – whom the legion designed to turn into a Jew (Freud, 
2001:15) 
As noted above for Freud the process of being and becoming a Jew involved a monumental 
struggle, something it seems, that could only occur as he got older and as he experienced 
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 A colonisation of space also in relation to a society imbued with the spirit of violence is evidenced by Christian 
missionary work. 
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personal disappointments. Freud did not know where to place himself, as German, modern, 
white, bourgeois, on the side of the cultural consciousness of the European elite, or as mixed 
race ancestry, bisexual and primitive origins
89
. This problematic of place and belonging for 
those who fall between European and non-European, black and white, gay and straight, brings 
us to the question: who did Freud believe himself to be, did he see himself, in part, as a mulatto 
and bisexual?
90
 
I have argued that Freud suffered from a non-European complex. Freud opted for assimilation 
into the bourgeois Viennese society and refuted his father as a man and role model; instead he 
adopted and identified with the economic gains provided by the ‘new father’:  the emperor. In 
so doing Freud offered his service as the coloniser of the mind, only to find that as a Jew and 
member of a race deemed other, black, and impure, he would never be accepted in the home of 
the emperor and was destined to be homeless. 
Dennis Klein (1985) contends the problem was that while the Austrian liberal government 
advanced the plight of Jews, it neglected other national groups in the Empire, the Czechs, 
Slavs, Italian irredentists, as well as the interests of the lower middle classes. Donald Sassoon 
(2006) goes so far as to argue that East European Jews emerged from their medieval past with 
some distinct cultural advantages in that their status as an oppressed minority in some 
situations brought about special privileges. He argues that while they were periodically 
persecuted, Jews were often under the “protection of local rulers”, which put them in “a better 
position than the overwhelming majority of the population”, mainly impoverished peasants and 
rural workers and urban factory workers with no rights at all (Sassoon2006: 620).  
It was in this context of a perceived relative privilege for them that the immigrant Jewish 
population were deemed responsible for the economic crash in 1873 and the resulting 
worsening economic conditions. They were blamed and seen as competitors and vilified as 
intruders. Anti-Semitism was spear headed by the Catholic newspaper Vaterland. At first many 
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 For Freud, the latter so-called primitive and unconscious expression, when sublimated, becomes the building 
blocks of European high culture, whilst for others it is simply the blood and sweat of slave labour that builds 
European high culture. 
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 The question of place and belonging for those classified as neither European nor non-European, black nor white, 
gay nor straight, one nor the other, as Jayne O. Ifekwunigwe and Stuart Hall contend, is a tension between being 
and becoming, a struggle between subjectivity and alterity, as cultural identity is a matter of ‘becoming’ as well as 
‘being.’ Jayne O. Ifekwunigwe (1997: 127) follows the arguments of Stuart Hall (1990). 
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Jews attempted to ignore this, but by the 1890s it was no longer possible to deny the emerging 
anti-Semitism (Sassoon2006: 620).  The Catholics formed a political party with the 
Reformvereinin 1899 known as the Christian socialists. Their manifesto called for the 
elimination of Jews from civil services and the medical and legal professions. As noted by 
Beller (1989) no longer was the ‘Jewish problem’ something to be solved through forced 
assimilation, becoming a Christian and a national citizen, now the talk was of elimination from 
the civil service and from society.  
Freud ends his life coming out as a Jew and it seems as somebody of mixed ancestry, part 
Afrikan. Sander Gilman’s (1993) boldly states that Freud saw himself as a Mulatto (Gilman 
1993: 55), racially marked. Gilman points to remarks which Freud made, which support the 
supposition that he saw himself as a white European Negro (Gilman 1986:7). Gilman
91
 bases 
his argument on what emerges in the margins, in the footnotes of Freud’s text as well as the 
writings of the day, which supported the belief that Jews are blacks or at least, of mixed race 
ancestry and certainly have in common with blackness their othering and marginalisation (no 
matter how assimilated they were) by European white society.   
It appears that I came into the world with such a tangle of black hair that my young mother declared that I 
was a little Moor (Freud 1953:337) 
On the other hand they are unconscious and are incapable of becoming conscious. Thus qualitatively they 
belong to the system Pcs, (Preconscious) but factually to the Ucs (unconsciousness). Their origin is what 
decides their fate. We may compare them with individuals of mixed race who, taken all round, resemble 
white men, but who betray their coloured descent by some striking feature or other, and on that account 
are excluded from society and enjoy none of the privileges of white people (Freud 1953: 190-191).92 
The comments above were made many years apart, in the Interpretation of Dreams in 1899 and 
much later when elaborating his second
93
 model of the mind. Do these comments, as Gilman 
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 Gilman (1993) contends that Freud is making reference to himself, at least, an unconscious reference.  This 
supposition is further supported or refuted by the psychoanalytic assumption that the relation between 
consciousness, pre- consciousness and unconsciousness can only be inferred. The unconscious wishes which 
speak through indirect expressions like nuances, gestures, mistakes and dreams. In this gap (discontinuity) 
something other, uncanny speaks. The conscious mind is rooted in a form of negation and false connection – 
taboo, denial, and prohibition. In this case the taboo, denial, prohibition is not to ‘snow white’ but instead see 
some uncanny resemblance to something disavowed when looking in the mirror. 
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 For some third, if the Project outlined in his correspondence with Fliess is accepted as his first model (topology) 
of mind. 
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contends, reveal how Freud saw himself? Additional evidence pointing in the direction that 
Freud saw himself as racially marked is the fact that his close colleague, Otto Fenichel was of 
the opinion that Jews were of mixed race origin
94
. Furthermore, a substantial part of the 
medical and anthropological literature in which Freud immersed himself, held the view that 
Jews were black or a mixed race. 
Gilman, who systematically unpacks the ethnographic literature of the late nineteenth century, 
concludes that the general consensus was that Jews had ‘black skin’ or, at least, were ‘swarthy’ 
and of mixed and inferior race (Gilman 1991: 171) and due to their “Jewish-Negroid features” 
(Gilman 1993, 12-14), in particular their skin colour, nose and flat feet. Jews were considered 
to have the skin colour of ‘kaffirs’, or “mongrels”. Jews were seen as interbred with Afrikans 
and as such were considered to be an ‘inferior race” due to their Negroid heritage. Otto Potzl, 
Carl Heinrich Stratz, Houston Stewart Chamberlain
95
 and Karl Burmeister, amongst others, 
wrote about Jews as an “inbred type”, a “mischling” (a hybrid of black origins) and others like 
Johann Pezel and Elcan Wolf categorised Jews as a “mongrel” race towards the end of the 
nineteenth century.   
The characterisation of Jews as having Afrikan blood, of being ‘mulatto’, seems to have been a 
universal assumption in the Western world during Freud’s life time. It was supported by racist 
viewpoints as well as by some Jews themselves. It was propagated in both Europe and in the 
United States by men like Adam Godowsky, John Quincy Adams, and John Nott. Charles 
Carroll and Rev. Arthur T. Abernethy and Robert Knox, in The Races of Men (1850)
96
 spoke of 
the “African character of Jews” and stated that “the blackness of the Jew is the key to their 
nature”. Even the standard medical dictionary, which Freud contributed to, contained an article 
which stated that Jews were of black origin. 
With the immigration of swarthy East European Jews (Ostjuden) to Western Europe during 
Freud’s life time, existing racial prejudices intensified and resulted in a comparison between 
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 One can surmise that they spoke about this especially as Fenichel went public with this belief. 
95
 Houston Chamberlain supposition of Jews coming from Afrikan origin seems to have informed Freud’s 
supposition that Moses was an Egyptian (Sander Gilman 1993: 184).  
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 Also see Leonard Rogoff (1997: 195-230) Is the Jew White? 
http://www.agonist.org/story/2004/12/3/15366/5729 
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the “dark and ugly” Ostjuden (Jewish peoples of Eastern Europe and Russia) to that of the “fair 
and handsome” gentile modern Jews. The Ostjuden in particular became the white Negro of 
Europe subject to similar racial stereotyping used in the colonies (Gilman 1985). Gilman 
(1985) concludes that the characterisation of the blacks within Weimar Germany was 
extraordinarily parallel to that of the Jew under the Nazis (Gilman 1985: 34). Furthermore, he 
states that during Freud’s life blacks and Jews became interchangeable, “the line between the 
two groups vanished, and each became the definition of the other” (Gilman 1985: 35). 
These perceptions of both Jews and blacks were the product of the racist biological theories of 
the late nineteenth century. These theories were linked, to some extent, to the old Christian 
tradition and moreover, claimed to be scientific. They provided a philosophy by means of 
which colonial racism could dress itself up as a scientific evolutionary theory. Both blacks and 
Jews, in Freud’s time, functioned as the European’s other, the non-European, the non-white of 
Europe (Gordon 1995: 6). As noted by Lewis Gordon (1995), this non-white position is one of 
being simultaneously part of and not part of the dominate culture. Freud as a white Jew 
simultaneously is and is not part of Europe; he is German but not German enough due to his 
Jewish roots, that is to say, not Christian, enough. It is a position of being too much and not 
enough, which in Lacanian terminology is that little bit of excess that refuses and/or cannot 
undergo symbolic assimilation.   
Through an appeal to universal categories Freud tries to overcome the racial markings of his 
Jewishness and instead wants to offer a universal body form that will take precedence over the 
fragmented body of the other, non-European that haunts him as something uncanny. The 
universal man - and this universal man is male, male libido, sexuality as male - provides him 
with an identification through which he seeks to find self recognition and overcome alienation. 
As a man of science, in speaking in universal terms, he hopes that which marks him as other, as 
non-European, becomes invisible. In effect he tries to create an alternative symbolic; what 
Lacanian theory refers to as constructing a name for oneself. He also attempted to create a new 
Name of the Father, as with the Oedipus. This enabled him to assimilate that bit of 
excesswhich gets confined to the unconscious, the outskirts of social order.  
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Freud’s contributions to understanding processes of marginalization and 
homelessness 
With the work of Freud, as compared to that of Fanon and Foucault, the emphasis here is more 
on the biographical narrative as this is consistent with Freud’s own style of presentation. Over 
and above this, it needs acknowledging that throughout this thesis I move between the tensions 
of   biographical narrative versus the contributions of their theoretical work. I shall now move 
from the elaboration of the subjective narrative and look at Freud’s theoretical contributions, in 
particular those concepts that I argue speak to homelessness. While much of his life narrative 
appears to be framed within a search for home and the backdrop of his subjective life serves to 
both clarify and deepen this theoretical contributions, Freud does offer us stand alone concepts 
which are of theoretical value in understanding homelessness, most notably the uncanny. In 
addition to this the practice of psychoanalysis itself can be seen as an attempt to construct a 
symbolic home as I have alluded to above.  
With psychoanalysis Freud makes a double move, working within the oral traditions of history, 
he attempts to construct a ritual that opens up space to represent the repressed unconscious 
voices of the subaltern. At the same time, working within the tradition of the textual history, he 
constructs the text of psychoanalysis as symbolic body so as to create a name for those on the 
outside. Both ‘text’ and practice offered a homecoming for the wandering Jew. The problem 
though is that Freud speaks as if the white European male were everybody; he gives a universal 
sound to it. Having said this, it does not mean that Freud totally ignored issues of racism, 
liminality and alterity. Rather, what needs to be understood is that Freud’s response to the 
racist biology that confronted him was very complicated. Such an excavation yields 
suppositions as to what Freud meant rather than explicit unambiguous conclusions. In this 
regard the two key concepts which talk to race are narcissism, specifically the narcissism of 
minor difference and the primitive, savage. 
In psychoanalysis narcissism is seen as an attempt to bring together and unify diverse drives 
(polymorphic perversity) through taking oneself as a love object, in fact, the first love object. 
The love object has the function of an ideal
97
. The first ideal is the child’s own image of 
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herself: self-love
98. Translating the above in Freud’s time, we can speak of the nationalist 
European male middle and upper classes, the ruling class, as somebody who is captivated by 
his own ideals, by those identity bearing signifiers and actions that resemble himself or at least 
lead to self recognition. Anything that disrupts this process introduces a want, a lack of being 
whole and completed unto oneself, and it is hated. 
The European male, body-image was a structure made up of identifications supported by ideals 
that enabled him to take himself as his own ideal image.  He maintained this identity through a 
process of an identification with, and expression of, these ideal images. His identity was 
constituted through that with which he identified. Again, it is a male construction, the woman, 
black, Jew, homosexual becomes a dark continent that he fears. Anything outside his field of 
identification was only seen (or not seen) from a European male bourgeois perspective. This 
approach to the other involves a use of the boundary at which the image of the European begins 
to fade. The hatred of minor differences begins when crossing the borders of self recognition 
and when boundaries feel imposed, often due to minor differences. Freud elaborates this by 
way of an example, the way “Gallic people feel towards the German, the Aryan toward the 
Semite, and the white races to the coloured.” (Freud 1953:  101)  
The key to the process of identification is repression of thoughtfulness and a dis-identification. 
Adorno (1991: 137), summarising Freud’s description of (group) identifications, puts it in an 
interesting way, arguing that suggestion and suggestibility are at play in the establishment of 
shared identifications. In addition, this provides a “shelter” or “screen” concealing ‘love 
relationships. “It is essential that the love relationship behind suggestion remains unconscious.” 
By way of example: I identity with the other, a fellow Arsenal supporter, through assuming a 
shared ideal and repression of the love bond that holds us together as well as repression and 
suppression of thoughtfulness. In this state of suggestibility I feel most united with my fellow 
Arsenal supporters when we hate Spurs (a club about three miles away) and make all kinds of 
accusations (abusive remarks) about them, most notably, it seems in the football world, 
accusations about men loving other men! Adorno (1991: 138) and Oakley (2007) argue that 
                                                          
dynamic conflicts can come together and unite under this ideal. 
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 Love of another is also narcissistic for Freud. He cites the example of a mother’s love of her child. What we 
notice is that if we look at the attitude of affectionate parents towards their children, we have to recognize that it is 
a revival and reproduction of their own narcissism. 
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what we see at play, especially when things spill over and become overly fascist, is 
convergence of fascist demagogues, authoritarianism and self hypnotism were by people 
regress and in so doing they can assume a group membership and share the same ideals. 
Europe, during Freud’s life, and today, functions as a fortress/shelter, trying to screen’s out an 
engagement with the other/world but at the same time Europe sees the growth of this 
other/world, under class within its very borders. 
The image of the complete whole European male was captivating but also filled with discord. 
The European man was in Hegelian terms dependent on the recognition of the other to uphold 
his own self image. He strived to be seen, while the role of women was to uphold and applaud 
this posturing
99
. The experience of “seeing to be seen” (a relation which replicates who I see 
myself to be, is captivating), but when the person sees that s/he is not seen, there is anguish, a 
gap is introduced. The other who introduces differences, however minor, introduces a gap, 
incompleteness.  
Homi K. Bhabha (1994) relocates the site of struggle around the narcissism of difference in his 
Locations of Culture and points to those “border lives” that lead to imaginative border 
crossings. These crossings take us beyond the binaries of same/different, citizen/foreigner, 
inside/outside. Needless to say, those operating within these border spaces, like the sex worker, 
as elaborated in a later chapter, are feared as they bring to the fore issues society does not want 
to grapple with. In fact, in the face of sex workers, the discourses surrounding them tell us 
more about marriage, heterosexuality, sexuality, love, poverty, lack of access to education, 
gender, the law than they do about the actual sex worker who is often swallowed up in these 
surrounding narratives. The border crosser, be it a sex worker, refugee, cross-dresser or Spurs 
fan watching football in an Arsenal pub is, in the language of Bhabha (1994), 
“incommensurable” to the ideals and narcissistic delights that the nation state wants to gloat in. 
The menace of the black man who speaks the Queen’s English and recites back the ‘great’ 
English poets is that the representations of the nation-state can no longer guarantee the 
authority of the whole and complete narcissistic image of the white European male. In 
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Bhabha’s (1994) terms, it is the menace of mimicry, a double vision which disrupts the mirror 
image and introduces uncanny effects.  
Again, with reference to the narcissism of minor differences, Freud tells us, of a fighting 
“against feelings of fellowship”. For example the fellowship a white English poet may feel 
towards the black rapper. It is on the basis of feelings of fellowship and at the same time of 
strangeness that hostility between people arises (Freud 1917: 199). To some extent it seems 
clear that this fighting “against feelings of fellowship” applies to Freud himself. In his text on 
The Psychopathology of Everyday Life, the effect of the ‘unpronounceable’ minor difference 
was produced by Freud’s encounter with a Signor, a Moor. The Moor, we can surmise, lurks as 
something uncanny, the double, disavowed mirror image of the Ostjude that Freud assigns to 
the unconscious.  
 Again it is in the footnotes, in the margins that the non-European and racially marked Freud 
emerges, as with the example above, where he forgets the name Signorelli. The word 
Signorelli, like a dream image, contains more than one signification. For Gil Anidjan (2003: 
137) with Signorelli we have the Jew (Freud), the Christian (Signorelli) and the Muslim 
(Signor): 
The unpronounceable is the Moor, moreover; in a single figure we have the father, founding father and 
stranger, the incarnation of the two Moses?  
Freud’s most complex contribution to racism is the concept of the primitive, the savage. At best 
Freud appears to respond to racist biology by situating the concept of savage, of primitiveness 
as savage. However Levi-Strauss has refuted this Freudian notion with the concept of the 
archaic illusion. In universalising the primitive dimensions of the psyche, Freud is attempting 
to sabotage the presumption of the superiority of the Western mind and this fails. As Celia 
Brickman (2003) points out, in wanting Jews to be part of the universal category of science, 
Freud inadvertently replaced the binary of Aryan/Jew with that of civilised/primitive. Thus the 
dominant cultural and racial category - civilization - is defined by it’s excluded opposite: the 
radicalised other as primitive and in a state of arrested development
100
. 
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 A very similar argument can be made with reference to Freud’s position on homosexuality. Freud gave political 
support to the gay liberation movement and supported a mother with her son’s process of coming out.  Moreover, 
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Celia Brickman (2003) concludes that the radical implications of Freud’s thought were, 
however, set in a male discursive framework that reflected the dominant social ideology of his 
time, a framework pervaded by the colonist and by the racist assumptions of nineteenth century 
socio-cultural evolutionism (Bickman 2003: 5). Hortense J Spillers (2003) and Barbara 
Johnson (1998) state that Freud’s relationship to the owning class and to male privilege, is one 
in which Freud could not ‘see’ his own connection to the race/cultural orbit. They argue that he 
could not theorise this connection, because the place of elision between race and culture 
marked the vantage point from which he spoke. Race, Spillers (2003) and Johnson (1998) 
conclude, is at the heart of Freud’s discovery, but it is not part of his explicit subject matter.   
At the same time, it may be precisely Freud’s implicit effort to overcome anti-Semitism that 
leads him to couch his insights in a universal language (Johnson 1998: 10). In wanting to 
overcome the invisibility, anonymity cast onto the Jew as non-European, Freud makes a name 
for himself through an appeal to universal categories. Gwen Bergner (2005) argues that this 
historical inattention to race is not only a missed opportunity, but also veils the implicit racist 
assumptions within psychoanalysis. Spivak argues along similar and different lines and notes, 
for example, the depiction of the primitive as timeless (Bergner 2005: xix). This failed move to 
deal with race not only allows for psychoanalysis to side up to colonisation, but also results in 
it colluding with patriarchal assumptions, specifically in the way that it configures females as 
the dark impenetrable continent
101
. 
Hussein Abdilahi Bulhan (1985) is of the opinion that it was Freud’s own personal suffering 
and his victim complex, both resulting from racism, which provided him with the stimulus for 
creative thought. However, this experience of victimization and oppression moves Freud in two 
directions: on the one hand, in the direction of rebellion which is coupled with a search for 
autonomy; on the other hand towards compliance and accommodation with colonialism, 
racism. Thus Freud’s approach allows for too much assimilation of conservative bourgeois 
ideology due to wanting psychoanalysis to be part of the elite. As a result of him pursuing his 
                                                          
with the concept of trieb, drive, he was able to put into question both homosexual and heterosexuality object 
choice. At the same time he used derogatory (scientific) terminology and produced a causal narrative that fixed 
homosexuality within the grid  of an arrested development, childhood attachments, that have enabled others to 
categorise gay and lesbian love as a perversion and pathology (Lewes 1988).   
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 A host of contemporary postcolonial feminists argue this point. See for example Hortense J Spillers, Gwen 
Bergner, Kalpana Seshadri-Crooks, Ann Pellegrini, Rajana Khanna and Barbara Johnson. 
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cherished goal of attaining status and class, wanting to be part of the world of the bourgeois 
male world, Freud whitewashes his racial concerns and is colour blind to class concerns.  
Race is a driving force, a recurring concern for Freud, but given his class alignment, it remains 
implicit.  Freud’s close relationship to the Viennese bourgeoisie, with its notion of the nuclear 
household, the nuclear family, his acceptance of the elitist pretensions of science, as well as his 
identification with the ‘glorious’ exploits of the colonial male enterprise, situates him a little 
too comfortable in the bourgeois world. In the words of Hortense J Spillers (2003), a world in 
which he was “at home.” As a result race and racial difference fail to become a primary factor 
for Freud and for that matter for psychoanalysis to understand subjectivity
102
. Thus this 
historical inattention to race and class results in the missing of the opportunity to align 
psychoanalysis to the left in a significant way, for example those receiving analysis and 
training as analysts. Instead psychoanalysis colluded with the creation of whiteness and 
heterosexuality as the “master signifiers” (Seshadri-Crooks 2000). Whiteness becomes the 
category from and through which all bodies must orient themselves. It was an opportunistic 
move on the part of Freud as whiteness granted him and those deemed white, European, 
mobility. The black body, and to a lesser extent the body of the Ostjude and the poor, 
stereotypical sex worker and homosexual male, in contrast to the white body’s ability to move, 
is marked, fixed, immobilized (Mohanram 1999:  xvi, 4, 15). 
However, the ways in which whiteness and blackness have been imagined and mapped out in 
the West have not been continuous. It is this discontinuity, Ann Pelligrini (1997) points out, 
which makes it possible for someone like Sander Gilman (1993) to meaningfully ask the 
question whether the Jew is black. Race, she says, signifies different relations between the 
body and society, between in-groups and out-groups, at different times (Pelligrini 1997: 17). A 
similar notion of a changing process underpins Karen Bodkin’s (1998: 40) question as to 
whether the assimilation of Jews into the middle class, resulted in them becoming white:  
Did Jews and other Euro ethnicities become white because they became middle class? That is, did money 
whiten? Or did being incorporated in an expanded version of whiteness open up the economic doors to a 
middle class status?  
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 Compare (for example) Gwen Berger (2005), who argues along these lines of Freud being caught up in the 
bourgeois world and as a result “declined to address racial difference as a constitutive factor of subjectivity 
(Bergner 2005:  xix). 
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Laura Levitt (1997) states that, for European Jews emancipation came at a price: there was a 
relinquishing of various forms of communal authority. In reality many aspects of Jewish 
communal life were lost. In a sense then Jews, specifically Freud, had to be whiter than white! 
The racial gap within psychoanalysis, created by Freud, needs to be approached, as Ann 
Pellegrini (1997) suggests, by working within Jewishness, blackness and, Womanliness, and 
we can add Homosexuality and working class and the homeless, the subtexts that drive 
psychoanalysis. Within these subtexts we can hear the subaltern voice and recover the Queer 
Mulatto who returns via the concept of the uncanny, as Spillers (2003) work suggests. Thus the 
figure of the Mulatto allows for the strategy of cultural ambiguity that allows for a neither/nor 
proposition which subverts the national landscape since the ‘Mulatto Queen’ embodies the 
unspeakable everything that the dominant culture forgets and covers up through nationalist 
inscriptions. 
The evidence to support the claim that Freud saw himself as a Moor, presented above, is 
inconclusive. As is evident from the above Freud’s own engagement with racism, 
marginalization, homelessness, violence informs his theoretical contribution and self 
conception.Freud may or may not have seen himself as a Moor, or as of mixed race origins or 
even as bisexual. What is of issue is not the evidence for or against the validity of this claim. 
Rather we need to try and establish how the question of the in-between, specifically, the so-
called coloured, the Mulatto, bisexual, the person of mixed race origins informed Freud’s 
thinking. We need to ask, for example, if the question of racial origins, Freud’s included gives 
rise to the question Freud poses: ‘what if Moses was an Egyptian?’103 
Freud’s struggle with ambiguity of identity, the in-between, ended with an assumption that 
there were two Moses – the Egyptian Moses and Midianite Moses. The ‘two Moses’ can be 
seen as a struggle to find ways to anchor the multiple and contradictory points of (Jewish) 
origin, belonging nowhere and everywhere at the same time
104
. For Richard Klein (2012) the 
“two Moses” theory is “certainty uncanny for the Orthodox Jew.” With the two Moses concept, 
Klein (2012, personal communication) argues “Freud is attempting to construct the notion of a 
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 Freud’s life ends with the question: what if Moses was an Egyptian?’ This question runs parallel to the Nazi’s 
situating Jews as an impure race. 
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 See discussion of mixed race origin. Jayne O. Ifekwunigwe (1997.  Also see Trinh Minh Ha who influenced 
Ifekwunigwe. 
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divided subject. The subject is divided between the statement, pronouncement as well as that 
something else that is speaking, an unspeakable enjoyment, without the possibility of this ever 
been represented (enunciation).  We are in a sense continually at a frontier, the opening of the 
mouth to proclaim a position in the world but only to fade into the hole in the very process of 
enunciation”.  
 
Freud’s ‘Prison Notebooks’ - the politicization of the psyche 
As the modern age simultaneously presented new forms of control and restriction alongside 
great promises Freud found himself confined. Clearly he felt alone, in exile, isolated, given the 
reality of his position, a radical thinker, Jewish, somebody exposing the secrets of bourgeois 
culture, the very group he yearned to be part of. In reality, as pointed by Chris Oakley (2012, 
personal communication), a front page cartoon devoted to Freud on his birthday, in the local 
newspaper, refuted his self belief that he was not recognised. Be this at it may, at the same time 
as he received public recognition, Freud began to realise it was provisional and conditional 
recognition, with racist undertones, much like the recognition granted to the black French 
world cup football players, some of whom realised that they were French when needed and 
when enhancing the glories of France, but for the most part, remained black.  
While Freud presents science as that which brought about psychoanalysis and liberation, it was 
in fact the cross-over of science, writing and the rituals and networks of the Jewish community. 
He began to find his voice by turning to writing, and through this writing he opened up space in 
the face of constriction in a similar and different way to Gramsci. Carl Schorske (1961) and 
Jose Brunner (2001) correctly contend that Freud emerges as a deeply political writer who 
systematically dissects the inner world of the psyche in parallel with the world of politics. 
Through his writings the intra personal, introspective and interpersonal concerns become 
politicised through implied analogies. Brunner (2001: 3) argues that nationalist rhetoric 
attributed characteristics like nervousness to particular races in their pursuit of the idea of the 
pure race:  
[N]ervousness and nationalism were interrelated by attributing a special nervousness to certain nations in 
which the concept of degeneracy became a major ingredient of nationalist rhetoric, which focused on the 
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biological potential and purity of the race. 
In this context Freud’s language ‘politicizes’ the psyche (Brunner 2001: viii).  Freud is the 
writer who pictures the unconscious as an arena of political conflict, where forces analogous to 
those in society oppose each other, and are driven by contradictory motives in pursuit of their 
goals, divided by defences and resistances (Brunner 2001: 49).  He adopts a plethora of 
political metaphors that present the unconscious as a microcosm which is analogous to the 
outer world of politics (Brunner 2001: 26). 
Of particular interest may be the influence that Jean-Jacques Rousseau had on Freud, 
particularly Rousseau’s use of the modern biography (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Jean-
Jacques_Rousseau) which brought the issue of subjectivity to the fore in a new way, and how 
this influenced Freud. Freud’s use of political metaphors forms part of the triumph of the novel 
as a newly established form of cultural expression, much the same way that information 
communication technology is current used to give voice to marginalised groups
105
. Freud 
presents us with 'disguised' political metaphors, for example, the concept of repression, which 
is presented as applying to a conflict within the individual's psyche but which could equally be 
seen as analogous to the conflicts brought about by the nation state between the nationals and 
foreigner. What is not clear is if this was Freud conscious or unconscious intention, but what is 
clear, for Freud words are a condensation or meanings and as such over determined, which as 
Lacanian theory notes, means they always saying more than and less than what the speaker 
intends them to say 
While Peter Gay is correct to emphasize the particular significance the autobiography served 
for the Victorians (Gay 1996: 103), it is limiting to only situate Freud’s writing in the shadow 
of Rousseau’s confessions, being the autobiography (Gay 1996: 106). Equally important are 
the establishment of fairy tales, adventure novels and the detective story and the reading of the 
Bible. Freud presents, to use his words, ‘as if’ or ‘just so stories’, fairy tales and new myths 
with which we can investigate and follow the clues of individual suffering. The truth of 
psychoanalysis, following Adorno, lies in its exaggeration, the ability to bring to light and offer 
new and different perspective on suffering through amplification of small details. The 
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restoration of the capacity to imagine, alongside using this imaginative narrative as a way to 
tell a story, constructs a biography, for oneself.  In fact it is the ‘narrative capacity’ which 
seems to be integral to the entire Freudian project. Whether a narrative is corrupted, colonized, 
re-written, how it is structured, theorized, described, lived, that describes any particular journey 
into ‘being’ in whatever form. 
On the one hand it can be said that the psychoanalytic text falls within the tradition of colonial 
mapping. Psychoanalysis, forms part of the adventure and detective novel, writing that reaches 
out to the common man. The adventure novel’s geography is a mapping of an adventurous 
colonial world by European men who are inspired by the Empire. Adventure stories produce 
cultural spaces in which imperial geographies and mapping can be conceived and can be 
accepted as the norm through the absorption of colonised space. Elaborating upon this, Richard 
Phillips (1997) calls this the imposition of “the invisible home” of the adventurer - male, 
Western - upon the colonized (Phillips 1997: 12). The adventure story occupies “an ambivalent 
space in which the boundaries between home and away” become unstable. The polarisation of 
home and away conformed to the Victorian division of public and private (Phillips 1997: 89).It 
is within this limited space that the psychoanalytic text unfolds.   
Provincializing psychoanalysis, Ranjana Khanna (2004: 29) places Freud alongside 
anthropology and the exploits of archaeologists and adventurers like Stanley. She reveals 
similarities in their prose, Khanna (2004: 50) which is to say, that Freud identifies with 
nationalist, colonialist self-constructions and encrypts the violence of the European nation’s 
colonial project in the text of psychoanalysis. Khanna (2004) concludes that psychoanalysis 
“constitutes ethnology of the nation-state” (Khanna 2004: 6).  It is a colonial discipline, based 
on a division of the primitive on the one hand against which the civilising mission needs to 
establish itself. 
At the same time, in opposition to this way of taking up space, is the respect, starting with 
Freud, for that which cannot be represented, that which refuses representation – what Freud 
calls the navel of the dream or the non semantic affective component of the symptom in 
addition to its signifying dimension. Moreover, Freud produces a practice, a ritualistic practice 
(of enjoyment) in which the process is every bit as important as the content and the need to 
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allow for an acceptance of that which cannot be voiced needs to be part of the process. This 
new way of experiencing the world is as important of the knowledge gained.  
Masud Khan has taken this furthest by emphasising the importance of the capacity and process, 
of dreaming and play over and above the content of the dream and play. Khan was critical of 
over-interpretation and more concerned with the capacity to dream. The dream allows for an 
existential experience alongside the demand for privacy and non-communication (Cooper 
1993: 81). 
In the work of Lacanian psychoanalyst Richard Klein, it is a push towards non-sense, an act of 
being able to free associate. Richard Klein as does Gilles Deleuze argues against interpretation, 
a process in which the utterance is crushed and stifled. The direction of the treatment is towards 
the unimportant, incomplete, incomprehensible. Free association is to speak and experience 
non-sense, to endure the affects of de-realization, anxiety, when one is unable to link signifiers; 
in fact, one of the parameters of analysis is not about linking, but cutting over determined links, 
hence the effects of de-realization. More and more in our regulated society, including 
regulation of therapeutic practice there is a resistance to free association, a demand to extract 
meaning, map human experience, which means a predetermined meaning, interpretations 
which bind things together in an orderly fashion and preset grounding.  
The thrust of Lacanian psychoanalysis is one in which the subject operates with lack, that is an 
analysis situated within the gap of knowledge and truth. The analyst thereby comes to the 
support of desire as paradoxical but a desire none the less, even if never actually finding rest. 
For Klein (2011, personal communication) the Lacanian analysis leads to an end, namely, one 
founded on an ironic being. Klein (2011, personal communication) depicts this irony through 
the use of the Möbius strip. On the one side of the Möbius strip there is that which refuses 
assimilation – for example the Ostjude - but on the other side we have the assimilated – for 
example the well spoken German scientist. The irony is there is no inside or outside, surface or 
depth. Put another way on the one side of the Möbius strip there is that foreign body which 
cannot be assimilated but at the same time this refusal, when twisted and shown as the ‘other 
side’ side of Möbius strip is a refusal of that which is already assimilated. It is ironic, or simply 
put, we do not take Freudian jokes seriously enough, noting off course, as does Klein, that what 
is tragic is comic.  
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Psychoanalysis is never just one thing. It tells us it is striving toward science when in fact is it 
navigating toward another place which is a kind of ‘Dionysian science.’ So saying, the other 
side of psychoanalysis is one inscribed in ritual, oral history and fairytales. Donald Sassoon 
(2006) discerns that fairytales and jokes are two important forms of oral cultural expressions to 
have survived outside market forces. Free association of the words of the Freudian 
psychoanalyst’s patient from the couch, is akin to the attempt to tell the fairytale106 without 
selective editing. Freud’s critique of the development of the sexual instinct becomes a 
metaphor of a critique of Western development generally (Cuddihy 1974:  65). Psychoanalytic 
imagery was deeply political, a challenge to Western morality (Bettleheim 1956: 49), and 
specifically to Western-Christian hypocrisy and its efforts to refine the irredeemably coarse and 
brutal effects of colonisation through looking the other way. 
What is truly unique about Freud is that despite, or perhaps because of, his contradictions, he 
approached the marginalized in a way that had nothing to do with previous Western mapping. 
This is, as Billa Zanuso (1986) puts it, what distinguishes Freud, most forcibly distinguishes 
him from his time and culture and links him to ours and we can add to the future, to the work 
of Fanon, Foucault, Adorno and Deleuze. 
Freud enables us to imagine the displaced body in a new and unforeseen way; to unravel a 
concept of violence and homelessness by unpacking the effects of being both ‘inside’ and 
‘outside’ the home and homeland and in so doing he foresees what Ilan Gur-Ze'ev (2005: 1) 
calls a Diasporic Philosophy.  
Diasporic philosophy represents a nomadic, hence "Diasporic" relation to the world, to thinking and to 
existence. Its starting point is the presence of the absence of truth, God, and worthy hedonism. Diasporic 
philosophy is positioned against any secular and theist philosophical, existential, and political projects 
that represent positive utopias and reflect "home-returning" quests. 
Adapting elements of Gur-Ze’ev’s depiction of Diasporic Philosophy I argue that Freud moves 
us in the direction of Deleuze and Adorno, a homeless ontology, such that “human's 
homelessness is neither a temporary situation nor a punishment, and ontologically it is rooted 
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in the infinite rootlessness, in what Deleuze calls “becoming” or “the rhizomatic”, that “opens 
the gate to nomadic existence…. resistance to normalizing education.” 
For Gur-Ze’ev (2005: 21), who is trying to develop a Critical Theory as a Jewish Negative 
Theology, it is a prayer in a Godless World.  
As Rabbi Moshe Sofer (Hatam Sofer) said: "The lamentation over the destruction is itself the building". 
This knowledge with which we are dealing is close to Gnostic knowledge – or rather the struggle for 
knowledge in the Gnostic sense of the word. Gnosis was the struggle for the knowledge of "the good 
exiled God", the understanding of which was unattainable. Hence its noble Diasporic position. 
 
The queering of psychoanalysis: the yid is an id 
To expand on the argument above, I shall show how Freud’s the notion that the id helps us 
understand the othering of the marginalized – the Yid, like the Id, like the homeless is 
repressed, is regulated. While it is too simplistic to suppose that the Yid is an ‘id’, an analogy 
can be drawn between the relation of the superego and the id on the one hand and the relation 
between pure German and Yiddish culture on the other. The superego – what Bettleheim 
(1956) translates as the Über (above, over) Ich, above-I, the upper-I – attempts to sweep the 
unconscious, margins, clean
107
 of its pre-history. Like the language of the unconscious, Yiddish 
is a language in its own right, even if it was seen as jargon, an inferior language, as Judeo-
German which High German tried to sweep under the carpet.  
By the mid 1880s Yiddish had become a respected literacy idiom, but it remained an unwanted 
language outside the Yiddish community. Yiddish was a hated language, seen as the cipher of 
social isolation, hybrid, an unnatural mix, the slang of criminals, and language of the ghetto, 
even ‘half-animal’ as Geiger claimed. It was opposed to Hebrew, the traditional language of 
learning and national idiom (Heller-Roazen 2006:  32, 33). As Y.L. Gordon, a great Hebrew 
poet said in 1889, it was “the badge of shame of the hounded wanderer” and he considered it 
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“the duty of every educated Jew to do what he can to see to it that it is gradually erased and 
vanishes from our midst"(Heller-Roazen 2006: 32, 33). 
Today we are witnessing post-vernacular Yiddish emergence, for example in klezmer music 
and even “Queer Yiddishkeit” (Heller-Roazen 2006: 32, 33) but in Freud’s day the story was 
very different
108
. Yiddish disrupted the concept of nation as an organic unity and the 
proliferation of the myth of an organic homeland, where the German language was supposed to 
bind people to the national Yiddish –what Adorno calls Fremdwörter - created a discontinuity 
by introducing the non-identical and thereby, as Adorno puts it, demonstrates the impossibility 
of an ontological language (Cheng 1999: 76). The Yid, the person and her language, becomes 
the alien thing, foreign body, that which had to be eradicated, an anomaly existing inside and at 
the same time, outside the national order. As Sinkwan Cheng (1999: 76) puts it: 
Both nationalist and the bourgeoisie find foreign words offensive because by remaining the absolutely 
other in language, these words prevent a non reflected affirmation of society. As Adorno puts it, foreign 
words take on an ‘alien’ posture in language. They (foreign words) are residues of the operation of the 
social contradiction between cultured and uncultured strata. 
Cheng (1999) concludes that it is no surprise that the Nazis should systematically eliminate 
Fremdwörter from their literature and pedagogy
109
. The Ostjuden became a ‘people without a 
homeland’ who were ‘looked upon as matter out of place’. Yiddish, as with the language of 
psychoanalysis, became a ‘homeless language’ discriminated against for its symbolic danger, 
exiled (1999: 78). 
Celia Brickman (2003) points out that Freud used the notion of primitivism to undercut the 
supreme self-confidence of European self-understanding, contending that what had been 
consigned as ‘savage’, ‘primitive’ actually lived on in the structures of modern European 
subjectivity and institutions” (Brickman 2003: 5). In holding this position, Freud does not 
consign Jews and blacks to what Dipesh Chakrabarty calls the “waiting room of history.” At 
                                                                                                                                                                                        
108
 Daniel Heller-Roazen (2006) points out that with the rise nationalism, specifically, the Nazis, three-quarters of 
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the same time, Freud’s discourse on primitivism does gives rise to what Kalpana Seshadri-
Crooks has aptly called the conceit of whiteness in psychoanalysis in its equation of an 
unmarked whiteness with its norms of subjectivity (Brickman 2003: 7), in which we see an 
entanglement of anthropological and psychoanalytic meanings of primitivism. 
Is psychoanalysis then an ‘adventure novel’, a form of colonial mapping or a subaltern text, a 
way of speaking back that refuses mapping? Freud is responding to the colonization of Jews 
that is to the internally colonized European population.  The response shows ambivalence.  
Freud provides a radical challenge and attempt to give what is oppressed and repressed voice, 
but at the same time there is the identification with the coloniser. Reflection on the relationship 
between Freud and Jung, it is interesting to note that Freud needed Jung and to a lesser extent 
Ferenczi, to help him establish a symbolic medical (male) home through conquering (fearful 
female anima and ‘primitive’) spaces, like mythology, occultism and trance110. Consider the 
following observations by Ronald Hayman (2002) in his biography on Jung:  
                                                                                                                                                                                        
110 Chris Oakley (2012, personal communication) directs our attention to Otto Gross. He feels that Freud wanted 
Gross to go to Jung for treatment, as opposed to Freud himself, due to a disavowal of a certain dimension of 
transference, the trance states. Freud was splitting off what he felt was unacceptable or too much, and sending it in 
Jung’s direction. Gross was clearly engaged in drug induced trance, whilst Jung had a long- standing fascination 
with religious trance states. Freud wanted to move analysis away from hypnotic altered states of consciousness.  
He ended up concluding that transference-analysis never ended.   
Freud's technical papers presented the "party line", the rules of engagement which applied to everybody but Freud, 
and Freudian orthodoxy came into full force thereby drawing a line between psychoanalysis and other "wild" 
practices, like analytic psychology or the use of drugs. Yet Freud was in many ways a humble person who was 
willing to acknowledge the limitations of psychoanalysis as well as his own abilities, so why this laying down of 
exact lines? He was interested in paranormal phenomena and took large amounts of cocaine, so why this drawing 
of boundary lines?  
It seems that there was a need to master transference and in this mastering of transference there was an exclusion 
of certain possibilities. Jung and Gross became associated with those trance elements that took psychoanalysis into 
directions in which Freud no longer knew how to find his position as analyst.  He was not able to recognise what 
he knew as analysis as it became something other, esoteric, dangerous.  
The intensity of these early explorations, working without a safety net, namely an understanding of the concept of 
transference, must not be underestimated. The early analytic explorers got themselves into spaces in which 
boundaries became confused and all manner of things happened. From this time on analysis seems to operate with 
dogmatic certainty as to what a boundary is - the analytic frame and ground rules. No longer do we live in a world 
were transference is some kind of magical golden alchemy, like the mythical copulation of the king and queen.    
During Jung and Freud’s time, boundary lines were more complex, or more akin to Heidegger’s formulation, 
namely, that a boundary is not that at which something stops but the boundary is that from which something 
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"I know not why you are so afraid of my criticism on questions of mythology. I will be very glad when 
you plant the flag of libido and repression in that territory and return as a victorious conqueror to our 
medical motherland." (142). Ronald Hayman remarks that Freud told Ferenczi that Jung wanted "to 'lead 
a crusade' into 'the field of occultism.’I can see that you two are not to be held back. At least go forward 
in collaboration with each other; it is a dangerous expedition, and I cannot accompany you. Just do not 
stay for too long in the tropical colonies. You have to reign in the homeland"(143, 144). 
The words that Freud repeatedly uses are very interesting – ‘conquering’ and ‘raising the flag’, 
returning to the ‘motherland’, ‘tropical colonies’, are all rather symbolically Freudian one 
might. Consider this statement notes by Ronald Hayman (2002: 125) as well. “I think we 
should raise our psychoanalytic flag over the territory of normal love, which is very close to 
us.” Yet strangely in the field of love, between male doctors and female patients (and arguably, 
the love bonds between these male soul doctors) the early analysts found themselves falling in 
love with their patients and/or having sexual relationships with them or crossing boundaries 
that would today be considered unethical
111
.  
Inverting Freud’s text it can be argued that where the (y) id (or perhaps woman) was so there 
shall come to be the secular Jew (ego) but at the same time the (secular Jew) ego is not master 
of his own home as there is no escape from one’s unconscious origins. So where the id was 
there shall be some uncanny site of subjectivity. Sander Gilman (1993) points out that the 
rhetoric of colonization and anti-Semitism converged in Freud’s Vienna and elsewhere in 
Europe in which Jews where variously described as oriental, primitive, barbarian, white Negro, 
mulatto or a mongrel race. Gilman (1993: 13) further observes that Ostjuden were credited with 
                                                          
begins to surface.  This is similar yet different to what Merleau-Ponty calls an embodied consciousness; the lived-
body goes beyond the boundary of the skin and incorporates the subject’s relationship to the world. This 
relationship organises what is experienced and is what is known.  
 
111 This began with Joseph Breuer and Bertha Pappenheim resulting in Breuer terminating the treatment but 
rushing to her bedside during a hysterical childbirth. Ferenczi feel in love with one of his patients, Elma Palos and 
wanted to marry her but he married the mother, Gisella Palos, instead, based on Freud’s advice. Ernest Jones it is 
alleged became sexually involved with a patient whilst working in Canada. Jones response was to go on the 
offensive, accusing her of being a lesbian and latter attempted to pay money to her to remain silent on this issue. 
The most famous cases were the love relationship between Jung and Sabina Spielrein. We can probably also 
include Freud’s analysis of his daughter as an example of confused boundaries and love.  
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many of the stereotypical sexual characteristics attributed to black sexuality and 
homosexuality. The racist and heterosexist ideology at the end of the nineteenth century was as 
hostile to Jews as it was to sexual ‘deviants’ and other non-Europeans. The internal 
colonization of European populations – Jews, Irish, Roma people - gypsies, gay and lesbians, 
‘the insane’, sex workers, etc – needs to be understood from the perspective of biological 
racism which assimilated the concept of degeneracy. Freud’s position is again complex, while 
attempting to colonise the mind he fought against the concept of degeneracy, that is to say, 
against internal colonization.  
In summary, as Hana Arendt (1979) points out, we need to consider German imperialism in 
Afrika as a preparatory stage for coming catastrophe. The Herero Genocide of 1904-5 in the 
German colony, South West Africa, is evidence of this.  Similarly as Aime Cesaire (1972) put 
it, the practices hitherto imposed exclusively on the non-European world were applied in 
Europe with the rise of Nazism and the use of the concentration camps. The Jew had become 
an “exemplary member of the dark skin races” (Gilman 1993: 13) trapped within a racially 
inscribed body subjected to homophobic and racist stereotypes. Freud, like Isis, is in search of 
the brother’s body in the underworld. When this body is found it is without the phallus as the 
black man has no penis; the male Jew is a mere clitoris. Neither has the phallus (Gilman 1993: 
224). To have a phallus is to take on a white mask. 
 
Godless religion: homelessness or the nation 
In 1897 Franz Joseph accepted the election of Karl Lueger, who belonged to the anti-Semitic 
Christian Social Party. In the same year Adolph Stoecker started the Christian Socialist 
Workingmen's Union in Germany with the aim of boycotting Jewish businesses. Prior to this, 
in 1881, Bismarck had accepted an anti-Semitic petition, with two hundred and fifty-five 
thousand signatures, demanding a ban on Jewish immigration. The following year, 1882 saw 
the first International Anti-Jewish Congress in Dresden, Germany.  
These were some of the events that marked the birth of modern anti-Semitism and the rise of a 
‘pure’ Teutonic race.  With the concept of ‘impure race’ no longer was a Jew qualified to be a 
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Jew by his or her religion (which left him/her the option of conversion), but identity was 
determined by their race, which not even the baptismal waters could cure
112
. Swept along by a 
romantic passion for pure race and by the simple and uncorrupted peasantry, the nation state, 
argues Hobsbawm (1990), found itself caught up in the manipulation of the popular culture of 
the common people, with a demand to rediscover the folkloric of ‘the people’ (Hobsbawm 
1990: 103). 
This new anti-liberalism culture gave birth to Czech nationalism, pan-Germanism, Christian 
Socialism, Social Democracy and Zionism (Schorske 1961: 117).Carl Schorske (1961) 
contends that anti-liberalism culture can be seen to have ushered in “post-rational politics”, the 
twentieth century political rebellion against reason and law. The rise of national interest, the 
popular culture of the common people united around a common racial identification, resulted in 
the principles of nationalism overriding the liberalism and the progress of ‘high culture’ 
(Schorske 1961).August Rohling published his Talmud Jude while Georg von Schonerer of the 
Pan-Germans and Karl Lueger of the Christian Socials emerged as the leading virtuosi of the 
new German in Western European nationalist movements (Schorske 1961: 119).
 
This was the cultural soil in which Zionism emerged, for instance with the founding, in 1882, 
of Kadimah, a Zionist nationalist students organization, by Nathan Birnbaum, one of the 
founding fathers of Zionism. Kadimah argued in favour of Jewish Nationalism rather than for 
assimilation. Also, it is within this context of emerging nationalism and anti-Semitism that 
psychoanalysis emerged.  
What unites the emergence of the Nazi party, Zionism and psychoanalysis, is an attempt to 
ground subjectivity, find a home in a world in which Europeans felt abandoned by the promise 
of rationality which had failed to deliver. Forlorn, homelessness fell upon Adolph Hitler, 
Thoedor Hertz and Sigmund Freud. Hitler, as a young man found himself homeless and ended 
up in a homeless hostel while for Hertz and Freud it was not having a sense of a homeland and 
having to live with the ever present threat that history would repeat itself and that they as Jews 
would find themselves once again homeless in all senses of the word.  
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Christians took this ritual from Judaism. 
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Imperialist Europe, which would come to decree white Aryan racial supremacy in Germany 
and Vienna, attempted to create a home for those chosen by the fatherland. The home of the 
fatherland defined by those it excluded.   
Home for Freud was not simply about one’s physical abode, but involved the politics of 
representation. Freud’s attempts to go beyond racial categories, beyond the nation-state, led to 
his deep scepticism about Israel. At the same time, in psychoanalysis he found a retreat, an 
alternative to the nation state. With the creation of psychoanalysis he re-enacted ritual 
dimensions from his Ostjuden heritage while at the same time negating such rituals as a 
determining force in his life.  
The replication of the rituals of his past was his blind spot. Psychoanalysis functioned as a 
tightly structured small community in much the same way that the Ostjuden lived in small, 
tight communities with a strong structure of beliefs and code of behaviour. The structure was 
similar in that both claimed to have found a sanctuary for the soul. Reading the analytic text 
and speaking from the couch offer a much needed ritual and retreat from the world out-there 
and allow for a secret private world, even if illusory, to playfully unfold.  
Psychoanalysis is an attentive rereading and a listening to the words of the analysed, a practice 
not too dissimilar to the Talmudic practice of providing a close reading of the text. Richard 
Klein (2006) argues that Freud is a heretic. Freud’s heretical reading113 of religion produced a 
new orthodoxy for all religions, something he seems to have been scripted to do from the 
moment he learned to read
114
. Almost as soon as he learned to read, he began to read the Bible 
with his father and out of this experience his education began. At the end of his life he returned 
to reading the Bible which was a kind of homecoming.  This return was a reinforcement of his 
Jewish identity in the face of genocide.  Freud himself states in his autobiography that his 
                                                                                                                                                                                        
113
 It would be interesting to ponder if Freud came into contact with the work of Thomas Hardy and what he 
would have made of Jude the Obscure.  See Terry R Wright Hardy the Heretic and Jude the Obscure: Reciting the 
Bible, Reforming the Church and Re figuring Christ. In Andrew Dix and Jonathan Taylor (editors) (1998).   
 
114
 Almost as soon as Freud learned to read, he began to read the Bible with his father. Out of this experience his 
education began. At the end of his life he returned to reading the Bible which was an “a kind of homecoming to 
the security of the thoroughly familiar world of language and images he had long ago from his father - once again 
reinforcing his Jewish identity.”  As Freud himself states in his autobiography, his entire life had influenced by this 
text. Furthermore, it is interesting to note that the Bible he used – Philippson’s Bible - contains words like 
unconscious, disavowal, repressed, realm of drives (Vitz 1988: 86). 
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entire life had been influenced by the Bible. Furthermore, it is interesting to note that the Bible 
he used – Philippson’s Bible - contains words like unconscious, disavowal, repressed and realm 
of drives. 
In assessing Freud’s attitude to religion, we need to distinguish, as Andrew Dix and Jonathan 
Taylor (1998) point out, between apostasy, which is the absolute abandonment of faith, and 
heresy, considered a blasphemy but still a matter for believers. Heretics are interpreters 
differing about the meaning of the texts, but people who fundamentally believe in the 
relevance, power and truth of the text. The heretic challenges any fixed and institutionalised 
reading. Like all heretics, Freud’s work is transgressive yet at the same time, again like most 
heretics, there are elements of fundamentalism, in the sense of referring back to the original 
texts (Dix 1998: 2-5). 
Freud will develop a godless religion – psychoanalysis. This godless religion, while 
proclaiming an epistemological break, in fact emerges out of preceding technologies of self 
that place upon people an obligation to tell the truth about themselves in the presence of a 
master. Following Foucault we will argue that psychoanalysis is a practice that grows out a 
tradition of care for the self and the knowing of self, examples being: purification 
(Pythagorean), the practice of imagining your worst fears and stocktaking (askesis, stoicism) 
and meditation (Seneca). The techniques of the Greeks were transferred onto Christian spiritual 
technique, for example self examination in monastic life, contemplation, verbalisation, 
confession, but with different emphases.  
The question Foucault asks is where the overlapping of technologies of domination of others 
and self is. This area of overlapping he calls govern-mentality. Freud when aligned to 
colonialism engages in govern-mentality, but when creating space for the subaltern, he pushes 
up against this domination and colonisation of psychic and physical space. Then again, 
psychoanalysis, as has been mentioned already, became a religion without a god whereas 
nationalism held on to the concept of their God and a male order.  
Richard Klein (2000) has attempted to develop a theory and practice of Lacanian 
psychoanalysis as a practice, in my words, ritual, without the law of the father. Yet more and 
more we see the regulation of psychoanalysis. In effect psychoanalysis is undergoing 
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castration; however it is a lack that does not introduce desire but imposes morality. It is 
important to observe that alongside the curtailing and confinement of psychoanalysis in the UK 
and other parts of Europe, we have more and more confinement and criminalization of the sex 
worker, the conflation of all sex work with trafficking. With both these actions we see an attack 
on the unconscious and merging of morality and law, in other words the law as superego, in 
which one singular model of relating is imposed on human experience. At the centre of this 
experience is the Father who knows what is best for us and how we should enjoy it. 
The psychoanalytic lineage takes us in many different directions. On the one side it takes us 
beyond the methods of natural science and onto the shores of both parrhesiastes, or is it back 
into the tradition of Talmudic studies? Parrhesiastes involves someone taking a risk to tell the 
truth instead of reposing in the security of a life where the truth goes unspoken (Foucault 2001: 
16).  It is out of the later tradition that Freud the healer will emerge, albeit a healer who, for 
some, like David Bakan and Richard Webster, produces a delusional messianic practice
115
.  It 
is out of this tradition of fearless speech – parrhesiastes - that Freud will stumble upon new 
forms of bonds in which to home the homeless and find space to be, think, feel, dream, work, 
play and love in the face of normalisation and nationalism.  
On the one side we have Freud who wants to make the Jew more of a Jew. To be a Jew for 
Freud, as argued by Stephen Frosch and Jaqueline Rose is to strip away the untenable aspects 
of the shift, such that the secular Jew is not less but more Jewish (Frosch 2005: 28). Yet, in the 
popular perception of Freud, he is seen as a white European. The exceptions are Hortense J 
Spillers and Sander Gilman who see Freud as mixed raced and Jacqueline Rose who sees Freud 
as non-European. 
On the other side we have Freud in kinship with Jacques Derrida in that both want to make 
space for the foreign bodies that lie outside of the nation state formation. Jacques Derrida 
(1998: 67) in his provocative commentary of the psychoanalytic institutions is of the opinion 
that for psychoanalysis there are continents, semi-continents and one dark continent only, and 
“one darkness - dark, that is, un-cleared or unexplored, black, black like femaleness, like sex, 
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 Richard Webster goes so far as to argue that any claim to biological evolutionism does not refute the messianic 
- moral philosophy - thesis in that the fundamental idea which lay behind all nineteenth-century theories of 
evolutionary progress was a moral and religious. 
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like the skin of some people, evil”. Freud, as Derrida (1998) points out, presents the symptom 
as a foreign body, foreign to the ego. Derrida’s wonderful response is to play the “symptom”: 
he takes up the position of a body foreign in relation to the Institution of Psychoanalysis (IPA), 
as a way of hearing the outside. He presents himself as an outsider to the psychoanalytic 
institution, not having to answer to any psychoanalytic agency (except one can assume, his 
wife, a psychoanalyst) and as someone born in Afrika. Derrida (1998: 69) notes: 
I guarantee you that I retain something of that heritage. My reason for recalling this today is that there is 
practically no psychoanalysis in Africa, white or black, just as there is practically no psychoanalysis in 
Asia or in the South Seas. These are among those parts of the ‘rest of the world’ where psychoanalysis 
has never set foot, or in any case where it has never taken off its European shoes.  
Jacques Derrida reminds us he is from Algeria, Afrika, as a way to remind the psychoanalytic 
institutions of the manner in which the Fanons of the other world have been “marginal or 
marginalized…a well-known and painful point of reference” (Derrida 1998: 69). 
As for Freud, his own approaching death is punctuated by his statement that Moses was 
Egyptian, a position rather close to that of Derrida as well as to James Joyce who wants to open 
up space outside the borders as defined by the home office. Psychoanalytic practice involves 
offering somebody a space to experience themselves in new and unforeseen ways, practices 
that allow the subject to think what is un-thought and house what is homeless – ‘part objects’, 
namely foreign bodies– in such a way that they can coexist in space without destroying each 
other.  
Psychoanalysis offers a space that is, paradoxically, to be at home within a world without 
guarantee, no Big Other, including devaluation of patriarchy – and in opposition to the nation-
state solution.  Richard Klein (2000) refers to this as a movement from the universal to the 
particular, one grounded in irony. The particularity of the subject takes the person beyond the 
plane of identification, representation, a movement from gender to enjoyment. Following the 
work of Richard Klein (2000) we can offer James Joyce as a paradoxical example of 
home/homelessness.  
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Richard Klein (2000) poses a question, “Why Joyce?” Why at the end of his career does Lacan, 
faced with the dichotomy of Freud or Joyce, choose Joyce?  
Lacan is eager to associate himself with the heretic Joyce. Lacan turns towards Joyce because of a 
psychoanalytical principle which is written in opposition to the desire to perfect the social world for the 
reason that it can lead to tyranny. Joyce ranges himself against the tyranny of the British Empire, against 
the tyranny of the Roman Church and uses Leopold Bloom against the racism inherent in the notion of 
Gaelic purity.  
It has to be Joyce because he writes, as does Toni Morrison in Beloved, in a way which speaks 
of what Klein (2000, lecture on Joyce) refers to as ‘a stream of jouissance’, pure non-sense, 
neologisms, disrupting the homogenous ordering of things. 
Joyce, a white European writer, can be placed alongside Toni Morrison as a black writer. They 
employ the spoken and written word, as note by Gilroy in a way that was irrevocably black and 
female, not because of the colour of their skin, their gender, not because of the subject matter, 
but becaue of the way the words are put together, the texture, tone, rhythm. So that anybody 
who hears them knows it is a black thing (Gilroy 1993: 78), in the case of Joyce, the Irish as 
the blacks of Europe. The point of convergence within the work of Morrison and Joyce is the 
excess of enjoyment that speaks through the word, that is surplus to any meaning, be it anger, 
poetic or mystical or simply feminine. 
Klein (2000 lecture on Joyce) reads Joyce, who as a young man endured physical 
homelessness, not wanting to be regulated by anyone. That is how things get littered, concludes 
Klein (2000 lecture on Joyce): 
The stream of jouissance makes a litter of the letter. James Joyce did not want to be regulated by the 
English language, and that’s how neologisms get constructed. It’s a social bond with litter in its 
foundations. One would expect it to lead to the statement: stop littering. Joyce didn’t stop. Lacan thinks it 
is an ironic social bond. Joyce indicates that he is cured of a social bond in a letter to Nora: ‘I cannot 
enter the social order except as a vagabond.’ 
The ordering signifier that functions like an ego ideal operates on behalf of the signifier of the 
Father, patriarchy. We may add nationalism. The ID card is a form of tyranny that attempts to 
put an end to the “ex-sistence” of the atypical citizen, according to Klein (2000 lecture on 
Joyce). The ID card is the ego tied to the symbolic by the signifier of the Name-of-the-Father. 
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It is supposed to exclude the real and to bury the particular in the universal. The ID card 
represents the triumph of the Father, nation state. The typical citizen is the hoped for result. 
Joyce moves in the opposite direction by achieving the status of atypical citizen. For Klein 
(2006) this atypical aspect of any citizen consists of the forms of satisfaction that are particular 
to the subject, which cannot be shared. They are heterogeneous elements outside accepted 
doctrine and must fall foul of any universalizing tendency.  
 
Conclusion 
The shadow of homelessness marked Freud’s life from beginning to end and no doubt 
informed his writing. At the level of theory the two concepts which speak most forciblyto the 
concept of homelessness is the uncanny and drive (as embodied in the Id and unconscious). 
The drive is a concept which Freud’s locates on the frontier between mind and body, soma and 
psychic and which is restless. It refuses representation and taming and leaves an uncanny 
shadow over the ego’s attempts at self mastery and identification. The drive and uncanny 
introduce us to the other world. Freud moves between the space of the established order and 
this other world. This division, binary, marks his work.  
I will draw upon another psychoanalyst, who also happens to be born Jewish, Richard Klein 
(2011) to elaborate upon this tension. Klein (2011, personal communication) presents us a 
useful Lacanian binary: world/scene. The construction an ego-body image occurs via the 
process of identification.  This identification is symbolic and imaginary; vertical, with an ideal 
and a horizontal identification, with other group members who imagine there is a shared 
identity. The process of identification saddles the world with a scene but not with reality. Klein 
(2011) argues that Freud needed the Father to situate the Oedipus that is to create a scene. The 
totem as a father surrogate in the animistic phase of civilisation and God as a father surrogate 
in the religious phase and now perhaps the symbolic in the scientific phases. As such, argues 
Klein, the Oedipus turns out to be both a defensive structure and alienating but also the site 
where identifications are put into place. Alienation by identification with ideal signifiers 
installs a scene structured by the symbolico-imaginary.  
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Klein (2011) informs us that the scene we operate within is a symbolic deception, a fiction, a 
sembIant (make-believe) that is maintained through lavérité menteuse (lying truth).  
Identification is buttoned down through the pacifying function of the ideal which is bound up since the 
dawn of history with the imago of the father. This is the signifier which triggers the identification, 
transforming the subject’s relations to his imaginary partners and groups, namely the ego ideal 
identification. The subject renounces enjoyment under the pacifying influence of the ego ideal and 
interiorises its imaginary partner, stabilising the identification.  
Following Klein’s (2011, personal communication) reading of Lacan we can argue that the 
structuring of the ego-body is a fictional process, one that establishes a social scene, bond, 
within which we are expected to engage in a repetitive repetition (game) of the self identify 
bearing signifiers. The ego-body is established through a narcissistic and alienating formation 
and build on aggression. For Klein (2011) the ego-body construction takes us into the field of 
narcissism as “the ego is a body-image and not a natural body. The question deserves to be 
asked as to how much access the subject has to its body outside the field of narcissism”. He 
further argues that the construction of the ego-body is a defence in which the ego has a 
remarkable capacity to imagine the world other than it is. The social bond through ideal 
identifications produces the homogeneity of a given community and familiar scene. Otherwise, 
reality has no intrinsic existence. The ego is neither a measurer nor a measure of reality 
precisely because it measures the world other than it is (Klein 2011).  
For Klein (2011), following Lacan, the scene is the world of recognition but not the world. 
Moreover in this binary world/scene is hidden another, existential binary, namely 
existence/essence. The scene provides us with essence and the world with ex-sistence. Not only 
is the scene not the world, the world has to the scene a relation of ex-sistence. The scene is 
established in the dimension of historical time where objects are described and cosmic time 
belongs to the world. We are alienated in the scene in that the foreign body, drive, is excluded.  
For Klein (2011) the drives and I will add foreign bodies belong to the world and ex-sist to the 
scene. Drives and foreign bodies are defended against and repressed. Repression happens in the 
scene, not in the world. The ego in the scene imagines the drives other than they are in an act 
called fantasy or projection. The drives and foreign bodies ex-sist to the scene in a de-
positioning manner, as a body-in-pieces, litter.  The ego becomes a defence against the world, 
 
 
 
 
138 
 
the body-in-pieces. Following Lacan, Klein (2011) asks if these drives, I will add foreign 
bodies, that ex-sist to the scene, will have a chance to exist one day. 
Freud can be likened to the mythical Moses; he has a vision of the land where foreign bodies 
can exist, but it is a place he cannot enter, instead he remains trapped in between the familiar 
scene and other/world. Freud, living with cancer, invested a huge amount of energy into 
producing this final work, Moses and Monotheism. Freud concluded not only that Moses was 
an Egyptian, but that there were two of them. In so doing he created a space characterised by 
doubles and the uncanny. Is this Freud’s moment of coming out as a coloured? If this is 
Freud’s moment of coming out, it needs to contextualised, namely, that the claim that Moses is 
an Egyptian occurs at the moment where he finds himself a refugee. The backdrop to this 
question was the rise of racial hatred towards Jews in Germany. While it came before the death 
of Freud’s relatives in a concentration camp, the threat of the effects of racial purification and 
hygiene were clearly evident to Freud. It seems that Freud’s reply is to want to appeal to 
coloured ancestry, mixed origin for all of mankind, or else to kill each other off in the name of 
difference. 
Freud becomes the symptom of this entrapment, the longing for a home alongside the drive to 
make space for the other uncanny world.  At best the process of free association offers him a 
home in the uncanny other world, at worst, his taking up of the position of the Father represses 
the uncanny semblances of those foreign bodies.  
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CHAPTER FOUR 
FANON: HOMELESSNESS AT ITS LIMIT POINT 
 
Introduction 
Colonialism cannot be understood without the possibility of torturing, of violating, or of massacring. 
Torture is an expression and a means of the occupant-occupied relationship (Fanon 1967: 66). 
The writings of Fanon offer us an understanding of homelessness at its limit point – the 
colonization of mental and physical space resulting in the absence of space to move, think, 
dream, work and play. We can arrive at this understanding through unpacking Fanon’s concept 
of alienation. Based on the elaboration below, it will be asserted, firstly, that that the 
relationship between violence and homelessness needs to be approached in spatial terms, 
Fanon’s approach, and secondly, that a study of the life and work of Fanon offers us a profound 
insight into the relationship between violence and homelessness. Another way of framing the 
spatial approach is to refer to it, as does Henri Lefebvre, as a ‘spatio-analytic’ (Lefebvre 1995: 
404 - 405). 
The argument presented in this chapter is based on the following assumptions: Firstly, 
colonization is both a psychological and material process. Secondly, the experience of having 
no space into which one can retreat is an attack on the body.  Thirdly, with colonization, there 
is a lack of mental and/or physical space into which one can retreat. Fourthly, this lack of space 
can be translated as one possible manifestation of homelessness. Finally, that all the above 
assumptions are a building upon the work of Fanon and that what Fanon is engaged in, as noted 
by Nigel Gibson (2011), is a politics of space.   
When applying some of the metaphors used by Fanon, often used to describe alienation, the 
spatial picture that emerges is that of a human being who is ‘fixed’, ‘laid bare,’ ‘hemmed in’, 
“…without motion towards the world” (Fanon 1972: 31) and segregated – what can be 
described as knowing one’s place. While Gibson (2011: 24), argues that Black Skin, White 
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Masks focuses more on spatial confinement and Wretched of the Earth on the spatial 
segregation of colonial urban planning, both experiences involve a feeling of being caged. 
Besides, they denote a reduction to what Fanon (1972: 77), portrays as a “crushing object-
hood”, namely a body subjugated through constricting circles of oppression that are slowly 
drawing tighter (Fanon 1972: 79), pushing one out of the world. This is the production of 
places that can be described as no-man’s-lands, in which the person is neither alive nor dead, 
what the Fanon scholar Gibson (2011:13) calls “…an almost life and death situation” due to an 
erasure and systematic negation of all attributes of humanity.  
The affliction of racism, and the spatial constriction that is experienced as a result of this, is 
carefully illustrated in the chapter in Black Skin, White Masks entitled The Fact of Blackness, 
(Fanon 1972: 77) which opens with the lines, “Dirty nigger! Simply look, a Negro!” Fanon 
describes his encounter with a child who proclaims fear upon seeing him. “Look, a Negro! 
Mama, see a Negro! I am frightened!” He presents us an image of immobility, dissociation, a 
“crumbling” of the “corporal schema” which is replaced by “a racial epidermal schema” 
(Fanon 1972: 79). In his words, “an amputation, an excision, a haemorrhage that spattered my 
whole body with black blood?  But I did not want this revision, this thematicisation” (Fanon 
1972: 79). The conclusion Fanon reaches is that “the first thing which the native learns is to 
stay in his place, and not to go beyond certain limits. This is why the dreams of the native are 
always of muscular prowess” (Fanon 1972: 40). 
Reading Fanon, I am led to the conclusion that without space into which one can retreat, 
violence will result. These places, as Giorgio Agamben (2000: 41) remarks, are often a location 
in which the public and private, political life and biological life, become rigorously 
indistinguishable. Following Fanon, it can be concluded that this lack of retreat forms the 
confines of the Wretched of the Earth, those who often find themselves stigmatized, outcast 
and criminalised. Simply put, they are not granted recognition, seen as human. As Agamben 
(2000: 35) puts it, they are considered as “naked life”, a life that does not matter or warrant 
thinking about. In this location, the wretched of the earth discover themselves to be invisible in 
a world that is indifferent to their suffering, yet, at the same time, as Agamben (2000: 122) 
notes, she is not granted a “…single instant in which he or she might be able to find shelter in 
the realm of the private.”  
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Achille Mbembe (2001), following Fanon, and in some ways the new Fanon of Afrika, refers 
to this as the reducing of the person to a state of flesh - a body marked, mythologized, object, 
thing, cast out, dropped, waste. In the words of Fanon (1990: 30), it is to inhabit “a world 
without spaciousness.” It is what Mbembe (2001: 200) calls “a purely negative essence without 
substance” and what Memmi expresses (in reference to the colonized) as the removal from 
history (Memmi in Haddour 2006: 35) or simply genocide. Mbembe (2011: 29) argues that for 
Fanon, colonization was a force animated at its core by a genocide drive. 
 
The structure of the chapter 
Fanon chose exile, homelessness, and worked with the homeless and alienated, or “the 
wretched of the earth”. To read Fanon, there is value in reading his work in reverse, see his 
work as an unfinished conversation and see it as living legacy at work within new sites of 
struggle, what Nigel Gibson (2011) calls unfinished struggles. We need to read the Wretched of 
the Earth back to front, or, at least, begin with the last chapter devoted to torture case 
studies.
116
 We need to start with his leave-taking of traditional psychiatry and French 
citizenship, and read this alongside his torture case studies and clinical practice at hospitals 
Blida and Charles-Nicolle.  
What I shall do in this chapter is first introduce the ‘Fanon Body’ and ask the question as to 
where do we place this ‘body’ and what is it that this ‘body’ wants to question. By so doing I 
am attempting to grapple with the difficulties of placing Fanon within any one singular 
theoretical framework.  
Having introduced the reader to some biographical information and presented my own way of 
positioning Fanon, the chapter proceeds to discuss a much neglected and arguably deliberately 
ignored dimension, Fanon the healer. Through this discussion of man who is deeply committed 
                                                                                                                                                                                        
116
 The idea of reading Fanon ‘back to front’, that is reading certain key essays, letters and events alongside each 
other, first occurred to me reading Alan Read (1996: 26) and the essays in The Fact of Blackness in which he asks 
us reread Fanon against the grain, to follow the logic of his work, to unravel the symptomatic, to listen to his many 
voices. Read draws our attention to a moment of convergence in Black Skin, White Masks and Wretched of the 
Earth in the chapter on colonial war and mental disorders.  For Read this convergence speaks of the systematic 
negation of the other person and the “imprisoning him.” This is not only a pivotal point of convergence, as Read 
noted, but traces the strain of colonization that marks the person as homeless in their own homeland.   
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to healing mental pain I arrive at an understanding of the relationship between violence and 
homelessness. This understanding is then applied to the experience of torture, presented as 
homeless at its limit point.  
Following this presenting and by way of further elaborating the work of Fanon the rest of the 
chapter places him alongside white and black men who have varying degrees of similarity. The 
chapter then proceeds to critic Fanon before offering concluding remarks. 
The methodology of the chapter is informed by both Nigel Gibson’s reading and application of 
Fanon. Fanon, like Foucault, offer us his theories as a political tactic, strategy and ethic, what 
some writers refer to as a toolkit. Fanon’s and Foucault work is incomplete. Both men died 
prematurely thereby leaving us wondering what would have followed next. Both men spent a 
great of deal engaged in politics, on the ground, time that could have been used to write and 
read.  
With Fanon, there is an additional dimension that makes his work incomplete, namely he was 
to some extent isolated and while he reached out to people like Sartre he did not have a ready 
madeaudience against which to bounce his ideas. Most of his time was spent helping others. As 
such, and again following Gibson, I try to create conversations based on the assumption that 
Fanon’s work will remain as unfinished conversations with which we can engage. I playfully 
place Fanon alongside white European outsiders affected by the war and Afrikan liberation 
activists as a way to continue and open up new conversations.  
 
Where does Fanon belong? 
In this section, I will argue that understanding where to place Fanon is imperative to getting a 
grip on his life and work. While Fanon slips through the net of categorization, my approach is 
to focus on what I shall call the ‘Fanon Body’, both in terms of why the Fanon body questions, 
as well as how it questions and engages with the world. The Fanon body is a new term I am 
introducing. There is something enigmatic about this body in that it is not an atomized 
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individuality but one that bears witness and faces the ancestors of the past and can be linked to 
another term I shall introduce, body-memory
117
.  
The Fanon Body includes his physical body, his body of work and the performance that 
reshapes the body’s relationship to the scene before him.  The Fanon Body means his 
corporeal, physical body and its psycho-social-political location, but also a body in a state of 
performance, continually evolving and becoming something other, even after his death.  
David Macey (2000: 6) opens his biography on Fanon with a chapter in which we are told that 
Fanon “never really become part of the pantheon of Algerian nationalism”. Similarly, the 
French have not claimed him as one of their own, while many Martinique regard him “as a 
pariah” (Macey 2000: 14). As regards to Fanon’s theoretical location, he cautions the reader 
around the theoretical locations of Fanon, for example as a postcolonial theorist. Macey’s 
(2000: 14) skepticism of the postcolonial location of Fanon, specifically by English and 
Cultural Studies Departments, is based on the assumption that it is a Fanon who is “constructed 
outside time and space and in the purely textual dimension”. Moreover, for Macey (2000: 28) 
the postcolonial Fanon is in many ways “an inverted image of the revolutionary Fanon of the 
1960’s.”  
What is significant about this observation
118
 is the fact that Fanon can be said to be stateless in 
the sense that no country is claiming his remains as its own. One conclusion that can be drawn 
                                                                                                                                                                                        
117 Body-memory is an extension of the concepts used by Paul Antze and Michael Lambek (1996) who challenge 
the view point of memory as some kind memory storehouse to the latest technology. Antze and Lambek (1996) 
ask us to imagine memory as practice, not as the pre-given object of our gaze but as the act of gazing. As they 
point out, memories are produced out of experience and, in turn, reshape it. Their concern, which I share, and have 
seen in my work, is a situation where medical discourse has reinforced and reified this state of affairs, 
individualizing memory, psysiologizing it, and placing it under the care of a body of experts. Antze and Lambek 
(1996) argue that more and more there is an increasing burden put upon the individual body to serve as the sole 
site of memory through objects like photographs, personal artefacts. The latest craze with i phones gives further 
testimony to this process in which the individual and experts, as they note, seek evidence of psychic and bodily 
memory As they point out, in contemporary society memory is called upon to legitimate identity via certain public 
ritual, like filming each and every event you engage in and constantly having your movements monitored by CTV. 
It is a very specific and narrow definition of memory, one that they note is the product of specific narrative 
conventions build on selective exclusions and systematic omissions.  Antze and Lambek (1996) think of this kind 
of memory as one which produces jural and moral persons, in direct contrast to the dream time of Aboriginal 
Australia and other cultures where there is a living embodiment of the past and playing out in the public domain 
the drama of collective memory, memory and time imperfect, continuously re-embodied, replayed and relived. 
 
118
 For Macey, over and above highlighting of the erasure of Fanon’s name, it is also important to note the need of 
France to Forget Fanon as it coincides with a desire to forget something else: colonization and the extreme 
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from the above is that Fanon still has no resting place, unlike Steve Biko, whose life and work 
project overlapped with his. Biko died in a brutal and dehumanizing manner, in the middle of 
nowhere, on the back of a truck, somewhere between Port Elizabeth and Pretoria. However, 
post his death he has found a resting place and has been returned to his ancestors. After 
Fanon’s death, his body was returned to Afrika; but has Afrika claimed this body, thought and 
legacy? Moreover, what would constitute returning Fanon to his ancestors - throwing his ashes 
into the Atlantic or burying his body in Afrika or on the island of his birth? No. Fanon wanted 
to die in battle. He died in an American hospital bed, arguably a deeply dehumanizing 
experience for him, based on the fact that he stated that he wanted to die on the battlefield. 
Gibson (2011: 3) 
What I wanted to say is that death is close by, and what’s important is not to know if you can avoid it, but 
to know you have done the most possible to realize your ideas. What shocks me here, in this bed as I 
grow weaker, is not that I’m dying, but that I’m dying in Washington of leukaemia considering that I 
could have died in battle with the enemy three months ago when I knew I had this disease.  
Gibson (2011), like others who write about Fanon, reminds us that he is a contested figure. 
Clearly it seems from reading the texts of those who engage with Fanon as a theorist, as well as 
those who write about Fanon as a man, that the question of location is central in understanding 
his life and work. Post his death, writers have attempted to give Fanon a theoretical home, the 
most debated and one of the earliest attempts is that of Homi Bhabha’s introduction to Black 
Skin, White Masks, who sadly seems to have been demonized for doing so.  
Bhabha (1986: xiii) is seen to use and misrepresent Fanon. He is presented as somebody who 
pushes a particular form of literature studies analysis by linking Fanon to French 
psychoanalysis with statements like:  
In articulating the problem of colonial cultural alienation in the psychoanalytic language of demand and 
desire, Fanon radically questions the formation of both individual and social authority as they come to be 
developed in the discourse of Social Sovereignty.  
What seems to get left out of the critique of his foreword on Fanon is that Bhabha’s “call to 
return to Fanon” occurred at the height of black cultural protests in Britain in the eighties and 
as such was not simply an academic armchair engagement. Secondly he presents a direction in 
                                                          
violence, total war, on Algeria. (Macey 2000:15, 25) 
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which we can take Fanon, which does not need to be seen as a negation of other possible ways 
to apply Fanon. With the work of Fanon it is about political application. 
Bhabha was writing at a time when activists like Fred D'Aguiar (2000: 194 to 196) spoke as 
follows: “home is always elsewhere...Guyana becomes remote. My accent, my sense of 
newness in the school and area, my lone status that set me apart from the little groups of boys, 
my reserve. All the time I felt away from home (Guyana) and never quite in step with London. 
...a Guyanese past I loved and felt in exiled from and dearly wanted to be reconnected to.” The 
Bhabha of the 1980s  is passionate and speaks to the experience of many blacks living in 
Britain in the 1970s and 1980s  in which they identified with Fanon’s depiction of not 
belonging, a stranger to his environment. As Homi Bhabha (1986: ix) puts it: 
To read Fanon is to experience the sense of division that prefigures - and fissures - the emergence of a 
truly radical thought that never dawns without casting an uncertain dark. His voice is most clearly heard 
in the subversive turn of a familiar term, in the silence of a sudden rupture: ‘The Negro is not. Any more 
than the white man.’ The awkward division that breaks his line of thought keeps alive the dramatic and 
enigmatic sense of the process of change. That familiar alignment of colonial subjects - Black/White, 
Self/Other - is disturbed with one brief pause and the traditional grounds of racial identity are dispersed, 
whenever they are found to rest in the narcissistic myths of Negritude or white cultural supremacy. It is 
this palpable pressure of division and displacement that pushes Fanon’s writing to the edge of things; the 
cutting edge that reveals no ultimate radiance but, in his words, ‘exposes an utterly naked declivity where 
an authentic upheaval can be born’. The psychiatric hospital at Blida-Joinville is one such place where, in 
the divided world of French Algeria, Fanon discovered the impossibility of his mission as a colonial 
psychiatrist: ‘If psychiatry is the medical technique that aims to enable man no longer to be a stranger to 
his environment, I owe it to myself to affirm that the Arab, permanently an alien in his own country, lives 
in a state of absolute depersonalization.... The social structure existing in Algeria was hostile to any 
attempt to put the individual back where he belonged. 
Bhabha’s call for a return to Fanon was at the end of the eighties a time when, as noted by 
Owusu (2000: 11, 12) the “grand globalizing themes of the previous decade: ‘Black 
Brutishness’, ‘Black art’, ‘the struggle’, ‘anti-racism’ etc. - indicators of a certain  readiness to 
embrace political alliances across nationality and ethnicity. Significantly, the political unity 
between Africans, Caribbeans and Asians broke down.”  
The call to return to Fanon, as I will argue is as alive today as it was in the 1970s and 1980s, 
but needs to be contextualized. The use of Fanon by the squatter community in South Africa 
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will be very different to the use of Fanon by Brazilian black youth or Somalis living in London. 
This application of Fanon speaks to the fact that he spoke in more than one voice and was 
engaged in different struggles.   
What is evident is that Fanon pushed up against psychiatry, existentialism, phenomenology, 
Marxism and psychoanalysis, even Negritude theory, exposing the limits of these discourses 
yet also opening them up as unfinished conversations with which we can engage. He spoke in 
multiple voices: as male, scientist, medical practitioner, healer, playwright, Black 
Consciousness thinker, psychoanalyst, postcolonialist, culturalist, revolutionary, poet. He was 
passionate, angry, and always deeply political. Yet, at the same time, one key conversation and 
much of his work, from my perspective, can be read as one long case study on alienation (read 
as a metaphor for homelessness), specifically 1) the psychopathology of everyday colonial and 
postcolonial life and its after-effects; 2) the Asian, Afrikan and Caribbean Diaspora.  At the 
same time, he rejected attempts to create a black Psychology, as he believed the neurosis of the 
black person to be a consequence of colonial alienation.
119
 
Yet having said this it is important to underline that Fanon work is multi dimensional, always 
on the move, a theory and political strategy that travels well and across time. For example 
Fanon can be placed alongside black British Cultural theorist like Stuart Hall, John La Rose, 
Homi Bhabha and CL James, to mention a few of the names, who in different ways began a 
dialogue on black cultural identity in the UK in the face of the racial tensions of the 1970s and 
1980s, especially with talk by Thatcher and Powell on the dangers of foreigners. It is work 
which can be read alongside the different ways the black cultural study surfaced in the UK, for 
example the transformations within black popular culture in the UK, like Notting Hill Carnival 
and black music and the sentiment amongst the back youth who “did not see themselves as 
'temporary guests,' they were not here to work and one day return home, Britain was there 
home” (Owusu 2000:9). Equally Fanon is as much at home in the struggle of the anti-apartheid 
movement in South Africa, embodied in people like Biko. Moreover a Fanonian critic of post-
apartheid South Africa is evident in work of people like Mbembe and Gibson.  
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 The normal Negro child becomes neurotic, Negro phobic, fighting against the potential collapse of his or her 
ego due to contact with the white world. For Fanon, it is clear that it is the racist who creates his inferiority by 
robbing him of actuality, space to make meaning for himself, opposed to a meaning that was already there, pre-
existing, waiting for him. The Negro is a victim of white civilization and the scapegoat for white society. 
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Fanon does not belong everywhere and nowhere, but everywhere key racial and ethnic 
struggles are at play. He is a man ready to battle but difficult to fix to one place. Fanon, it 
seems, arrives at a position that can best be described as ironic. In this respect, we can think 
about the remark by Ato Sekyi-Otu (1996: 8) who maintains that, in Fanon, we have a 
remarkable phenomenon of a life devoted to psychological inquiry and clinical practice but 
which results in an anti-psychological understanding of the human situation. While I do not 
totally agree with this conclusion, what it does point to is the ironic and paradoxical positions 
that Fanon held. Fanon made highly significant clinical interventions that foresaw 
developments in the anti-psychiatry and trans-cultural psychiatry tradition, as well as furthering 
psychoanalytic theory, yet he was neither an anti-psychiatrist nor a trans-cultural psychiatrist or 
a psychoanalyst.  Alice Cherki
120
 (2000: 2), who worked alongside Fanon, informs us that to 
construe Fanon as any one thing – revolutionary, psychiatrist, writer, Antillean, Algerian –  is 
to misconstrue the profound unity of his project. This inability to confine Fanon to one place is 
what makes him so exictting to work with, but also at times, difficult in that it leads to in 
fighting and accustations of misrepresentation of the ‘true Fanon’.  
My placement of Fanon is to situate the body of Fanon as the central determinate in locating 
his life and work. Stateless and, at times, arguably homeless, Fanon claims a position in the 
world by actively occupying his body. Moreover, occupation of the body is not something that 
happens automatically or passively, it is an active and deliberate engagement, namely, a taking 
up of a position. It is a positioning that guards against getting consumed by the other; even if at 
times it converges with the position of others, and which speaks to his particular and 
intentional engagement with the world. It is this positioning of the body, as Fanon (1972: 165) 
concludes at the very end of Black Skin, White Masks, that makes him a person always 
questioning: “O my body, make of me always a man who questions!”  
Alongside this line of questioning, is to ask why the Fanon body questions. One answer lies in 
the biographical details, those encounters that placed his being in question; what he came up 
against, both as unforeseen and unwanted, as well produced by the (usually challenging) 
positions he purposely took up in the world. In developing this line of thought, we can take into 
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 Alice Cherki, in my opinion, is key to helping us both understand Fanon and continue one of his most 
important unfinished conversations. 
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account Azzedine Haddour’s (2006) forward to The Fanon Reader, in which Fanon is 
presented as somebody who moves from a belief in the possibility of being French to one who 
rejects France. It is a complex tour, as presented by Haddour, which begins with a disavowal of 
his West Indian identity and the identification with the colonizer’s cultural models, which are 
French and white. Soon thereafter, Haddour tells us, Fanon came to an understanding of the 
fiction of assimilation due to his personal experiences: the juxtaposition of his time in the army 
when he was awarded the Croix de Guerre for bravery, while at the same time was treated as 
less than human and as an object of terror due to being black. As a solider, Fanon was 
confronted with the question as to “what happens when the colonised liberate their colonizers 
only to realize they are still colonised” (Macey 2000: 99).   
After his encounter with racism in mainland France, there is a process of disillusionment 
ultimately leading him to renounce his ‘Frenchness’. One depiction of this unfolding 
movement from French Intellectual and Doctor to Afrikan Liberation Revolutionary is that it is 
built upon an ambivalent relationship with Martinique, France and the existential question of 
what it means to be seen as black. Haddour is of the opinion that in Black Skin, White Masks, 
he is still trying to reconcile his personal identity with that of the French nation and, perhaps 
more importantly, that he rejected “Negro nationality”, by asking; “What have I to do with a 
Black empire?” (Haddour 2006: 6-7). Haddour concludes that it was the colonial practices in 
Algeria that led him to reject France and realize that assimilation and colonialism are 
contradictory terms. At the same time, Haddour (2006) contends that Fanon also seems to have 
become disillusioned with the Algerian struggle, and instead become more interested in the 
Afrikan struggle for liberation.  
My personal reading of why the Fanon body questions is that he occupies a place that is both 
inside and outside the canon of Western thought. It is within this uncertain relationship with 
Western thought that he operates, and his challenge to colonization and racism unfolds. 
Fanon’s body is a nomadic one. At times, Fanon rejects an essentialist reading of what it means 
to be a black body, leaving this an open-ended project for the black man. Yet, concurrently, 
there is the appeal of Black Consciousness, which seems to offer him a sense of a strategic 
home.  
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It is important to bear in mind here, something we shall return to, that Fanon’s viewpoint is 
limited by a heterosexual male perspective. As pointed out by Njoki Mwaniki (2009, personal 
communication), he seems to periodically fix the black woman: her role is to protect the black 
race, and to procreate with white men is to betray the black race. That she does not have the 
same possibilities as the black man borders closely on having some sort of essentialist identity, 
a notion which gets challenged by Fanon in his paper entitled Algeria Unveiled – “side by side 
with us, our sisters do their part in further breaking down the enemy system and in liquidating 
the old mystifications once and for all” (Haddour 2006: 124). This positioning of the Algerian 
women can be read as an attempt to challenge the “essentialist identity” of black women that 
he had previously constructed. 
Fanon was a revolutionary, a Black Consciousness writer and a comrade who obeyed orders. 
At the same time, he walked alone. His time was divided between running a psychiatric setting, 
including the training of psychiatrists and nurses, and fighting for the liberation of Afrika. He 
liked the silence of the night to read, was a skilled footballer in his youth, spoke passionately 
about jazz and dance, and enjoyed good wine. He has been described in a variety of ways, both 
in Macey’s (2000) biography of him and other texts devoted to Fanon the person, such as 
‘extremely sensitive,’ ‘aloof’, ‘isolated’,  ‘outgoing’, ‘challenging,’ cuttingly aggressive’, 
‘boisterously’ and ‘brave. ’ 
While presented as one of the founding fathers of postcolonial theory, he never attempted to 
establish a philosophical school. In fact, postcolonial theory found him. He was restless and 
continually moving onto new projects as he ‘resigns’ his belief in previous projects. This is 
illustrated in a number of key letters he wrote, particularly his letter home before he went into 
battle believing he would die, and his letter of resignation from French psychiatry.  
The point that I am trying to make is that the position of the Fanon body was first and foremost 
one of being deeply engaged with the struggles of his generation, not from the confines of the 
academia, but as an activist. Fanon was deeply critical of armchair left-wing intellectuals, who 
write without an active political engagement in the world, confining their battles to textual 
tenets. Fanon, like Freud and Foucault, found a way to think about theory alongside practice 
and politics. While Fanon, as Gibson (2011) alludes to, seems to have constantly refused to 
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settle at one particular site and instead always looked ahead to the next struggle, the Afrikan 
liberation does seem to have offered him the allure of some kind of homecoming.   
My approach to Fanon is to argue that we need to think about how the Fanon body is 
positioned in the world. Fanon never offered up his work as authoritative text. Instead, he 
presented us with a tool kit to be used in the fight against alienation – that is, the closing down 
of mental and physical space.  Gibson (2011) opens his new book, Fanonian Practices in South 
Africa: From Steve Biko to Abahlali base Mjondolo, with the quote from Fanon’s letter to 
Roger Tayeb, arriving at a similar conclusion to my own. This is namely that Fanon’s resting 
place is amongst the unfinished struggles, including specifically, but not only, those of the 
homeless.  
Gibson’s (2010: 10) purpose is to “…recreate Fanon’s philosophy of liberation in a new 
situation”. Gibson (2010: 10) presents a person who is neither “…the cosmopolitan theorist of 
postcolonial and cultural studies, nor the theorist of guerrilla war or ‘revolutionary violence.” 
Moreover, he highlights how the concepts used by Fanon emerged, not from “…secluded 
contemplations on philosophy, but through reflections on, and engagement with, real 
movements of those excluded, marginalized and disenfranchised masses, namely the damned 
of the earth, struggling for social change” (Gibson 2010: 11) It is a “practice of action” 
following Antonio Gramsci produced by “living inside history” and not some fancy-dress 
parade (Gibson 2010: 11). 
 
Dr Fanon 
To approach Fanon, we need to collect a diverse body of work that includes archival materials, 
specifically his clinical papers and an oral history of those treated by him and who worked 
alongside him. Cherki, Razanajao,  Postel and Allen are particularly helpful in this regard, but a 
translation of this clinical case notes and other archive material, like ward round visits or 
teaching/supervision sessions, if they exist, would help open a whole new conversation and 
reading of Fanon.  
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Fanon the psychiatrist needs to be read alongside his theoretical and political writings. What 
gets ‘bracketed out’ in most readings of Fanon is his therapeutic work, exemplified by his 
practice at hospitals Blida and Charles-Nicolle. He was a practicing psychiatrist to the last. 
Even as he became more and more involved in the revolution, he still practised psychiatry. 
Moreover, he  was a practitioner who deeply cared, was willing to challenge the medical 
establishment – something, even today, most medical practitiners would not even dream about 
doing, let alone actually doing so. He comes across as  bold,  creative and embracing of those 
he worked with. 
His clinical practice and revolutionary work complemented each other in that they provided 
different angels from which to approach alienation and, as pointed out above, allowed for the 
use of spatial metaphors to depict the effects of alienation, the experience of depersonalization 
and de-realization. 
Fanon’s unique interventions at hospitals Blida and Charles-Nicolle provide a development of 
Sociotherapy (institutional therapy), psychoanalytic practice and, more importantly, 
understanding how to engage with those who find themselves silenced and imposed upon. 
Sociotherapy, as practiced by Tosquelles and Fanon, not forgetting his interns Jacques 
Azoulay, Alice Cherki, Charles Geronimi and Francois Sanchez, involved an attempt to create 
a communal site (home) in which the so-called sane and insane, lived together side by side 
inside an institutional setting. Fanon, Azoulay, Cherki, Geronimi and Sanchez setting up a 
therapeutic situation whereby a deconstruction, probably partial, of the binary opposition of 
sane and insane, Western and Afrikan, doctor and patient - which is not to say that Fanon 
disbelieved in the concept of psychosis
121
 - and at the same time countered the disabling 
symptoms of institutionalization and colonial occupation by the European and Western medical 
man, for example by medical practitioners like Porot and his racist categorisation of North 
Afrikans. 
Sociotherapy challenged the hospital environments in which patients were subjected to 
restraints with limited choice, leading them to have no control over the space in which they 
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 According to Cherki (2006: 72) he did not agree with the anti-psychiatric trend to deny the existence of 
madness. He was profoundly touched by madness, which he understood as alienation and loss of bearings. He 
eqauted madness with oppression. 
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lived. The lack of opportunity and movement produced a blame culture in which patients were 
stigmatized as hopeless cases. As an effect of this stigmatization and restriction of movement, 
patients underwent a moral career
122
, as described by Erving Goffman (1961) in Asylums: 
Essays on the Social Situation of Mental Patients and Other Inmates. 
Erving Goffman overlaps with dimensions of Fanon in that we find a similar
123
 emphasis on 
alienation and spatial restriction and constriction as elaborated throughout their work.  The 
‘total institution’, involves imposed presence, seen as the breaking down of the person and 
their ability to find a place to sleep, play and work. As part of this impingement, the person is 
stripped of identity and colonized. According to Goffman (1961) the person can respond in 
several ways to this mortification, for example situational withdrawal, rebellion or undergo 
colonization
124
 and conversion.  
Despite Fanon’s significant contribution to the debate on the treatment and understanding of 
madness, there is a tendency to downplay Fanon‘s clinical work, and instead to portray him 
only as a firebrand revolutionary.  Macy, amongst others, finds it important to distance Fanon 
from psychoanalysis. Francoise Verges situates Fanon’s work within the more conservative 
dimensions of psychiatry, and attempts to remove the psychoanalytic undertones or 
engagement with Freud. Madness, we are told by Verges (1996: 49, 51), was worked out 
through the logic of reason and, as Fanon was a psychiatrist of the time, he used chemical 
psychiatry, electro-shock therapy or straight-jackets when other means of restraint had failed or 
when he felt the condition required it.  
The implication of Verges reading (Verges 1996: 61), is that Fanon is messianic, subjected to  
revolutionary romanticism which was produced by a flawed discourse about emancipated 
masculinity, a heroic macho quest to free the black man. Verges (1996), who places the work 
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 The moral career is two-sided. ‘One side is linked to internal matters held dearly and closely, such as image of 
self and felt identity; the other side concerns official position, jural relations and style of life, and is part of a 
publicly accessible institutional complex’ (Zusman 1973: 151). 
123
 Erving Goffman (1922 –1982) born a little after Fanon, had a similar and different fascination, namely with the 
mask people present to the world. In Goffman’s terminology, the face-work required to present a set image. It 
would have been interesting to imagine Goffman and Fanon engaged in a conversation around the institution.  
124
 Significantly for this work, colonisation for Goffman is seen as occurring when the person ‘becomes content 
with his existence and makes the most of his situation. He is no longer orientated towards the outside world and if 
discharged seems imminent may behave so as to prevent it’ (Zusman 1973: 304). No doubt, Fanon would have 
granted merit to this observation, but at the same time would have substituted ‘total institution’ with the word 
‘colonisation’. 
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of Fanon and Tosquelles within the tradition of ‘moral treatment,’ traces a direct line via Jean-
Etienne Esquirol to Phillipe Pine, and draws a parallel with Pinel’s involvement in the French 
revolution and its promise of liberty. Both men are presented as rationalists employing moral 
treatment and the principles of liberation. Pinel’s French revolution and promise of liberty is 
compared to Fanon’s fight against colonization and the unchaining of the inpatients, which 
may or may not have occurred, at Blida. 
Verges elaboration of Fanon’s theoretical origin is problematic. While it is correct to highlight 
the masculine dimension of the project, it does feel like an exaggeration. More importantly, it 
is extremely limiting and unhelpful to reduce the work of Fanon to moral treatment. There 
seems to be a misunderstanding in her work around the different dimensions of moral 
treatment. To link Fanon with Pinel, especially if one reads Foucault’s Madness and 
Civilization, is not only unflattering, but also overlooks the fact that it is not Pinel who 
developed ‘moral treatment125. Secondly, moral treatment was established more on the basis of 
personal conviction and courage to change the hospital setting. It first appeared in British 
literature in the eighteenth century, then as a theory of clinical intervention. While Pinel is seen 
as a pioneer, especially in light of the cutting of the chains of mental patients, he informs us 
himself that he was inspired by British physicians. Pinel’s call was for more humane restraint, 
not an end to subjugation, and believed in the needs to induce fear and use seclusion and 
straight jackets, but for limited time periods only. Unlike John Conolly, who emphasized how 
people developed more self control through the use of moral treatment (Zusman 1973: 284, 
285), Pinel never highlighted the effects of moral treatments on the symptoms of patients and 
their behaviour.   
While a case can be made for the linking of moral treatment to institutional therapy, its 
founders
126
, institutional therapy took it in very different directions and more importantly, were 
informed by a whole host of influences. Fanon inherited a watered down moral treatment 
methodology and like Felix Guattari would take this work in an interesting direction.  
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 Looking at Pinel’s actual clinical practice, he worked more within the tradition of British moral treatment, 
something he acknowledged. Moral treatment in the UK was developed by people like Samuel Tuke, John 
Conolly and John Reid, not Pinel. Of particular significance was the work of Samuel Tuke who created an 
environment in which family and patents lived their lives together (Zusman 1973:283-285). 
 
126
 Oury, Tosquelles, Bonnafé, Schotte, Maldiney, Pankow, Torrubia, Gentis and Daumézon.  
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Moreover, Fanon was deeply engaged in the study of psychoanalytic texts alongside a close 
reading of Sartre and Marx. What is of relevance as Verges (1996: 53) points out, is that 
colonial psychiatry was heir to both the school of degeneration, which had a huge influence on 
psychiatry, as well social Darwinism. Theories which emerged about the dangerous classes, the 
mad, vagabond, anarchist were extended to the colonized. Verges (1996: 53) notes that “Le 
Bon even tried to show proof of female inferiority due to similarities between women and 
Negroes, provided by craniology”.   
Adding Gilman’s (1993) observations around the convergence of racism towards Jews and 
blacks at the end of the 1800’s, it is not surprising that Fanon “drew specifically and in detail 
on Sartre’s Reflections while formulating his accounts of colonial racism on himself and 
others” (Cheyette 2005: 7). Furthermore, the observations of the psychoanalyst Cherki (2000), 
who worked alongside Fanon, present a vastly different portrayal to that of Verges’ 
characterization.  
Reading Cherki, Fanon comes across as a compassionate and brilliant clinician who possesed a 
great erudition in psychoanalytic theory, as well as in existential and Marxist writing. His work 
is better understood as a close and critical reading of Sigmund Freud and Sandor Ferenczi, 
which was made possible as a result of his mentorship with Tosquelles. If Freud can be said to 
be the first to take seriously the speech of hysterics, giving meaning to their symptoms, then 
Fanon is the first to attempt to understand the symptoms of the black person and colonized. 
Jean Khalfa (2005: 42) argues that Black Skin, White Masks could be read as a phenomenology 
of the “colonized consciousness”.  
I would like to posit that had Fanon been white and/or part of the International Psychoanalytic 
Association (IPA)
127
, his interventions at hospitals Blida and Charles-Nicolle would have been 
placed alongside those essential psychiatric and psychoanalytic papers on psychosis and 
borderline patients, and read alongside the work of Goffman. Fanon would probably have been 
seen as a Freudian Marxist or Marxist Freudian. Verges (1996: 49) is correct in pointing out 
that, to Fanon, individual alienation and political alienation are related; both are the product of 
social, political, and cultural conditions that must be transformed. He believed in continuity 
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 It is questionable if he would have been allowed to join. 
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between individual and political freedom and tried to liberate the insane in similar ways to how 
he would liberate the wretched of the earth.   
Fanon was clearly an ethical man, but does this restrict him to moral treatment or even mean he 
can be bound to its ethical framework? Fanon insisted on allowing the patients to speak for 
themselves, even if it meant disturbing the institutional setting (Razanajao, Postel and Allen 
1996: 502). Patients were refered to as ‘boarders’, denoting a person, somebody seen to have 
agency, intentionality, and an equal partner in the construction of care. He implored his staff to 
go beyond stereotypes, for example, to see Muslim patients as human beings who deserved to 
be taken seriously and respected. Moreover, as Cherki (2006: 71) notes, he insisted that staff 
know each individual patient. He wanted them to know about their lives before they became ill. 
This ethical demand is consistent with Richard Klein’s (1996, personal communication) 
principle of always supposing a subject, a person and not to reduce a person to any singular 
dimension
128
.  
When approaching Fanon’s clinical work, it is helpful to place it alongside anti-psychiatry, 
trans-cultural psychiatry and alternative healing practices, the work of Goffman and the history 
of the moral treatment framework, as well as psychoanalysis and Marxism. Instead of 
distancing Fanon’s clinical practice from psychoanalysis or trying to make him a Lacanian or 
reducing his work to moral treatment, his work should be placed alongside that of other 
European males outsiders who endured the effects of war. In other words, Fanon’s thinking 
was  arguably a direct response to and engagment with the intolerable of oppression and 
violence. Secondly, we need to apply his understanding of alienation as it affected those 
subjected to torture.  
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 In this regard when asked if I think it difficult listening to the stories of torture or addiction all day, referring to 
a particular group I am working with, my reply is that I would not be doing my work if the only thing I heard was 
stories around torture and secondly, that I work with a person in which one dimension of their life is torture, but it 
is not the only dimension. My challenge is to engage with the different dimensions. 
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Homelessness at the limit point: torture 
Nowadays as soon as I hear someone shouting I can tell you exactly at what stage of the questioning 
we’ve got to. The chap who’s had two blows of the fist and a belt of the baton behind his ears has a 
certain way of speaking, of shouting and of saying he is innocent. After he’s been left two hours strung 
up by the wrists he has another kind of voice. After the bath, still another. And so on. But above all it’s 
after the electricity that it becomes really too much. You’d say that the chap was going to die any minute. 
Of course there are some that don’t scream…Now I’ve come so as I hear their screams even when I’m at 
home. Especially the screams of the ones who died at the police headquarters. (Fanon 1990: 214) 
If we take into account the fact that Fanon’s life ended with a discussion on torture, and that the 
final chapter of The Wretched of the Earth is devoted to a discussion on torture, it is imperative 
that we return to earlier remarks made on torture. Dr. Fanon, whose patients included torturers 
and the tortured, declared in 1957, speaking of Afrikan liberation, that colonialism cannot be 
understood without comprehending torture. It is clear to Fanon that torture is fundamental to 
the construction of the colonial world. He states, “Colonialism cannot be understood without 
the possibility of torturing, of violating, or of massacring. Torture is an expression and means 
of the occupant-occupied relationship” (Fanon 1967: 66). It will be argued here, following 
Fanon, that colonization is a form of violence modelled on torture
129
. Torture is the 
methodology driving colonization, the epistemological space through which the occupant-
occupied relationship takes hold, operates and transforms the values of the occupied. Torture is 
a spatial metaphor of occupation, of homelessness, a means of maintaining control, inserting 
fear and breaking down the body and the community. This involves a rupture, an uprooting and 
re-rooting of the person through the breakage of those links building and maintaining body-
memory and home, and turning the body into property to be re-shaped and put to work. 
Uprooted and re-rooted, the body-memory is without the soil of the culture, history and 
ancestors that maintained this body-memory. There is a forced surrendering of body-memory, a 
reduction to property or an object belonging to the colonizer - mere flesh to be moulded.   
Torture takes us to a limit point, a state of acute alienation in which the person has no mental 
and or physical space within which to dwell. The aim is to break the person down, reduce them 
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 The power of colonization involved both outright terror, as well as something more subtle. Whilst colonization 
and apartheid had their moments of ‘total onslaught’, they were also able to obviate the violence it required for its 
reproduction. 
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to the level of a child in which they become dependent on the torturer and jail warden. The 
colonised can either begin to orientate themselves in terms of the colonial system, adapting to 
the new landscape and moral order, or else continue to resist with the risk of mental and 
physical fragmentation
130
. Colonization – torture - is an experience, for many from which there 
is no return; an absolute ex-communication. Depersonalised, the subject participates as a third 
person, as something spoken about and acted upon. With the loss of the ability to control,
131
 
predict and influence their environment or find anything positive about their changed set of 
circumstances, learned helplessness sets in.  
With colonization, the colonized are given Western names and values, including a Western 
god. In other words, the occupant-occupied relationship is one in which the colonizer positions 
himself with a gun in one hand and a Bible, food parcel and development programme (doctor, 
social worker, priest) in the other
132
. To understand the complexity of colonization, we need to 
place the allegory of the ship of fools and Foucault’s History of Madness alongside the slave 
ships and trains to the concentration camps
133
. Erving Goffman alludes to this overlap by 
defining both the concentration camp and mental asylum as a total institution. As such, we can 
conclude that the mental asylum and the policing of the marginalised and poor in the West 
functioned as a teaching laboratory for colonisation. The challenge is to ponder the degree to 
which colonization of the non-Western people is built upon a refinement of methods used to 
colonise the marginalised in Europe. As such de-colonization is both a mental and physical 
exercise, the attempt to reclaim land as well as overcome alienation, self derogation, 
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 As a result of repeated and extreme exposure, the person’s resistance gets worn down. This leads to exhaustion 
and a return to a state of alarm that followed the initial shock of being violated. Stripped of their humanity, the 
process of attempting to re-find psychological equilibrium, energy and internal resources to cope, for many, cannot 
be met. Moreover, when attempting to understand what occurred, confronted with the question as to why and how 
somebody could do this, the person feels abandoned, deserted and betrayed by humanity. 
 
131
 According to Kobasa (1979), with the loss of decisional control (the capacity to autonomously choose from 
various courses of action), cognitive control (the ability to interpret and incorporate pain into an ongoing life plan) 
and the reduction of the range of coping skills they can use to negotiate the pain, there is a loss of personality 
hardiness. 
 
132
 The contemporary version of this is the war on terror, using smart bombs and getting the country to pay for the 
rebuilding, for example the oil situation in Iraq. 
 
133
 Applying a close reading of Fanon and Foucault, we can place the psychiatric setting and madness alongside 
the of colonization space. 
 
 
 
 
158 
 
dependency, stigmatization, and learned helpless. In sum, it is the attempt to re-find a home – a 
mental and physical space to dwell:  
The principle that over and above a certain threshold pain becomes intolerable takes on singular 
importance. The aim is to arrive as quickly as possible at that threshold. (Fanon 1990:25) 
Working with the supposition that homelessness occurs when one is without mental and/or 
physical retreat, torture becomes the embodiment of this experience of homelessness taken to 
its limit point. Torture is an impingement upon the individual’s body, thoughts and ancestry. 
When someone is subjected to torture, something external impinges the individual’s psychic 
skin (what Freud calls “the protective shield”) leaving the person in an incapacitated and 
helpless state. With the breaking down of the individual’s protective shield, the person is 
reduced to a physical body in isolation, not in relationship to the symbolic body, the 
community, but apart, alone and destitute - that is, homeless. 
The effect of torture is to leave the person with a residue of something excessive that is too 
much to bear. There is a breaking down of thought and an inability to put into words what 
transpired. It is to be present in a bodily form, but no longer a free conscious agent; a person 
without intentionality. Following the logic of Franz Brentano, that consciousness is 
characterised by its intentionality, which is to say that it always intends something; we can 
conclude that with torture the person is positioned separately to himself or herself, as 
consciousness no longer intends anything. The person is reduced to an object, cast off, 
dropped, hanging flesh in limbo. Instead of self-representation there is a void, a break in 
translation, a world without the symbolic. With the shrinkage of one’s worldview 
(weltanschauung) the world is no longer based on the dialectic
134
  of presence and absence, but 
instead on what Lacan calls the “lack of a lack”. Richard Klein (1996) translates the lack of a 
lack as a pure presence without absence. Presence without absence is a state of homelessness, 
violence and pain in which all one wants is for the discomfort and pain to stop. Pain heightens 
one’s senses. The slightest sounds or smells become very intrusive and unpleasant, as there is 
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 Ordinarily, in our daily life everything is based on dialectic of presence and absence. In effect, presence and 
absence are traditional ethics, Aristotelian, not too much of anything, not too little. It is an ethics that recognizes 
the pain of existence but tells us to keep on the good side of pain. Torture is a presence without an absence. That's 
how Freud defines pain in the Entwurf (1895), as summating Q. 
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no letting up and ability to find a resting place
135
. Physical pain is arguably more intense, 
demanding and immediate than mental pain, but once departed it can often be forgotten, as 
opposed to the lingering effects of mental pain. Torture includes physical and mental pain. 
When this pain overrides the capacity to find comfort zones, mental and physical spaces into 
which one can retreat and re-establish a sense of self-connection, the person is left destitute, 
homeless matter upon which the colonized can write.  
With colonization, there is "thinking for, as opposed to of the other" (Oakley 1997, personal 
communication). This is to leave someone without choice, appropriating the thoughts of the 
other. Taken to its limit point, as with torture, the subject is without a sense of personhood and 
reduced to the state of object, of flesh to be written upon. The person is unable to reconstitute 
his/herself in an existence through his/her traditional forms of identification. The effect is a 
silencing of language (self representation). In the place of representation there is a hole, as the 
person is unable to represent (re-present) themselves to themselves, with the result that the 
person is placed outside of the community of speech. As Lyotard (1993:135-147) states: 
The capacity to speak to others is a human right, and perhaps the most fundamental human right. If this 
capacity is forbidden a harm is inflicted on the speaker thus constrained. He is set apart from the speech 
community of interlocutors. To no one is he any longer something other, nor is anyone now his other.  
 
There are many ways of imposing silence. The right to impose silence which the community grants itself 
is always dangerous. Any banishment is a harm inflicted on those who undergo it, but this harm 
necessarily changes to a wrong when the victim is excluded from the speech community. For the wrong 
is the harm to which the victim cannot testify, since he cannot be heard. And this is precisely the case of 
those to whom the right to speak to others is refused.  
In the everyday taken-for-granted, my world is rather restricted going no further than the field 
of my representations. I own my representations, my habits represent me, and they become the 
frame through which I am pictured. With colonization, and similarly with torture, the person is 
taken beyond the range of the ordinary and taken-for-granted human experience, and 
persistently re-experiences invasive and intrusive representations. Isolated, without a witness, 
the tortured person cannot believe what is happening to him/her, as he/she cannot believe 
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 In fact, when a person is presented at the Accident and Emergency Unit, one of the first interventions is to 
bring the pain under control alongside or before beginning the treatment of the underlying causal dimensions. 
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his/her own eyes. The person is no longer human in the way he/she was before the torture or 
colonization; they are alien to themselves in that something alien (a remainder, foreign body) 
resides inside them. What is experienced and seen is something so strange that it can only be 
‘witnessed’ as something alien136. 
The person is left with something unthinkable that lives in the body like an alien object
137
, 
refusing to go away. Left with a residue of something excessive that is too much to bear, 
something intolerable overburdens the signifying apparatus. The disruption of the signifying 
apparatus, a defect in signification and linear time, is the point at which anguish causes an 
inability to link one thought (signifier) to the next and engenders nonsense, scrambled thoughts 
and intense emotions. The result is a breakdown in translation due to an attack on the 
metonymy of the signifying chain. One can say that there is no substitution, a displacement of 
signifier to signified in a chain lending itself to an affect of sense. Without substitution, based 
on similarity, selection and continuity, there is only the present as the future present, a presence 
that negates the person’s own presence.  
So saying, when asked to speak of the torture in order to establish the facts of the case, the 
person subjected to this human rights violation is confronted with an impossible situation (for 
example TRC hearings and asylum applications). Often, apparently arbitrary details are 
remembered and even if the torture is remembered in detail, the hole remains. These gaps in 
representation place the person outside of the community of speech, due to a break in the social 
                                                                                                                                                                                        
136
 The alien thing is that bit of pain which people tell others they will never understand. In thinking about this it is 
useful to ponder the words ‘You will never know how I feel, what I went through.’ What in effect the person is 
saying is that you will never know what is alien to them, but then again they will never know either. The alien can 
be depicted as a foreign body, a parasite. As JA Miller puts it: "Extimacy is not the contrary of intimacy. Extimacy 
says that the intimate is Other - like a foreign body, a parasite. The exterior is present in the interior. The most 
interior - this is how the dictionary defines 'intimate'. The most intimate is at the same time the most hidden. 
Therefore, paradoxically, the most intimate is not a point of transparency but rather a point of opacity." (Miller 
1994: 76). 
 
137
 One way to elaborate this phenomenon is to think about the film Alien and the way Sergeant Ripley negotiates 
with the alien that is within and outside her. Through a therapeutic encounter with the alien, in which the Other 
acts as witness, Sergeant Ripley not only gives birth to something alien, but in the end she is able to live with this 
alien thing inside her. It no longer consumes and engulfs her being, as it does at the beginning of the drama. She 
can look the beast in the eye, in so doing think about and represent the horror that lies within and around her. She 
can create a plan (structure, thought binding signifiers) so that the little ship can be detached from the mother ship. 
At this moment of separation, she can live with the alien thing as one aspect of her being, without it dominating 
and engulfing her. 
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bond
138
. The result is that the person is unable to continue to reconstitute him/herself in 
existence through his/her traditional identifications. Put another way, a break in the social 
bond, in the symbolic world, limits the person’s ability to absorb their experience into a 
symbolic framework, with the result that the person is haunted by unassailable images. The 
imposed images are indelible. The person has incorporated something alien that cannot be 
represented through his/her traditional frames of reference. The person is no longer human in 
the way he/she was before the torture; homeless, alien to oneself - a foreign body, a remainder, 
not only resides inside them but also engulfs them.  
Torture inhibits the ability to screen out anguish with the result that the space between dream 
and waking becomes blurred
139
. The person exists on the outside, homeless, a bad dream but 
from which there is no waking up. The person does not have a retreat, a home, to act as a 
‘contact barrier’ against this excessive stimulation. Freud is clear that we can only endure 
limited periods of contact with the outside world. Our relation to the outside world is one we 
are not able to tolerate uninterruptedly and in which we need, from time to time, to withdraw. 
With torture, the colonisation of the mind, even sleep and dreams
140
 no longer offer a retreat, a 
home
141
. 
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 The social bond as understood through psychoanalysis is the operator in the formation of a collective; 
commonly known as civilization, organizations and groups and in this instance the operators are vertical and 
horizontal identifications. The collective - civilization, organizations and groups - is another name for the Other. 
The social bond can be seen as enabling the person to enter the public speech-circuit. On entering the public 
speech-circuit there is a semantic effect (production of meaning) on that which is imaginary. This symbolic 
inscription, upon the imaginary trunk, ties the subject's speech to an imaginary identification. The symbolic is that 
which designates the objective order and enables distinctions between different images to be made. The symbolic 
representation is made possible through the use of language. When we make segregation itself our social bond, 
then we can expect the worst. Segregation, it seems, is the first step towards systematic torture. We had 
segregation between men and women, black and white, but now we also have segregation between rich and poor, 
as you have in South Afrika. It has gone very far in South Africa. One constructs one’s artificial cities with barriers 
and guards to keep the poor out. The beggar reminds us of the drive because of his demand. We can expect 
systematic torture as applied to the poor in a different form, no doubt. 
 
139
 This can be depicted as some kind of waking REM state. REM is the deepest sleep state categorised by active 
brain activity, deep sleep, dreaming and temporary paralysis. Signals from the pons brain structure are sent to turn 
off motor neurons in the spinal cord. With torture, the person is incapacitated, for example tied up, but at the same 
time experiences hyper brain activity that produces bewilderment and confusion. There is no way of blocking out 
the excessive stimulation, nowhere to hide, to retreat, no sanctuary. 
 
140
 Major sleep disturbance is perhaps the most dominant and consistent symptom experienced by torture 
survivors. For many who endure war and torture the capacity to dream is taken away. This speaks of impossible 
retreat, to live without access to private space. What is lost is the concept of ‘home’, a space into which one can 
retreat and close the door to the outside world. Day, night, past, present, conscious, unconscious, sleep, awake, 
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Unlike a bad dream in which, once you wake, the world falls on its feet again, with torture, 
there is no waking from the nightmare and you cannot stop seeing what you see and have seen. 
Without this ‘protective membrane,’ excessive stimulation cannot be screened and 
redistributed, for example, to the various libidinalized zones (rims) of the body. The person 
struggles to evacuate and transform the anguishing effects of this intolerable, excessive 
stimulation, and instead finds that excessive stimulation returns, often in the form of a self-
reproach
142
. The person cannot stop seeing what he/she sees and has seen, and as such, enters a 
foreign and strange world in which his/her Lebenswelt (life-world) is turned upside down. 
There is nothing to ground the person, as there is a loss of sanctuary
143
. 
There is a forced identification with the representations of the colonizer. The torturer 
announces himself, often late at night, with the sound of the cells opening, one by one, and a 
particular footstep that the colonized gets to know intimately. The colonized body senses this 
arrival as it is inscribed with the nuisances of the colonizer, which like a bad smell that will 
take hold of the discerning and experiencing body, transfixes his/her reality. The person 
experiences themselves as captured and captivated by the look of what is not-me but is still 
said-to-be-me.  This process of captivation results in what Fanon refers to an internalisation of 
self-oppression. The process of self-representation is frozen and replaced with new 
representations, imprinted onto the mind in much the same way a film freezes on the screen 
and one becomes aware that one is caught up in a single look.  
                                                          
reality, fantasy, merge and slide in and out of each other. The result is confusion, bewilderment and disorientation. 
 
141
 For Freud, the condition of sleep involves a narcissistic withdrawal of libido onto the person’s own self, or, 
more precisely, onto the single wish to sleep. Freud describes sleep as a state in which ‘I want to know nothing of 
the external world, in which I have taken my interest away from it and put myself to sleep by withdrawing from it. 
As such, to go to sleep is to say to the external world, ‘Leave me alone’. 
142
 In its most extreme form, the person is haunted by foreign images that replace the former self-representations, 
with the result that the person becomes nothing but pain; they become an object without human attributes and 
essence. The body of pleasure becomes the body of shame. The capacity for relationships is disrupted, as the 
person is no longer able to connect with him/herself or others in the way he/she used to. All too often, people 
come to identify themselves as a no-body - a body-in-pieces without a name.  Left on the ‘outside’, adrift, without 
a retreat, in a state of wonderment, she or he becomes the subject of his/her own nightmare, unable to wake up. 
 
143
 This loss of sanctuary goes hand-in-hand with the development of unwanted altered states of consciousness. In 
the more extreme instance the person’s relationship with the world is now marked by an invasiveness and 
persecution, in which something unassembled is imposed invasively on the individual. The person is adrift and cut 
off from his perceptual roots thereby losing the sense of predictability and of future. Perception is now unbound - 
there is no map. Instead, there is disorientation in which the person is unable to ‘bracket out’ the intimate 
‘embrace’ of what is intolerable and unbearable. 
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In contradistinction to the classical diagnosis of Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD)
144
, 
built upon a colonial legacy, we will classify torture victims according to whether they have 
shed their body or not. Before elaborating on the shedding of the body, we need to briefly 
elaborate upon what we mean by the body.  
Fanon’s conceptualisation of the body is drawn upon an encounter with existentialism and 
phenomenology
145
. Within this tradition the body is in dialogue with the world and others in a 
way that a thing or an animal is not. The body is an active, lived perception in relation to 
others. The lived-interpretive relation to others is the space out of which the body-memory 
takes its shape. Put another way, the lived-body-memory goes beyond the boundary of the skin 
and incorporates a lived relationship with others.  
Within the phenomenological tradition, the body is in the world in a different manner to the 
way in which an object, say a chair, might be. At the moment of being reduced to an object, 
there is no outside for this lived-interpretive-body, only an inside that has closed in upon it. 
Occupied and sat upon by the weight of the coloniser, the interpretive-body is not permitted an 
interrelationship with the world, but only a relationship to itself as an object that responds to its 
master’s demands. The master’s demand determines and restricts that segment within which 
the body-memory interacts. It is no longer a lived-body-memory, a body that moves with a 
multitude of relationships to the world that exist outside the immediacy of the body-flesh, but a 
body-memory turned and determined by the special habitual movements of the coloniser. 
Extending Merleau-Ponty (1968: xlviii) I argue “the rhythm of movement that propagated 
itself” and becomes a “habit” that neglects subjectivity.  
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 See the work of Young, A. (1995). 
145
 For Husserl the body is a discerningly experiencing organism involved in all perception, whilst for Merleau-
Ponty, perception is a bodily-event, the body is both the subject of experience and perception and the place 
through which the person perceives the world. Perception is intimately tied to the body and in fact cannot be 
disentangled from the body. The body is not an enclosed entity in space in the same way as things are objects in 
space. The body is not an object reduced to physiology, but constituted by inter-relationships with the world. 
These interrelationships become the person’s viewpoint, the perceptual framework in which body and world 
interact. The body for Merleau-Ponty is a lived-interpretive-body with a perspective, the place of perception-
consciousness. The body, as such, is actively engaged in living relationships with the world that structure the 
perpetual-experiential constitution of the body-person. 
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Without the possibility of engagement, of relationship to the world, the lived-interpretive-body 
becomes an object, a thing, without space to imagine and engage in possibilities. The “body is 
shed” (Klein, 1998, personal communications)146.    
Those who have shed their body are in a much worse condition and more difficult to treat than 
those who have not shed their body. Those who have not shed their body may produce more 
dramatic effects and discuss what they lived through in more dramatic ways. However, despite 
the drama, there is a better outcome to the treatment. For example, a patient can begin his or 
her therapy with absolutely no affect or no drama, sort of like a rag doll. When the drama 
begins to return to the story, he/she has to tell things. What is happening? The person is re-
acquiring a body and is stitching, that is reconnecting, to human experience. By so doing, the 
body - thoughts, body, and ancestors - can be reconnected in a continuum of experience. 
Richard Klein (1998: personal communication) describes the shedding of the body as follows:  
To shed the body means the person can no longer construct a body with signifiers. The person’s body 
becomes an object, an abject object. It is a body that has been left in the lurch. What does this mean? It 
means that that we can say that such a person is no longer in a scene, and we can say this because 
representation is a scene. A body that cannot be represented is a body that has fallen from the scene. That 
is the difference between acting out and impulsive acting out. When acting out, the person wants to show 
something in a scene. Acting out is a way of expressing something rather than speaking about it. We 
expect to encounter this sort of acting out in every analysis. The person puts him/herself in the scene and 
does so intensely.  
Elaborating of acting out, Richard Klein (1998, personal communication) states:  
Impulsive acting out, on the other hand, is something we do not want. We define this as an attempt to 
leave the scene, like jumping off a bridge and other less dramatic ways of disappearing. The French call 
impulsive acting out a passage to the act, which is far more expressive. Stephen, the hero of Joyce’s 
Portrait of an Artist as a Young Man, describes a beating he received at the hands of his comrades. He 
says that with a feeling of disgust, he shed his body. Essentially, Stephen cannot use his body to think 
with. His thinking becomes creationist, that is, all the signifiers are new, ex nihilo. 
James Joyce, Toni Morrison and Fanon found a way to think that compensated for a missing 
body. Not everyone can do it. Observe seriously deteriorated refugee and torture victims who 
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 The concept of the shed body was something I developed jointly, in discussion with Richard Klein over a one-
year period whilst working with torture survivors. It is primarily his idea.  
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end up homeless on the streets, something we constantly witness in South Afrika. It would 
seem that due to their encounters with xenophobia, as well as their impossible battle with 
survival, they are driven crazy. One will note how these individuals will walk the streets, very 
scantily clothed in the middle of a winter, without signs of shivering. Surely anyone who would 
venture out into such a cold winter in shirtsleeves would shiver. These individuals do not. 
That's what we mean by shedding one's body. 
 
Fanon and the brothers he did not know – the call for Afrikan liberation 
In understanding Fanon and his contribution to the question of homelessness, I shall read him 
alongside ‘homeless’ Afrikan men, Steve Biko and Fela Kuti who endure torture and who 
attempted to provide homeless people shelter. By reading Fanon alongside these male thinkers, 
it is hoped that the different dimensions of Fanon’s thinking, specifically as applied to home 
and homelessness, will be further illuminated and amplified.   
In comparing the life of Fanon to Biko what can be said is that Steve Biko (1946 – 1977), Fela 
Kuti (1938 – 1997) and Franz Fanon (1925 –1961) died young, fired up, defiant, without fear 
and with awareness of their approaching death. Steve Biko died at age thirty-one in 1977 and 
Franz Fanon died in 1961 at the age of thirty-six. Biko died in brutal circumstances as a result 
of torture while Fanon, who died of leukaemia having faced assassination attempts
147
, judged 
the deciphering of torture to be essential to understanding colonization.  
While it is questionable if Fela Kuti can be said to have died young - he died in 1997 at the age 
of fifty-eight of AIDS – what is true is that like Fanon, Foucault and Biko, Kuti’s was a life cut 
short, a project not completed. Like Biko, he was subjected to repeated detention and torture. In 
fact, he was ‘reportedly arrested, detained, framed, and imprisoned more times than any other 
Nigerian in history by successive governments attempting to muzzle him at home and aboard. 
His residences were frequently attacked and occasionally destroyed by soldiers of the Nigerian 
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 As a member of the Algerian Liberation Movement, his life was at risk. There was an assignation attempt 
involving a car accident in which he suistained serious injuires, as well as the blowing up of a car that was 
supposed to pick Fanon up in Rome. (Macey 2000:129, 130) Fanon also endured near death experiences whilst a 
solider in World War II. He was wounded in battle. He cut short his hospital stay to be reunited with his battalion 
as part of the battle of Alsace. He faced extreme battle conditions and the bitter northern cold. (ibid :12) 
 
 
 
 
166 
 
army, and he was beaten nearly to death on a number of occasions. Serious and even mortal 
harm was visited upon members of his family and household’ (Veal 2000: 17). Another 
example of the brutality Kuti suffered occurred in 1977, the year Biko died. Following the 
release of Kuti’s hit album, Zombie, in which he mocked the Nigerian regime, soldiers attacked 
his communal home, severely beating him and throwing his elderly mother from a window 
causing fatal injuries.  
Kuti, like Fanon, occupies two worlds, moving along with the middle class and European 
educated elite while, at the same time, amongst those invisible Afrikans whose lives are seen 
not to matter. In 1958, Kuti studied music in London. Like Fanon, Kuti is a product of a blend 
of Europe and Afrika. In the case of Kuti, he formed bands that blended American Jazz and 
funk with West Afrikan highlife music. Kuti, like Fanon, held views towards women which are 
seen by many as misogynistic. Like Fanon and Biko, Kuti’s world view was a mix of Pan-
Afrikanism, anti-colonialism and socialism.  
What these three men
148
 systematically elaborate on is a forced formation and shaping of the 
body in which violence, specifically torture, is used as the primary classroom teaching 
methodology. Each of these Afrikan men speaks their mind, fully aware of the risks of doing 
so. Biko and Fanon speak primarily about European colonisation, while Kuti elaborates on 
postcolonial dictatorship and its overlap with colonial rule.  
In thinking about the teachings of colonial rule, torture speaks of the colonial intent to occupy 
and empty out the body, thought and soul of the colonized so that the colonized is a blank slate, 
flesh to be written upon. Torture is the expression and means to which the coloniser needs to 
go to ensure that occupation, an appropriation of the colonized resulting in ‘property’ rights in 
an ownership over the body. The process, be it indirect structural violence or direct torture, 
aims to leave the imprints of colonisation upon the flesh and memory of the colonized, so as to 
turn and shape the body of the colonized.  
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 The three men whilst never meeting were nonetheless in some kind of dialogue with each other. Biko read 
Fanon and may have been familiar with the music of Kuti who in turn was probably aware of Biko and Fanon. 
Fanon, of course, died before Biko and Kuti came into prominence.  
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In citing torture as the model through which colonization operates, Fanon ‘hears’ Kuti’s defiant 
music and Biko’s cry to take up a position in the world without fear because “fear erodes the 
soul of Black people” (Biko 2007: 30). Torturers, and those who stand in for the torturer - “the 
civil agents, police, CID officials, army men in uniform, security police or even the occasional 
trigger happy white farmer or store owner” (Biko 1987: 76) - induce fear so as to remind the 
black person of his or her place. The colonizer, including the ‘big men’ who trade on their role 
in liberating that country from European rule, restricts the spatial possibly within which the 
colonized body can move through imposing habits - technologies of self - that leave the 
imprints of the colonizer on the body, in the thought and amongst the ancestors of the 
colonised. With colonization, a new symbolic, built upon the thinking for (and in the place of) 
the colonized, inscribes itself on the flesh and memory of the person. 
Colonization results in a loss of a position in which, in the language of Biko (2007: 34) people 
get bottled up with fear as it takes hold of their minds and inhibits political action.  Biko (1987: 
76) concludes that people end up not even knowing they are human anymore, let alone free 
people, as fear gives rise to the tendency to deny new possibilities, the emerging potentiality 
and questioning of the body. Fear creates docile bodies, ready to give up on the place they 
occupy. Reframed in the language of Fanon, for the colonizer, to know your place is to be 
without place, homeless, to have no space for the body to move
149
 and question. It is for this 
reason that Fanon ends Black Skin, White Masks with the prayer that the body always continues 
to question.  
If Fanon can be said to have read Biko, it is as a witness who hears the screams that come from 
occupation, the prison cells and the wretched of the earth. Fanon is not a silent witness but 
somebody who screams out in rage in turn, and calls for arms. There is something prophetic 
about this scream as it can still be seen in the wretched lives of black men and women living in 
the UK and USA. Moreover, the principles of colonization and use of torture as the 
methodology, still apply in the manner in which globalisation either starves or bombs people 
into submission, producing places in which people have no mental or physical space into which 
they can retreat, as with Palestine and Iraq.  
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 This can be read alongside the work of Maurice Merleau-Ponty (1968) and his description of the moving body. 
Fanon was aware of his work.  
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For Fanon, as with Biko and Kuti, to think in terms of the postcolonial/post-apartheid is to both 
build houses and rethink the meaning of home and homelessness. Kuti attempted to create a 
musical homeland, a space people could feel alive, often in trance. For Fanon and Biko, any 
attempt to move towards a postcolonial/post-apartheid involves material and psychological 
liberation. In Fanon’s letter of resignation as a French psychiatrist, the connection of de-
personalization and homelessness takes concrete form as the Algerian in Algeria is declared a 
stranger in his own home: “This is why his call is to build not only houses but the meaning of 
home.” (Gibson 2003: 96).   
This depiction of being homeless within one’s own home is a condition under which many 
contemporary Afrikans have lived and died, from the days of slavery till today. It also applies 
to the lives of some black children growing up in London and Chicago where, as Kathleen 
Kostelny and James Garbarino (2001) note, children display symptoms of numbness and 
hopelessness as a result of exposure to violence, in Chicago and other urban areas of the United 
States endure, which is comparable to children who live in countries at war.  
For Biko and Fanon, to re-find a sense of home and break enslavement, suffering from an 
inferiority complex as a result of 300 years of deliberate oppression, denigration and derision, 
(Biko 1987: 21) is both a psychological and material exercise. Fanon, Kuti and Biko turn the 
very thing meant to shame, inhibit and restrict the black person (his or her skin) into a tool that 
questions, and gives rise to new evolving cultural consciousness and site of enjoyment. Black 
Consciousness becomes the means to oppose the methodology of colonization and torture, and 
thus a symbolic home.  
Fanon, Kuti and Biko functioned as the township psychologists and revolutionary healers by 
introducing a way of taking up a position that opposed the colonial truth. The medicine Fanon, 
Kuti and Biko prescribed was frank talk and satirical music that opposes the colonial truth. 
Biko’s frank talk and Kuti’s music, while correlative of what Foucault (2001) calls ‘parrhesia’, 
(that is, to say everything, to give a complete, frank account of what is on the mind) have very 
particular Afrikan nuances. What emerges is a dialectical play of Afrikan national liberation 
philosophy, alongside the practices of the wise elders and sages, and an embracing of Afrikan 
cultural within a modern context. At the same time, it is a ‘frank talk’ or ‘parrhesia’ that is 
deeply engaged in Afrikan cultural concepts.  
 
 
 
 
169 
 
Biko’s reading of South African cultural concepts introduces a sense of witnessing that requires 
one to face the ancestors. Biko (1987) elaborates selfhood as something that goes beyond the 
individual’s body; it is a body-memory that is in relation to community and one’s ancestors. 
Put another way, the lived-body-memory goes beyond the boundary of the skin, and 
incorporates a lived relationship with others, what Biko calls ubuntu.  It is body-memory that 
expands the concept of home to include something larger than oneself, and moves in the 
opposite direction to colonization. With colonization, the person is reduced to flesh, and there 
is an attempt to crush ubuntu and kill witnessing.  
Fanon, Kuti and Biko’s work/music suggests the use of the struggle, of Black Consciousness, 
as a site of therapy and enjoyment. In the days of the struggle, people turned away from 
Western psychology, but they did not primarily turn to the sangoma either, but rather to the site 
of struggle as a therapeutic practice. The struggle, specifically Black Consciousness, gave 
people an interpretive framework and structure, akin to therapy, from which to reconstruct their 
identity and endure pain. Significantly, music and dance played a key role in reframing and 
analyzing the actions of the colonizer.  
The Black Consciousness Movement offered many therapeutic rites of passage enabling people 
to share their suffering, build supportive, caring and healing relationships, express themselves 
in a bodily and rhythmic way and obtain insight. It allowed them to make links, think through 
situations, and obtain distance and perspective from their pain, as well as move from passivity 
to action. In fact, the site of struggle was not only a fight for political and economic 
emancipation, but also a site of therapy, a means of decolonizing the mind. As Potiphar 
Nkohoma (2005) puts it: 
What Black Consciousness did for me, and I am sure millions of others, is provide me with armour where 
I was ‘denied’ or rather where I was rendered to a status of ‘nonentity.’ It played a vital role and liberated 
those who came to it. It helped scores of youth TO BE (being black was okay, it was no longer vital to 
aspire to become non-black). Or as Malcom X said, you call coffee Coffee, not non-tea, but Coffee. The 
scores of youth were suddenly no longer nonentities, nonexistent. They were Black. But Black for the 
sake of being in opposition to the Other is not sufficient either. It is at this point we need to move to and 
return to ubuntu, botho, motho (being human).       
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Central to the therapy of Black Consciousness is the question of the body. Fanon, Kuti and 
Biko demand that all bodies are in motion, question and hold a position. As Biko (1987: 152) 
puts it in an interview a few months before his death, it is to give the world a more human face. 
“If you want us to make any progress, the best thing is for us to talk. Don’t try any form of 
rough stuff, because it just won’t work…If they talk to me, well I’m bound to be affected by 
them as human beings.” This is something that has to be fought for especially when there is an 
attempt to create “spaces of terror” (Achille Mbembe 2001: 181, 175) that try to evade every 
space of the colonized, including the space of sleep and dreams. For Fanon and Biko, 
colonisation was not only about provoking, but also an attempt to control the response to the 
provocation such that the work of the settler is only completed when the colonized shout out 
the values of white supremacy. 
By approaching the life and work of Biko, Kuti and Fanon from the perspective of the way in 
which they faced their death, we are better able to understand the construction of slavery, 
colonization, racism and homelessness. These men faced death as they faced life, without fear, 
as bodies that question and refused to be fixed. Biko (1987: 152) position is clear: you are 
either alive or proud or you are dead. 
As Mbembe (2007: 137) underlines Biko died in brutal circumstances as a result of torture.  
Biko’s captive body locked up, tortured, injured, stripped down, chained, the object of mutilation, a 
human waste that had been utterly disgraced before being lynched. They wanted his death to be the 
epitome of indignity and abjection, the symbol of a derisory and superfluous humanity, in the manner of 
the slave’s death. 
Biko “suffered a terrible death”150 and, as Achille Mbembe (2007: 137) correctly points out, 
died as a slave, while Fanon died fighting against those who imprisoned and colonized his 
slave ancestors. Kuti, who survived many beatings and imprisonments, died from an excess of 
(unprotected) sexual ‘enjoyment’. As important as it is to speak of their courage, bravery and 
boldness, accentuating what was heroic about their lives and assigning them to the history of 
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 What one finds at the moment of death, with full awareness in the work of Biko and Fanon is something 
incredibly moving. Fanon actually listens to both the tortured and torturer and in the case of the latter he wants, as 
he says all Algerians do, to discover the man behind the torture, the colonizer, who is an organizer of violence but 
also a victim who is reduced to silence. What Biko says is even more moving, is that Biko wants to engage the 
human behind the torturer so two humans can be affected by each other. This is the key to any healing 
engagement, not to reduce the person to one dimension.  
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great men, in which we could include Chris Hani and Nelson Mandela, is limiting in that it 
feeds into the Western game of biography, individuality and patriarchy. The works of Biko, 
Kuti and Fanon must not be reduced to that of the male biography of the hero and history of 
kings, as their plight speaks of something larger than themselves: their connection to those 
lives that don’t matter, bodies without homes, the history of a people, specifically Afrikans, 
demanding a home and space to live in the face of colonization and the death of subjectivity.  
What if Fanon and Biko were alive today, what questions would they be asking? No doubt it 
would have been similar to the questions that Kuti possed and which Achille Mbembe (2001) 
analysis of the postcolony bring to light. What would they say to each other when South 
Afrikan’s speak of Afrika as if they belong elsewhere? Would they see any affinity between the 
newly emerged black elite and the sense of ubuntu that prevailed in the days of struggle? What 
would they be thinking when they see a young black child on the tube in London turn to her 
mother with the words, “Look a Muslim! I am scared.”At that moment, the Muslim is 
hypervisible and invisible at the same moment. Both Fanon and Biko knew what it was like 
when the black man was reduced to flesh and had to function as a screen of the other’s 
projections - to be placed in a position in which the body becomes fixed, immobile, and then 
made to speak on behalf of all. Finally, what would they say to each other about the images of 
prisoner abuse in Iraq? 
Summarising Fanon’s vision of post-liberation culture Mbembe (2011: 29) underscores the 
following insights. Firsly that for Fanon there was the distinct possibility that post-liberation 
culture might turn out to be an empty shell. The liberation struggle had not healed the injuries 
and trauma that were the true legacy of colonisation and simply internalised this violent 
system. Moreover, after liberation the native elite had been ensconced into intellectual 
lazinessness and cowardice through its williness to imitate and assimilate the most corrupt 
forms of colonialist and racist thought. Mbembe goes so far as to argue that for Fanon the 
educated classes were stuck in a great procession of corruption in which the innermost vocation 
of the new elites was to racket and loot. It annexed state power for its own profit and created 
new buffer zones and smoke screens between the masses and leaders. A nationalist system 
based on speedy and pitiless self enrichment.  
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Mbembe (2011: 29) argues that Fanon’s nightmare is our reality due to new forms of social 
apartheid and structural destitution having replaced the old colonial divisions. What we see 
around us are deep inequities, entrenched by a brutal economic system that results from global 
processes of accumulation by disspossession.  
Fanon, Kuti and Biko present us with what Lalu (2008) calls incomplete histories, which is not 
to say that any narrative can be completed. The questions of Biko, Kuti and Fanon reveberate 
in our contemporary world. For example, can a postcolonial and post-apartheid geography 
move beyond the creation of new elites and embrace the working and under-class, the lives that 
don’t matter? Biko, Kuti and Fanon offer a way of questioning that points towards the 
postcolonial, a practice centered on opening up mental and physical space for the body to exist. 
While it is clearly apparent that the struggle for identity is not over, this struggle must not be 
reduced to identity politics, but be seen as part of the struggle to open up spaces in which 
people can exist and find a sense of home. Put another way, Fanon, Kuti and Biko are clear that 
the struggle for identity will continue as long as it is not tied to the development of Afrika. 
Following Fanon and Biko it is obvious that the origins and history of racism cannot be 
seperated from those racist practices which are used to create wealth. The roots of racism are 
tied to the turning of Afrikans, their flesh and bodies, into property. This logic of creating lives 
that matter and lives that don’t matter, as exists in slavery, sadly structures much of our 
contemporary existence and shadows any attempt to talk of the postcolonial home. If Fanon 
reads Biko, it is with the realisation that slavery, colonisation and racism is not simply about 
violent abuse or a set of ideas or beliefs. It also had very important psychological and economic 
functions that run parallal to each other. The aim was to perpetuate dependency and ensure that 
independence and emanipication occur in a context in which the Afrikan still finds him/herself 
under the yoke of colonisation, dependent on Europeans and the ‘big man’ for all their needs.  
What Fanon and Biko tell us is that slavery, colonization and racism are not only about 
humiliation, degredation, discrimination, and alienation, but also about robbing and 
impoverishing people of the possibility of finding mental and physical spaces into which they 
can retreat. In other words, it is about making people homeless in the broad sense of the term - 
to rob people of their land, humanity and ancestors, making people dependent on those who rob 
and torture them. As such, the development of Afrika is an economic, cultural and 
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psychological act. The principles of racism, colonisation and torture still apply, and are 
produced in ways in which people have no space into which they can retreat, recharge and then 
go forth into the world. To understand these impossible spaces is to understand the colonial 
indifference to suffering. It is, as Biko puts it, very expensive to be poor. At the same time, it is 
to understand the effects of internalized self oppression that Biko and Fanon writes about, 
including most importantly, the oppression of women of colour and lesbian, gay, bisexual 
transgendered and intersexed persons. It can be argued that the oppression of women and gays 
and lesbians is the forefront cultural, economic and psychological battle facing Afrika today.  
To think about postcolonialism is to try to conceptualize spaces not reduced to the 
methodology of torture. Biko opposes the non-space of torture, homelessness, with an appeal 
for consideration of the Afrikan’s attitudes to house and land, music and dance. To refind a 
sense of home, is for Biko and Fanon both a psychological (or if you prefer, cultural) and 
material question. Culture, as Fanon and Biko put it, is not static and something arrested with 
the arrival of the white settler, but something that develops with the historical evolution of the 
modern black person and which largely succeeds in withstanding the process of colonization. 
An example here might be the sacred tradition of sharing. Sadly, however, it seems that 
Afrikan culture is reduced to male and heterosexual priviledge, one which negates the history 
of men loving men in a sexual way and the rights of women to use their bodies as they please. 
Fanon reads Biko
151
 as he reads Freud: both offer him the psychological dimension 
underpinning colonization. This move to place the question of subjectivity alongside historical 
materialism, to read Marx alongside Freud, was downplayed in the 1980s by the ANC 
leadership, in which it was concluded that Black Consciousness was presented as insufficient 
to the tasks of fighting apartheid. As Premesh Lalu (2008) notes, Black Consciousness was not 
deemed to be revolutionary, that is a military strategy, unlike the ANC. Lalu (2008) concludes 
that soon after Biko’s death in 1977, the ANC was only too happy to take up the concept of 
Black Consciousness, underneath the banner of the idea of internal colonialism, into its 
analysis of the South African political crisis. Moreover, according to Lalu (2008) the timing 
was not completely accidental since the programmatic declaration on internal colonialism, a 
concept that echoes with Biko’s unfolding of the logic of Black Consciousness, seemed to 
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 In talking of Fanon reading Biko, it is obviously a metaphorical and imaginative exercise. 
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absorb the full load of the political resurgence marked by the beginning of mass resistance to 
apartheid in the late 1970s. 
If Fanon reads Biko and listens to Kuti, it is with a sense of writing and music as a lived-
interpretive-body-memory that dances to the beat, texture, tone and rhythm of our Afrikan 
ancestors. This convergence of body and text, elaborated as body-memory, is not just a 
question of biography as a determining force that frames Fanon or Biko or Kuti, neither is it 
simply a question of the progressive development of the history of ideas and political 
conditions that gave rise to Fanon or Biko or Kuti. It is additionally a question of the 
conjuncture that gives rise to a technology-of-self that is bound to a particular production of 
space. The body-memory, life and work of Biko, Kuti and Fanon speaks of movement in space, 
a taking up of a position in response to constriction, and an attempt to open space.  
Fanon, Biko, Kuti, Ngugi, Hani and many unknown others, dance to the beat of the Afrikan 
drum that refuses to be hemmed in. Again, let’s return to Fanon’s depiction of the colonised 
child who learns to stay in his or her place, and not to go beyond certain limits, the reason why 
the dreams and writing of the colonized male (female space is something Fanon does not 
understand) involve movement, action, agency and muscular prowess
152
. In summary, to speak 
of Fanon reading Biko is to speak of the postcolonial as a geography of space not restricted by 
the road map of Western market forces. What Fanon, Kuti and Biko offer are strategies of 
movement and questioning, that allow for an opening up of space to think, imagine, or even 
dream. It is a movement of words that demands space to express itself, a body that questions, 
but arguably still a body that still falls within a heterosexual and patriarchal frame! 
 
Fanon alongside Marx 
Fanon’s work leads me to the conclusion that we need both a material and psychological 
definition of homelessness. Following Fanon alongside Henri Lefebvre we can begin to unpack 
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 It is not by chance that both Biko and Fanon make reference to music and dance. The flip side of Fanon 
statement that we need to understad torture to understand colonization is his declaration that any study of the 
colonial world should take into consideration the phenomena of dance and of possession. Dance and song are 
ways of opening up space, the antithesis of torture, which closes down space. Biko reminds us that dance and 
music in Afrika is featured in all emotional states, not a luxury but is part and parcel of the Afrikan way of life. In 
fact, we could say the liberation of South Africa followed an Afrikan beat. 
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a contemporary Marxist viewpoint of homelessness that incorporates both psychological and 
material homelessness. In this regard it is useful to draw upon the concepts of negative space 
and alienation. The concept of alienation is central to both Fanon and Marx’s writings and can 
be traced throughout their work. Young Marx, the philosopher and political theorist, was of the 
opinion that “man had forfeited to someone or something what was essential to his nature” 
(McLellan 1980: 118) this loss for Marx was a by-product of the way in the market economy 
was structured. The late Marx, the economist, identified the alienated situation of the worker 
under capitalism as comprising of four aspects. David McLellan (1980: 119) spells this out for 
us: 
The worker [Marx wrote] is related to the product of his labour as to an alien object. The object he 
produces does not belong to him, dominates him, and only serves in the long run to increase his poverty. 
Alienation appears not only in the result, but also in the process of production and productive activity 
itself. The worker is not at home (my emphasis) in his work which he views only as a means of satisfying 
other needs. It is as activity directed against himself, that is independent of him and does not belong to 
him. Thirdly, alienated labour succeeds in alienating man from his species. Species life, productive life, 
life creating life, turns into a mere means of sustaining the worker’s individual existence and man is 
alienated from his fellow men. Finally, nature itself is alienated from man, who thus loses his own 
inorganic body. 
Fanon engages with homelessness at its limit points by extending Marx’s notion of alienation. 
This theoretical and practical engagement by Fanon can be presented as the starting point to 
understand the relationship between violence and homelessness. Kelly Oliver (2004) highlights 
how Marx’s account of economic alienation is extended with Fanon’s analysis of the 
psychological factors involved in racism. She tells us that Marx fails to recognise that 
alienation occurs in relationships apart from the labour process. Moreover, alienation is not 
only alienation from work and one’s immediate environment, but from one’s self, especially 
the value/devaluation of one’s body (Oliver 2004: 12-13). It is a brutal process in which there 
is a denigration of the body of the oppressed, especially with racist and sexist oppression, 
reducing people to abject objects. The sense of self is abjected as bad, evil, both invisible and 
hyper visible as something abhorrent.  For Oliver (2004:16) with colonialism, slavery and 
patriarchy, ‘it is not just the one’s consciousness that is possessed by the other, but one’s body 
is property owned by the other.’ 
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Moreover, Radhika Mohanram (1999) following Fanon, concludes in the process of becoming 
hyper visible and invisible at the same time, there is a marking and fixing of the body such that 
the stigmatised body becomes nothing but a Jew, black and Homosexual. In the processes of 
fixing their particularity is lost as they are reduced to a universal category. The antithesis of 
this, using Mohanram (1999) terms, is the ‘unmarked’ and ‘mobile body’, a site within which 
to dwell, find meaning and recognition and feel at home. According to Radhika Mohanram 
(1999: 38) the body is marked through race, gender or poverty such that the negative aspects of 
embodiment are displaced completely onto the poor body, seen to be in closer proximity to the 
brute, and to the animal kingdom. This fixed location and visual immediacy locates the poor 
man as incapable of the development of consciousness. We can conclude that the marked body 
undermines the persons’ entry into the social bond. 
Alienation as used by Fanon and Oliver (2004) refers to the inability to make meaning, that is 
separate ourselves from the outside world, which allows us to see ourselves as social being. 
This separation from the outside requires sense of distance necessary for self reflection and 
meaning making, the opposite of this what Richard Klein (1992: 80) has elaborated ‘pure 
presence without absence, the lack of lack’.  With estranged labour there is, for Marx, the 
turning of a person into fragments, appendages of a machine (Oliver 2004: 10). People are 
reduced to objects or commodities and as such they are not offered the possibility of finding 
space to stand back and reflect upon what is occurring from a different perspective. Adding 
direct violence to this process of estranged labour, as is the situation with slavery and rape, the 
effect is a crippling alienation and separation from the body. For Oliver (2004), following 
Fanon and Marx, the slave is reduced to animality, yet at the same time denied the pleasures 
that Marx associates with animal functions, instead the slaves life becomes a ‘means for the life 
of others’, it is ‘not a means to one’s own life.’ ‘All relations, not just the relations of 
production, are forced, including the so-called animal functions’ (Oliver 2004: 11-12). 
Alienation as used in this work, following Fanon and Oliver’s conception, refers to the inability 
to make meaning, that is separate ourselves from the outside world, which allows us to see 
ourselves as social being.  With estranged labour there is, for Marx, the turning of a person into 
fragments, appendages of a machine (Oliver 2004: 10). To speak of alienation is to allude to 
the loss of a sense of grounding, place in the world, a home. As such this work deduces that 
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Marx and Fanon need to be read alongside each other. In other words the presentation of the 
home as the modern ideal cannot simply be understood from within the perspective of a 
complex materiality but it must also include an analysis of discourses that frame the way the 
place is understood as well as a phenomenological understanding of the lived meaning of 
occupying a particular place. Alienation in this reading is both an effect of the weighted 
narrated gaze – look a She male, Prostitute, Negro, Homeless person, I am scared – as well as 
the effect of the appropriation of land and the granting of property rights and home ownership 
opportunity to some but not others or simply having no food, water and life expectancy beyond 
35 as is the situation in different parts of Afrika.  
It is not a question of what should take precedence, materiality or psychological homelessness, 
but a blend of the physical space one occupies, the ‘fantasy of home’ or the sense of belonging 
to some ‘imaginary homelands’ of feeling grounded and rooted in a particular place and the  
‘material conditions that determine their existence?’ (Fortier 2003: 119). Moreover, it is 
imperative to acknowledge agency, resilience but at the same time it is not helpful to negate 
victimhood; as with the young person engaged in survival sex and who gets exploited, used and 
abused. The boundaries between resilience, agency and exploitation blur, as does the outlying 
of the spaces that these individuals inhabit.  
Fanon’s life and work demonstrates that physical and mental alienation go hand in hand and in 
fact become the principle around which the colonizer tries to organize the social bond – a 
physical segregation producing an state of alienation . The inverse, mental segregation leading 
to physical separation also occurs, for example the transgendered sex worker. Richard Klein 
(2000 personal communication) argues that segregation is the first step towards systematic 
violence and homelessness.  
When we make segregation itself our social bond, then we can expect the worst. For the person subjected 
to segregation, there is a forced choice, a state of alienation, in which something is lost: your money or 
your life, freedom or death. In South Africa you had segregation between black and white, but now you 
also have segregation between rich and poor. It has gone very far in SA. One sees the construction of 
artificial cities with barriers and guards to keep the poor out. The poor fellow is used as a guard against 
the poor. The rich are dependent on these ‘poor fellows’ for a sense of security but at the same time he 
fears that this person may come live next door or worse marry his daughter, that is want a home like his. 
Clearly you have no sense of fellowship in South African real estate. 
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The second key Marxist concept of value here is that of negative space. Henri Lefebvre speaks 
about the power of the negative as a “violence, terror and permanent aggression directed 
against life” (Lefebvre 1991: 109). Negative space for Marx, Fanon and Lefebvre is the life 
blood of capitalism. With the colonization of the planet and entrenchment of the market system 
what in effect took place was the creation of centralized urbanized empires, the birth of the so-
called Western capitalism as global capitalism. This global capitalist system prospers through 
the appropriation of the natural resources and human labour, from the periphery. It is a system 
of appropriation which had little or no regard for the resources - people, animals and land – 
needed and used to generate profit. It is a practice build upon a violent seizure and conversion 
– the deterritorialization of space. The seizure of land, animals and people and conversion of 
this ‘raw material’ into energy which in turn has enabled the development of the modern 
(Western) urban centres. The most evident example of this is slavery and within slavery we 
have further gendered divisions of appropriation as with the slave master who repeatedly rapes 
the slave and then sells the child born from this rape.  
The management of the vast demands for natural resources, like food, timber and fibres, let 
alone humans and animals, to feed and fuel the growing industrialized states and consumer 
patterns in urban centres, was not something planned, but took on a life of its own. Moreover 
when it was planned, as with the colonial city, it put in place an ‘architecture’ that was set up to 
service the needs of the imposing people. Today much urban development still disregards 
rational planning and instead spreads uncontrollably, as evidenced by the rise of shanty towns 
and inner city ghettos.  The human cost and ecological effects of these global modes of 
production are immense. One effect and symptom of this negative space is homelessness, 
another is an indifference to the ecological effects, as evidenced by the futile attempts to 
replace replenished natural wealth imported to the urban Western centres.   
Fanon placed alongside Marx enables us to conclude that homelessness is part of those 
entrenched, often indiscernible, social structures and modes of production that normalize 
violent divisions and hierarchies. These structures, or in Marxist terminology, modes of 
production are normalized through the taken-for-granted institutionalized power, be it political, 
economic, knowledge or cultural, that is often centralized in the hands of a few who control the 
means of production.  
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Mode of production encapsulates the relationship between the forces or means of production - 
technological, natural resources, human labour, economic instruments such as banking and insurance - 
and the social relations of production - essentially class or property relations - which determine the 
pattern of development of the productive forces. The forces of production, for Marx, are never found in a 
‘natural’ neutral or random state. They are always organised and developed by particular groups - classes 
- in their own interests (Bullock and Trombley 2000: 536). 
The demand to assimilate, as seen with globalism, produces a mono-scene, in which people 
throughout the planet are taught Western and consumerist habits of self, like dress codes, cell 
phones and the values of individuality. The under classes are forced to adhere to certain class 
and cultural norms, and know their place while others have free reign to do as they please. This 
is illustrated by the strict sentences imposed on the rioters in London in 2011 and the way 
many stock brokers and bankers walked away free, with bonuses in some situations.  
What we are seeing is a deregulated process in which there is the reduction or elimination of 
taxes on corporate activities and earning, absence of taxes on movements or transfer of capital 
as seen with banks and the stock market. Freedom to play with money, debts, without regard to 
the de-stabilizing and destructive effects this can have on entire nations and peoples.  In Afrika 
and now Europe we have debt crises resulting in bailout packages in the West and structural 
adjustment programmes for Africa. The result is a reducing of state benefits, national health 
and labour standards in the West and forced cutting in public spending resulting in a cutting 
back in jobs and in health, educational and social services. The capitalism of the other-world is 
starting to visit the European scene.  
 
Schooled in violence: the de-colonial project within Europe 
To amplify Fanon as a thinker engaged with the effects of violence, I shall now place his life 
and work alongside the work of white European male outsiders, like George Bataille, Wilfred 
Bion and Francois Tosquelles, all of whom directly experienced the horrors of war and the 
modern age. They were deeply affected by war and found themselves both inside and outside 
the West. It is unlikely that Bataille, Fanon and Bion knew each other’s work in any detail if at 
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all. Their work differs vastly in approach, style and content, yet each writes from the place of 
the outsider, from a sense of displacement, creating narratives framed by homelessness.   
Georges Bataille was born in 1897 and died in 1962. He grew up in a peasant family, his father 
going blind from syphilis and then suffering paralysis. His mother was of dubious sanity, and 
subject to frequent suicide attempts. With the impending war in 1914, Bataille ended up 
homeless. As he and his mother evacuated the city, which was under the German advance, they 
had to abandon his father. In 1917, he was discharged from the army due to tuberculosis. As a 
result of his disease, he was placed in an institution where he endured isolation.  
Bataille, like Fanon, was a philosopher of the extreme. Both men were political, but also-called 
for an understanding of inner experience. Bataille’s quest for inner experience is very different 
to Fanon’s understanding of the internal world, which is linked to alienation and the fight 
against colonisation of space. Both experienced, in direct ways, the horrors of war and 
responded to the ruse of Western progress in ways that introduce post-war thinking. For 
Bataille, it was to move in the direction of the postmodern, while for Fanon, it was a push 
towards the postcolonial. For Fanon, the World Wars were colonial wars, while for Bataille 
war exposed the absurd appeal to rationality and progress as advocated by the Enlightenment. 
Both would concur that the appeal of Western rationality is an appeal to master nature and 
human relations.  
Fanon’s call is for a postcolonial state, while Bataille’s call is for subversion via an appeal to 
heterogeneity. The appeal to heterogeneity is the direction that Homi Bhabha tries to take 
Fanon, the heterogeneous element subverting any attempt at homogeneity. For Fanon, as read 
by Bhabha, it is the introduction of diaspora identities breaking down the way the Western 
home is imagined. For Bataille it is eroticism that challenges the illusions of harmonious 
existence, both for the individual and society.  
Belonging to the surrealist generation, Bataille desired a reintegration of mythical thinking into 
Western discourse through reinventing a sense of community and myth. Fanon’s relation to the 
enlightement is more complex, his starting point is political, anti-Christain and clinical. 
Bataille, who started out a devote catholic, as Michael Richardson (1997) points out, would not 
accept the break that Adorno and Horkheimer perceived between religion (in its Christian 
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form) and the Enlightenment. On the contrary he would assert that if Christianity is a religion, 
then so is the Enlightenment. The Enlightenment was thus the continuation of Christianity in 
another form, Christianity taken to its highest realisation (Richardson 1997:126-127). In 
summary, what the enlightment gave rise to was the means to annihilate and bring to extinction 
the human, and other species of animal. Fanon wanted to use the technological tools, like the 
radio, of the Enlightment to fight back and stop the annihilation of Afrikans. 
Following Richardson (1997), my reading of  Bataille is one in which he presents the human 
condition as an experience of limits framed by the recognition of death, which he demonstrates 
in his novels. For example, in Story of the Eye and Blue of Noon, eroticism is elaborated as the 
excess of subjectivity that overflows our identifications and goes beyond, refusing what is 
good; essentially, it is the drive towards death
153
. In this scheme, the person can either inhabit 
the world through a surrendering (to the demands of capital and illusions of clothes, home and 
harmony) or else embrace differentiation, an unheimlich or unhomely world in which the ego is 
not the master of its own home. It is a homeless world in which “birth and death meet in the 
sexual act [...] Our existence is an exasperated attempt to complete being’, something which is 
in fact unbridgeable” (Richardson 1997: 99).  
Fanon also writes about sexuality, but his starting point is very different. Unlike those feminists 
who want to imagine a sexuality that is not male, Fanon wants to imagine a sexuality that is not 
white, however remaining male. For Fanon, the black man and woman’s body is not only 
enslaved, but its sexuality is abused. Central to the construction of black sexuality is rape and 
slavery due to the central role this plays in white male fantasy and identity and colonisation. 
The body and desire of the black person is cut adrift, it needs to be reclaimed. For Fanon, the 
questions of grounding, of home and homelessness cannot be separated from questions of the 
movement of the body, in particular as the site of sexual expression. Fanon reads this contested 
ground as a battle field, one in which the black male needs to preserve a black consciousness in 
the face of the relentless attack on the sexuality of the  male and father figure. Sexuality 
becomes dangerously closely linked to a reading of nationalistic liberation.  
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To return to Fanon and the men of war, both Bataille and Fanon find themselves entangled in a 
struggle with the logic of Hegel, as played out in the question of alienation and the movement 
between master-slave. For Bataille, all alienation is self-alienation due to surrendering to the 
demands, as enacted through certain roles, of capital, while for Fanon, it is the white gaze 
which alienates the black man and woman - an alienation which precedes existential alienation. 
Both alienations produce a state of homelessness and both Fanon and Bataille write from the 
perspective of homelessness.  
Clearing the site of the modern Western age is for Bataille primarily a metaphysical clearing, 
while for Fanon the starting point is a removal of a physical presence. Violence, or, better still, 
the shadow of Nietzsche, seems to descend upon Fanon and Bataille in this attempt at clearing 
of Western clutter so as to make space to think and be. Fanon’s so-called call for purification 
comes close to treading the territory of Bataille’s Nietzsche – in which there is the experience 
of exhilaration and a violent purification. As Bataille (1994 121, 167) put it:  
Nietzsche had already seen that the rigors of asceticism and holiness have ceased to be attractive for our 
age, and that only revolution and war offer the mind comparably exhilarating experiences…he (Roger 
Caillois) has no hesitation in regarding war as the counterpart in modern societies of the paroxysm of 
festival: war, the time of ‘excess’, ‘’violence’ ‘outrage’. War is the ‘unique moment of concentration and 
intense absorption in the group of everything that ordinarily tends to maintain a certain area of 
independence’. Like the festival, war gives rise to ‘monstrous and formless explosions that serve to break 
up the monotony of normal existence.’ This interpretation is shocking, but it would not do to close our 
eyes. To do so would be to fail to understand the sacred, as it would be to fail to understand war 
Bataille and Fanon find themselves on the fringe of psychoanalysis. In the 1920's, Bataille 
underwent psychoanalysis, with the result that he was able to write. Yet it was his writing that 
in fact inspired Lacan. His first wife, Silvia Maklès, who he divorced in 1934, went on to marry 
Lacan, with whom Bataille had a friendship. Bataille influenced psychoanalysis. In fact, in 
Lacan’s elaborations of his concepts like ‘the real’, ‘impossible’, etc there are indirect and, 
sometimes unreferenced, illusions to the work of Bataille
154
.   
Most of Fanon’s adult life was defined by war. The effects of which seem to have profoundly 
influenced this thinking and the way he practiced psychiatry. In this regard it is interesting to 
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place him alongside another male doctor, Wilfred Bion, whose therapeutic work was also 
influenced by his experience as a soldier.  
Wilfred Bion was a psychoanalyst, philosopher, Major in the army and a pioneer of group 
work. The overlapping production of these concerns seems to be a theory of thinking, allowing 
for space to think in extreme situations and how we think about institutional practices. Bion 
was born in India in 1897 and died in 1979. In speaking of his childhood in India, little mention 
is made of colonial life. Instead, there is reflection on his family drama and its effect on him.  
One of the details that stands out in Bion’s (1985) auto biographical writing, The Long 
Weekend and recurs as a pattern in his life, was the warning and fear that he would ‘get ideas’, 
which can be read as the same fear the colonialist had about the Indian population. When he 
speaks of his father, and this could apply to colonization, it is of somebody who loved his 
image of children (the colonized) but who bitterly resented the menace of reality. Alongside 
this he outlines the shame of being human and not living up to the ideal. This notion of not 
fitting into the narrative of colonial family is akin to Fanon’s depiction of the challenge facing 
the black person when discovering the white mask is a masquerade that fails to replicate the 
image of whiteness that is yearned after. 
The experience of leaving India and entering boarding school profoundly affect him for the rest 
of his life. He felt exiled, expelled from the Eden of India. Feeling abandoned he was overcome 
with a feeling of homesickness. While looking the part, excelling in sport, studying at Oxford 
and ending up as a war hero, he remained an outsider. Even as a pioneer within psychoanalysis 
and with depictions of him as a Kleinian, he remained an outsider and felt like an imposer. This 
longing for home resulted in him travelling to Brazil and living in Los Angeles, before 
returning to England to die. 
As a very young man he served as a tank commander in France where he was awarded both the 
DSO and the Legion of Honour. Fanon was also noted for his bravery during the war. Yet what 
the experience of war left both of them with was a sense of hypocrisy and lies. It was not only 
that they did not fit in, but also that they were acutely sensitive to lies, and the fit that people 
colluded with was a lie. Throughout his life, like Fanon, Bion courageously attempted to speak 
and face the truth, no matter how uncomfortable it was. Both Fanon and Bion attempted to 
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think in impossible situations, both felt like outsiders, yet the one was white and the other 
black, with the result that a different elaboration of the lie occurs.  
Bion’s legacy is left in the hands of psychoanalysts but his work could have a very different 
place within the postcolonial framework - the Englishman who longs for his Indian homeland 
which he attempts to find in psychoanalysis, but a psychoanalysis that leads him to the mystics, 
that which lies outside the grasp of the gird of language and psychoanalysis. Central to Bion 
and Fanon’s homeless narrative is the attempt to craft spaces in which people could experience 
the full depth of their experience of truth, fiction and lies. Like Bion both these men drew upon 
psychoanalysis, philosophy, literature and personal courage.  
Bion, Fanon, Bataille and Tosquelles respond to homelessness and the horrors of war by 
attempting to find communities and spaces that can function as a retreat in the face of 
impingement and abuse. The huge and important legacy of Francois Tosquelles, as noted by 
those Fanon biographers like Macey (2000), is only now beginning to be known but still lies, to 
some extent, in the shadow of his pupils, Fanon and Félix Guattari. Tosquelles was a freedom 
fighter, physician, psychiatrist, psychoanalyst, and one of the founders of institutional 
psychotherapy. He was born in 1912 in Catalonia and died in 1994. He served as in the 
Republication army as the psychiatric head of the republican army in the Spanish civil war, 
during which he introduced breathtaking interventions like the use of sex workers as 
caregivers. Condemned to death by Franco, he ended up as a refugee in France at the 
psychiatric hospital Saint-Alban. He read underground prints of the early Lacan and, more 
importantly, transformed Saint-Alban by rearranging the space in accordance to the social 
reality of the patients. 
François Tosquelles, Fanon’s mentor, began his own analysis with Sándor Eiminder, an 
Austrian refugee fleeing Nazism. The theme of refugee, exile and outsider transfers itself, via 
the lived ritual enactment of analysis, from Freud to Fanon in the analysis of Tosquelles by 
Eiminder and mentorship of Fanon. Tosquelles’ own development within the field of analysis 
was overviewed by another (German) refugee, Werner Wolf. Tosquelles was a refugee himself 
at the time of his engagement with Fanon. The other link to the theme of homelessness is that 
Saint-Alban became a safe-haven during World War Two for ‘refugees,’ for wounded 
resistance fighters, as Blida also functioned as a refuge for political exiles. At the very least we 
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can conclude that Fanon’s own ‘analysis’ or mentorship with Tosquelles was punctuated by the 
theme of offering refuge for the excluded, oppressed and marginalized at Saint-Alban and 
Blida lived on and thankfully acted out something unanalyzed in the life of these two men.   
The damaging Father and healing the wounds  
Fanon’s position in relation to patriarchy and the role of the naming father as determinant is 
complex. For now, we can simply register that this battle with the notion of ‘Father’, is 
something he seems to share with Freud and Foucault, as all of these men can be said to have 
suffered major disappointments with their own fathers. We can mull over the remarks of Fanon 
in a letter written in 1944, just before going into battle, in which he states:  
Papa, you really have sometimes failed to perform your duty as a father. I allow myself to judge you in 
this way because I am no longer part of this earth…If we, the eight children, have become something, 
Mama alone should take all the glory. She was the spirit…You at yourself. Look back at the years that 
have passed, lay your soul bare, and have the courage to say: ‘I deserted.’ (Macey 2000:57) 
Fanon, Freud and Foucault all seem to have been more attached to their mothers, but unlike 
Foucault who has no desire to occupy the vacant position left by a failed father, Fanon and 
Freud, clearly fill this void. After the death of Fanon’s father, he wanted to know if his father 
had spoken of him before he died. He wanted to know what his father had thought of him. 
(Macey 2000:122) While this is totally understandable and we risk the danger of reading too 
much into this, it is possible that what it is be a father, may have been important to him.  
Fanon’s life work, in fighting for Afrikan liberation and in running a psychiatric setting, 
converges in a struggle to overcome alienation, be it anguish and exclusion evoked by mental 
illness or the appropriation of land by the colonizer. His approach to both mental illness and 
land appropriation is to find strategies whereby an opening up of space for self-agency, for 
both voice and place to speak, could occur. Perhaps Fanon saw a similarity between the 
aetiology of mental illness and colonization, over and above the effect of alienation, in that 
both of their victims can be seen to suffer from the effects of appropriation by another. His 
response to this appropriation is to open up space. As with the coffee ritual established in the 
psychiatric hospital he ran, he presented the alienated person with choice (in the existential 
sense of the word).   
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It should be acknowledged here, as pointed out by Priyamvada Gopal (2002: 39), that as a 
doctor, Fanon was in the structural position of representing the colonial system. Fanon (1989) 
was aware of this contradiction and wrote about it himself in an article entitled Medicine and 
Colonialism, spelling out the complex nature of the medical establishment in the colonial 
world. Fanon unpacks the ‘native’s’ refusal of treatment, even at the risk of losing their lives, 
attributing it to this difficult interrelationship. Gopal (2002: 40) concludes that Fanon’s life as a 
man of medicine was imbricated with his work as a revolutionary thinker.   
The clearing that Fanon offers, like Freud, is limited by a patriarchal cluttering, those hetero 
normative demands and yearnings for a home in which the father is still the central and 
determining frame of reference. Fanon works at the intersection of conflicting discourses. He 
moves within the spaces between these intersections, but comes to an abrupt halt when 
speaking of the black women, who he declares, like Freud speaking of female sexuality, he 
does not understand.  
Central to the life and work of both Fanon and Freud, is the wounded father who falls at the 
feet of the white Christian European male.  Both these men are angry with their fathers, their 
impotence and possibly with the way they treated their own wives.  There is the element of 
disgust, a needing to transcend the father, and at the same time an attempt to replace and create 
a symbolic father to heal these personal wounds. bell hooks (1996: 82) is correct to argue that 
“Fanon’s insight was that the body of the father was a body in pain, a body awaiting loss, a 
body longing to be re-membered”. Fundamentally, for bell hooks (1996), Fanon’s writing is 
concerned with the issues of healing. 
Following bell hooks (1996), it is in the attempt to heal the wounds caused by the father to the 
imaginary home that Fanon constructs in the Wretched of the Earth. The hope is that the black 
man may once again dream
155
. At the same time, it is a very male construction. Fanon, like 
Freud, stumbles when it comes to seeing female sexuality outside the lens of his own male 
projections and constructions of female sexuality. Freud, who failed to address racial difference 
as a primary determinate in the construction of subjectivity, veiled some implicit racist 
assumptions with the concept of the Dark Continent. Put another way, Freud’s projections onto 
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women are not only informed by male prejudices but, as Sander Gilman (1993) shows us, 
include dimensions of the racial stereotyping and feminization of male Jews. Women, 
diagnosed as hysterics, become the container of these projections, thereby restoring the 
masculinity of the Jewish man. While Fanon goes further than Freud in illuminating racial 
difference, he stumbles when encountering female (specifically black female) sexuality and 
homosexuality.  Moreover, when it comes to seeing the black woman, Fanon seems to depict 
her in essentialist and nationalistic terms. 
For now, let us begin to read Fanon as he reads himself, which is in relation to other men, 
usually white men. Moreover, while Fanon’s approach to women has many failings, it is 
important not to discharge Fanon’s work as a whole and on these grounds. There are feminists, 
such as Gautam Premnath (1999) and Madhu Dubey (1998) who claim that Fanon’s 
revolutionary writings can inform the projects of postcolonial feminism. As we have seen, 
Fanon has many faces, which specify the manner in which Fanon’s work shuttles between two 
mutually unrecognizable subject-positions: the detached rational subject of Western humanism 
and the engaged impassioned, subject of revolutionary national consciousness. For Premnath 
(2002: 44), following Dubey, Fanon’s model of political emancipation does not stake its claims 
or find its guarantee on the pure grounds of either Enlightenment modernity or primordial 
native culture, but provides postcolonial feminism with a more supple theoretical paradigm 
model. 
Osei-Nyame (2002: 47) is not so sure, arguing that the Fanon who critiques the West and 
Western universal reason is himself part of it, and no matter how much he takes a radical 
stance against it, he is fashioned out of that very humanism.  Vikki Bell (2002: 17) sidesteps 
the issue of Enlightenment when it comes to assessing Fanon’s relevance to feminism, and 
argues that any feminist project that seeks to consider the cultural production of difference is 
linked by concern with a history of anti-colonial and anti-racist struggle. For Bell (2002: 17) 
Fanon’s work can be reread through the context of the notion of performativity as his work 
speaks powerfully to the place of mimicry, both within the constitution of subjectivity and as a 
tactic of resistance.  
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Conclusion 
Gazing upon the Afrikan body and homeless person there is the pronouncement ‘Is that man 
still alive, or dead?’ (Mbembe 2001:173). The primary function of this statement is not to 
engage in a dialogue but enforce a categorization of what belongs within the scene and what is 
of the other-world, naked existence, animal, homeless, Afrikan.  
Decolonization, for Fanon, is the opening up of space to survive, think and be recognized as 
human being. While Fanon helps us to understand the extremes of impingement –elaborated 
above in the discussion on torture – he also enables us to think about day-to-day segregation as 
seen in colonial and postcolonial cities. In this regard, Arif Dirlik contends that colonial 
societies were compelled into modernity, not as its subject but as its object. The third world, he 
articulates, was irrevocably alienated from its origins in Europe and was experienced, not as an 
internal development, but as alien hegemony. For Dirlik (1997) the challenge is border 
crossings.  As Dirlik (1997: 6) puts it: “Boundaries that divide by essentialised notions of self 
and the other must be rejected in favour of border crossings, which underline mutual 
dependency in the conceptualization of identity, which enshrines syncretism and hybridity”.   
What remains consistent in the move from the colonial (Afrikan) city, as depicted by Fanon, to 
the postcolonial Afrikan city, is the wall. As Robert Young expresses, we are surrounded by 
walls, some of us are walled in, and others are walled out, “many walls are a home” (Young 
2003:66-67). Walls have become our border cities, which most nations rely on in a hypocritical 
manner: You cannot cross over my wall, but I can break down all your walls via new 
technologies and the setting up of these within the market economy! 
As Gibson states, for Fanon the experience of space is crucial for a sense of freedom and 
liberation. (Gibson 2010:16) Moreover, as pointed out by Gibson (2010: 15-16), this ‘world 
without spaciousness’ is a contemporary concern; the ‘control of space has become 
increasingly essential to neoliberal globalization’ as has the ‘policing of the urban poor’ which 
has become ‘more and more militarized, based on attempts to establish a sort of neo-colonial 
cordon sanitaire of walls, gates and enclaves to separate and isolate the poor from elite and 
bourgeois spaces.’ In addition, there is the gentrification of spaces, via architectural and 
interior design, and certain unstated codes of conduct that provide a clear message that these 
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spaces require the imitating of certain behavioural ethics or, simply, that you do not belong. 
Following Gibson (2010: 17), we can conclude that the homeless – shack dwellers, foreigners - 
are good enough to clean the homes of the middle classes, work in their restraints and function 
as consumers of cyber space finance, but ‘too dangerous (economically and socially) to live 
outside the walls of the luxury estate.’ This analogy also applies to the West’s enjoyment in 
setting up cheap industrial manufacturing sites in the ‘Third World’ and ‘developing’ Afrika as 
a new consumer market, but their simultaneous horror that these Afrikans might want to live in 
Europe. 
By way of concluding I ask the question, which is a Fanon question, namely, who owns the 
body?  The body is the point of convergence in the work, theory and politics of Fanon. It is a 
body alienated by socio-political and economic context. The particular manifestation of this 
suffering needs to be understood from the lived experience of that individual. Fanon uses a 
phenomenological and psychoanalytic model of mind to understand the particularity of the 
individual. At the same time he radically transformed the psychiatric settings within which he 
worked. This included the removal of racial segregation, establishing a Moorish café and 
inserting essential features of the social life of North Afrika, like bringing into the hospital 
traditional story tellers during certain social gatherings and celebration of their religious events. 
Simply put he gave the borders spaces within which to retreat and rediscover what was familiar 
and safe, creative spaces. He used his position of authority to allow the borders to speak for 
themselves while at the same time he attempted to learn their indigenous language, Arabic. He 
supported their attempts to gain personal autonomy and re-engage with society (Razanajao, 
Postel and Allen 1996). 
Razanajao, Postel and Allen (1996: 523) correctly point out that not only does Fanon’s work 
predate R. D. Laing, more importantly he worked out a “radical psychiatry directly related to 
the political sphere”. He pioneered his own community approach to psychiatry and 
psychoanalysis ensuring that enabled people to draw upon resources that were of value to them, 
be it political, cultural or even family.  
Through a process of opening up creative spaces, interpretation and self determination through 
organized activities Fanon’s approach addressed the different dimensions of alienation, as 
identified by Bulhan (Razanajao, Postel and Allen 1996: 529) from one’s body and self, family, 
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people of other races, culture.  At the same time, as noted by Razanajao, Postel and Allen 
(1996: 523), while expressing doubt about the universality of the Oedipus, in his practice, 
according to Sanchez, he never questioned this. As such one if left to conclude that his practice 
was orientated around an Oedipal reading that went through the Name of the Father - the 
gender and heteronormative blind stop. 
In conclusion, as described above, for Fanon, the alienated are fixed, without movement, 
displaced, cut off, and subjected to experiences of being without spaciousness and voice. 
Fanon’s texts, which unpack the experience of racism and colonization, offer a spatial 
depiction of the underlying violence that closes down space - displacement. What is apparent 
from reading Fanon is that this displacement can be either a displaced sense of embodiment (as 
described in Black Skin, White Masks) or to become displaced from one’s home (as presented 
in the Wretched of the Earth). Without choices and the ability to move, mental and physical 
space shuts down, and an erasure of subjectivity occurs.  
Bodily displacement and displacement from one’s sense of home, following Fanon’s logic, can 
be seen to go hand-in-hand, both involving an attack on the body. To close down space, to 
create a ‘non-space’, is to place somebody, a body, in an impossible situation, a double bind in 
which that person is alive but somehow dead at the same time. Analogous with a caged animal 
in a zoo, it is a body that is alive and dead at the same time, dependent on the master who feeds 
the body and determines its movement. To speak of this in experiential terms, one can speak of 
the person being present in bodily form but mentally absent (without agency), or the alternative 
- with mental agency but a confined body. This is an experience, as noted by Chris Oakley 
(1998) of being unable to represent (re-present) oneself to oneself (through having space to 
speak, dream, play and create) brings about a loss in the capacity for self-representation. It is an 
experience indexed on a moment of alienation and separation-of-self through the loss of being, 
having no access to mental and/or physical spaces within which to retreat.  
Fanon’s life and work, which involved a convergence of the political and psychological, was a 
bold attempt to give the wretched (homeless) of the earth a human face, a way of speaking 
back. The response of Fanon - like Freud and Foucault - is determined by his marginality, 
existing outside the parameters of the European homeland.  Fanon occupied an uncanny 
position in which, as a doctor and intellectual, he existed within the middle classes and 
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intelligentsia, with space to move, but as a black man, the experience of racism left him with a 
deep sense of fixity and immobility. Due to having one foot in, making him at home in Western 
society, yet at the same time having one foot out (foreign and homeless) he operated with a 
state of double-ness. At the same time, Fanon probably found himself stuck between spaces, as 
opposed to being completely confined to one space. This provides for empathy with the 
experience of confinement, as well as an ability to see what produces this captivity. One 
example of this is the fact that, as a French psychiatrist, he dealt with torturers, while at the 
same time, he help to hide the tortured from the very torturers he attended to.  
It is as a result of this state of double-ness that he was able to observe and challenge the 
privileged and taken-for-granted representations of the European homeland, thereby 
demanding that the unheimlich, the not-at-home, be seen and accommodated. Moreover, much 
like the ‘masters of suspicion’ - Marx, Nietzsche, and Freud – who allude to something 
uncanny within the cannon of Western thought, Fanon opens up space for the black person and 
the poor by clearing away the shadows of white Western cultural representation which are cast 
over ontological questions as to what it means to be human. He highlights how the meeting of 
the white and black world constitutes an erasure, a production of homelessness, and calls for 
the death of the universalised white Western representation as the normative yard stick.  
Like Freud, Fanon functions with a sense of double vision, a state of consciousness not 
confined to the replication of sameness, but one that pushes consciousness towards that which 
is both unconsciousness as well as moving towards an appreciation of Black Consciousness. 
Black Consciousness, like the consciousness of the working class, in the words of Marx, 
functioned as the spectre that haunted Europe (Royle 2003: 4). Like Marx, Fanon exposes the 
alienation of those not at home in their own homelands.  It is within the faceless spaces of 
capitalist abstraction, colonial impingement and racism that the geopolitics of Fanon push for 
the opening up of a space that liberates and brings into vision the erased human face. 
Unfortunately, at the same time, this space is still restricted by a gender blind spot. This gender 
blind spot is paradoxical, in that he questions the universality of the Oedipus and challenges the 
position of the Father, yet he uses the model Oedipal in his clinical practice; he speaks in male 
and heteronormative terms, but deconstructs the knowing position of the white male doctor 
who knows what is best for the other.   
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CHAPTER FIVE 
FOUCAULT: DISCIPLINE OR FUGUE 
 
Introduction 
Michael Foucault died in 1984, at the height of academic career, aged 57, from a HIV related 
illness. Approximately ten years after his death two English biographies simultaneously 
appeared, one by David Macey and the other by James Miller. The work that was to capture the 
attention of the general public and noted thinkers like Edward Said is Miller’s The Passion of 
Michael Foucault. The Foucault that gets depicted in these two books is vastly different. 
Macey presents Foucault as somebody who was deeply engaged in politics and who lived a 
political life. James Miller (1994: 7) tells us he felt ‘forced to ascribe to Foucault a persistent 
and purposeful self...preoccupied with death” and sadomasochistic eroticism. 
Foucault, like Freud and Fanon, as I read him is somebody that cannot and should not be 
reduced to any singular reading. There are many Foucaults, what is key is to allow Foucault to 
have more than one life and different possible relationships to himself and others. If Fanon can 
be said to live on through his unfinished conversations, then the legacy of Foucault continues 
due to the many lives he lived and different kind of relationships he engaged in. This approach 
is in opposition to Miller who systematically reduces the life and work of Foucault to a morbid 
passion for death and sadomasochistic eroticism. In so doing Foucault’s sexuality is dissected 
with the help of the psychiatric theories of Robert Stoller.  Miller’s work, from my perspective, 
is an act of triumphalism in that Foucault is turned into a psychiatric patient.  
By way of contextualising Foucault, I shall present him as a   'sixties child', somebody who 
embraced politics with a small ‘p’, explored alternative life styles and different states of 
consciousness - drugs - and ways of obtaining pleasure. It was an engagement with the world 
that was not limited to experiences to ‘self’ but also a political allegiance. Foucault, like Fanon, 
was deeply committed to political action, and willing to go onto the streets and face physical 
assault and injury in challenging the regime of overt state oppression. He was deeply engaged 
in the politics of the world around him but at the same time he was deeply sceptical of 
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liberation politics and uniting under any universal category, which he saw as an extension of 
the promises of the Enlightenment. One example of his political engagement was his work in 
prisons.  
As regards biographical details relevant to this work, what stands out for me is the fact that 
Foucault, like Freud and Fanon, had a difficult relationship with his father. Foucault, like 
Freud, changed his name. He was named Paul-Michel after his father, the surgeon but later he 
removed the name Paul which can be seen as signifying a patriarchal and medical lineage. Like 
Freud and Fanon, Foucault was close to his mother. Another commonality with Freud and 
Fanon is that Foucault was to know directly the effects of war; he grew up under German 
occupation in the 1940’s.  
While Miller (1994: 39) chooses to highlight adjectives like aloof, odd, delinquent, isolated, 
withdrawn, violent and enigmatic, the word that stands out for me is humour.  As with Freud 
and Fanon, laughter was important to him. For me, this laughter speaks of irony. Foucault 
comes across as somebody who did not take himself or his achievements too seriously even if 
he took intellectual debate very earnestly. The exemplary story that stands out for me is the 
following. When asked by Edmund White how he got to be so smart Foucault replied it was 
due to his lust for boys. It began by doing homework for a boy he liked. To do the homework 
for this boy he needed to keep up with the work. “All the rest of my life I’ve been trying to do 
intellectual things that would attract beautiful boys” (Miller 1994: 56). 
Foucault lived a disciplined, rigorous and studious life. He was a well established and 
respected academic, and intellectual. At the same time he was engaged in exploring the cutting 
edge of sexual expression as undertaken by gay men in the 60s and 70s, worked with prisoners 
and supported the plight of refugees. He was also a seeker of experiences and ways of writing 
so as to have experience in which the author, ego, master of the experience makes way for the 
experience itself. Moments in which self awareness disappeared and Foucault was not present.  
He wanted anonymity and not to be reduced to one singular story. If Freud used psychoanalysis 
to try to create a sense of home and Fanon adopted the liberation struggle as a site of home-
coming, then Foucault can be said to have refused any home.   
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Foucault’s uncertain and questioning relation to Western thought which characterized his life 
and work helps me think about homelessness in a new and unforeseen way. Foucault's non-
European position involved a queer migration to the 'outside', an overcoming of those 
normative attachments that ground childhood to the established order as well as to pre-given 
heterosexual (or for that matter, homosexual) identifications. His was a migration towards a 
position of intellectual homelessness built on a refusal to play the game of identity politics as 
“identity is a game” (Foucault 1997: 166). It was a moving beyond those places of alleged 
guarantee, and a rejection of the established order of things with its promise of ontological 
security. For Foucault (1997: 124) the challenge was to “move beyond the outside-inside 
alternative; we have to be at the frontiers. Criticism indeed consists of analysing and reflecting 
upon limits.”  
Foucault refuses any grand narrative but instead offers us a tool kit, strategy and ethics that 
invite us to seek out those experiences, problems, questions and limits that not only result in us 
feeling like strangers within the familiar landscape of society, but make the familiar landscape 
uncanny, unheimlich.  
What Foucault’s brings to the question of homelessness is tactical, strategic and ethical tools. 
For him theories are a tool to enable one to take up a strategic position. In this reading, the 
homeless are a rather queer bunch, that is say, following David Halperin (1995), we are 
situating “a horizon of possibility whose precise extent and heterogeneous scope cannot in 
principle be delimited in advance” (Halperin 1995:62). It is at odds with the norm, the given.   
Foucault arrives at a homeless position not only through a particular use and inversion of 
theory, but also through his own lived reality. As with Freud and Fanon there is the overlapping 
of theory, practice and ethics in the life and work of these men.  He knew only too well that 
those “desires that stirred him” to engage in certain ways of relating to people sharply 
differentiate him from what was considered the norm and the unquestionable order of things 
(Wilson 1978: 21).  
Using the life of Foucault, I try to introduce some complexity into the homeless argument by 
sketching a network of uncertainties and feints so as to present another homeless existence 
which runs alongside the picture of homelessness as constriction, and in some ways reverses 
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the picture we have become accustomed to seeing. Following an analysis of Foucault’s life, 
what will unfold are various uncanny shades of being that refuse a fixed representation.  
Foucault’s ethics 
Foucault offers his words as a strategy to engage and think about certain relationships between 
certain concepts, as a tactical tool, one that is in direct conflict with the model of authorship. 
Authorship needs to be disentangled, something Foucault sets out to do. Authorship is linked to 
the game of property rights, the word standing in for the truth of who I am. I am grounded by 
and to the word, thought, and concept and therefore need to examine my words, the words of 
others, so as to ensure a conformity and consistency with the way I identify the world and 
other.  
The game of authorship is one of staking a truth claim, in which one assumes correspondence 
between the word and the speaker, but also a belief that in giving something a name one has 
authority and ownership over what is designated, signified.  In summary, Foucault arrives at a 
homeless position not only through a particular use and inversion of theory, but also through 
his own lived reality, politics and ethics.  
By following Foucault I shall attempt to develop an analysis that moves beyond a yes-no, 
outside-inside, home-homeless alternative. As will be shown, the binary home-homeless, is a 
projection, “a conceptual and semiotic dumping ground for all sorts of mutually incompatible, 
logically contradictory notions” (Halperin 1995: 45). Foucault's strategy is to put into question 
categories which are present as sites everybody is assumed to belong to and feel at home within 
but which in fact hide the mechanisms of power, the production of sites of normality, deviance 
and degeneracy. To arrive at the site of homelessness following Foucault is to take the 
development of a given, the home, and put it 'into a question' (Foucault 1997: 118, 119). 
Through situating homelessness as a starting point I wish to expose what is at stake in 
occupying a place called home. I shall show that home is intimately tied to the game of truth, 
relations of power and forms of relations to oneself and to others (Foucault 1997 117).  
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Foucault’s position on homelessness emerges as a result of his engagement with philosophers 
such as Nietzsche, as well as from the manner in which he lived and the ethics and politics
156
 
he adhered to. To unpack the different strands of ‘Foucaultian homelessness’ I shall engage the 
following steps. Firstly I shall apply Foucault’s archaeological approach, thereby subverting the 
binary of “home” and “homelessness” to show how these concepts are entwined within a web 
of complex relationships that need deconstructing. I shall look at three overlapping events, 
killing of ‘witches’, slavery and incarceration of the ‘mad’. Following this process I will 
engage in a geopolitical and spatial analysis of homelessness by supplementing Foucault’s 
work with that of Franz Fanon and Karl Marx. This will allow for a genealogical and spatial 
conceptualization of the relationship between homelessness and violence, something that is 
lacking in the historical formulation of the concept of “homelessness”.  
The next step will be to think alongside the later Foucault and his return to Nietzsche, placing 
his philosophies alongside Bataille and Deleuze. What unfolds is a subtle unsettling of the 
methodological foundations of knowledge where, in the words of Deleuze, nothing is produced 
but the “…nomadic distribution of singular points.” (Deleuze 1989:79) In Foucault’s preface to 
the Anti-Oedipus he tells us that, for Deleuze, what is productive is not sedentary but nomadic 
(Foucault 2000: 109).  
Following this I will present Foucault as an advocate of homelessness located in an ethical and 
political position from which to engage and build critical communities. I will do this by looking 
at Foucault as a person, the position he took in the world and what his writing meant to him and 
his concept of heterotopias. 
Lastly, I shall use Foucault’s ideas and approach as a means of thinking about home and 
homelessness.  
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 It is important to note that one of the lives of Foucault was a deeply political engagement as David Macey 
(2004) carefully observes. As noted by the Chicago review Macey demonstrates that it is through embracing 
contradiction that we can relate Foucault's work to his life in an original and exciting way. Exploring the complex 
intellectual and political world in which Foucault lived and worked, and how that world is reflected in his seminal 
works, Macey paints a portrait of Foucault in which the thinker emerges as a brilliant political strategist, one who 
aligned himself with particular intellectual camps at precisely the right moments. See 
http://www.press.uchicago.edu/ucp/books/book/distributed/M/bo3534934.html 
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Home versus homelessness: deconstruction of the binary opposition 
By applying Foucault’s reading on the dichotomy of “madness” versus “normality”, to the 
opposition of “home” versus “homeless”, we are confronted with a question: to what extent is 
this binary opposition, home-homelessness, in fact a continuation (albeit a transformed one) of 
the normal-abnormal divide in Western society? What can be discerned is that homelessness 
has become one of the most prominent contemporary orders of abnormality, while the norm, as 
will be argued below, is having, or desiring, a home. The notion of “home” has not only 
become a vital cure for abnormality, functioning as a form of physical, mental and spiritual 
hygiene, but is also central to the logic of financial capital and the operations of the market 
forces.  
The idea of homelessness, in its function as the antithesis to the idea of home, constitutes the 
negative of what is accepted as home, and thus, normal. What is so effective about this 
(mythical) representation of these opposites is that it leads not only to consensus of the home as 
a contemporary ideal, but also to a consent of this unexamined and accepted ideal by the 
homeless themselves. In working with a very diverse group of homeless people in London, 
both on the street and in hostels, it became apparent that what seems to ‘unite’ the homeless 
under the category of homelessness, is neither their experience of being homeless, nor the 
receiving of services as a result of this classification, nor, even, that they have lost their homes. 
Rather, the homeless are ‘united’ through the sense that their experience can be understood and 
managed through the assumption that there is something natural and presupposed about having 
a home. As a result, they are identified by others, and often by themselves, as having something 
wrong with them because they do not possess that which is natural, the home.  
This game of division and rule is successful when the homeless person internalizes these 
assumptions and consequently not only sees herself as abnormal, but also judges others who are 
homeless, especially those considered inferior. By way of example, a homeless person with a 
drinking problem might feel scornful towards a drug user living on the streets.  To understand 
homelessness we need to put into question this binary opposition and question the production 
of the space we call home. We also need to understand the centrality of the ideal of the home of 
the middle class, nuclear household, and its presentation as the norm, to the continued 
unfolding of capitalism and Cartesian dualism.  
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With regard to the link to unfolding capitalism, consider the origins of the international division 
of labour. This is epitomized by the rapid growth of industrial capital in Europe, which went 
hand in hand with the collapse of extended rural family existence and the growth of urban 
settings. The Industrial Revolution was an historical period in which European industry 
demanded new technologies and new ways of organising work. It also necessitated new family 
arrangements, and ensured that new lands, as well as cheap or free labour, would be exploited. 
The advances of global capitalism brought about the international migration of labour and 
consequent changes in the spatial patterning of family relationships in order to support the new 
modes of production, capitalist accumulation and urbanisation. Capitalism went hand in hand 
with the construction of the Western nuclear family as the norm and the bearing it had on the 
politics of health in the eighteenth and nineteen century.  
To return to our deconstruction of the binary of home and homelessness, what should be clear 
is that home can be said to have functioned as a ‘given’, a ‘truth-claim’, while the homeless 
experience becomes a ‘blind spot’, something that does not get thought of outside of the binary 
opposition of home-homelessness.Home is a representation that automatically privileges a 
particular lifestyle and recruits individuals into a set of unexamined assumptions about having a 
home, job and family arrangements and demands to assimilate. The taken-for-granted manner 
in which these narratives exist reifies having a home to the status of the unquestioned natural 
order of things as prescribed by the nation-state. In the language of Foucault home presents as a 
pre-established unity (Foucault 1986: 71). The challenge states Foucault is to “accept as valid 
none of the unities” (Foucault1986: 31). 
Let me illuminate how the concept of home takes on an aspect of a priori naturalism while 
pushing other vital aspects into the background. I made the observation between 2001 and 
2005, while working with the street homeless in London that the daily demand of the homeless 
was for a flat (apartment). My work with these individuals was consumed by an overriding and 
overwhelming demand for a flat, which subsumed any other kind of intervention.  For instance, 
an attempt at harm reduction in the case where a person’s alcohol consumption had become life 
threatening was pushed into the background by the overriding demand for a flat, i.e. a home. 
The demand for a flat produced a one-dimensional reality, as if, somehow, once in a flat, all 
else would fall into place.  
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What needs to be examined here is why the situation, occurring between 2001 and 2005, 
differed from my experience of working with the street homeless in London from 1994 to 1997. 
I need to mention here that during the later period I worked with some of the same individuals 
encountered in the earlier period (1994-1997). During the initial encounters many of the 
individuals I met simply wanted to be left alone. In my observation the demand for a flat, given 
the force with which it came to the fore from 2000 onwards, was a new trend, which had 
reached an intensity it simply did not have in the early nineties. Together with colleague Steve 
O'Toole (2001), I reflected about a possible explanation for this intensified demand for a home.  
Firstly, we noted that this demand occurred at the same time that the Zero Tolerance approach 
(the coming together of the police and outreach teams with the shared aim of getting the 
homeless off the street) had become the norm. Secondly, we observed a parallel preoccupation 
with home ownership and development of the concept of the ideal home on the mainstream TV 
networks. We found that a huge amount of airtime on the mainstream TV networks was 
devoted to issues of home ownership and idealised homes. These programmes portrayed an 
absolute obsession with the acquisition of property, of design and of life style. A closer look at 
a weekly television guide revealed that typical Monday and Tuesday listings included close to 
twenty home ownership related shows
157
. Amidst such a plethora of programmes on housing, it 
wasn’t much of a surprise to note that one station even had three programmes in a row on 
homes. 
It needs to be considered whether these programmes fulfil an audience need to find out about 
housing or if it is rather a question of the property industry artificially sponsoring television 
programmes in order to try and intensify the need for owning a home? But even without intense 
research into the viewing habits of different groups of people, what stands out undoubtedly is 
an obsession with home ownership. In light of this obsession, it is understandable that its 
opposite, whether implied or explicit, is one where those without a home would be led to see 
themselves as abnormal and in need of a home. Thus, upon closer inspection, the category of 
the “home” can be seen to function similarly to a forerunning classification of ‘normal’.  
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 With titles such as Building the Dream, Through the Keyhole, House Doctor, House Invaders, Trading Up, 
Garden Invaders, I want that House, Brassed off Britain, How to get a New Life, Escape to the Country, Selling 
Houses, Hot Property, 60-Minute Makeover, The City Gardener”, Up Your Street and A Place in Greece. 
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Following this, the demand to assimilate home and homeland become linked. To return to an 
example from England, consider the transition from Conservative rule to the Blair years, in 
which, it can be argued, New Labour pushed forward what can be seen as a conservative 
agenda that criminalizes poverty and demands assimilation.  Evidence of this push is found in 
the policies of Michael Howard and David Blunkett, changes in the law and the recent response 
by the Conservative Party to the riots in London catalysed by the shooting of a young black 
man in Tottenham.  
What is clear is that when Michael Howard, then British Home Secretary, stated, “In October, I 
announced the most comprehensive package of measures to tackle crime ever announced by a 
Home Secretary” (Howard: 1994), a precedent was set which Tony Blair wholeheartedly 
embraced.  Not only was the Act a criminalization of diversity, but according to Anne Bagehot, 
cited by George McKay (1996), it could be likened to ethnic cleansing. “Speaking as an 
individual, my personal view is that the phrase ‘ethnic cleansing’ is not over the top. People are 
talking about scum and wasters and riff raff. There’s a hate campaign going on” (McKay 1996: 
162). 
Blair pushed this agenda even further. The Criminal Justice and Public Order Act of 1994 
became a template from which Tony Blair and David Blunkett would impose a new moral 
order. Essential to Tony Blair’s moral world order, as enacted in the war on Iraq, David 
Blunkett’s tough policy on asylum seekers and the new laws used to control ‘antisocial’ 
behaviour, are ideological stereotyping and representations of the homeless and unwanted other 
as deviant, dangerous or simply evil. In fact, these representations – evil, bad, mad, sad, dirty, 
contaminant - perpetuate the premise upon which racist arguments and mythologies are 
constructed. Following Foucault I argue that this transforms homelessness and otherness into a 
political tool used to manipulate public consent and conserve a moral order based on a 
perceived social hygiene and purity of the nation, that is to say homogeneity. This strategy truly 
becomes effective when the homeless themselves buy into this moral ordering, seeing 
themselves as failed citizens in need of purification, in which, to use the example above, the 
flat and the home improvement it needs, become the antidote to impurity and abnormality.   
Underlying the attack on the homeless is the example of New Age travellers, and, as Kevin 
Hetherington, cited by George McKay (1996), points out, is a fear of contamination and racial 
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impurity. Moreover, Hetherington points out that just as has been the case with Jews and 
gypsies down the centuries, the New Age travellers are hated not because they are always on 
the move but because “they might stay” and contaminate, and bring all manner of horrors and 
sins upon the locals (McKay 1996: 48).   
Mc Kay (1996) is clear that the Dongas
158
 welcome to join the growing tribe living in benders, 
travelling by foot, horse, donkey, bicycle and reclaiming their stolen countryside, the right to 
live together tribally and celebrate the seasons is a direct threat to the countryside middle class 
who do not want the problems of inner cities turning up on their door steps. New Age travellers 
and gypsies, refugees and street homeless, have become categorised as a threat to law and order 
and in need of psychological correction, in essence: purification.  
What we seem to have here then is capitalisation around a mythical Western home with the 
home functioning as an ideal, the point of psychological identification and capital investment. 
This mythical home ideal, alongside the middle-class lifestyles that go with it, erases 
alternative ways of living in that it replaces extended family existence with a demand for 
middle-class home ownership and nuclear family living arrangements. The ideal home, dressed 
up with certain labels, for instance, that of the elegant style, goes along with those attempts, 
which Foucault makes reference to, to push into the background issues such as illness and 
death.  
For Foucault the challenge is to understand the intersection of some of the different discourses 
that enable a concept to surface (Foucault (1986: 41).  So saying, to arrive at the concept of 
home is to stumble upon a host of interrelated events: relationships, the emergence of the 
nuclear family, the transitions from a territorial state to that of a population and nation-state and 
the politics of health in the eighteenth and nineteenth century. Foucault observes that medicine 
takes on an increasingly important place in the administrative system and machinery of power 
in the eighteenth century. This increasingly important role comes about due to a privileging of 
hygiene and the functioning of medicine as an instance of social control or urban space. “This 
programme of hygiene as a regime of health for the populations entails a certain number of 
authoritarian medical interventions and controls. First of all, control of the urban space in 
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 The Dongas Tribe was a gathering of UK road protesters and travelers in England who took  occupation of 
Twyford Down outside Winchester, Hampshire. 
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general” (Foucault 2000: 98, 99). In order to control urban space a reorganisation of the home, 
namely, the medicalization, education, imprisonment of the individual’s body was needed. As 
Foucault (2000: 96-98) puts it, with reference to overlap between the family and medical 
institution:  
At all events, from the eighteenth century onward the healthy, clean, fit body, a purified, cleansed, 
aerated, domestic space, the medically optimal sitting of individuals, places, beds, and utensils, and the 
interplay of the ‘caring’ and the ‘cared for’ figure among the family’s essential laws. And from this 
period the family becomes the most constant agent of medicalization. 
The family is no longer to be just a system of relations inscribed in a social status, a kinship system, a 
mechanism for the transmission of property; it is to become a dense, saturated, permanent, continuous 
physical environment that envelops, maintains and develops the child’s body. 
The family is assigned a linking role between general objectives regarding the good health of the social 
body and individuals’ desires or need for care. This enables a ‘private’ ethic of good health as the 
reciprocal duty of parents and children to be articulated onto a collective system of hygiene and scientific 
techniques of cure made available to individual and family demand by a professional corps of doctors 
qualified, and, as it were, recommended by the state. 
The question of the home is intimately linked to questions of nuclear family arrangements, 
property, housing, socialization of children, the creation of sense of belonging and life style 
aspirations, colonization, capitalism, urbanization, rise of the middle class, social hygiene and 
public schooling.  Central to the home is a gendered clean body, orientated around patriarchy 
and socialized to accept and strive for certain (sexual) habits and ways of expressing one’s self 
(identifications) and structured in such a way to maintain the body (parts) in a certain order. 
The home functions like a machine, as Deleuze and Guattari put it in their Anti-Oedipus. What 
we see is the many regimes of power, for Foucault “the political investment of the body and the 
microphysics of power” (Bogue 1989: 105). The home is framed by medical, educational, legal 
and correctional discourses, the convergence of these discursive practices discourses upon the 
body results in what Foucault outlines as discipline and punishment. The home sets in place 
habits that lead the child to accept certain moral disciplinary constructions as facts of nature, as 
something given and taken for granted. As Paul Rabinow (2000: xxiv) states, a “habit leads us 
to accept these constructions as facts of nature or universal categories”. 
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The home not only operates as something taken for granted, but is presented in nostalgic terms, 
something everybody should long and strive for, much like Plato’s ideal - the original idea of 
home we try to approximate. In thinking about homelessness outside the binary of home-
homelessness, we resurface a ‘counter-history’, an untold history, one that introduces 
interruption and suspension of the homogenous manifestation of the (Western middle-class) 
home and patriarchal family as the only possible outcome of history. As such, homelessness is 
part of the Subaltern project, one based on what Foucault (1986: 4) calls “the incidence of 
interruptions” (Foucault 1986: 4). Homelessness is a story of a specific set of problematics 
intimately linked to questions of gender, nationalism and capitalism. 
No longer, according to Foucault, are we talking about the authority to guide and “shepherd 
over the sheep”, the educator, the doctor, the gymnastics teacher (Rabinow 2000: xxxix) but the 
art of governance, setting up necessary relationships to manage the population and ensure 
people police themselves. What is at play is the game of controlling urban space in which home 
is in a subtle way linked to the hospital, school, judiciary and prison, something that began with 
the advent of industrialization. The central mechanism upon which it operates – the ordering of 
things – is the body.  
What needs to be understood with regards to home is that it has become a limit point in our 
thinking, our comprehension: home exists because of a grid of complex relationships and 
exclusions (Foucault 1986), which result in conditions necessary for the appearance of private 
property, of appropriation of land, the patriarchal construction of the body and gender roles 
which emerge as the norm, the rights and the rule of certain sovereign groups, etc. 
Homelessness scrutinized, similar to madness, exposes a form of ordering and rationality that 
makes certain divisions, exclusions and an order of things (Foucault 1994), possible. To think 
about the home is to think about the advent of what Foucault calls bio-politics (Foucault 1997: 
74). Home has become one of the central sites to manage the population of the nation-state.  
The health policy of the nation-state operates upon the bodies of the families: the production of 
sites of normality, disease, deviance and degeneracy. In other words to arrive at the place of the 
home is to understand those complex institutional networks and instruments required to 
construct a general theory of degeneration.  
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The use of the idea of degeneration was evident during Freud’s life, for example used by the 
French doctor Bénédict Morel who believed that some groups of people were degenerating, and 
taking society backwards in terms of evolution. In this regard it is useful to ask, as does 
Catriona Macleod (2010) why, even with proof to the opposite, does the storyline of the 
negative consequences of teenage pregnancy, abortion and childbearing persist? The emergence 
of the home as a sovereign site of power goes hand in hand with the development of modern 
training techniques which uphold concepts like normality, disease, deviance and degeneracy. 
In this regard consider what Foucault (1997: 225) refers to as the specific technologies of 
government that are responsible for maintaining the borders and boundaries of the social body: 
the public and private domains of the social body, what constitutes inside and outside, internal 
and foreign, good and bad, the attempt to maintain social hygiene of the nation state 
(homeland). The home both protects and invades the body; it is the primary site for the 
management of the body, second only to the prison.  
To be born into a home, to play with Foucault’s terminology, is to invite inspection, confession, 
the regularization and normalization of bodily movement and gesture, the acceptance of certain 
disciplinary regimes of the body. This ‘invasion’, socialization, or in Freudian terms, the 
Oedipal regime imposes discipline, the language of the naming father on the body and 
technologies of the nation state. This occurs via signifying practices that demarcate a specific 
sense of a gendered self and outline habits/procedures that the body is expected to subscribe to 
so as to maintain bodily coordination and the overall operation of the home.  The individual 
extends the jurisdiction of the state ( by transforming individuals into subjects of the home 
rule). Following Foucault's elaboration of the judicial model of inquiry we can speak of the 
home as one of those forms of power-knowledge linked to a system of control, exclusion and 
punishment, as well as measurement, inquiry and examination. When the body is no longer in 
conformity with home-rule, when it develops bad habits that disrupt the social organism of 
home, land and property rights, then the body must be further and more forcibly disciplined, 
punished and re-trained.  
Home has become one of the central sites to manage the population, nation-state. In this regard 
consider what Foucault (1997: 53) refers to as the onanist: 
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A completely new figure in the eighteenth century. It appears in connection with the new relations 
between sexuality and family organisation, with the new position of the child at the centre of the parental 
group, with the importance given to the body and to health. The appearance of the sexual body of the 
child. 
By extending the Foucaultian analogy, we are offering the home as a kind of prison. This 
supposition is further supported by Foucault (1979: 228) who asks if it is “surprising that 
prisons resemble factories, schools, barracks, hospitals, which all resemble prisons?”  As with a 
prison the aim is to educate or re-educate the body and create good habits, or simply create a 
numbed body. These practices of bodily imprisonment operate both in and outside the prison, 
they start with the home in which we find ourselves prisoners; a training ground in which we 
are inducted in limit setting and exclusion, which we practice without knowing it. The body 
needs to be taught obedience. In other words, this body needs to be colonized so that s/he 
becomes the person driving his or her own subjection and imprisonment.  The interiority of the 
body becomes an acquiescent surface for the effects of disciplinary power and nationalist 
identifications. As Foucault (1998: 203) puts it:  
He inscribes in himself the power relation which he simultaneously plays both roles; he becomes the 
principle of his own subjection. 
Another way of framing the above is to speak of the authority of the parents and the larger 
authority of normativity that is enacted in popular culture, the home, the school, etc. as a form 
of Panopticism (Foucault 1979: 228). The young child is watched over and this experience is 
internalized. With the Panoptic tower, according to Foucault (1979: 195), “inspection functions 
ceaselessly. It is a segmented, immobile, frozen space. Each individual is fixed in his place.” 
Panopticism extends Freud’s concept of the superego. The superego is a judiciary-machine that 
brings together different discourses – legal, moral, educational, medical. The child undergoes 
surveillance supported by a process of constant self monitoring and confession. Moreover the 
home has elements of the old and modern regimes of power. Like the old regimes, there is the 
exercise of power over life, but at the same time it supports the operations of modern regimes 
of power, bio-power, procedures, and technologies of self, regulating and determining the 
habits of the body.  
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These habits produce a habituate that connects the body and the nation. They function as 
regulatory controls: a bio-politics. Simply put, you are an African male, you cannot love men 
through the expression of sexual pleasure, or else you will be excommunicated. You are a 
mother, you cannot sell sex, or else you will be excommunicated from the categorization of 
woman and deemed to be outside the law, without protection of the state but in need of rescue. 
However, power is not fixed and enables those subjected, like the sex worker, to speak back. In 
this regard sex work can sometimes function as a site of rebellion against restricted roles placed 
onto women and act as a site of independence from home rule
159
. It is not for nothing that sex 
workers are called “home breakers” in many parts of Africa. They disrupt the home, not 
because the husband sleeps with the sex worker - this is often what ironically keeps the 
marriage together - but because they promote independent and powerful women no longer 
dependent on men, as well as community living arrangements for women.   
The home is a produced space which speaks of larger production processes. In such a way, in 
being at home the subject is in effect accepting and internalising the larger production of 
national and patriarchal processes, the machinery operating upon their bodies which they are 
often not even aware of. As Marxism has taught us, the home can be seen to exist within a grid 
of complex relationships that condition the appearance of private property, where the Christian, 
bourgeoisie nuclear family is the norm. We can add hetero normative patriarchy. The home 
structures ways of thinking - force of habits that determine how people identify life patterns. It 
determines what they can and cannot think and see, who they distance themselves from and 
socialise with, as well as how these social interactions take place, all leading to particular 
points of view. 
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 For Foucault (1978) power is not fixed and enables those subjected, like the sex worker, to speak back. In 
speaking of power, as outlined in the History of Sexuality, Volume One, Foucault is not referring to a mode of 
subjugation, a group of institutions, and a general system of domination exercised by one group over another. 
Power is not something possessed, or ‘embedded in particular agents of institutions’ but instead what characterizes 
the complex relations among the parts of a particular society – and the interactions amongst individuals in that 
society – as relations of ongoing struggle’ The key application of power to a reading of homelessness is that power 
is a moving substrate of force relations, a tense force field of relations unbalanced, heterogeneous, unstable and 
never united and as such can be subverted. Power for Foucault is the ruse of history. Power, for Foucault, is 
everywhere; it is the dynamic fluid exercise of complex relationships between people and the relations between 
the different systems within society. It is a shifting, never static, site of struggle, dynamic and unstable. To speak 
of power is to speak of a plurality of resistances, for shifting, for example shanty dwellers who claim the right to 
produce architecture without architects thereby subverting rights over who constructs a home. 
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It is interesting to note that the nuclear family, the bedrock of the ideal modern home, emerges 
round about the same time as the study of sociology. This is significant as it is from sociology 
that the now-established concepts of deviance and bad habits come into existence. Emile 
Durkheims put forward a progressive viewpoint of deviance that moves crime and marginality 
away from psychological or biological readings of abnormality. Instead, the ‘deviant’ is 
presented as something society produces and more importantly, a functional necessity and 
integral part of all societies. Moreover, Durkheim even allows for the possibility that what 
functions as deviance today may in fact be an anticipation of future morality (Haralambos and 
Holborn 1991: 585).  
For other sociological theorists, for example, Robert K Merton, deviance is an inability to 
conform, which is said to come about as a result of social pressures, such as achieving social 
success. The homeless, what Merton calls psychotics, pariahs, outcasts, vagrants, vagabonds, 
tramps, chronic drunkards and drug addicts, cannot conform according to this reading, and so 
retreat, rebel or turn to crime as innovative ways of coping with social pressure (Haralambos 
and Holborn 1991: 588-589). They cannot adjust to, and do not accept societal goals and 
institutionalised ways of succeeding. Foucault turns the sociological reading upside down by 
noting that exclusion is central to the attempt to delineate what makes us part of the 
community. A sacrificial or exclusionary perspective, as with the binary home and 
homelessness, holds society together. Quoting Foucault, John Rajchman (1991: 103-105) 
summarises: 
Our twentieth-century problem is not Gemeinschaft: it is identity, the sort of identity shown in the 
spectacular rise of racism and nationalism. With his History of Sexuality, Foucault was working with 
another picture; the Twentieth century is rooted in a very real but singular or specific sort of 
identification and exclusion, central to forms of government the War did not eliminate, and with which 
we are not yet done. The central category was the great complex idea of the norm and normality. ‘It was 
rather a way of identifying us, and of getting us to identify ourselves in such a way as to make us 
governable. It was a ‘singular form of thought’ from which individual and collective experience arose. 
With his analysis of ‘normalization,’ Foucault refined a central theme that runs throughout his reflections 
on community: the problem of exclusion. His histories were directed to those whom a society deprives of 
acceptable discourse, or excludes from its self-definition. ‘Traditional sociology, sociology of the 
Durkheim type presented the problem in this way: how can a society hold individuals together? What is 
the form of the relation, of symbolic or affective communication, that is established among individuals? I 
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was interested by the somewhat opposite problem, or, if you will, by the opposite response to the 
problem, which is: through what system of exclusion, by eliminating whom, by creating what division, 
through what game of negation and rejection, can a society begin to function?’ 
 
Homelessness and Violence: Spatial depictions of constriction 
Homelessness, in works like Discipline and Punish: the Birth of the Prison, can be understood 
as resulting from an act of violence that constricts and appropriates the space of others - of 
other people. So saying, underlying madness, slavery and witch hunts, to use the words of 
Foucault (1994), is “The Order of Things” in which Western reason is used as a way of creating 
division and bracketing out what is categorized as irrational, abnormal, degenerate, sub-species, 
demonic and dangerous. A system of division prompted through a precarious relationship to 
Christianity and patriarchy.  
To think about the home is to think about ‘the order of things’, while to think about 
homelessness, is to think about the history of madness, witches, slavery. The history of the 
order imposed on things would be the history of the home, what Foucault calls the ‘Same’ 
(Foucault 1994: xxiv). The homeless are written out of history. The history of homelessness, 
like the history of madness “…is ‘a history of the other’ of that which, for a given culture, is at 
once interior and foreign, therefore excluded (so as to exorcise the interior danger) but by being 
shut away (in order to reduce its otherness)” (Foucault 1994: xxiv). 
While historians of the Enlightenment would like to represent modern history as a movement 
away from those so-called ‘primitive’ days, the Renaissance and scientific age are the peak 
periods of the Atlantic slave trade, the confinement of people suffering from mental illness and 
the hunting down of witches. This new age of discovery was in part built upon the loss of the 
power of the church due to the plague of the Black Death and catastrophic outbreak of 
pneumonia in 1347 which ravaged Europe and put into question the authority of the church to 
control misfortune. With the emergence of the Renaissance and developments in science, there 
was a weakening of restrictive religion that resulted in a more sceptical, inquiring attitude, 
while, at the same time, the church promoted Aristotle. Bridget Edman (2010: 39) puts it thus: 
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Aristotle, who had a ‘renaissance’ in Christian Europe after Thomas Aquinas in the 13th century, 
philosophically underpinned imperialist discourse, justifying subjugation of all ‘non-European’ people. 
Aristotle justifies slavery. In the 15 century pope Nicolas underscored Aristotelian discourse and gave 
ecclesiastical approval to the Latin monarchs to conquer and govern ‘the rest of the world.’ In Romanus 
Pontifex he undersigned the ‘right’ over all non-Christian people….Romanus Pontifex undersigned their 
sovereign ‘right’ over all non-Christian people. ‘They would present to them a Christian interpretation of 
history…At the end of the meeting, the natives were invited to pledge submission and to convert. If the 
natives failed to accept the truth and politically to become colonized, it was not only legal but also an act 
of faith and religious duty for the colonizers to kill the natives. 
While feudalism begins to lose its power, the master’s use of the body of the other – women, 
slave - as his own labour, remains very much in place. The movement and control of the body 
of the other becomes more firmly entrenched as a property right under the directorship of the 
masters of ‘High Culture’. This new age saw the birth of the author and the advent of so-called 
‘High Cultural’ in which the profession of author/artist/master becomes a noble one, and no 
longer a medieval craft. The master is the one who knows and who is thus positioned to 
instruct ‘the other’ as to their best interests; the master who thinks for and in place of the other. 
On the other hand, the mad, witch and slave are those who speak in foreign tongues, engage in 
unspeakable acts and belong to a dirty, supernatural, forbidden, primitive and disordered world. 
The labour and production of the body of the latter - the slave and wife - is the master’s 
property to lord over. The thoughts and actions of the mad, slave and witch are reduced to non-
sense, irrational and demonic, something needing to be controlled, confined, disciplined, or 
used as justification for their own murder or to put them to work like an animal. 
It is a time period in which the sciences and arts converge in taking up the position of ‘He who 
Knows’ - the rational bourgeois male who can map the world and classify objects due to a 
higher cultured perspective of the world. High culture is presented as distinct from the non-
culture of the slave and the mad. During this period, we see the hunting down of women 
deemed to be witches occurring along a similar timeline to that of slavery and the confinement 
of people suffering from mental illness.  
Around about the same time slaves were being brought to Portugal, Pope Innocent VIII and 
Pope Alexander VI (1492-1503) sanctioned and ordered that witches be hunted. Witch hunts 
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occurred from 1400 to 1800
160
, and, in more concentrated form, between 1550 and 1650
161
. 
Following Brian A. Pavlac (2009) as well as his website with the Ten Common Errors and 
Myths about the Witch Hunts, it is a misrepresentation to present witch hunts as an example of 
medieval Christian cruelty and barbarism as they were conducted by civilized people. He tell us 
that while Christianity set in place the conditions necessary for the witch hunts, no single 
Church was to blame, and many secular governments hunted witches for essentially non-
religious reasons as evidenced by the fact that the most highly-educated, literate, urban elites 
conducted most of the hunts. It is estimated that between 50,000 to 200,000 people died as a 
result of witch hunts. The most common form of execution was hanging
162
. 
During the same time period that women were been stigmatised and hunted down as witches, it 
is estimated that 12 million slaves, and probably many more, were exported from Africa to the 
Americas. One can only speculate about the numbers of people deemed mad who might have 
died in mental asylums as a result of ill-treatment and torture during the three centuries of the 
slave trade. No precise record exists. However, it is estimated that, during the 1500’s, more 
than a hundred thousand ‘insane’ people were prosecuted and some burned alive 
(http://laingsociety.org/cetera/timeline.htm). This hatred was supported by men in positions of 
power, for example Pope Innocent XIII’s who gave instructions on how to torture the 'mad' so 
as to rid the Christian world of devils and demons. Another example is the Malleus 
maleficarum, a guide for witch hunters, in 1487, by two Dominican monks, who were 
commissioned by the Roman Catholic Church to publish a book detailing the proper methods to 
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 Ilza Veith (1965), is correct to see an overlapping concern around female sexuality, and it’s so-called excesses 
with witches, hysterics and ‘prostitutes’. 
161
 Pope Paul IV continued these practices which included torture in the 1500 hundreds. Following the historical 
work of Brian Pavlac what can be observed is that in 1602 Henri Boguet conducted numerous trials, condemning 
people to die in prison. In addition Pavlac informs us of the following. Matthew Hopkins (1644-1646) began a 
witch hunt in East Anglia that resulted in the death of about 400. King James VI Stuart (1567-1625) of Scotland/ 
King James I Stuart (1603-1625) of Great Britain wrote the book Demonologie that supported the hunting of 
witches, and the English Witchcraft Law (1604) passed by parliament, was harsher than that of his predecessor, 
and gave great leeway for judges to interpret evidence.  It became the basis for more intensive witch hunts, and 
remained on the books until the 20th Century (http://departments.kings.edu/womens_history/witch). 
162
 Other forms of killing included burning, beheading, drowning, and breaking on the wheel.  
Punishments inflicted upon convicted witches included mutilating, branding, whipping, dunking, locking 
in the stocks, jailing, fining, banishing, or selling into slavery. It warrants noting that similar methods of 
punishment were inflicted on slaves and those with mental illness, though differences occur in the forms 
of punishment, especially with regards to people with mental suffering who were often used in 
experiments and on which more elaborate treatments and/or punishments where tried out 
(http://departments.kings.edu/womens_history/witch). 
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find, arrest, and try witches ( see http://www.essortment.com/malleus-maleficarum-guide-
witch-hunters). 
While many historians present the ending of slavery, witch hunts and the confinement of the 
mad as a new era, when applying Foucault, it is clearly apparent that there was no break in 
history, only a subtle rearrangement of the way violence and othering occurred. In this regard, 
consider the so-called Enlightenment of the 1700s – the so-called ‘bringing of light to places of 
darkness’. Not everyone agreed with those like Kant who thought the Enlightenment was 
enlightening. Goethe thought it was enlightening, but not enough, and he called for ‘mehr 
Licht.’ The 1700s became known as the Age of Reason in which many people began to believe 
that the all-important questions about the world could be answered by reason. The idea that 
reason had all the answers was thought to be revolutionary, but in practice it resulted in new 
and subtle forms of exploitation. With the introduction of the Enlightenment and 
industrialisation we see a shift. While the ‘mad’ and the slave will eventually have their chains 
removed and women will no longer find themselves hanged as witches, we see new subtle 
forms of confinement emerged, for example instead of slavery we have racism; witches become 
‘bad women’ classified as hysterics and whores and he mentally ill undergo medical shock 
treatment, are heavily medicated, etc.  
The concept of race and madness, which entered Western thought as part of the Renaissance 
was solidified during the Age of Enlightenment, the same time that banking gets established 
and we see move towards a new economic order. The result was that the ideological 
classification system of the seventeenth century, essentially an Enlightenment map of the 
world, was both reinforced by - as well as reinforcing - theories of degeneracy and binary 
classification that created practices of exclusion and violent subjugation. 
Moreover, from the 1600s onwards we see the emergence of institutionalised racism via the 
beginnings of what Foucault calls biological racism.  Within this elaboration, the history of 
homelessness forms part of the evolution of racism and bio-politics. The resultant race struggle, 
according to Foucault, is a very specific moment in Western history, namely, the discord 
between the history of sovereignty and the history of race. Race struggle evolves into racism, 
the moment when “racial purity replaces race struggle” and in so doing gives birth to biological 
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racism. State sovereignty thus becomes “the imperative to protect the race” (Foucault 1997: 
81). 
The history of race is a confusing term, as it covers all kinds of struggles undertaken by 
different racial groups in Europe against various sovereign kingdoms. For Foucault (2003), the 
moment of convergence of the history of race struggle and new sites of sovereignty, resulted in 
traditional Western race and class struggles being converted into a form of biological racism. 
The manifestation of the latter is not so much a direct war against another race, but rather a 
more subtle attack, fought out through bio-politics, which takes the form of an attack on the 
‘impure’, the ‘unhygienic’ and the ‘irrational’ by branding them with terms like ‘criminal’163, 
‘unhygienic’, ‘shack dweller’, ‘drug addict’, ‘hysteric’, ‘homeless’, ‘foreigner’, ‘prostitute’, 
‘asylum seeker’, ‘black’, ‘homosexual’ and so on. Giorgio Agamben (1997) in Means without 
End expands this argument by showing how these individuals are placed outside the normal 
juridical order, but, at the same time, they are deemed to be in need of enforcement by the 
military, the police, by psychiatry, or by medical and educational professionals. In 
contemporary terms, this forms part of a more covert attack on ‘impure’ categories, like 
Muslims and sex workers. The underside of the unwanted race/group reappears as a sub-species 
of lives that don’t matter – a death on the African continent or in Iraq does not have the same 
meaning or status as a death in London.  
Reflecting back to Freud we observed the manner in which racism and anti-Semitism 
converged such that the Jew and black converged in the way they were depicted. Post world 
war two this convergence of Jew and black lessoned and new racial categories came about. For 
example in Cape Town we see the characterisation of the poor through the self same categories 
that were applied under apartheid to describe the black population
164
. 
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 When these outsiders are re-educated, as with the prisoner, what is the result? Consider Foucault’s 
comment. “So the question one obviously asks is what does the machine produce, what is that gigantic 
installation used for and what comes out of it? That nothing at all is produced. Society eliminates by 
sending to prison people whom prison breaks up, crushes, physically eliminates, and then once they have 
been broken up, the prison eliminates them by freeing them and sending them back to society; and there, 
their life in prison, the way in which they were treated, the state in which they come out insures that 
society will eliminate them once again. Like a kidney which consumes, destroys, breaks up and then 
rejects, and which consumes in order to eliminate what it has already eliminated” (Simon 1991: 27). 
164
 An example of this is the presentation of the street homeless or street vendor as somebody dangerous, 
somebody beneath the everyday man or woman needing to be confined to the outskirts. Derogatory words, and 
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Common to all the different manifestations of racist discourse is the category of degeneracy, 
the creation of insiders and outsiders, normalisation of one race group and the exclusion of the 
other. No longer witch, now hysteric or (perhaps worse) ‘prostitute’. No longer slave, or black 
or Jew but poor.  Normality becomes a weapon. Foucault (1997) argues that this shift involved 
the splitting of a single race/groups into a super-race, in which the underbelly of the unwanted 
race/group reappears within it as a subspecies of deviants – the mentally ill, Jews, prostitutes, 
hysterics, blacks, and homosexuals – that pose a threat to the pure race. The division into 
human and sub-species enables man to capitalise upon the production of what is classified as 
other, including animals, as flesh to be used, to abuse, to put to work, to treat as objects of 
fornication or simply to eat.  
In a sense, the homeless form a new race. Foucault (2003) in Society must be Defended argues 
that the history of race, in the sense that he uses the term, refers to an attempt by certain groups 
to restrict the strength of royal power and to construct an alternative model to the one of the 
absolute rule of the monarch, namely, the parliamentary democracy. Foucault (2003) tells us 
that bio-politics constitutes a shift from law to norm, from races in the plural to race in the 
singular and away from the emancipating project towards a concern with purity. Foucault 
(2003) and Giorgio Agamben (1997) argue that through these shifts sovereignty was thus able 
to reutilize the race struggle for its own purposes.  State sovereignty thus became the 
imperative in order to protect the race and safeguard its “purity” and (national) identity. Such 
state sovereignty was no longer ruled and constructed by magico-juridical rights, but by 
medico-normalizing technologies, namely, the management and policing of the hygiene of an 
orderly, ideal society. This entailed an elaborate system of record-keeping by those policing the 
boundaries and borders, which resulted in the less-than-ideal been cast out.  
As the less-than-ideal, the homeless get caught up in grids of specification, a process of 
mapping, classifying, contrasting and grouping. Moreover, the homeless, caught up in this 
process, find themselves, by and large, excluded from telling their own stories. A manifestation 
of this in the contemporary world sees the social worker, law enforcement officer, home office 
official and doctor writing the history of the homeless person. So saying, what constitutes 
                                                          
stigmatisation of this group sometimes come from middle class blacks who will use similar words used by the 
apartheid government to describe them, for example, as idiots, backward, not human, and dangerous.  
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homelessness is a contested struggle between two narratives: on the one hand, the history 
constructed by the practitioners who write those medical reports and case notes in an attempt to 
manage and help the homeless; and on the other, the counter history, largely an oral one, that 
the homeless share amongst themselves and with trusted individuals. This elaborate record-
keeping system, which gives people that which they can supposedly call ‘my history’, is a 
means of appropriating their space, and thus of colonization.  
What I am arguing, taking Foucault (2003) as a starting point, is that, if politics is war by other 
means, then any policy of mass expulsion and/or forced assimilation, however disguised, is a 
political strategy as well as a war, and, more specially, a war against the impure and outcast. In 
search then of a new term that can magnify and explain the historical processes outlined above, 
we have Foucault’s notion of biological racism, with its underlying concepts of racial purity 
and hygiene of the homeland, neighbourhood and family, all in “need” of protection by the 
state.  
At the heart of the state is a race – agreed upon identification - that is portrayed as the one true 
race, the ideal, the race that holds power and is entitled to define ‘the norm’, so as to protect the 
homeland against those deviants who pose a threat to its biological heritage. This state-race, or 
race-state, Foucault argues, has acquired access to biological-racist discourses of degeneracy, 
as well as to institutions within the social body which make the discourse of racial struggle 
function as a principle of exclusion and segregation and, ultimately, as a way of normalizing 
society. Simply put, we are talking about identity politics in which the child is put under huge 
pressure to conform to the game of identification, and, in so doing, identify with key 
‘signifiers’ that uphold the pillars of the home. At the same time we are talking about a subtle 
war against the impure. This war results in death, expulsion, assimilation and constriction of 
movement. 
Homelessness has became the shadow side of a sovereignty linked with the shifting parameters 
of capital, the rise of the bourgeoisie, binary division of rationality and madness, as well as the 
re-structuring of racial definitions within Europe, in the context of the rise of the nation-state.  
The management and policing of the hygiene of an orderly society occurs through the creation 
of a new class that can here be referred to as the class of home owners. This comes about 
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through the interaction of various technologies, in particular the coming together of the 
technologies of domination/power with the technologies of self
165
. 
To return to our historical overview and the move from the so-called irrational to rational world 
order, what we see is the development of so-called liberal systems that produce a morality 
based on characteristics such as religious tolerance, disapproval of wars, a favouring of the rise 
of the middle class rather than the monarchy, and the value of commerce and industry. This 
development led to a marked emphasis on education and a move towards individualism. Yet, 
ironically, the freedom and individualism of the ‘mad’, black people, the poor and women was 
not only one step too far for these theories, but, in fact, the putting of these people in their place 
was a prerequisite for this system to function. It was through the drawing of boundaries and 
grids of specification that the new political order could justify and develop more subtle ways of 
confinement and of treating these people as a sub species.  The labels of confinement that 
define and brand the other as ‘abnormal’ and nameless are branded onto the body that as a 
result of this marking become bodies outside the state in need of enforcement.  
When unpacking what could be termed the founding fathers’ statements on sovereignty we see 
an interesting linking of the patriarchy, home, body and property. In this regard, consider the 
work of John Locke and Thomas Hobbes.The philosopher Hobbes (1588-1679) captures the 
essence of the emergence of this so-called new moral and rational world order, a man who 
outlined those who are not sovereign, as nasty and brutish. The sovereign here are those not 
who are not party to the original contract, those above the law who do not recognize any limits 
to their authority, any limits to ‘his’ authority. In these sites of impunity, we can see a 
convergence of capitalism and patriarchy in which certain groups are entitled to exercise their 
powers unconditionally, as they are regarded as the enlightened.  
Locke argued with Robert Filmer's Patriarcha (1968) which claimed that all sovereigns were 
sacred persons, divinely appointed and therefore like fathers given a natural authority over their 
larger family. In 1690, John Locke presented his essay entitled Concerning Human 
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 Foucault speaks of four kinds of technology, each of which can be applied to the way in which the home is 
governed (1997: 225).For example, to take but one form of the technology, sign system, the specific attributes and 
identifications that trace out the essence of the nuclear family, involve a signifying network clustering around the 
signified, 'home, which is constituted as the norm so as to enable individuals to constitute themselves in an 
existence through those identifications.  
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Understanding. It was to have a huge influence on the Enlightenment and became the corner 
stone of liberal democracy. As noted by Radhika Mohanram (1999) the central elements of the 
essay are the Body, Identity and Property. Mohanram (1999) asserts that for Locke, identity is a 
fixed enduring sameness and which is evident through the bodily appearance. Following 
Mohanram (1999) it can be concluded that the body becomes property
166
, the mark of the 
man,
167
 space, while the unmarked person, the other, becomes the property of the white men.  
In summary, by placing Foucault’s reading of Ship of Fools alongside slave ships and witch 
hunting, there is an attempt to develop a spatial understanding of the similar and the divergent 
ways in which both physical and mental spaces get colonised and appropriated, producing 
homelessness at different historical moments. Reading Foucault we are cautioned against 
believing in breaks in history. For example, in the modern arena, we find new ways to play out 
the old game of appropriating space. Further evidence of this is found in the birth of modern 
medicine, which as Foucault points out is a text about space, about language and death, it is 
about a way of seeing, a reductive discourse, that reduces certain people and certain 
human/bodily process to the state of object-hood, sub-species and disease. In this reading, the 
body is central to the birth of the ‘modern man’.  
It is within this space that the body finds itself in relationship to the ‘body experts’ and 
‘masters’ who cast over their all-knowing gaze so as to order the world, and maintain the 
existing hierarchies. It is within this spatiotemporal matrix that the crisis of modernity is staged 
and acted upon through the body. This ‘history’ is a vast and elaborate system of surveillance - 
record keeping, security checks, etc. - to control and monitor the social body so that it complies 
with home rule. In this scenario, bio politics, the power of the state and pastoral care converge 
                                                                                                                                                                                        
166
 In 1704, John Locke dies. He had tried to produce a moral system based on ‘self-evident’ natural laws and had 
argued that where there is no property there can be no justice. Property, in this reading, is the key to all political 
philosophy. According to Locke, God gave everybody reason, so that all people could utilise the world’s resources 
to their best advantage. Everybody owns their own body, so by mixing the body's labour with nature, individuals 
acquire property rights over certain bits of land. Owning more land is God’s way of rewarding the industrious. 
Moreover, as all people are equal, those who are not capable of looking after themselves (essentially those who 
have fallen permanently behind in the pursuit of property) can be assumed to have only themselves to blame. They 
are without consciousness, style and grace of manners and mobility?. In this regard, the poor body, the homeless, 
is presented as being in closer proximity to the brute and animal kingdom, whilst the rich, white body is 
unmarked, invisible. It is well-mannered, a proper identity, an idealised and invisible mobile male body. This lends 
itself to a system of distinction between different sorts of human beings on the basis of their bodies. See 
Mohanram (1999) and http://philosophyfaculty.ucsd.edu/faculty/rarneson/courses/166lockeonpropertynotes.pdf 
 
167
 See Radhika Mohanram (1999) Black Body: Women, colonisation and space. 
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on the body via home care. It is the result of the coming together of the training habits of the 
home, the ideals of the nation-state and pressures of the market. The result is to demand that the 
inhabitants of local spaces belong to a single homogeneous global space, and consume the 
same tastes, habits and ideals.  
 
The eagle and serpent sleep in doorways: on the outside 
Homeless Fleet horses bear me, 
Without fear or dismay,  
Through distant places. 
And whoever sees me knows me, 
And whoever knows me calls me: 
The Homeless man – 
 
No one dares 
To ask me 
Where my home is: 
Perhaps I have never been fettered 
To space and the flying hours, 
Am as free as an eagle!  
 
(Nietzsche, cited in Edman 2010: 53) 
 
The aim of this work is neither to rewrite the politics of family and home, nor to give the 
homeless a history, but, in an imaginative way, to play with the possibilities that becoming 
homeless offers us. As Bridget Edman (2010: 53) states:  
The tropes of home and homelessness, impossible to decode and constantly collapsing into one another, 
exist together in problematic, destabilizing relations. Figurations of home and homelessness are not only 
political signs. They signify both more and less than social. This does not deny their political and 
economic construction (Jameson, 1981), which is constantly underwritten. Co-existence of political, 
socialized and human, psychic homelessness, situated in the margin between conflicting political 
ideologies and cultures...Marginality is not only physical but metaphysical...Young Nietzsche wrote the 
poem Homeless. 
What will emerge in this section, through the application of Foucault, is that while 
homelessness is a history of a specific set of problematic relationships; it is also a way of 
thinking and opening up space. Following Foucault it will be argued that the process of 
thought, thinking, is not to inhabit and give meaning, to categorise; rather being thoughtful is 
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what allows one to step back from this way of acting or reacting. Thinking involves detaching 
oneself from the fixed, and reflects upon that which one can question. This is to think from a 
place of ontological insecurity, homelessness, to refuse any final and singularly beautiful 
interpretation. If Foucault, as well as his friend Deleuze, see thinking as creating, in which 
nothing is produced but the “…nomadic distribution of singular points” (Bogue 1989:79) and 
strategies of both engagement and refusal, then homeless thought becomes an experiment with 
the limits. Both these men displace the designated proper names, shelter, home of Western 
metaphysics and oppose the “despot with his administrative machine” (Deleuze 1997: 148) and 
state apparatus. 
Following Foucault, we can offer homelessness as a contemporary starting point to think about 
society. This is to work within the paradigm of counter-history in which homelessness forms 
part of those untold histories that Foucault unpacks – madness, abnormality, homosexuality, 
etc. - histories that introduce interruption and suspend the homogeneous manifestation of the 
bourgeoisie home, nuclear family and nation-state as the only possible outcome of history.  
Homelessness, as a contemporary starting point, is thus to open up a ‘post-home’, what could 
be called homeless knowledge from above and below, the eagle and serpent. Homeless thought 
unfolds as a strategy of insurrection beneath the homogeneous manifestations of a single 
identity or universalism of the Western home; homelessness in this regard, as part of Gay 
Science in which Nietzsche (1974: 377) states:  
We who are homeless. Among Europeans today there is no lack of those who are entitled to call themselves 
homeless in a distinctive and honourable sense, it is to them that I especially commend my secret wisdom 
and gaya scienza! For their fate is hard, their hopes are uncertain; it is quite a feat to devise some comfort 
for them—but to what avail! We children of the future, how could we be at home in this today! We feel 
disfavour for all ideals that might lead one to feel at home even in this fragile, broken time of transition; as 
for its "realities," we do not believe that they will last. The ice that still supports people today has become 
very thin: the wind that brings the thaw is blowing, we ourselves who are homeless constitute a force that 
breaks open ice and other all too thin "realities" ... 
We who are homeless are too manifold and mixed racially and in our descent, being "modern men," and 
consequently do not feel tempted to participate in the mendacious racial self-admiration and racial 
indecency that parades in Germany today as a sign of a German way of thinking and that is doubly false 
and obscene among the people of the ‘historical sense.’ 
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German is constantly being used nowadays, to advocate nationalism and race hatred and to be able to take 
pleasure in the national scabies of the heart and blood poisoning that now leads the nations of Europe to 
delimit and barricade themselves against each other as if it were a matter of quarantine. For that we are too 
open minded, too malicious, too spoiled, also too well-informed, too "travelled": we far prefer to live on 
mountains, apart.    
Foucault's theoretical advocacy of taking up homeless spaces comes about primarily through 
his encounter with Nietzsche. In advocating a kind of thinking that does not attempt to ground 
itself in some preordained metaphysical truth, as with the fixed terms heterosexuality, 
normality, home, we can hear the echo of the maxim that “every philosophy also conceals a 
philosophy; every opinion is also a hiding-place, every word also a mask” (Nietzsche 
1973:197). Foucault offers no mastery and blue print theory of home to ground subjectivity. 
Instead, he seeks out those placeless places and in so doing, echoes the path trodden by 
Nietzsche and his homeless comrade Bataille.  
In following the call for homelessness, for nomadic thought, Foucault is offering a double 
move, not only theoretical, at the level of thought and method, but also visceral, at the level of 
lived experiences. At the level of theory Foucault subverts that privileged moment of 
individualization in history, those experiences, identifications and productions that Freud 
latches onto in trying to make a name for himself. For Foucault (1998: 205), writing, the 
making of a name for oneself though authorship is an attempt to pin a subject within language, 
it is to play the game of truth in which writing is identified with its own exteriority as it 
attempts to glue description and designation.  
The manner in which authors’ names function is seen to correspond to what is produced, as if 
somehow the author owns her production, property that belongs to her and which she can 
occupy, designate as ‘mine’ and as an essential description of ‘my’ identity and how I take up a 
position in the word. In this regard the thought, concept, production is seen as unique, coming 
from within the person as an intrinsic expression of who this person is, and what is essential 
about them. It is, in the Aristotolian sense, the unfolding core, or fruit, of the person. In contrast 
to this, Foucault writes to have no face (Foucault 1974: 17). He sees his words as writing on the 
sea shore waiting to be washed away by the incoming and outgoing tides. This does not imply 
pessimism about the futility of words or concepts, but a degree of humility. As the feminist 
Terry K Aladjem puts it, with Foucault there is a profound “humility before the complex 
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enclosures of the historical past and the variety of human existence” which “moves on every 
page of his writings, and it is from this that we may learn the most from him” (Aladjem 
1996:284). 
Foucault offers his words as a strategy to engage and think about certain relationships between 
certain concepts, as a tactical tool, one that is in direct conflict with the dominant model of 
authorship. Authorship needs to be disentangled; something Foucault (1998: 205) sets out to 
do. Authorship is linked to the game of property rights, the word standing in for the truth of 
who I am. I am grounded by and to the word, thought, and concept, and therefore need to 
examine my words and the words of others, so as to ensure a conformity and consistency with 
the way I identify the world and the other. Or as Deleuze and Guattari argue the primary 
function of language is not to transmit information or allow communication but to issue 
commands in the form of slogans (Bogue 1989: 136). The game of authorship is one of staking 
a truth claim, in which one assumes correspondence between the word and the speaker, but also 
a belief that in giving something a name, one has authority and ownership over what is 
designated and signified.  Put another way, Foucault, as with Lacan rejects the process of 
identification inherent in the game of authorship.  
Both Lacan and Foucault make space for something that evades representation and allows for 
those spaces, those moments of subjectivity, which cannot be mastered, put into words, named 
and owned. Richard Klein (2000, personal communication) who develops this line of argument 
speaks of making space for sites where there is a fading of the subject, where not all of the 
person can be represented within a signifying chain, the gap, the remainder, what Lacan calls 
object and that which Richard Klein (2006, personal communication) refers to as the atypical 
citizen. With the fading of the subject, we appear and disappear; we are citizen and atypical 
citizen, in and outside the symbolic representations used to represent us.  
What seems to be at stake in the naming game, in identification, is the game of property rights, 
an appropriation of the space of the other through claiming authorship over what is said and 
seen; that is to say my interpretation of reality results in me mapping what can and cannot exist 
at that moment, what is consistent with the chain of simplifiers, what belongs and what does 
not belong. To exist through a set of identifications that not only speak the truth as to who and 
 
 
 
 
221 
 
what I am, but ground me, house my being. What I dis-identify with becomes the site of 
homelessness, which, in an uncanny way, returns to haunt the house of my being.  
What Foucault brings is an understanding of the way the outsider, the ‘other’, is used and how 
the maintenance of these myths are essential to the group’s identity. It is somebody deemed 
outside the home, without access to the rules of home law. The key element in this hatred is the 
feeling of virtue, of self righteousness, in the group. For example, under apartheid many white 
men and women often felt justified in their abuse, torture and killing. There were no sleepless 
nights in much the same way that some black South Africans did not lose much sleep over the 
killing of African refugees and immigrants. As Agamben (1996) puts it, we live in a world in 
which some lives matter and other lives do not matter. We live in a world where the lives that 
don’t matter are reduced to an unwanted subspecies. In fact, here we can include the lives of 
animals. The person or animal is not granted the right to life, there is no sense of ubuntu or 
connection with this other person or animal. They are reduced to flesh, raw meat, an object, 
which is there for the group’s enjoyment and usage. We refuse to see any connection to this 
creature, and feel justified in inflicting pain upon what becomes an 'it.'  
 
A little bit more space please 
In this regard it is interesting to acknowledge that the most renowned religious figures 
(Buddha, Moses, Christ and Mohammed) either had moments where they were homeless, or 
else can be seen as advocating homelessness. They camped at the limits but, unlike Foucault, 
offered a doctrine, except perhaps for Buddha, and gathered a following. The founding of the 
new religious movements followed ex-communication and/or the search to find space to be 
with God and left alone to contemplate the condition of mankind. It involved voluntary 
homelessness, an exile, be it in a cave or desert.  
The Buddha and to a lesser extent, Christ, seem to advocate a homeless existence. In Matthew, 
(8:18) of the Bible, one of the scribes says, “Christ, Master, I will follow you wherever you 
go”. Christ replies, “Foxes have holes and the birds of the air have nests, but the son of Man 
has nowhere to lay his head.” Similarly, upon discovering Enlightenment, the following words 
by the Buddha can be read as the advocating of homelessness. 
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I wandered through the rounds of countless births,  
Seeking but not finding the builder of this house.  
Sorrowful indeed is birth again and again.  
Oh, housebuilder ! You have now been seen.  
You shall build the house no longer.  
All your rafters have been broke,  
Your ridgepole shattered.  
My mind has attained to unconditional freedom.  
Achieved is the end of craving. 
 (Epstein 1996:75) 
Some followers of Buddha and Christ have also taken up a homeless existence or chosen to 
work with and live amongst the homeless, for example, the Christian saint Joseph Labre and 
Mother Teresa. 
In certain Buddhist traditions, part of the daily meditative practice involves walking the 
countryside with begging bowls. Needless to say, this plea for alms by the homeless takes on a 
very different meaning in a contemporary or Western context. In the Buddhist context, 
homelessness can be a means to an end - the end to the craving for attachment. This 
relinquishing of ‘attachments’ leads to a new grammar of thought (or what Buddhist teachers 
refer to as an enlightened state). 
Consider this appeal for non-attachment when in our busy lives we are assailed by appeals like, 
“Can you spare me any change?”, or when we encounter a drunken woman sleeping on a street 
corner. Life on the streets, homelessness, sometimes means the end of the road due to physical 
assault, illness, hypothermia or mental fragmentation. The irony arrives with cases of those 
homeless who believe they are Christ or the Buddha. What is ironic is that like Christ and 
Buddha they roam the streets looking for signs of care in the community. 
Many homeless individuals on the streets of London and elsewhere may yearn to escape a state 
of demand and constant constraint. This contemporary act is consistent with spiritual retreats 
spoken about in different religious texts, when people went into a cave, the desert or 
monasteries; a self-imposed silence.  
 
 
 
 
223 
 
The impulse to carve out a zone at home for prayer or reflection has its roots in ancient cultures, yet 
flourishes today with a new vitality. An intimate domestic sanctuary may be a place to worship, to 
meditate, or simply to be an oasis of calm amid the myriad distractions of contemporary life. More 
than that, it may serve as a refuge, a place to come to terms with the pressures and anxieties of an 
uncertain? world." (Macweeny and Ness 2002:10) 
If Fanon can be said to have offered the homeless a face through innovative clinical 
interventions that engaged the homeless as active agents, as opposed to as passive recipients to 
be acted upon, then Foucault, through a call to ‘Get off your face’ as well as through his own 
faceless existence, can be said to have opened up space for the homeless to move. Foucault’s 
offering, a call for faceless existence, typifies what some street homeless individuals attempt to 
achieve, that is to find spaces where they are left alone, to be, “not forced to live up to the 
expectations of others” (Culshaw 2002, personal communication) and to play by certain rules 
and identification structures. “Becoming homeless is trying to be inside one’s own head, it is a 
protest vote, ‘stop trying to get into my head’ and attempt to escape from having to live up to 
somebody else’s standards” (Culshaw 2002). 
The need for a safe haven or retreat, is something that Foucault seems to have wanted in his 
quest to have no face and re-write himself. This desire to be left alone, escape the demand of 
the other and the forced compromises one has to make, can be seen in our contemporary world 
in the attempt to use the holiday or trip abroad as a means of seeking exile. This need to 
transport oneself to another place, for example the beach or park, to meditate and reflect upon 
things, is found for some by taking to the streets. The streets, for some, are an attempt to be 
transported to another place, a kind of monastery
168
, where one can live alone, and attempt to 
find space. However, the contemporary Western and non-Western homelessness experience, 
for most, does not provide this much sought-after silence or retreat, or fulfil the wish for quiet 
or to be left alone or to escape somebody else’s prescriptions. Instead, the person encounters 
zero tolerance and is subject to threat of arrest, labelled as either mad, bad, sad or a public 
nuisance by laws or anti-social behavioural orders. The person is forced, by law, to move on, 
go to another area or go into a hostel.  
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 The origin of the word monastery, monos, means alone. 
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Another picture of homelessness that speaks to another dimension of the life of Foucault is that 
of the drunken, intoxicated orgy of the senses and pushing of the limits. This intoxicated 
existence categorised as tragic can also be seen as a celebratory break with identity and fixed 
prescriptions, and, even if only momentarily, an attempt at retreat. This breaking down of the 
narrow limits of identity introduces homelessness as a state of ecstasy and rapture, "...a way of 
challenging everything, of putting everything into question without permissible rest, that turns 
everything within us like a violent wind." (Bataille 1954:5) 
This project of rapture and challenge is what Foucault and Bataille, working within a 
Nietzschean tradition, advocate. As Bataille (1954: 3, 5) states: 
Dogmatic presuppositions have provided experience with undue limits: he who already knows 
cannot go beyond a known horizon. I wanted experience to lead where it would, not to lead it to 
some end point given in advance. And I say at once that it leads to no harbour (but to a place of 
bewilderment, of nonsense). I wanted non-knowledge to be its principle. The unknown on the 
contrary leaves one cold, does not elicit our love until it overturns everything within us like a violent 
wind. In the same way, the unsettling images and the middle terms to which poetic emotion has 
recourse touch us easily. If poetry introduces the strange, it does so by means of the familiar. The 
poetic is the familiar dissolving into the strange and ourselves with it. 
Homelessness, as advocated here, is a passage to a state of anonymity, the only ‘home’ being 
the experience of transgression, being beyond a limit. The homeless break free of customary 
identifications and prohibitions, opening up new spaces and possibilities, due to the manner in 
which they take experience to the limit. In this regard, the homeless are truly Nietzschean in 
stature, violently obliterating and breaking the rules of the games and our fictions of the world, 
our imprisoned realities. The homeless present a refusal to be assimilated, and oppose 
integration into an administered world or one-dimensional society. Homelessness becomes a 
voyage, the only home being the experience of being beyond a limit, existence laid bare. 
Homelessness folds into being the unbound and unlimited, from the Greek Apeiron
169
, it is 
something transcendental, and incomprehensible.  
                                                                                                                                                                                        
169
 The concept of “Apeiron” is found in the work of Anaximander who proposed that the primal substance of 
which everything is modelled is an unlimited and unbounded substance, an underlying changeless, unbound and 
unlimited essence. 
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Within this perception, the homeless are those, like Foucault, living 'on the edge', the margins 
of society, walking a tight rope, indulging in excess, in which the 'eagle' and ‘serpent’ sleep 
down together in the city doorways. In this context, we observe people playing with different 
forms of intoxication, which in turn bring about different (trance-like) states of consciousness 
and loss of bodily control: the cult of Bacchus/Dionysus, half man and bull, a state of divine 
intoxication. It is a savage and poetic cult in opposition to prudence. The Dionysian ritual 
endeavours to produce enthusiasm, that giddy state of being inspired and possessed (from the 
Greek entheos), through having the divine enter one’s being. It is a pursuit that involves an act 
of courage and embrace of all, even if there is a savage sacrifice of what is considered to be 
reason. This Dionysian abandonment, perhaps Faustian pact, involves an uninhibited 
exploration and transgression of limits. The homeless are at home in no-man’s land, what 
Foucault calls the ‘space of untamed exteriority’ (Miller 1994: 30). 
Homelessness can be seen as “...a critique of dogmatic servitude.” (Bataille 1954:3) There is a 
courage and conviction to indulge in moments of excess, to be taken to the limits and beyond, 
through what Foucault calls the systematic effacement of own subjectivity. This Dionysian 
becoming, overcome with spirit intoxication, is a passage from self to anonymity through 
abating the burden of thought. Singing the dance of the ‘Overman’, there is an attempt at that 
which is non-human - the will to power – which is in opposition to the identification of man 
with him/herself. In the spirit of Nietzsche, it is to 'smash' the image of the man we have 
become accustomed to and identified with.  In seeking a homeless position, Foucault offers a 
dancing body in the place of body acted upon and made to be useful, the body of instrumental 
reason. In the language of Alphonso Lingis and Nietzsche this dancing is a movement playing 
across the lips, throat, trunk, arms, legs, gestures, a passage from self to anonymity, dissolving 
the ego in voluptuousness and frenzy. 
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Conclusion 
Since the philosophical first must always already contain everything, spirit confiscates what is 
unlike itself and makes it the same, its property. Spirit inventories it. Nothing may slip through the 
net. The principle must guarantee completeness.(Adorno 1982:9) 
For the postmodern thinker ‘God is dead’: there is no ultimate code to be cracked open or great 
revelation of the truth corresponding with some ideal form. In fact, for Nietzsche every 
interpretation conceals as much as it reveals, since the intolerable can only appear as veiled, 
masked and each mask masks another mask. What is left, so-called knowledge, is a fictitious 
understanding, covering over everything strange, uncanny, a forced coherence which offers 
itself as a site of guarantee and which attempts to bring things under our control. In summary, 
knowledge is subjection, a discourse of mastery that attempts to assimilate, moderate, simplify 
and create correspondence by reducing all phenomena to identical cases.   
Edman (2010: 225) summaries: 
Post-colonials try to clear a liveable space in the homelessness of ruined depopulated landscapes. 
They are ‘swept up’ on the narrow cusp of non-existent present coloniality, that is not terminated 
and postcoloniality that has not begun.  
Foucault and Fanon's Europe, was an ambivalent Europe, in conflict with its own 
contradictions, a collection of nation-states propelled forward by modernity but also united and 
divided by the rallying call for traditional values and identification with nostalgic ideals. While 
it was still a Europe premised on a correspondence between land, territory and citizenship, it 
was also a Europe in which a postcolonial arena could begin to be prophesied. Theirs was a 
world order in which the West, men and whites could no longer be regarded as the 
unquestionable centre of the world, but, and despite the rise of the Gay Rights Movement, the 
order of things was still unquestionably heterosexual, male and aspirantly middle-class.  
For Foucault to accept the definition of ‘gay’ is to work within a binary heterosexual and 
homosexual, those inside the ontological home and outside the home - the homeless and the 
faceless. Foucault refused to have the pleasures, sexual expressions, intense joys, friendships 
and love of men restricted to this “…system of constraints” (Foucault 1997: 147). He rejected 
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this binary, one in which homosexuality
170
 supplements and stabilises the definition of 
heterosexuality. Sexuality, for Foucault, was not a fatality, but a possibility for creative life. 
(Foucault 1997: 163) For Foucault the challenge is not to treat homosexuality as an occasion of 
arrival, an articulation of the secret truth of our desires, but rather to use this kind of 
relationship to invent and achieve a multiplicity of types of relations thereby constructing other 
sites and forms of pleasure, relationships, coexistences, attachments, loves and intensities 
(Halperin 1995: 78). 
Foucault arrives at this position through a sustained critique of the kinds of identification and 
practices of exclusion that are central to the nation-state, and forms of government that these 
nation-states took on.  In exposing the game of identification Foucault re-frames the home and 
introduces a series of gaps which disrupt the correspondence between familiarity, the home and 
nation.  In other words: the One of Guarantee = familiarity = home = nation. Foucault makes 
the home something uncanny.  
Home/homeland are intertwined within the body-politics of nationhood and the de-
naturalisation of citizens (outside the home/homeland). The body becomes a surface to be 
written upon, trained and disciplined. To be part of the social body/bond involves the 
destruction of the physical body and the internalisation of symbolic order, that is, the 
body/discourse of the Other as narrated by the master. This is to make the physical body, the 
materiality of the person, a symbolic body - an internalisation of the habits of the home and 
homeland thereby forging a social bond. The person exists as a social being at the expense of 
her actual being.  
The history of home and the homeless is what Foucault calls ‘a history of bodies’, a body 
condemned to subjection, a political investment of the body bound up in complex relations, 
with economic use; a body that becomes useful only if it is a productive body and a subjected 
body that knows its place, and which does not move outside that space. The home supports the 
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 Fanon was clearly in favour of identity politics as a way of challenging hegemony. Foucault’s position is more 
complex. Foucault supported the struggle against oppression undertaken by the gay Liberation Movement, and 
validated the laboratories of 'sexual experimentation’ including the overdose of pleasure. Yet, at the same time, he 
refused to limit himself by defining himself as gay or Homosexual. He did not want to discover his so-called true 
self, homosexuality, but wanted to 'create a gay life. To become.' (Foucault1997: 163). For Foucault, it is better to 
ask one’s self: “What relationships, through homosexuality, can be established, invented, multiplied, and 
modulated? The problem is not to discover in one’s self a truth of one's sex, but rather to use one's sexuality 
henceforth to arrive at a multiplicity of relationships” (Foucault 1997: 135) 
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operations of modern regimes of power, bio-power, procedures and technologies of self, 
regulating and determining the habits of the body. Thus habituating the connections between 
the body and the nation, they function as regulatory controls: a bio-politics. Simply put, certain 
women, races and acts of so-called irrationality and pleasure result in excommunication from 
the homeland.   
The globalization of the modern home following the logic of capital arrangements is to situate 
private property as not only a cause but also a consequence of alienated labour. In addition to 
this, which Foucault points to, we can see private property as both the cause and consequence 
of bio-politics. In other words, to read the state of homelessness we need to place Foucault 
alongside Marx and Fanon, bio politics (ownership over the construction of the body) 
alongside land and property (ownership over the means and modes of production). Following 
Marx and Oliver’s (2004), we can argue that people must be returned from religion, the family, 
the state and home. Adding Fanon and Foucault we can argue that people must be returned to 
their bodies, to themselves, through opening up spaces in which the person can be other than 
what they are or, as Biko (2000) and Fanon advocate, strategically use (black) body 
consciousness as a challenge to oppression.  
The central tenet in the work of Foucault and Fanon is a body that can move and experiment, to 
be other than what is imposed upon it. For Foucault and Deleuze this can be depicted as a fold 
within a fold that refuses the ordering of things, something that continually unfolds, opening up 
different spaces where people can transcend that which writes them and appropriates their 
bodies as flesh to be scripted. This space is not a state of self consciousness as it would be for 
Marx. On the contrary, as outlined in one of Foucault's earliest texts Dream, Imagination and 
Existence it is a space which refuses symbolic inscription (Foucault 1994). It is a space which 
side steps questions of self consciousness and identification, spaces in which the person can 
refuse any self and no longer needs to remain within the game of identification. Without space 
into which one can physically or mentally retreat, like the dream, there is in Georg Lukac's 
(1967) terminology a “reification” of space, the atomization of being and the transfixion to a 
one-dimensional reality or man, as Herbert Marcuse (1964) put it.  
Bodily displacement and displacement from one’s sense of home, often go hand-in-
hand, as the notion of a retreat into ‘my space’ is closed down, and replaced with a non-
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space, a placeless place, state of double-bind, erasure. A history of home and homeless 
can be seen to trace out the process of appropriation of body through attempting to 
colonize both the mental and physical space of the person as property
171
.  Both Fanon 
and Foucault systematically outline the production of placeless places, impossible exits, 
in different ways.  
Foucault also moves us in the direction of those intellectual and political figures who camp at 
the limit, what Said calls the ‘secular critics’ (Said 2000:218). For Edward Said homelessness, 
what he calls exile, is a politics of refusal, the secular border intellect without a home. Said 
directly follows in Adorno's footsteps and indirectly draws upon the work of Foucault. 
Homelessness, in this formulation, becomes a form of critical awareness that renders one an 
adversary not only to nationalism, but also to the administered world.    
Using Nietzsche
172
, Foucault presents thinking, and here he includes history, as an encounter 
with the intolerable. Home/homelessness is the historical analysis of the limits imposed on us 
and an experiment with the possibility of going beyond the taken-for- granted. In taking heed 
of Nietzsche's situating of man as homeless, Foucault calls for homelessness. He does not 
trying to find a shelter or make any appeal to the Enlightenment or rational project. Instead, he 
celebrates this infliction of homelessness and our inability to distinguish rationality and 
irrationality and pin point our starting points. In so doing, he makes the very process of 
perception something unstable and introduces the category of the uncanny.  
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 The example par excellence of this is globalisation in which we are bombarded with messages and have new 
communication technologies imposed upon us resulting in us needing information technology experts to organise 
and control this information. The result of this impingement is one in which local space is consumed by global 
narratives that demand we consume a sense of belonging through buying into certain life styles. New information 
technologies impose the global upon the local, thereby attempting to ensure the ritualized consumption of the 
same market goods (gastronomical, sporting, and musical) throughout the planet. The impositions of these new 
technologies of self create very specific bodily habits which are then normalised. 
 
172
 The backdrop to the work of Foucault is Nietzsche. Nietzsche’s attack of Western civilizations use of 
rationality
172
, Christian morality and Apollonian order breaks a spell; “the innermost kernel of things is laid open” 
(Wicks 2010: 28). Logical order is seen as illusionary an attempt to bring things under control, It springs from the 
desire to reduce all phenomena to identical cases, a fictions ordering of things. Nietzsche’s rejection is a form of 
intellectual homelessness, but interestingly, it is followed by “moving gypsy-like from place to place…much like 
the Jewish people had lived for centuries, Nietzsche had no proper homeland during the prime of his life, living in 
the places he stayed as much of an alien as he was a citizen” (Wicks 2010: 153). Moreover, for him any home 
contains “ineradicably alien aspects”’ (Wicks 2010: 73).   
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Foucault extends the work of Freud. This move, which alludes to the estranged and haunted 
state of nationhood dwelling, becomes Foucault's starting point. By introducing the concept of 
the uncanny into the body of Western thought, Freud re-framed the familiar as the stranger 
within the home. Foucault takes this to its limit point by making the body of history of Western 
thought something uncanny. Foucault refuses to lead us back home; instead we are forced to 
exist on the outside. What he does offer is a set of cautions and questions, conceptual tools or 
lenses that enable one to resist playing by the rules of Western reason and its games of truth. In 
other words, Western reason and history can no longer function as the safe starting point. At the 
same time, he refuses to flip the script and privilege the underside of domination, as there is for 
him, no outside of power.   
For Foucault, as with Lacan, it is about taking up a position in the world in which one does not 
assume a discourse of master
173
. Moreover, as with Deleuze and Guattari, Foucault writes 
within the space of the Nietzschean Overman. For Foucault the challenge is to practice a 
stylistics of the self so as to “cultivate that part of oneself that leads beyond oneself, that 
transcend oneself: it is to elaborate the strategic possibilities of what is the most impersonal 
dimension of personal life – namely, the capacity to 'realise oneself' by becoming other than 
what one is (Halperin 1995:76) For Foucault one produces, writes, in order to become other 
than what one is. This is an active engagement, and becoming something other than what one 
takes oneself to be, is to conceive of man without a master plan.  
As with Adorno
174
 and Lacan, for Foucault there is an active refusal of identification, a refusal 
to return to any philosophical first that attempts to subsume difference. It is a strategy of 
insurrection beneath the homogeneous manifestations of a single identity, citizenship or 
                                                                                                                                                                                        
173
 It is this humility, what Richard Klein (2000) refers to as taking one’s bearings on lack, on not knowing, that 
offers us a clearing of the ground, as it opens up space for what is not known and predetermined. What Richard 
Klein (2000) refers to as taking one’s bearings on a lack, on not knowing, to be without essence and identification, 
is an ethical attempt to offer what (and who) is other, a space to be heard, to create the possibility of a thought not 
already thought.   
174 The critical theorist whose work comes closest to Foucault is that of Adorno. Adorno was of the opinion that 
nationalism is rooted in place. In opposition to this Adorno wants us to cultivate a state of awareness which is 
modelled upon rootlessness and the restless character of exile as this critical awareness enables one to oppose both 
the nationalism and the administered world (Cheng 1999:79-80). For Adorno 'it is part of our morality not to be at 
home in one's home'. Moreover, in ‘Heine the Wound’ (“Die Wunde Heine’), Adorno points out that "today, the 
fate Heine, suffered has literally become the common fate: homelessness has been inflicted on everyone" (Cheng 
1999: 73). 
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universalism of the Western home. To offer homelessness as the atypical citizen is a way of 
thinking is to situate moments in which the project of Foucault and Adorno share a common 
concern, the disruption of what Adorno refers to as ‘identity thinking.’ It is the creation of sites 
of refusal, like Adorno's depiction of art; the disruptive effect of the art object’s refusal to be of 
use value.  non-identity becomes a guiding principle, a state of exile that cannot be assimilated 
into the host language, into home. In bringing Adorno and Lacan
175
 together, Sinkwan Cheng 
(1999) notes a common theme, what she refers to as a kind of separation, what she calls exile-
without-reserve: to dispossess and undo the idea of homeland in such a way that reveals 
homeland to be always already dispossessed; to cross the frontier and undergo a separation and 
defamiliarization of the family of people to whom one is supposed to belong (Cheng 1999: 93). 
In Adorno and Foucault's terms, homelessness becomes a form of criticism with regard to a 
society where everything is forced to be useful, and offers a critique of nationalism which is 
built on rendering the body both useful and knowable. As Irene Gedalof (2003) points out, it is 
the refusal to the make a body useful so as to reproduce a particular version of gender, 
community and belonging and citizenship. (Gedalof 2003:93) Against the prevailing dominant 
mode of thought (identity thinking) and operations of state upon the body (making useful and 
gendering bodies and classing and cultural bodies) that constantly subsume the heterogeneous 
under the heading of sameness, homelessness “makes room for the non-identical and the 
opaque.” The homeless are perhaps one of the last “refuges where real experience of the non-
identical, is still possible.” (Cheng 1999::175) They are a site of struggle that contest the 
history of the taken-for-granted and privileged assumptions that organize, in advance, our 
understanding of the world.  
The other side of homelessness, elaborated in the first two sections of this work, forced as 
opposed to chosen homelessness, exposes the transformation of power into new sites of right 
and power, in which the homeland, home and private property have become the norm. In this 
                                                                                                                                                                                        
175
 To call for homelessness is not only to understand the way home has functioned as a ‘given’, a ‘truth-claim’, in 
which the home is an ‘essential’ part of the ‘grand narratives’, but also to come to terms with the way in which 
certain modes of thinking function as master narratives. What Lacan calls ‘the discourse of the master’ can also be 
called the discourse of the home, thinking that forces a linking of signifiers so as to produce a chain of meaning. It 
is a filling in of the gaps, those sites of non-representation that disrupt, refuse and transcend any attempt to 
represent everything. Foucault, alongside Lacan, makes space and allows for the possibility of non-representation 
and, in fact, builds an ethical structure around non-representation and homelessness. In these uncanny moments, 
Foucault’ work overlaps Lacanian analysis in that they produce effects that make the familiar strange, by making 
all the sites of homecoming something uncanny.   
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reading, it becomes the imperative of the state to protect the integrity, superiority and the purity 
of these mythical spaces, of what is normal that is the Western home, against the infiltration of 
foreigners and deviants from within and without. One way to heal oneself, to remove the curse 
of difference and the illness of being foreigners (refugees, Muslims) and deviants (homeless, 
sex workers, homosexual), is to assimilate.  
Homelessness in this reading is a strategy to reject, to reverse the process of normalisation, a 
refusal to engage in set symbolic repetitions and be of use value. Homelessness, to apply 
Deleuze and Foucault's depiction of the fold within a fold, is always open, never finally 
delimited yet constantly traversed within the unfolding of a space in which it is once more 
possible to think. Within these incomplete histories, bodies which are forever becoming male, 
female, black or white, heterosexual, but never arriving. They are always written with what is 
negated, the homeless ‘camp on the limit’, and clutching to difference thereby, as Said puts it, 
“jealously insisting on his or her right to refuse to belong” (Said 1990: 363). 
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CHAPTER SIX 
THE SCENE OF IDENTIFICATIONS OR THE OTHER/WORLD OF 
EXCESS 
 
The shadow of the sex worker 
...the problem of experiences on the edge, those forms of experience that instead of being 
considered central, of being positively valued in society, are deemed to be a borderline experiences 
which puts into question what is usually considered acceptable (Foucault 1997:152). 
The shadow of the objectified and marked body frames the space within which Freud, Fanon 
and Foucault write. The marked body is hyper-visible while the human face, the person living 
inside the body, is invisible and erased.  Simply put, the stereotype of stigma is all that is seen, 
while the particularity of the person is unknown. The body is shamed and treated as a universal 
category in which the person is seen to represent all who are assumed to share the same 
markings. This experience, notes Klein (2012, personal communication), is similar to the 
experience of psychosis:  
She is experiencing being robbed of a sense of self. Her body in the mirror, due to the hostile gaze 
of the Other, keeps changing. There is a disconnection between the property of her vision and 
intrusive gaze of the Other. It’s not possible for her to have any belief in the image in front of her, 
the identifications with her body in the mirror, as her specular image becomes a foreign and invasive 
image. Between image and identity there is no link. She is now linked as an object to the gaze of the 
Other. Her body becomes a double to her, something alien. When it is perceived it will not be 
experienced as an ego, body. The double is non-ego.  
Against this objectification, fixity and shaming, I have shown how Freud, Fanon and Foucault 
develop an ethical orientation or practice that opens up space for the body to question, dream, 
desire and play. The commitment to opening up space in the face of erasure is the point at 
which politics, theory and practice converge in the life and work of Freud, Fanon and Foucault. 
When cleared of clutter, impingement, a body in motion comes into being, one that speaks, 
dreams, desires, plays and thinks and has sex. It is not an atomized individual and 
deterritorialized body but a body-memory that extends beyond personalized and biographical 
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attributes of identity, a body that is always in the process of becoming or performance.  
Put another way, for many destitute people, surviving on the streets of urban Afrikan ghettos is 
something that brings pride, self-respect and street credibility. While many harshly judge the 
selling of drugs, stealing, hustling or exchange of sex for money, when this enables a person 
not only to get through the day – something that cannot be taken for granted and which is often 
a monumental struggle – but also to put food on the table for their children, the picture of what 
constitutes choice, agency, work and respectability becomes more complicated. They have in 
effect moved from the negative deterritorialized body,without a face and nomadic; and have 
inaugurated another signifying system of becoming, a voice detached from the despotic centre. 
Many sex workers in Afrika reclaim their bodies and find agency through sex work.  
By way of example, while working with sex workers what was ensured was that a community 
development and partnership approach was adopted. This included advocacy, in this case, sex 
worker led advocacy that challenged national strategic plans and laws that directly impacted 
upon sex workers. Another community approach used was social planning and networking 
which aimed to mobilize resources and partnerships to promote joint initiatives. The third 
community work approach used was neighbourhood development, being the mobilization of a 
group of people (in this case, sex workers) around shared concerns. The banner uniting the 
different programmes of action was participation through education, specifically focussing on 
the transfer of skills. 
In reality this work, briefly stated, involved consulting the service users on what services they 
wanted, ensuring service user satisfaction surveys were undertaken and, most importantly, 
enabling a transfer of skills so that the sex workers could run the programmes themselves. This 
involved the development of a peer education programme which was later reframed by the 
concept of human rights defence. By placing peer educators (called human rights defenders) at 
the forefront of outreach, research and advocacy interventions, the aim was to empower sex 
workers with skills so as to enhance their capacity to speak on their own behalf, feel more 
confident to address human rights concerns and make informed choices, including with regards 
their health needs. This became the strategic objective. It is an approach that further emphasis 
collaborative work and creates broad support for different campaigns and the use of public 
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events to raise awareness around the concerns and challenges that sex workers face from civil 
society. At the centre of these partnerships, sex worker groups became the dominant voice.  
On a personal note of satisfaction with regard to the above, I note the following. Firstly, within 
the organisation I was based, there was a move towards a situation in which the staff 
composition was radically transformed to include sex work staff representation at all levels, 
including management level (through Board representation). The majority of the staff were sex 
workers and most of the programme activities the organization ran were identified by sex 
workers, as well as run by them. In addition to this, sex worker led alliances, run by sex work 
organizations or movements, were established in Botswana, Nigeria, Namibia, South Africa, 
Mozambique, Zimbabwe, Kenya and Uganda.  
What is noteworthy is that, despite the attempt to apply theory to a practice, the work of Freud, 
Fanon and, to a lesser extent, Foucault, stumbles at the point of intersection with female 
sexuality. This is interesting as the work of all three men cross over most markedly into the 
field of sexualit, this being a space they attempt to reclaim. However, in so doing, they risk 
leaving female sexuality on the outside. It is arguably within the space of male sexuality that 
they make their boldest claims; and they falter most when approaching or, arguably, ignoring, 
that of the female.  
This assumption is not to ignore a host of rereadings of Freud, Fanon and Foucault. For 
example, Lacan’s concept of jouissance176, repositioning of the phallus177 and engagement with 
female sexuality has allowed for feminist engagement with Freud. Without reproducing yet 
another commentary on the gender problematics within the respective works referred to above, 
I wish to focus on one particular site of sexuality, which is also, arguably, a site of 
homelessness (with respect to physical homelessness and enduring social marginalization): the 
sex worker, who appears as a marginal figure – a kind of footnote – in the work of Freud, 
Fanon and Foucault.  
                                                                                                                                                                                        
176
 Jouissance is made up of those heterogeneous elements and forms of satisfaction that are particular to the 
subject, cannot be shared and which go beyond phallic enjoyment. 
 
177
 Phallic as the signifier of desire is orientated around either having or being the phallus. Traditional relations 
between the sexes (including same sex relationships) is is founded on dialectic of being and having the phallus. 
Meaning at the level of the signified, representation, is phallic unless one goes beyond phallic enjoyment. 
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This chapter will apply the lens of homelessness – homeless in the symbolic sense but also 
sometimes homeless in the material as well – to a particular group of people on the margins, 
being sex workers in Afrika. After an engagement with sex work in Afrika and feminist 
responses to sex work more broadly, Freud, Fanon and Foucault’s ‘footnotes’ will be 
discussed. The chapter ends by offering comments on those who exist in the ‘other/world178’, 
outside of the established and taken-for-granted scenes of ‘normality’. 
Before proceeding, the question may be asked why one should focus on sex workers in a 
discussion on homelessness. Firstly, and quite literally, many sex workers are physically 
without homes and live on the street or move from one insecure accommodation to another, 
especially Afrikan male and transgendered sex workers. Secondly, some homeless people 
exchange sex for money in an ad-hoc manner in order to survive. Thirdly, the mass murder and 
stigmatization of sex workers, as well as the normalization of hate crimes against sex workers 
and the internalization of this violence, results in an erasure of their physical and mental space. 
Lastly, placing sex work alongside the work of Freud, Fanon and Foucault is an interesting way 
of engaging with these theorists’ blind spots around female sexuality.  
 
Sex work and human rights violations in Afrika 
Indifference to the killing of sex workers, alongside a host of other gross human rights 
violations, was a key theme and rallying point at the first-ever, sex worker led, African sex 
worker conference in Johannesburg in 2009
179
. As noted at the conference, sex workers in 
Namibia, Uganda, Kenya and Malawi simply disappear
180
. The ignoring of sex workers’ rights 
                                                                                                                                                                                        
178
 World/scene is a term Richard Klein uses; it comes from Lacan who in turn gets the term from Sartre. Klein is 
using the term world to refer to those excluded from the scene. We could simply use the word other, but I have 
placed world/other together to emphasis the spatial dimension of the process of othering and exclusion of those 
others cast out of the established scene. The scene is a symbolic-imaginary life stage where the drama of the social 
bond and a constituted identification are enacted. What drops outside the scene are abject objects which include 
marginalised speaking beings.  The drama, script, stage is an ordeal with the want to be (lack). The person wants 
certainty and holds onto fictions of reality called normality. Even when these fictions are disrupted the person 
clings to the illusion of normality. This is abnormal, normality will return. The hope is that what constitutes that 
subject, the daily rituals which have an everyday certainty about can once again be engaged in. 
 
179
 See the history of ASWA at www.africansexworkeralliance.org 
 
180 Post conference and in response to these violations various legal actions against the police occurred in South 
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to legal redress following human rights abuse was reported by all nine of the countries 
attending the conference. Consider the following press statement, delivered to the press by a 
delegation of female and male sex workers representing a cross-section of African countries:  
From our government we need law reform and the decriminalization of sex work so that we have 
the spaces to access our rights. We demand rights and not rescue. As 153 sex workers from 9African 
countries: South Africa, Senegal, Zambia, Zimbabwe, Botswana, Malawi, Uganda, Kenya, Namibia 
and Nigeria, today we demand our governments to honour their agreement that every citizen has 
human rights, and give us the rights that we are entitled to as human beings. Your citizens are 
speaking, you have a duty to listen and act. 
 
The challenge that we face as 153 participants from different countries are almost similar. Many of 
us face violence and discrimination on a regular basis. Regardless of which country we are from 
many of us have experienced being raped, verbally, emotional and physical abuse from police, 
clients and community members. There is unfair discrimination from service providers. Sex workers 
are not protected or defended by the law when they are exploited and abused. We demand that these 
violations stop immediately and decisive action is taken against perpetrators. Put your stigma, 
discrimination and judgments aside. Let us work together to ensure that all Africans live equally and 
freely as human beings (www.africansexworkeralliance.org). 
A recent research report on the experiences of sex workers in Afrika (Scorgie, et al, 2011) 
further substantiated the above, reporting a wide range of human rights violations including 
those perpetrated by police and related authorities. Below is a summary of some of the 
findings: 
Sexual violence, perpetrated by police and related authorities, was common across all sites. Some 
SW
181
 (both female and male) had experienced this multiple times, often in the form of gang rape by 
police. Having to bribe the police, “all the time”, was deeply connected with sexual violence. A 
range of people on the fringes of the sex industry take advantage of sex work criminalization by 
extorting money or sex. Clients, according to female SW, commonly ignored their wishes or the 
occurrence of pain. By having paid for sex, clients appeared to feel they had ‘ownership’ of SW and 
                                                          
Africa, Kenya, Mozambique and Uganda. For example in Cape Town the South African Police (SAP) were taken 
to court for unlawful arrests of sex workers - a  detention without trial, refusal to inform  sex workers of their 
rights and failure to keep a record of the case or even open the case. The case went to the High Court and was won 
by SWEAT. For a history of these events see the ASWA and SWEAT website, www.africansexworkeralliance.org 
and www.sweat.org.za 
 
181
 SW refers to sex workers in this passage. 
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objectified them in various ways. SWs described many instances of poor treatment once health 
providers – particularly those in public clinics and hospitals – became aware of their work. For 
many SW in this study, health providers were plainly described as “abusive” or “hostile”: “We are 
despised in the hospitals.”  
A key finding to emerge from research, the 2009 conference and anecdotal information from 
different sex workers, was a sense of their not being at home within their own countries. In 
light of the excessive violence that sex workers experience and not having safe spaces, one of 
the first challenges was to create safe spaces.  
Jackie Nakazibwe (2010, personal communication) who has pioneered the use of creative space 
as a means of giving sex workers space, states that creative space is “a place where sex workers 
can find a voice, both as a sex worker as well as a woman, trans-woman or man, or simply (as 
a) person”. Nakazibwe (2010, personal communication) elaborates on the value of the project, 
which she claims “... helps participants overcome feelings of isolation by building connections 
between participants. Theatre and dance pieces developed in the Creative Space can be 
performed for public audiences to provide a humanized and positive public image of sex 
workers.” Following the establishment of creative space, Nakazibwe (2010) went on to 
establish a drama group, UMZEKELO, the mission of which “is to use performing arts as a 
tool for education and fun by reaching out to different communities as well as sex workers to 
remind them that sex workers are human beings just like anybody and that the issues they face 
are often the issues the community face such as rape, different kinds of Discriminations, HIV 
epidemic, violence from police and health centres.”  
While assisting sex workers set up sex worker led national partnerships in Nigeria, Uganda, 
Kenya, Namibia, Botswana, Zimbabwe and Mozambique, I have undertaken a wide range of 
exploratory visits, met with many sex workers on the ground and thereafter produced reports 
based on what I was told with each visit. What I discovered is that many Afrikan sex workers 
use sex work to overcome homelessness, abuse and patriarchal exploitation, as well as a means 
of gaining material independence. At the same time, many sex workers find themselves having 
to negotiate complex and often violent situations due to the regulation of the sex industry by 
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criminals, and corrupt police officers and politicians
182
.  
What is particularly relevant for this study on homelessness, and especially disturbing, is the 
fact that police officers will come to the homes and remove a sex worker from this sanctuary 
for the express purpose of extorting sex and money. While functioning as the Director of 
SWEAT, I continually heard reports of this from sex workers in Hillbrow, Johannesburg. In 
addition to this, sex workers attending a national sex work conference organised by the Centre 
for the Development of People in Malawi in February 2010 reported not only being removed 
from their homes, but then being gang raped in police cells, often without a condom; and then 
having to pay the police officer to be released.  
While Afrikan sex workers want different things, from what I have been told, I understand the 
shared priorities to be the right and space to exist as a human being, and the right to work in 
safe conditions
183
.  
Sex work becomes a means of obtaining space to exist, independence, employment and, for 
some, even enjoyment. In this regard, it is interesting to read the stories of sex work activists in 
When I dare to be powerful, edited by Zawadi Nyong’o (2010: 95-102) 
So when so-called feminists say that sex workers are victims, that we are being exploited by men, and 
                                                                                                                                                                                        
182
 A significant number of the women I spoke to cited high profile politicians, business men, religious leaders and 
military and police officers as clients. They informed me that some of these clients are the same individuals who 
speak out against sex work during the day but use the services of the sex work at night. My conclusion was that 
within context where sex work is illegal and sex workers are targeted by the police, sex workers are driven 
underground. This was verified by sex workers when the Vice Squad intensified police arrests in the build up the 
FIFA world cup. In response to the ongoing targeting of sex workers, sex workers in Cape Town have organised 
two marches. In the most recent one, 3 March 2012, they marched and chanted “Stop harassing us! Tackle real 
crime!” (www. sweat.org.za).Sisonke, a sex work movement in South Africa and SWEAT have undertaken an 
intensive campaign to tackle this abuse of sex workers and significantly have gained the support of the 
Department of Health especially after it was reported, to the Western Cape Department of Health, that the police 
were interfering with safe sex outreach work.   
 
183
 In addition they desire to make as much money as possible, have access to health care, human rights. For some 
this means advocating for law change, the right to use their bodies as they please, hence the slogan “My Body, My 
Business”. Political activism is taking place to make these demands a reality. For example Kenya has had public 
marches on the 17 December 2011 and a march on the 3 March 2012 to Advocate for access to health care and 
legal services (www. http://africansexworkeralliance.org/content/sex-workers-advocate-access-health-care-and-
legal-services) in which thousands of sex workers came onto the street demanding their rights and setting the tone 
for activism in the rest of Afrika. My understanding of these advocacy demands is that it is in part, informed by 
the historical violence and deception many women suffer of in terms of what men declare they want from them in 
cross gender relationships, and the promises made in order to get what he wants, often simply sex. In the language 
of many Afrikan sex workers, it stems from the right not to feel manipulated and used which is underscored by the 
thinking “why should I give it away for nothing?”  
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that we are not in control of our lives, I tell them some of the times I have felt most powerful in my life, 
have been when I was doing sex work. Whenever I get an opportunity to negotiate the price, protection, 
and choose my client, in that moment, the ball is my court and I have the power. The situation is under 
my control so I don’t feel that I am being taken advantage of by these men...I also believe that many 
women in the feminist movement who are against sex work have been abused by men and that are not 
currently in heterosexual relationships. These women may have been empowered, but they are still 
hurting in their hatred towards men. In their pain, they also judge and hurt other women like us who they 
don’t even understand. It is really sad when women undermine each other because we need to stand 
together...I am very sexually active and I embrace my sexuality, but I don’t want anyone to objectify or 
degrade me...I want my son to respect women, whether they are sex workers or not. That is why I am 
going to tell him that I am or was a sex worker. 
Having worked alongside sex workers in nine African countries over the past five years, I have 
observed that the conditions under which sex work occurs vary vastly, and that both context 
and personal factors play a significant role in how the person experiences the work. It is 
predominately those sex workers who engage in sex worker rights and who possess a sex-
positive consciousness
184
 who regard sex work as a form of independence, feminism and 
LGBTIQ
185
 activism. What stood out in the tales of many of those I listened to, was a sense of 
self-respect due to their achievement in putting their children through school and giving these 
children opportunities they themselves had never had.  
Sex work in Afrika is not without its contradictions. It is a profession that some women can use 
to their advantage. Consider in this regard a letter that Mrs G, who has been in the industry for 
seven years, gave to me to give to other sex workers and to the South African Law Reform 
Commission, which was debating different sex work models at the time. Mrs G was in the 
process of leaving sex work in a brothel and I had been seeing her for one-to-one therapy. She 
had seen women suffering abuse in the industry and becoming addicted to drugs. Mrs G stated 
clearly that she did not use drugs or drink when working. She was leaving sex work having 
                                                                                                                                                                                        
184
 Sex workers in Afrika as a group can be both united and also highly competitive and undermining of each 
other. They are not a homogenous group, as evidenced by a huge range of diversity and complexity within the sex 
industry in Afrika. In addition what sex work means vastly varies from person to person and changes over time. In 
therapeutic groups I ran in different brothels in Cape Town over a six month period, as well as one to one 
psychotherapy sessions, what I discovered was that age, burn out, control over the working environment, living in 
secret and having nobody to talk to, attitudes towards the provision of sex for money, amount of money made and 
abuse experienced, health status, levels of alcohol and drug use, achievement of financial and emotional 
independence all play a key role in how these women and men  experienced sex work. 
 
185
 LGBTIQ stands for lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgendered, intersex and queer.  
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made enough money to buy a house and a car and to put her children through school
186
. She 
shared the following:  
We would like to have equal rights to those people working in other jobs. For example, sick leave, UIF 
(unemployment insurance fund), pregnancy leave, annual leave, bonus. You must recognise sex work as 
a job, like any other job and must treat us equally.  
The biggest challenge working indoors is to remain focused on why you came into the industry, the goals 
you set yourself. Be careful of distraction. It is important to take time off. You(r) body and mind gets 
tired. That is when the girls get problems, when they don’t take time out, when they become isolated and 
only mix with people in the industry. You must take breaks. Go for a swim, mix with other people, do 
everyday things with people outside the industry. Take up a hobby. I do volleyball and kiddies mural. 
Don’t let the industry overtake your life, don’t become isolated. The moments you are isolated then you 
have the same thoughts over and over, going over the day, this can lead to depression as you cannot 
switch off. The biggest difficulty for me was becoming independent. Men are threatened when you can 
stand on your own two feet. Independence is good but it comes with a cost. People think you are too 
strong, intimidating. A lot of men want to be in charge. 
It is important to note that sex work in Afrika varies vastly
187
. Boyce and Isaacs (2010: 
unpublished report) point to a host of diverse considerations that undermine the assumption of 
homogeneity within the Afrikan sex industry. They conclude:  
                                                                                                                                                                                        
186 The build up to this letter was her concern about those women from poor backgrounds who suddenly find they 
are earning more in one day than their parents earned in a month. Some of these women who begin buying 
expensive things they would not have bought before. Soon they found themselves needing more and more money 
to maintain this life style and in the process started working longer and longer hours, using drugs to stay awake 
and even engaging in unsafe sex when offered lots of money. They get lost, isolated and sucked into a narrow 
existing. These women in the Cape Town industry are referred to those who chase the money.  
What I observed in my therapy groups is there are times when some of the women would find great relief in been 
able to say they enjoyed sex, as ‘sex workers are not supposed to enjoy sex’, but would then later contradicted this 
with discussions around ‘perverted clients’ who want you to call them daddy or want you to pretend to be their 
wives. This statement does not off course negate the times that sex with clients is enjoyable but also references 
times when it is not unpleasant and/or disturbing. What I have discovered in working alongside sex workers over 
the past five years is that there are sex workers who want to continue doing sex work as long as they can and 
continue to make good enough money and there are others who want to exit sex work and those in between. 
Moreover attitudes to sex vary and shift.  
 
187
 The experience of those who can make as much as R10000 to R20000 for a few hours of work and who front 
as high-class striptease dancers (often white foreign women in large cities of South Africa) cannot be compared 
with those in Zimbabwe for instance, or with women who stand at the side of the road with a blanket near the port 
in Maputo and who will provide sex for an entire night so as to have something to eat. The rural versus the urban 
sex worker, or a male sex worker doing drugs with a client in a Cape Town club as compared to the young man 
from a Nairobi slum willing to have unsafe sex as he has not eaten for two days, present vastly different 
experiences, despite the shared categorization of sex work. 
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Personal developmental milestones [family background], language, vernacular, cultural and tribal 
affiliations, including inner city and peri-urban influences – and migrant sex work populations -have 
created mini-sub-cultures that often contain specific mores, codes of behaviour, class divisions and 
gender rivalry. This anthropological diversity must be addressed -sensitive to the needs, aspirations and 
participation of all concerned. This in turn can offer important insights into sex workers life experiences 
in a manner that can offer new and significant pathways for addressing social vulnerability, rights, risks, 
HIV prevention and health. 
The boundaries as to who is and is not a sex worker
188
 become even more blurred when we 
include those who engage in stripping, transactional sex or those who have multiple partners 
with fringe benefits.  
As a staff member who wishes to remain anonymous  (2010, personal communication) at 
SWEAT articulated, while the general public focuses on the word ‘sex’, many sex workers say 
that they are interested in the word ‘work’. At the same time, it is clear that it is not 
straightforward as to what the work of a sex worker is. For some clients, the sex worker may be 
a drug partner, while for others, the sex worker will ‘do something the wife will not do’. For 
many, the sex worker is the avenue to a quick ‘blow job’or even an truer expression of sexual 
orientation, such as in the case of a man who has desires for other men and who wishes to 
maintain a closeted existence
189
.  
                                                                                                                                                                                        
188 The definition is even more convoluted when applying self- definition. What emerges are tenuous boundary 
lines, for example a new young man on the gay scene who is ‘kept’, as opposed to a self identified rent boy. Many 
women working in brothels or from the internet will distance themselves from those working on the street and do 
not see themselves in the same way, they are ‘hostesses’, or ‘call girls’ while the women on the street who sells 
cigarettes and sweets but is also willing to provide sex, sees herself as a business woman. Guy De Lancey (2012, 
personal communication) has noted how in Cape Town woman working on the street refer to business as a jump, 
she gets into a car or goes into the bushes and tries to do the business as quickly as possible while in Nigeria a 
women will talk about business as ‘being carried’. She will want to stay in the hotel with the man for the night 
knowing that she will have a place to sleep. The realities have subtle yet marked differences. 
There are self identified sex workers, and those, probably in the majority, who do not identify as sex workers yet 
engage in transactional sex, those who move in and out of the sex industry, those who will do anything, including 
selling sex to survive. There are those who find a safe space to be gay or ‘trans’ through the provision of sex work. 
Marcos Benedetti (2010, personal communication), who has worked extensively with both female and transgender 
sex workers, informed me, that for some transgendered women sex work is the only space they can exist and be 
accepted. 
 
189 While working at SWEAT and also with ASWA, I have repeatedly heard many Afrikan sex workers speak of 
being sex therapists, social workers, of comforting the lonely or enabling men in society to maintain their split 
realities. I have even heard sex workers, noted in two of the therapy groups I was running in brothels in Cape 
Town, speak about inhibiting male rape, a position that does not sit comfortably within different feminist readings, 
both those for and against sex work.  
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When offering sex workers space to speak, be it through blogs (see for example, the SWEAT 
and ASWA websites) or the media, what has stood out as a consistent theme in their writing 
and interviews is the relationship between sex work and marriage. Many sex workers will 
report having been told that, if it were not for them, a marriage would have fallen apart. Some 
sex workers, as reported to me in the therapy groups I ran, went so far as to argue that the real 
business of sex work is keeping secrets.  
Sex work exposes us to the ‘secrets’ employed to keep the ‘home’ together. These secrets 
enable men and women to maintain the social and morally respectable positions that society 
often demands. Equally, sex work is embedded within the complex social positions that 
women, gay and transgendered persons occupy in Afrikan society and the history of 
transactional sex and multiple sexual partners. In most Afrikan settings, transactional sexual 
arrangements have traditionally existed, as did, for that matter, sex between men. This is 
something that is erased in the historically dishonest presentations by those who proclaim sex 
work and homosexuality are not Afrikan, but a dysfunction brought to Afrika by the European 
male.  
What is also true is that the contexts informing transactional sex and, for that matter, men 
having sex with men have significantly changed and are in a process of continual change. 
Moreover, it is difficult and perhaps even foolish to try to arrive at any singular reading of sex 
exchanges that involve money or rewards. For example, even when focusing on a specific area, 
being transactional sex on university campuses in the Western Cape, Shefer, Clowes and 
Vergnani (2012) note a complex interplay between self-agency and exploitation: 
 
There are clear signs in participants’ narratives that transactional sexual encounters on campus are not 
simply about money but also involve a range of material and emotional transactions that can confer 
benefits on both men and women. Women are not necessarily passive victims in these exchanges, they 
may actively and strategically engage in such relationships as has been argued by Gukurume (2011) in 
his study on a higher education campus in Zimbabwe. And at the same time there are hints that a few 
female students are aware that women also have sexual feelings and can experience sexual desire, 
although they also recognise that it is risky to acknowledge this publically. It is especially noteworthy 
that students’ narratives highlight a continuum of relationships in which the boundaries between a 
transactional relationship and a ‘normal’ intimate relationship are not clear. What becomes more 
important is to differentiate between relationships that are equitably transactional and those which 
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involve intersecting axes of power which facilitate possibilities for exploitation and abuse of either 
partner. 
In summary, sex work in Afrika is linked to a plethora of terminologies or narratives
190
 which 
need to be unpacked if one is going to attempt to talk about the Afrikan sex industry. With the 
coming of the white man, Christianity, Islam, capitalism and, lately, the rise of the ‘big men’ of 
Afrika, sexuality was restructured. Sex work needs to be linked to slavery, colonisation, and 
the brutalization of Afrikan and black male sexuality, the myths of black female sexuality, 
urbanisation, poverty, lack of education, capitalism and globalization. Sex work needs to be 
included in urban and migrancy studies. It also needs to be placed alongside Afrikan LGBTIQ 
and feminist struggles to achieve autonomy and spaces for self expression. Again, it is an over-
determined space that cannot be understood in one-dimensional terms. 
 
Sex work and feminists 
Once upon a time women in England demanded the vote.  
This was thought too much, a step too far. 
Then in the sixties women in the USA demanded the same pay as men. 
This was thought too much, a step too far. 
Then lesbian women spoke out and demanded women only spaces and wanted men excluded 
This was thought too much, a step too far 
Then African American women spoke out and said their white sister must stop speaking for them 
This was thought too much, a step too far 
Now African sex workers are speaking out 
Starting a revolution of independent women and inclusion of LGBTIQ 
                                                                                                                                                                                        
190 For example what I have discovered in working with sex workers in Mozambique is that many young girls in 
Mozambique have to leave school at a young age, some live with a life expectancy of 35, such that by the time 
they are 18 it could be described as a ‘mid-life’ crisis. These and other submerged narratives exist around sex 
work. Despite this complexity sex work is more often than not reduced to simple binary categories in many 
debates.  
One of those submerged narratives is a form of genocide against the Afrikan sex worker, the extreme violence and 
murders, which are not investigated unless they take on horrific and gross dimensions, as with serial murders 
which capture the public attention and imagination. An example of this is in Kenya, 2011, where sex workers 
reported to the police that there was somebody engaged in the serial killing of sex workers. Only when this man 
started killing women thought not to be sex workers was this case taken seriously. The secret is that the 
normalization of violence against sex workers is a subtle way of accepting violence against women and people 
from the LGBTIQ community. It is a way of maintaining hate crimes through the belief that it is ok to abuse 
certain women or gays. The secret is that sex work in Afrika offers society an outlet for both sexual expression 
and hate. The role of the sex worker is thus to provide sexual release as well as absorb violence and hatred. Were 
sex work not illegal then another hated group would need to be found. 
 
 
 
 
 
245 
 
This was thought too much, a step too far 
 
Radical means what and for whom? Is radical grassroots!? Is it radical to claim that men want sex and 
that women in Africa are tired of giving it away for nothing? What is radical? Is it the very public display 
of female sexual agency? Or is it the revelation that sex for money is not different to most, perhaps all, 
marriages? Is it the combination of both these realizations that is too radical?  
 
Sex workers are told they are selling their bodies to men. Sex workers reply they are claiming their 
bodies both from men and from those women who tell them what they can and cannot do with their body. 
This self-righteous middle-class, Western interference and undermining of African women's attempts to 
overcome and gain independence.  
 
But it is true for many sex workers sex work is not liberating. Liberation comes with control over ones 
environment and a state of consciousness. Black liberation activists cried out that people needed not only 
to change laws, but liberate their minds. He promoted Black Consciousness which goes beyond simply 
the colour of your skin.   
 
As female sex workers and role models, human rights defenders, 
We are developing an African sex worker consciousness. 
At the centre of this liberation is 'my body, my business.' 
At the centre of this liberation is the realization that sex can be fluid. 
One can have sex with men and women. 
One can have sex for money and without money.  
Sex work can provide independence, freedom of movement, money and sexual self determination. 
But sex workers have to fight a battle on three fronts 
The abusive client 
Laws which undermine control over the environment 
And from other women    
 
It is these women who call themselves feminists who attack sex workers that make sex degrading and 
who turn sex workers into an object and tell us that you are a bad girl. At the same time as telling us they 
are trying to save you and they know what is best for you. It is like been called the head mister office in 
which you then have to justify what you are doing. This must stop. Time to stop having to explain and 
justify ourselves and time to start asking these women:  
 
Sister, how can you continue to call yourself a feminist when you deny my voice? 
 
Sex work gives me equal pay 
I can have sex with both men and women 
We have female, male and transgender sex workers 
We can speak as black women 
As women from the working and under class 
As African women 
We are feminists  
We fight for the independence of women and LGBTIQ inclusion 
I am a feminist, now it is time for you to tell me if you are a feminist? 
Are you a feminist my sister?  
 
(extract from Daughtie Ogutu’s presentation at the Regional ‘Changing Faces, Changing Spaces’ 
Conference, organized by UHAI with the theme “Moving Beyond” Nairobi, Kenya; 4 – 6 May 2011). 
 
There are many feminist perspectives on the issue of sex work (or what some feminists call 
prostitution).  These debates overlap with other discussions about sex between the sex-positive 
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feminists (like Camille Paglia, Gayle Rubin, Carol Queen and Annie Sprinkle) and anti-
pornography feminists (like Catharine MacKinnon and Andrea Dworkin).   
Feminists are divided on their position towards sex work. For some, like radical feminists 
Catharine MacKinnon and Andrea Dworkin, sex work when labelled as prostitution is viewed 
as inherently problematic and considered a form of violence against women that undermines 
gender equality and should be illegal.  For such authors, ‘prostitution’ and pornography are 
seen to perpetuate a distorted perception of women's bodies and the availability of women as 
sexual objects of satisfaction.  Selling sex is seen as degrading and something that reduces 
women to commodities. These viewpoints often results in abolitionist policies, stigmatization 
and denial of human and reproductive health rights. These feminists may be religious, 
conservative, liberal or even radical. They push the belief that that sex workers should find 
other jobs and that sex workers should be “rescued.” They see sex workers as victims of a 
male-dominated society and believe sex workers to be psychologically unstable women in need 
of help.  
Opposing this are those feminists who see sex work as a means to better the economic 
circumstances that women knowingly embark on within particular cultural, national and global 
contexts
191
.  
                                                                                                                                                                                        
191 Placed within an Afrikan context, consider this women’s view point. The article is entitled Pissed off Feminist.  
(http://www.sweat.org.za)  
Zimbabwe is a multi- cultural country that believes in traditional, cultural norms and Christian values. The issue 
of sex work is considered dirty and leads to sex workers being outcasts and viewed with contempt. Sex work is 
one of the oldest professions dating back to the early times in the Bible. I am a female sex worker living in the 
City of Kings and Queens in Bulawayo. 
 
I am the national coordinator of sex workers for the African Sex Workers Alliance. I advocate and fight for sex 
workers rights. Sex workers are always treated with disrespect in societies and communities simply because they 
choose to earn a living through commercializing sex. 
 
Sex workers are marginalised which makes us so vulnerable to diseases, violence, rape, hate crimes, verbal abuse, 
emotional abuse etc. Sex workers are raped each and every day and if we report rape cases to the police they 
refuse to assist us. Sex workers should therefore be protected in order to protect others. 
 
Why pay bride price? Why sell a woman? There is no difference between a married woman and a sex worker as 
we all are for sale, because a man has to pay somehow for their sexual services directly or indirect. The same 
applies to dating couples if you ask a girl out she will start telling you about paying for her bills, rentals, buying 
pizza, lingerie, chocolates etc, then after all that she is all yours whether you want to have sex there and there it’s 
up to you but you have already paid for your services indirectly. Let us face the facts in other words; paying of 
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Moreover, it is important to note, firstly, that anti-prostitution feminist readings are imposed in 
a forceful manner and secondly, that Western experiences are normalized. There is blindness to 
the realities of those who most lack economic, social and political power or obtain power and 
independence through sex work
192
. Third-world feminists like Chandre Gould (2008) and 
                                                          
bride price simply means you are paying for permanent sex. As a married woman you will have sex whenever 
your husband needs it and you will have children. As a sex worker I offer my clients temporary sex. I render the 
services that my client needs and we part ways no strings attached, strictly business. The question then is who is a 
prostitute? Most people will say that a prostitute is someone who offers sexual services in exchange for goods or 
money directly or indirect. Then all women might be prostitutes as they are paid, indirectly or directly for sex. 
 
Sex is something that is supposed to be celebrated, embraced and enjoyed without fear. Why is it that the word 
‘prostitute’ always refers to women who have different sexual partners? Remember we don’t have sex by 
ourselves as it takes two to tango. What then do we call the men that we have sex with? Are they also prostitutes? 
 
Society needs to sit down and rethink its attitude towards sex work. Stop this name calling and blame game! Ours 
is a water-tight profession because we do not intend to break families, it’s a straight forward transaction of sex and 
money, no further intentions unlike the so-called “small houses” and “girlfriends” whose main objective is to be 
loved by someone else’s boyfriend/husband and they will do the unimaginable in a bid to oust the wife out of the 
matrimonial home. Sex work is a completely different industry that does not break up homes as it does not involve 
love. 
 
You may concentrate on sex but we concentrate on the work! Let us work together as a nation to find a strategy to 
stop our enemy HIV/AIDS from taking lives. Together we can make a difference, Unity is power! 
 
192 The sex work debate speaks to a middle class failure to understand the position of the working and underclass 
women living in the so-called Third World. It imposes a middle class perspective. See current debate in New York 
Times and Marth Nussbaum's contribution, ‘Ignore the Stigma and Focus on the Need’. 
http://www.nytimes.com/roomfordebate/2012/04/19/is-legalized-prostitution-safer/ignore-the-stigma-of-
prostitution-and-focus-on-the-need . Feminist arguments about prostitution portray financial transactions in the 
area of female sexuality as demeaning to women. But all of us, with the exception of the independently wealthy 
and the unemployed, take money for the use of our bodies. The stigmatization of prostitution may be based on 
convincing, well-reasoned arguments. But it may also be based on class prejudice or stereotypes of race or gender. 
When prostitution does not involve coercion or force or the use of children, the most urgent issue is the poor 
employment opportunities for working women and their lack of control over the conditions of their employment. 
The legalization of prostitution would likely make things a little better for women who have few options to begin 
with. The really helpful thing for feminists to ponder, if they deplore the nature of these options, will be to help 
expand those possibilities through education, skills training and job creation. 
When prostitution does not involve coercion or the use of children, the most urgent issue is the poor opportunities 
for working women. 
Keeping prostitution illegal only increases the threats of violence and sickness and abuse that women face because 
illegality prevents adequate supervision, encourages the control of pimps and discourages health checks. 
And prostitution's continued illegality hampers any efforts on behalf of the dignity and self-respect of prostitutes. 
Women in many parts of the world are especially likely to be stuck at a low level of mechanical functioning, 
whether as agricultural laborers, factory workers or prostitutes. The real question to be faced is how to expand 
opportunities for such women, how to increase the humanity inherent in their work and how to guarantee that 
workers of all sorts are treated with dignity. 
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Sylvia Tamale (2011) emphasise concerns about the realities of women who have restricted 
access to education, literacy and formal jobs but have the burden of having to take care of 
extended families.  
Within the feminist debate on sex work, there are feminists trying to find a middle ground, for 
example those who see “prostitution” as anti-feminist but a strategic necessity for women to 
survive. The middle ground viewpoint
193
, argues Linda Le Moncheck (1997: 116, 117) calls for 
a view point that allows for us to see sex work both in terms of “women’s sexual subordination 
and in terms of women’s sexual liberation from oppressive norms...in terms that are neither 
exclusively oppressive nor unilaterally liberating.”   
Shifts of opinion by feminists often come about due to sex work groups throughout the world 
challenging their feminist sisters about the lack of support in the struggle for recognition of sex 
workers’ rights as human rights. There are also feminists who are sex workers and who identify 
as feminist sex workers as a way to advance the feminist struggle. 
 
Sex work contextualized 
Le Moncheck (1997: 120) in her review of some of the literature points out that what makes 
sex work threatening is that it exposes the fundamentally commercial nature of sex. Quoting 
Engels, the bourgeois wife is presented as somebody who only differs from a sex worker in that 
her body is sold once and for all into slavery, with the women becoming totally financially 
dependent upon the man. Le Moncheck (1997: 124) notes that the context in which sex work 
takes place is sometimes more important than the content of the work itself.  For Le Moncheck 
(1997: 127), to attack sex work is to address a symptom, a social location within a patriarchal 
society which determines the scope of sexual degradation. Le Moncheck (1997: 129) sums up 
                                                                                                                                                                                        
193 Included in this middle ground group are those who are pragmatic in which the primary concern is the risk of 
violence and sexually transmitted diseases. This position is one some religious groups have also taken in arguing 
that from a pragmatic view point, legalizing sex work reduces risk of violence and disease. This is a so-called 
reality based position. They argue it should be legal but do think it hurts the goal of equality. At the same time 
there is recognition that those who have tried to abolish sex work, even through the use of brutal and violent 
practices, have failed to stop sex work, have only driven it underground and under the control of criminals, often 
men. Violence against women can only be tackled in a decriminalized context and the criminalization of sex work 
increases women’s vulnerability.  
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that a woman can be harmed without being regarded as a commodity: 
Therefore, if we address only the ‘sex’ in ‘sex object’, without addressing her complex ‘object’ status, 
those contexts that turn a woman’s objectification into her degradation remain indeterminate.  
Sex work only degrades and subordinates when, as Le Moncheck (1997: 129) notes,  the 
message that woman are naturally subordinate to men, already exists and is integrally part of 
the society’s views.  Le Moncheck (1997: 132) calls for a more nuanced reading, one which 
can look at the fascinating dialectic between reality and fantasy and subject and object 
positions in both sex and sex work, as well as what it means to be a bad girl, the redefinition of 
sexuality in women’s terms (1997: 137): “What kind of woman wouldn’t choose sex work?” 
As long as sex workers are stigmatised any woman can be turned into a bad girl (1997: 138). 
She concludes that the overemphasis on objectification or its potential for female agency is not 
helpful and calls for an “embrace of some tensions and highlight some of the complexities in 
our attitudes towards sexuality and the sex industry.” What is required for Le Moncheck (1997: 
216, 217) is a more representative picture, not only of sex workers but of female sexuality. She 
calls for a depiction that allows for contradictions and incorporates diversity, complexity, 
ambiguities of women’s sexual lives and fantasies. Moreover, female sexuality, as with sex 
work, is comprised of individual and institutional forces of oppression on the one hand and the 
possibilities of sexual exploration, passion and pleasure on the other. What is required is a 
“sexual ethic of care.”  
Laura Agustín (2005) , not only calls for a more embracing  approach in the study of sex work 
but also points to dangers inherent within current scholarship:  
With the academic, media and ‘helping’ gaze fixed almost exclusively on women who sell sex, the great 
majority of phenomena that make up the sex industry are ignored, and this in itself contributes to the 
intransigent stigmatization of these women. A cultural-studies approach, on the contrary, would look at 
commercial sex in its widest sense, examining its intersections with art, ethics, consumption, family life, 
entertainment, sport, economics, urban space, sexuality, tourism and criminality, not omitting issues of 
race, class, gender, identity and citizenship. (at http://www.lauraagustin.com/sex-industry-cultures-not-
just-sex-work-or-v...) 
Having contextualized the contemporary context of sex work in Afrika and juxtaposed it with 
feminist work on sex work, I now turn to reflect on the work of Freud, Fanon and Foucault, 
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towards both foregrounding their limitations and the possibilities their work opens up for the 
political project of sex work. 
 
Male fantasies 
In the work of Freud, the sex worker is confined to theories of male sexuality, as all sexuality 
for Freud is male in that it is orientated around having, or not having, a phallus. For Freud, the 
‘prostitute’ is a fantasy object for men. Freud uses the desire to have sex with a prostitute as a 
model to help us understand some of the conditions for men falling in love. He speaks of the 
important role the female sex worker plays in male sexuality, but he does not address the 
unconscious longings and desires of the sex worker.  
Freud (1910: 251) exposes the binary logic of male desire: “Where they love they do not desire 
and where they desire they cannot love.” Put another way, where the man loves (the affect 
current resulting in the idealized substitute mother), he cannot desire, and where he desires (the 
sensual current resulting in a debasement of the women seen as a whore), he cannot love. The 
love relationship is seen to be a displacement or re-enactment of the male’s desire and 
attachment for the mother. The desire for the whore is an attempt to escape this attachment to 
mother. This resonates with the feminist analysis of the whore-Madonna binarism in which a 
dominant discourse in patriarchal societies is the construction of woman as either the mother 
(nurturing and innocent ) or the woman who is sexual and bad. Moreover, there is the 
construction of permissible violence: ‘bad women’, like the young child who flirts or the 
woman who dresses like a whore deserve what they get, albeit violence, since they are ‘asking 
for it’. This discourse has been shown to be popular in constructions of sexuality impacting on 
safe sex practices in Southern Afrikan contexts. 
Freud’s formulation implies a conflict in bringing love and desire together. In his paper, On the 
universal tendency to debasement in the sphere of love, Freud (1910: 250, 251, 252) informs us 
that men project onto women two separate aspects: the over-valued love object, who is 
regarded as unique and irreplaceable, but who fails to provide the desired sexual satisfaction, 
and the harlot whom the man can and needs to debase, as it is this debasement of the 
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(mother/woman) ideal that frees male sensuality and allows for uninhibited sexual expression. 
The challenge, usually a failed one, is to be able to both love and desire the same person. The 
man has split the loved object into an over-valued object (the mother) and a debased object (the 
prostitute).  For a satisfying love relationship to occur, the affectionate and sensual currents 
need to combine.   
In A special type of choice of object made by men Freud (1910) tells us that the woman who in 
some way or other of bad repute sexually and whose fidelity is open to some doubt triggers 
male desire. The prostitute, in this reading, is akin to the mother who becomes unfaithful in that 
she loves the father (or the other child), and does not exclusively love the boy child. This man 
is only able to desire in triangular situations, as they re-trigger the Oedipal situation where he 
feels betrayed by the mothers love for another. The thought of other men conditions this 
triggering of desire, allowing for a state of jealously that enables his passion to reach its height. 
With this type of desire, what is ‘most startling’ to Freud (1910: 234) is “the urge they show to 
rescue the woman they love. The man is convinced that she is in need of him, that without him 
she would lose all moral control and rapidly sink to a lamentable level.” Men will try to justify 
this by highlighting the dangers of her social position, even when there is no such basis in 
reality. In effect, Freud is telling us that the man rescues the woman from a danger and the 
excesses that exists inside him.  
Perhaps Freud’s most revolutionary comment on sex work needs to be extracted from his 
comments on sexuality, specifically his theory of ‘the drive’, which implies that there is 
something about sexuality that takes us beyond the site of identification. Consider Freud’s 
(1905: 57) remarks on homosexuality:  
Psychoanalytic research is most decidedly opposed to any attempt at separating off homosexuals from the 
rest of mankind as a group of a special character. By studying sexual excitations other than those that are 
manifestly displayed, it has been found that all human beings are capable of making a homosexual 
object-choice and have in fact made one in their unconscious. Indeed, libidinal attachments to persons of 
the same sex play no less a part as factors in normal mental life, and a greater part as a motive force for 
illness, than do similar attachments to the opposite sex. On the contrary, psychoanalysis considers that a 
choice of an object independently of its sex - freedom to range equally over male and female objects - as 
it is found in childhood, in primitive states of society and early periods of history, is the original basis 
from which, as a result of restrictions in one direction or the other, both the normal and the inverted types 
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develop. Thus from the point of view of psychoanalysis the exclusive sexual interest felt by men for 
women is also a problem that needs elucidating and is not a self-evident fact based upon an attraction that 
is ultimately of a chemical nature.  
Freud stated over and over that homosexuality is not a form of psychopathology. He argued 
that seeing homosexual behaviour as a sign of degeneracy is a value judgment, a condemnation 
and not an explanation. Furthermore, Freud lobbied for the decriminalization of homosexuality, 
was fairly open about his own homosexual thoughts, supported a mother with her son’s 
‘coming out’ process and opposed Ernest Jones attempt to restrict a potential psychoanalytic 
candidate on the grounds of sexual orientation. Freud’s drive theory, which is premised on the 
assumption that an alien and impersonal foreign thing (das ding) leads the subject beyond itself 
in the construction of new possibilities, constructs a theory of sexuality that is independent 
from anatomy. There is no one unified drive (ganze Sexualstrebung) but a number of partial 
drives, despite the attempt to bring together all these partial drives under the sign of genitality. 
The effect of which, we are told by Freud, is that it becomes impossible to discern any 
normative libidinal attachments, even in heterosexuality.   
 Despite the strength of this argument and the subversion inherent within the drive theory, 
Freud, as noted by Kenneth Lewes (1988), finally adopts a deviant and normative theoretical 
model. This model involves a theoretical shift from the drive theory, such that homosexuality is 
now the manifestation of a pre-genital fixation and is represented as an inverted object choice. 
Homosexual object choice, Lewes (1988: 36) observes is now ascribed to a certain arrest of 
sexual development, and takes place, Freud believes, due to an inhibition of normal sexual 
development. Freud analyzed male homosexual object choice primarily in terms of the 
mother/child bond, the so-called negative-Oedipal complex and the manifestations of paranoia. 
As Lewes (1988: 29 to 31) notes that that not only was the language of psychoanalysis 
saturated with derogatory definitions of homosexuality - ‘perversion’, ‘pathological flight from 
woman’, ‘a fixation in childhood’, ‘an arrest of sexual development’, ‘regression to partial 
drives of childhood’ and ‘an inhibition in development of the consolidation of partial drives’ - 
but for a long period, psychoanalysis enforced the game of classifications in which 
homosexuality, and male homosexuality in particular, functioned as a pathological form of 
sexuality needing to be cured. It is a system that leads to brutal attacks and violations of human 
rights, in the name of curing. 
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It is only over the last 10 years that psychoanalysis has come to accept homosexuality as 
normal, something that can be seen to be happening in most Western societies and as also been 
shown to be normative in different ways in many societies historically and internationally. Sex 
work, it seems, is the next contested site. This comes up against the moral panic, the loathing, 
the murderous anxiety of nationalist purity. Central to this ‘thinking’ is the category of 
degeneracy within the piety of moral theory, which assumes the right to say what is good for 
each of us, and where and how we might find it. Our experience matters to the degree that it 
conforms, or fails to conform, to what is seen to be good and obligatory. We construct the 
home and family and the nation through excluding from ourselves those we take to be 
abnormal, irrational and bad, but who are needed, in one way or another, usually as labour, at 
the same time to hold these institutions in place.  
The sex worker functions as that which is uncanny within the home, lurking beneath the 
shadows, while also binding the home together. This is built not only on a fear that the husband 
may frequent sex workers, or that the daughter may sell sex, but also on the repressed 
awareness that marriage itself is often a form of sex work. The household is thus bound 
together through the inhibition of desire so as to maintain the group identification. The hope 
being that the inhibited drive will bring about lasting ties. Within the home, the sex worker has 
both a sacred and profane function. Freud tells us that what appears in the place of the 
repressed is a symptom. I would like to pose the idea that the sex worker functions as the 
symptom for the home, as the incompatible idea, the ‘vorstelung’ representation of sexuality 
that is in distressing opposition to the home but at the same time often needed to hold the home 
together.  
Post-Freud psychoanalytic discourse, along with the engagement with sex workers, is often 
limited to pathologisation and the rhetoric of rescue. Lacan –who was alleged to have been 
happy to visit brothels – does not reflect this limitation. Alongside this, many feminists claim 
the ‘prostitute’ is subjecting herself to male desire, being used by men and perpetuating the 
patriarchal order through allowing men to be able to buy sex. In this reading, the ‘prostitute’ is 
presented as somebody ill-informed, broken, on drugs or without choice. This position is 
founded on the belief that no woman would choose to do sex work. 
What the argument fails to distinguish, especially in an Afrikan context, is the difference 
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between career and work. The fact is that most women in Afrika, as well as most men, operate 
within an informal economy where part-time work rather than a career is the norm. For a sex 
worker with minimal education, sex work provides a higher income for fewer hours of work 
than other jobs within the informal economy. As Gould and Fick (2008) point out, for women 
who have little education, sex work offers far more lucrative final rewards than those, with the 
same levels of education, employed in other professions. The sex worker can obtain the same 
amount of money with two to three clients as she would make as a domestic worker for the 
entire week. Moreover, many domestic workers are in any case subjected to sexual harassment 
from the men in the home, without this unwanted sexual engagement providing any financial 
reward (see Motsei, 1990; Hassim, 2010).  
The presentation of sex workers in Afrika is, firstly, gendered and normative; secondly, it is 
premised on a lack of agency. By Western standards, she (the sex worker is also seen as only 
female) must be mad, bad, sad or uninformed, as well as in need of rescue, often from herself. 
When attempting to think about the sex between the sex worker and client, the argument is 
often that the sex worker uses various forms of dissociation to cope and undergoes a process of 
depersonalization. Again, we see the ideological line that no woman would choose to have 
multiple sexual encounters with strangers and, if she does so, it is pathological and she must 
use certain defence mechanisms to cope. The arguments above assume firstly, that the sex is 
the same with all clients. This is immediately counteracted by the fact that there is almost 
always a range of clients, including a few ‘special’ clients who will often be kept after the sex 
worker leaves full-time sex work. Secondly, it assumes that all sex workers are the same and 
operate in the same way. Again, this falls short when we observe that the interaction with 
clients varies according to who the person is, what is going on between the sex worker and 
client and under what conditions. Sex work in a criminalized environment is structured very 
differently to an environment where sex work is not a crime (as is seen with any people who 
work under the table without rights, a contract and legal protection). 
As Ine van Wesenbeeck (2005) notes, the sex is context-specific. Depersonalization may be a 
strategy to cope with negative conditions and experiences in sex work, but is significantly 
related to indicators of stress, emotional exhaustion and working conditions, such as the lack of 
management support. As noted by Gordon Isaacs (2010, personal communication), sex workers 
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spend the majority of their time waiting, so boredom is a key factor. Sex workers are also in 
competition with others, gossiping, in anticipation, on the lookout, ducking and diving, dealing 
with stigma and hustling. Eventually there is an interaction with the client who, if new, needs 
to be assessed and managed. In contrast, the popular view of sex work simply projects onto sex 
workers feelings that often have little to do with sex work and speak volumes about the issues 
that society and researchers grapple with, particularly with reference to sexualities.  
Freud seems to have some inkling of this. He acknowledges the work dimension of sex work, 
alongside the moral judgment projected on women who choose sex work as a profession. It is 
in the terms Freud (1910: 234) uses to talk about “prostitutes” that we get some indication of 
how he sees the desire and needs of the sex worker, as well as how he sees sex work. There is 
“the woman of bad repute”, used to describe a stigma that men place on women who might 
love or desire more than one man. This also refers to the need of some men to see the woman 
to have verisimilitude to a prostitute so as to trigger the male desire. Alongside this, there is the 
term “Dirne”, similar to the English word harlot. Again, this is used by Freud to describe a 
term that men use to categorize women, here describing the unfaithful woman or the woman 
who has more than one sexual partner, and who is not, to use Freud’s words, of 
‘unimpeachable moral purity.’  
Freud (1910: 237) also uses the term “unfortunates”, implying that they do not have the same 
fortune or inheritance as other women. Most interestingly, Freud speaks of prostitution as 
profession. In Freud’s case study The Rat Man (1909: 95), he refers to “a certain female 
profession”. Likewise, in A special type of choice of object made by men(1910: 237), Freud 
talks about “certain women who practice sexual intercourse as a means of livelihood.” He adds 
that they are held in contempt because they practice sexual intercourse as a means of 
livelihood. Here we see the acknowledgement of work, alongside some understanding of the 
moral judgment projected on these women, even while on another level, he seems to be 
engaging in the same moral judgment as found in his engagement with homosexuality.  
Freud observes that knowledge of the “prostitute” provides young men with insight into the 
“secret of sexual life” (Freud: 1910: 237), which destroys the authority of adults. It does so 
through the young person’s discovery that his mother’s love goes beyond him. The secret of 
sexual life is the discovery that one cannot be everything for the other, even (and most 
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importantly) for the mother. The mother is unfaithful in that she can love more than one child, 
despite the announcement that all her children are loved the same. In other words, people want 
more and can love more than one person. People are not inherently monogamous. Freud points 
out that some men from the upper classes keep a secret mistress while probably others, I would 
add, wish they could, even if only as a fantasy. 
 
Black and white love and sex 
Leaving Freud and turning to Fanon, again we see that the conception of ‘prostitution’ needs to 
be extracted. In Black Skin, White Masks, Fanon offers us three descriptions of sex work: 
firstly, sex work as an initiation or rite of passage for black men; secondly, whoring yourself as 
a black woman to white men; and thirdly, the white female sex worker’s fantasy of sleeping 
with a black man.  
Fanon’s (1972: 52) first description of sex work (“prostitution”, in his terms) is his depiction of 
the brothel. He refers to as going “off to the houses” as a rite of passage. This rite of passage is 
cited in the context of the man of colour and the white woman. For the black man coming to 
Europe, specifically France, going off to the houses was an initiation into manhood
194
. In 
undergoing this rite of passage, the black man, we can assume, occupies his body thanks to the 
service of the female sex worker who appears to be white.  
Is Fanon saying that to be a man and adapt to white society, the black man must sleep with a 
white sex worker? If this is the case, is this transaction a positive one in which sexual 
expression is affirmed or is it an act of revenge? Is Fanon saying that the only home that the 
black men can occupy is ‘the houses’, occupied by white women who are outcast and 
stigmatised like the black male? Is there equivalence between the way the sex worker and black 
male subjectivity get constructed? The problem in trying to unpack this is that Fanon is not 
allowing for equivalence between the white and black sex worker. A black woman who sleeps 
with (or even desires to sleep with) a white man is a slave. We can of course wonder about the 
                                                                                                                                                                                        
194
 There is a good chance that those friends of Fanon who visited the houses, brothels, included Fanon. But then 
again Fanon being the stubborn person he was, there is also a good chance he may not have. Perhaps he wanted to 
prove he could sleep with white women without having to pay for it?  
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exchange between black men and black women. 
The figure of the white sex worker returns in Fanon’s chapter entitled The Negro and 
Psychopathology(1972) in a very interesting way. Fanon tells us of a “prostitute” who, at the 
mere thought of going to bed with a Negro, experienced an orgasm. The sex worker went in 
search of Negroes and never asked them for money. It seems that, for Fanon (1972: 112), the 
black man displaces the sex worker as the sexual object of desire, even if everything takes 
place on the genital level. So powerful is the fantasy of the black male penis that it upstages the 
role of the white “prostitute” and, in fact, for white men, results in fear and revulsion that leads 
to sexual revenge in the form of lynching.  
In Fanon’s essay entitled The Woman of Colour and the White Man (1972), it seems a black 
woman who has sex with a white man must be a prostitute and a slave. This is something still 
thought by many today in many parts of Afrika. Fanon (1972) tells us that white men do not 
marry black women, thereby implying that all a black woman can be for a white man is an 
object, a whore or, at best, the substitute woman while the man is away from home. In this 
essay, the reference is to transactional sex. Mayotte is a woman of colour who loves a white 
man and who “submits in everything”, as “he is the lord” (Fanon, 1972: 32). Fanon here 
presents women as frantic, waiting to be taken by white men at any price. He scornfully adds 
that one day they will learn that white men do not marry black women. The disgust Fanon feels 
for Mayotte who wants to be part of this opulent white world is akin to the contempt many 
Afrikan men feel when ‘their women’ end up with a mulungu, a white195.  
Fanon (1972: 40) encounters many Martinique women who would never marry a black man, as 
the white world is seen as the only way out. Fanon points to racism as well as Negrophobia, In 
this regard, Gordon Isaacs (2012, personal communication) refers to internalized self-
oppression and desire for white approval as the motivating factors. Ironically, in this text Fanon 
does not mention poverty as an essential factor. Fanon’s portrays Negrophobia and uses 
Adler’s inferiority complex to explain this desire for white approval, but what gets left out of 
the equation is how this self-oppression and phobia manifest in the relations between the 
                                                                                                                                                                                        
195
 Many people writing about Fanon have pointed to the irony of him dictating to his white wife his thoughts on 
relationships between white and black males and females. This is however not entirely accurate, as Macey (2000: 
133) points out Marie-Josephe Duble was said to be a mix of Corsican-gypsy decent which places her outside the 
mainstream. It is true that Fanon’s first child, Mireille Fanon, was through intercourse with a white woman.  
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woman and man of colour. In other words, is it white approval that the woman wants, or 
economic advantage, or escape from the violence inflicted by some black men who take out 
their frustrations and internalised self-oppression on ‘their women’? In Cape Town, it is a not 
an uncommon occurrence for black women, as reported to me by close friends, that when 
walking alone down a street they are sometimes sexually and aggressively harassed and 
insulted by township Xhosa men
196 ;yet ironically, this abuse is very seldom directed towards 
white women
197
. This is not to imply that it is only Xhosa men that are abusive to black women 
in the streets of Cape Town.  
The point is that, while Fanon may feel betrayed by women who end up with white men, and 
may feel they are no different to “prostitutes”, some woman of colour feel deeply betrayed by 
the levels of violence or deception inflicted upon them by black men. Others simply want to 
survive and see around them men who are not able economically to provide for them and their 
children.  
What is helpful within Fanon’s analysis is the opportunity it provides for thinking about the 
legacy of slavery and colonization on male and female sexuality in Afrika and how this informs 
male and female interaction and larger social practices. Fanon’s analysis alludes to slavery, and 
the violence and dependency that were imposed on the female slaves when forced to have sex 
with the master and give birth to his offspring.  Moreover Fanon’s work does surface the issue 
of when the sexual exchange is one of choice and when it is forced.  
 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                        
196
 Another example, as informed by black sex workers in South Africa, is that some black South African men are 
very verbally abusive and degrading, making them feel like ‘a dirty whore’. Again, surprisingly, this kind of abuse 
is not as common amongst white clients or if it is, it is underreported. The white clients are said to be kinkier 
wanting to do things like smell the sex worker’s panties or for her to call him daddy. However, this picture 
changes in other parts of Afrika, especially male to male sex, where the white male is more abusive towards the 
black male sex worker than the black male client is. This information comes from therapy groups and informal 
discussions and as such cannot be generalised. I still though think it is worth noting as I heard this comments 
often.  
 
197
 At the same time, interestingly Xhosa men in Johannesburg tend to act differently to those in Cape Town, 
treating both women and whites in a different manner. This (over generalised) difference can be explained by the 
fact that Cape Town remains the closest model to apartheid in South Africa and was the first area in South Africa 
to be colonised. The black woman becomes an easy and safe target for violence. Moreover, Johannesburg is a 
major international and cosmopolitan city.   
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Sex work and trafficking 
Fanon seems to fall into the same ideological trap at play in our contemporary society in which 
sex work and trafficking get blurred or even confused as one and the same thing. What is of 
concern is that the anti-prostitution, abolitionist, conservative and sex-negative feminist 
agenda, which encompasses the mainstream voice on sex work, argues that sex work is forced. 
It is a position informed by a political conservative agenda. All forms of ‘prostitution’ are 
presented as rape and secondly, ‘prostitution’ and ‘trafficking’ are seen as the same.198  
                                                                                                                                                                                        
198 Barbra Nyangairi (2009) in her research on sex work and trafficking concludes that there is a mistaken belief 
that sex work and trafficking are linked. She concludes that treating sex work as if it is the same as sex trafficking 
both ignores the realities of sex work and endangers those engaged in it. My own opinion is that the conflation of 
terms is often deeply dishonest and unhelpful and at times seems driven by a political agenda – dirty politics. 
Moreover what I have witnessed on more than one occasion, both in Cape Town and London, is the deportation of 
women trafficked and an indifference to their suffering.  
Having worked as both a therapist and social worker with women who have been trafficked in London, Cape 
Town and Denver, it is clear to me that trafficking is a form of torture but also that trafficking and sex work are 
two very different phenomena in much the same way that consensual sex and rape are two different phenomena.  
In speaking before the Counter Trafficking Coalition and other bodies in 2010, I tried to bring out both the 
political dimension, border control as well as the subjective experience. I argued that while concern around 
trafficking allegedly emerges out the history on slavery and its modern day equivalents, it comes into legalization 
at the same time that Western countries are developing tighter border controls. In this regard I noted the reluctance 
of Western countries to make an apology for the Atlantic slave trade let alone provide compensation. I further 
argued in my presentation that not only is trafficking conflated with sex work but that numbers are misreported 
and exaggerated and that  the focus is often exclusively on people trafficked into sex slavery and excludes other 
forms of trafficking, like child labour, body parts. The trafficking discourse has become a political tool to attack 
sex work and pushes a moral agenda.   
In my presentation I challenged the often immediate deportation of people trafficked, which I see as deeply 
unethical. People who get trafficked often break the law to obtain entry into the republic, as with border crossings. 
Moreover, in some situations, women will knowingly enter sex work only to then find themselves in a trafficked 
situation. The person will in many situations not want to be return and will want to remain in South Africa. In 
some situations they will be dealing with a complex range of emotions and experiences which are not clear cut
198
. 
They will have broken the law to enter SA, face dire poverty back home and have suffered betrayal and brutal 
abuse. A knee jerk deportation response risks doubly victimising the person. It is a double bind to demand that the 
victim/survivor comply with legal prosecution of the abusers or else face deportation. Lessons learned from rape 
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and domestic violence need to inform any approach. Not everybody is willing to testify or even if willing, 
sometimes not capable due the extreme nature of the abuse.  
Sex work and trafficking are surrounded by dirty politics, nationalism (border control) and right wing religious 
and patriarchal ideologies. This was especially evident in the build up to both the German and South African 
hosting of the FIFA world cup. It was stated that thousands of women would be trafficked when in reality this did 
not occur and the figure was very low. Significantly, research undertaken Richter (2011) found that:  
“During the 2010 World Cup period, there were not significantly more clients seen per sex worker during 
the World Cup period. Sex workers’ demographics did not change significantly during the World Cup 
period, indicating no major influx of young sex workers, for example. Demand and supply of sex work 
remained constant across the World Cup period. Our data also does not support fears about an increase of 
children or foreign migrant sex workers into the sex industry during the World Cup period. 
The challenge is to think about a host of terms alongside each other, for example the historical legacy of 
slavery, migration, urbanisation,  the relations between white men and Afrikan women and more broadly, 
between black men and women. We need to understand how poor families who cannot survive will often 
knowingly sell their children into domestic work or sex work. The historical legacy of colonisation and 
slavery, including the continuation of economic dependency, lives on in parts of Afrika. The fabric of the 
‘indigenous’ and ‘traditional’ home has been changed forever as a result of slavery, colonial occupation 
and the emergence of new ‘tribal’ or ‘ethnic’ elites who surfaced as a result of division and rule. These 
new hybrids, masters (often male), are blends of Western patriarchal Christian and Islam models mixed 
with traditional patriarchal dimensions which in turn have been structured by global market economy and 
the maintaining of self-interest. We need to understand how certain individuals will knowingly exploit 
marginalised black Afrikan men and women but be the first ones to shout out about racism. It is within 
these sites of overlapping contradictions that we need to dwell and attempt to come up with provisional 
‘truths.’” 
These conflicting narratives  have opened up a whole new playing field, one which has resulted in great confusion 
as to what constitutes the home, and how to deal with a huge abundance of people living in homeless conditions 
and informal settlements. A different set of rules apply, formal and informal. It is a world in which one is pushed 
to take the opportunities that are presented, like the expedient survival strategy to directly or indirectly use sex as a 
means of exchange. In the case of transactional sex, which existed in a different form before the arrival of the 
white coloniser, the largest client group (‘boyfriends’) is not made up of the European tourist, but of the local 
population who are only too happy to have ‘their cherries’ on the side. This dynamic unfolds in the form of 
multiple concurrent relationships and, in reality, opens up new and differing sexual realities.  
Clearly, sexuality is no longer confined to the home, not that it ever was! For Fanon the question of grounding, 
home and homeless cannot be separated from questions of the movement of the body, in particular the site of 
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These questions are as relevant today as they were in the day of Fanon. Thanks to the growing 
body of Afrikan feminist writers like Tamale (2011) and Oyewumi (1997) these questions are 
been framed in different ways. The central concern remains the body, space, but the reading is 
nuanced with conflicting complexities. For example how does the black woman claim her 
voice, body and particularity and move beyond the stereotype of her as a maid, sexually exotic, 
strong woman or an angry black woman? Freud and Fanon do not help in this regard and at 
times reduce the black women’s sexuality to that of the ‘dark continent’ (Afrika), in which her 
body remains a site of colonization. Moreover, as noted by Mwaniki (2010), Fanon’s reading 
of black women borders on an essentialist argument, which is not the situation in understanding 
black men.  
In summary, the colonization of the body of the Afrikan woman occurs not only through men 
like Freud and Fanon, but also by women, white and black, and even by those who may term 
themselves feminists.  
 
Brothels and the heterotopia 
Let me now move to Foucault, a man who no doubt hung around rent boys and did not only 
think about sex work from an intellectual position. Unlike Freud and Fanon, Foucault writes 
about male and female sex workers as well as pimps. In his terms, the police who are used to 
discipline, punish and control female sex workers. What is of central interest is less his 
commentaries on sex workers but more his placement of the brothel and psychiatric institution 
alongside each other.  
In trying to understand this placement of the brothel and psychiatric institution alongside each 
other, it is helpful to consider Freud’s placement of the church and army together. In doing so, 
for example, in the Group Psychology Paper, Freud (1921) is offering a model of identification. 
                                                          
sexual expression. Fanon reads this contested ground as a battlefield, one in which the black male needs to 
preserve a black consciousness in the face of the relentless attack on the sexuality and social standing of the black 
male and father figure. The position of the black female is more complicated as it is one which returns us to the 
fight of the slave women in the face of white (and now we can add black) male sexuality and exploitation.  
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It is the ideal which binds the group together. The army and church, it seems, are the antithesis 
of the brothel and psychiatric institute in that the sex worker and ‘mad’ person share so-called 
displays of excessive behaviours, unbound seriality, and are sites of excess that refuse to be 
bound together by some ideal. At the same time, it is important to note that the client of the 
brothel is often the soldier, priest, Imam or orthodox Jew.  
Having argued for a reading of the ship of fools to be placed alongside the slave ship and witch 
hunts as examples of colonization of the mind and body; we now need to place the brothel 
alongside the mental asylum. Each of these spaces is an example of what Foucault refers to as 
heterotopias
199
. A heterotopia is a “place without geographical co-ordinates”, a “different place 
compared with ordinary cultural spaces”, with a “precise and specific operation within the 
society” (Foucault, 1998: 179 to 184). He includes the brothel as an example of heterotopia. 
Homelessness, as with sex work, opens up different spaces, and is akin to a crisis heterotopia. 
For Foucault (1998: 179), a crisis heterotopia is a “privileged or sacred or forbidden place 
reserved for individuals who are in a state of crisis with respect to society and the human 
milieu in which they live. Adolescents, menstruating women, women in labour, old age, and so 
on. In our society these crisis heterotopias have all but disappeared” (ibid: 179).  
The brothel and psychiatric institute are spaces where excess manifests but is usually restricted 
and controlled by the men who run the these institutions. These spaces have the potential to 
allow excess to flow. Foucault is alluding to the sites as festivals where excesses can exist. The 
brothel, like the bathhouses that Foucault frequented, has the potential to allow for the 
establishment of different kinds of bonds. Within this elaboration, Foucault is offering us an 
outline of what he calls a critical community. The sex worker and mad person, when given 
space, present us with different kinds of social bonds.  
Rajchman (1991: 144) who elaborates on the ethics of the critical community tells us that 
Foucault wants to establish a new erotic to resist, deform, and depart from the taken-for-
                                                                                                                                                                                        
For Foucault (1998: 176) different space, like heteropias, is not the space of emplacement (“defined by relations of 
proximity between points or elements”) but the space of outside, “by which we are drawn outside ourselves.” The 
heteropia as argued by Foucault (1998: 176) is not a utopian space, for example a mirror utopia, ‘where I see 
myself’ as the same, but rather a space of ‘where I am not’. 
 
199
 Ironically, the brothel, like the church, also includes a priest; only it is a priestess of pleasure, of excess. In 
ancient Egypt and Greece the sex worker was the high priestess. This engagement is similar to the way the mad 
person used to be accepted in many Afrikan societies as the therapist, following a rite of passage.  
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granted history presented as a universal, timeless given about who and what we are and how 
we can and cannot identify in the world. Foucault wants to find sites not yet governed by law, 
rule or habit. As such, he calls for the invention of new relationships, new forms of community, 
of co-existence and pleasure, not based on the exigencies of the superego (Rajchman 1991: 
144). The mythological brothel run by the high priestess and the rite of passage that healers – 
who would later be classified as mad by Western psychiatry - underwent in traditional Xhosa 
culture allude to different kinds of space where new and creative relationships can unfold. 
In this reading the space of the homeless, the sex worker, and the traditional Xhosa healer, is an 
attempt to establish some kind of bond outside the traditional plane of identification. The 
possibility of the critical community comes when there is an interruption, refusal or reversal of 
forms of the given community, leading to the exposure of the ways community supports the 
system.  
Rajchman (1991: 144) reads Foucault to be arguing that the critical community problematises 
identity, thus making our subjectivity an open and endless question. The art of living thus frees 
itself from rule, law and habit: critical problematisation frees up space; and possibility and a 
revolution in ethics occurs. In opposition to the critical community, we have regulation which 
begins in the home. Consider Foucault’s (1978: 3) remark:  
But twilight soon fell upon this bright day, followed by the monotonous nights of the Victorian 
bourgeoisies. Sexuality was carefully confined; it moved into the home. The conjugal family took 
custody of it and absorbed it into the serious function of reproduction. On the subject of sex, silence 
became the rule. The legitimate and procreative couple laid down the law. The couple imposed itself as 
model, and forced the norm; safe guarded the truth, and reserved the right to speak while retaining the 
principle of secrecy. A single locus of sexuality was acknowledged in social space as well as at the heart 
of every household, but it was utilitarian and fertile one: the parent’s bedroom. 
Open space, critical space with the possibility of different kinds of relationships not hemmed in 
by rigid identifications
200 in much need in a world which is becoming more and more regulated, 
especially in Western settings. Enforced space is one in which there is a demand that the body 
                                                                                                                                                                                        
200 Identification takes place with the support of the identity bearing imagery, signifiers and ideals of the nation 
state as provided to the child in the home setting. Identification with these signifiers and ideals enables the person 
to triumphantly assume the image of the citizen. At the same time it is a process built upon exclusion and 
distancing from the atypical citizen from the other/world by stigmatising others.  
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assimilate and cast out and disregard those identity bearing signifiers and identifications that 
previously orientated the person, for example their Afrikan name or polytheistic gods.  Yet 
history shows us that this enforced space, which demands one, assimilates and adopts the 
master’s values, still operates through exclusions, often in a subtle way. For example, some of 
the assimilated Jews in Vienna in Freud’s life time hated the Ostjuden, some coloured men in 
Cape Town distance themselves from Afrikan men, and some gay men despise transgendered 
people. Those who were once excluded and deemed to be objects, and who have gained a 
subjective position, gain further acceptance through distancing themselves from those once 
deemed to be kin.  
By way of illustration, one of the most powerful examples of this is the transgendered sex 
worker. There is a shaming or even killing of the body that refuses those identifications and 
expressions of love and desire which do not tally with the norms of the nation state. One of the 
most brutal forms of attack in Afrika is against transgendered  persons
201
. Transgendered sex 
                                                                                                                                                                                        
201 Richard Klein (1999) offers an analysis of the film Boys don’t cry: 
“Boys don't cry is the movie that begins the new millennium with a kind of gender meltdown. Of course, the 
movie is extremely dramatic. Nevertheless, there is a future in it somewhere for all of us. Of course, the boy 
finally did cry. It took a lot of punishment to make him cry. The rape scenes are not ordinary rape scenes. I am not 
going to make a distinction between ordinary rape and extraordinary rape. I am not quite that daft. Rape is a 
"special kind" of violence to the body usually done to a woman though not always. I am totally unable to describe 
this "special kind", what distinguishes it from other forms of violence to the body. In the rape scenes of Boys don't 
cry there is this special kind of violence that is common to all rape. But there is more which makes the whole 
thing even worse. 
“Brandon has a relation to a young man in a trailer at the beginning of the film. It is a fraught relation, but it seems 
to be reasonably contained. The young man calls Brandon a dike. Brandon says that he not a dike which is quite 
correct. Brandon is not a homosexual. He is a man who loves women, or a special woman in this film. Brandon 
life involves a movement from female to male. Brandon was lucky. He had a family name that he could use as a 
masculine name. I wouldn't want to push this too far but there is a rape when questioned around the proper name. 
His name was Teena, I think. Now if there ever was a girlish name, it's Teena. Brandon was using the signifier 
outside the law. He had it stitched onto his jacket. It was very moving watching him in his jacket with Brandon 
printed on it. As I recall his name was brought into question twice. Firstly, after the police chase, he had to show 
his papers. The police didn't examine them very closely, and he got away with it. Secondly, when he was in jail 
and in court, the clerk of the court called out his name, Miss Teena Brandon. He could not reply to the name. It 
isn't that he was a criminal and wanted to avoid some penalty which would have been a rather minor penalty. It is 
that he could not reply to a woman's name. There was a split between recognition and identification.  
“He is changing his form of existence from female to male. He had his breasts bound very, very tightly. 
Something like a medieval woman might do who decided to devote herself to God. It evoked that image and also 
the image of feet-binding in China. At first he stuffs paper down his pants to provide himself with a bulge. Then, 
he gets the idea of using a dildo. This is a very moving dildo. He manages to acquire a rather enormous penis. 
Brandon makes masculinity correlative to size in his apprenticeship at becoming a man. We see this dildo rather 
late. He uses it to make love to the young woman. I myself was first amused at this great big thing he pulls out. 
Then I was rather moved by it but I am not too sure about Brandon's dildo. Brandon's dildo is a prosthetic device. 
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workers in some parts of Africa, for example, Uganda, speak of the hostility they receive from 
the gay community, yet how they are accepted by female sex workers. Others, for example in 
Namibia, will speak about acceptance within the gay community but hostility from female sex 
workers. Others, for example in Cape Town, will speak about belonging nowhere, neither 
among the gay community, transgendered persons or sex workers.  
Gordon Isaacs (2011, personal communication) frames the process of transitioning in terms of 
mourning and concludes that all gender identifications involve a mourning or fear of mourning. 
Isaacs (2011, personal communication) ponders the transition from man to woman in terms of 
the letting go, symbolically, of the status as male. The female relinquishes the ascribed power 
of masculinity in order to become a female. Those who cannot transition are in a state of 
perpetual crisis. But the transitioning itself does not dependent on the actual body. For 
example, having a vagina  and not a penis is not necessarily preferred by Namibian 
transgendered women, who do not want to have their penises removed. For them, the ultimate 
sense of being a woman was to have breasts. They wanted an additional something (breasts), 
not to have something removed. Moreover, for them their anus was a vagina, so anal 
intercourse was more than satisfying. As regards the penis, it gave them sensation, enabled 
them to climax, and moreover, allowed them to still be men despite being women. This 
                                                          
The liquidization of the sexual position is nevertheless not quite the same as Brandon's problem which led him to 
what we might call the mechanization of sex. A dildo is a kind of machine, and the effect is the mechanization of 
sex. 
He is seeking an apprenticeship in becoming a man. As part of this he befriends the ‘trailer trash’ colleagues who 
are going to rape and kill him. These are two men who are always somewhat outside the law. Brandon is not a 
criminal but he is beyond the everyday humdrum laws that make others a man or a woman. He is forced into 
identification with two men beyond the law. They become his same gender pals, same gender buddies. He is raped 
by two men with whom he is identified. Those identifications are destroyed along with the body of Brandon. The 
mother of one these men, plays a very ambiguous role. She sees that her son has a gun. She looks stressed about it, 
but does absolutely nothing to persuade him not to undertake the course of events which unfolded anyway, much 
like in a Greek tragedy. She does not use her influence at all on the son.  
“The unveiling of his genitals in the mother's house, extremely painful. They pulled his underwear pants down, 
and that was the moment when Brandon was murdered, not when he was actually shot. Brandon ceased to exist 
and became an object from that moment onwards. He now had only one way to cling to this world which was in 
the relationship he had developed with the young woman. His reality narrowed to her.  
“Brandon died for his gender. He sacrificed his life for his gender identification. The film for me provided me 
with a lot of pain. Certain scenes were unbearable.” 
For Klein (2009) this transgendered person has both his physical and symbolic body violated and his identity 
removed. 
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contradiction Isaacs (2011, personal communication) explains by the fact that they saw 
themselves as female gays.  
Isaacs (2011, personal communication) contrasts this situation with that of the young 
transgendered sex worker from Uganda who speaks of abuse from the gay community. She 
feels no affinity with the gay community and defiantly does not see herself as gay. As regards 
transitioning, this is not part of her vocabulary and moreover is costly. She knows she is a 
woman
202
.  
As noted by Gordon Isaacs (2011, public lecture) with a history of colonialism and oppression, 
Afrika is a continent with a collective wound. As with all crises of transition, and 
transformation, a period of vulnerability and anticipated healing co-exist. This paradox situates 
itself in the interlinked themes that make up modern-day Afrika: that of trauma and gender 
based violence, HIV/TB, addictions and stigma
203
 . Isaacs (2011, public lecture) states the 
following: 
                                                                                                                                                                                        
202 Isaacs (2011), who undertook workshops with transgendered sex workers from different parts of Afrika, 
observes that some transgendered sex workers in Afrika like to talk about sex – sex is what they do for a living –- 
while others who are more strongly identified with transgender identity politics find it deeply intrusive and a 
violence to pry into the sex life of a transgendered persons. For the more politically identified transgendered sex 
worker identity, sex work and gender need to be spoken about in political terms, spaces transgendered activists 
have fought hard to claim. There is a deep suspicion, towards the gay community and fear that within LGBTI the 
TI is subsumed by gay. I concur with Isaacs’ (2011, personal communication) analysis which reminds me of a 
remark I overheard in which a lesbian psychologist spoke about transgendered person in the most damning and 
pathologising manner, as “those people who mutilate their bodies and waste the state’s money”  
Isaacs (2011, personal communication) is of the opinion that transgender sex workers in Afrika clearly do not 
present a homogenous face and in fact more variations than similarities exist. What is common is the depiction of 
homelessness. Consider a young working-class mixed race transgendered sex worker, one of the few 
transgendered sex workers I have met who actually identifies with the term transgendered sex worker. Most 
transgender sex workers prefer to see themselves as ‘trans people’ or better still trans-woman or simply a woman 
who sell sex. This person, when it comes to business, refers to herself as a ‘chick with a dick,’ something the more 
ideological transgendered sex workers find offensive. She has a girl friend and when she makes love to her 
girlfriend she uses her penis and in fact has made her girl friend pregnant. Perhaps the usage of the term chick 
with a dick applies to her private life as well, only in this case in an inverse sense, in that having or not having a 
penis, does not make her woman.  
203 As an example consider South Africa which has amongst the highest rates of gender based violence in the 
world. It manifests in many ways: rape, “corrective rape”, sexual abuse, incest, child sexual abuse, and intimate 
partner violence in familiar surroundings. In Gauteng, the Medical Research Council concluded that over half of 
the women surveyed had experienced some form of gender violence, and that despite the statistics of reported rape 
in 2009/10 as over 55,000, it is recognized that only one in 25 rapes are reported annually, and at least half of the 
reported violent episodes are committed by persons younger than 18. [Kriel – Trauma Unit]. 
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The historic manipulation of communities and associated splintering of family life has impacted upon the 
countries exponential increase in GBV, HIV, and substance abuse.  Social dislocation, poverty, 
unemployment, homelessness, migration fuel the hungry appetite of violence. In addition entrenched 
patriarchal norms and beliefs form the basis of male gender entitlement percolated through social 
institutions and the socio-cultural scripts for female submissiveness and male hegemony. Divisive class 
structures, racial divides and the loss of a National Identity compound these phenomena.  
What is called for is a space free from the patriarchal gaze. In the work of Freud, which we can 
extract from a careful rereading of Foucault’s (1993: 34) critique of Freudian (dream) 
interpretation, Foucault (1994: 56) points to a particular woman’s  attempt to resist masterful 
(male) interpretations. Foucault tells us that over above the interpretations Dora’s dream 
expressed her disgust, her refusal to assume her feminine. “Dora got better, not despite the 
interruption of the psychoanalysis, but because by deciding to break it off, she went the whole 
distance to that solitude toward which until then her existence had been only an indecisive 
movement”.  
Foucault is of the opinion that psychoanalysis explores only one dimension of the dream 
universe, that of its symbolic vocabulary via a process of interpretation. What Foucault is 
arguing, in effect, is that the meaning of the dream that Freud explores is one that involves a 
reductionism. For Foucault (1994: 35), the dream is analyzed only in its semantic function, as 
Freudian analysis leaves its morphological and syntactic structure in the dark. The result of 
which is that the distance between meaning and image is closed, and the particularly 
imaginative dimension of the meaningful expression is completely omitted. The space of 
dream-retreat is penetrated and saturated by the male medical gaze.  
                                                          
The inextricable link between trauma, violence and substance abuse is clear. The vulnerable conscience and the 
heightened anxiety are key drivers to self- medicate our traumatic pain. In my opinion – stigma- underscores the 
pain and humiliation of persons in the context of trauma and recovery. Stigma is a social virus which mutates in 
the placebo of culture, tradition, morality and fearful beliefs. Stigma is often internalised as self oppression. It is 
this stigma, often compacted into moral injunctions, that we as mental health practitioners are confronted on a 
daily basis, and to echo the words of the late Steve Biko: the liberation from internalised self-oppression – or self-
stigma is seminal for healing. Known as primitive incorporation: we have the confidence and humility to know 
that our symbolic  devoured body and spirit by the legacy of the past – also contains the spirit of resilience and  
has the ability to regenerate, and this calibration sanctions the  all -consuming components of the intervention 
process: providing succour – hence the freedom to be repeatedly incorporated. 
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Foucault (1994) is calling for a subjectivity that cannot be rescued by masterful (we need to 
add, male) interpretations in much the same way that many Afrikan sex workers are asking for 
rights, not rescue. This is much the same way that Dora’s204 refusal of the interpretation needs 
to be placed alongside the refusal of many sex workers to be rescued, that is, to be constituted 
by a male subjectivity. In Jungian terminology the female sex worker
205
 can be seen as the 
trickster, beating men at their own predatory game.  
Sex (work), like dreams, has the potential to offer the subject a radical way of experiencing his 
or her own world, one which reverses the familiar normative heterosexual perspectives through 
fantasy. Sex Work, dreams become a performance, in the Judith Butler sense of the term, that 
resists the normative. With Freud’s reference to prostitution and the radical dimension of 
desire, that which refuses love or symbolization, the ‘drive,’ he pushes us in the direction of 
radical subjectivity
206
. 
The brothel in the broad sense of the term, a space where sex worker and client engage, is a 
much needed site allowing for the possibility
207
 of something other and radical in the field of 
sexuality to play, dream and be voiced. It is a home for that which is homeless in an analogous 
way that the ego-body, symbolic body is (often a reluctant) home for the drives, which is 
experienced as something uncanny
208
.  
                                                                                                                                                                                        
204
 A female patient who refused to be rescued and mastered by Freud.  
205 Male sex work introduces a different order of complexity, for example the male sex worker knows that for 
some older clients what they want to see is him with an erection as this constitutes in their minds the belief that 
they can still arose a young man, but the trickster dimension remains. 
206 But we have to wait for Lacan and his analysis of female jouissance to move from the exclusive male focus. 
However, like dreams, sex (work) can also be mandarin, repetitive and traumatizing. What is truly radical is not 
simply the possibility to imagine or voice other and contradictory dimensions of self, or even to transport (as with 
transference) oneself into another world, but the possibility of solitude, that no matter how powerful or engaging 
or masterful the moment, one is alone with the other/world.  
207
 Of course much of what happens sexually is often routine, but it is less a question of how creative the sex is but 
more if the encounter allows for the possibility of experiencing the space as librating, racial and creative.  Put 
another way, something akin to the spaces that open up when people engage in creative visualisations or are 
entranced by something.  
 
208 Richard Klein (1998) following JA Miller and Lacan refers to this embodiment as a paradoxical and uncanny in 
that that which is most intimate to body (I will add home) is also external. JA Miller (1994: 117) refers to the 
extimite was the exterior that is present in the interior. “The most interior has in the analytic experience, a quality 
of exteriority. Extimacy says that the intimate is Other – like a foreign body, a parasite.” For Klein (1998, public 
lecture) the heimlich entails knowledge, and the unheimlich is an affect associated with this secret knowledge that 
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The space of the brothel must not be viewed in a concrete manner, as something restricted to 
sex worker and the client, rather what is called for is the allowing of all women the possibility 
to be a ‘whore’, someone whose desire refuses patriarchal straightjackets and whose desire is 
not limited by male heterosexual desire and/or practice/power in heteronormative sexual 
relations between men and women i.e. that centre around an active and dominant male 
sexuality. This radical dimension is simply a refusal to reduce all sexuality and its expression 
to one dimensional identification system. In Richard Klein’s (2000, personal communication) 
terms, it is the movement from gender to enjoyment.  
What I am attempting to articulate are those sites, via the example of sex work, that challenge 
normative notions of gender, further challenge normative notions of home and allow for 
momentary transcendence, or better still, an experience in which one is not self aware. To be so 
caught up in something so that conscious self awareness is absent.  What seems to be at play is 
the unfolding of those contested spaces where identity formation and the possibility to go 
beyond the game of identity manifest. It is making room for the excesses, what Freud refers to 
as drive, that civilization cannot ‘tame’ and which surface as a site of discontentment.  
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
has become manifest. Unheimlich is a secret knowledge that produces anxiety. In his seminar on anxiety Richard 
Klein argues that in The Uncanny we get Freud’s version of the mirror stage. In Richard Klein’s (1998, public 
lecture) rereading of Heidegger he notes a return to that which Freud returns to, the space of the uncanny, un-
homeley, unfamiliar, and the dread (angst) that goes with this. Richard Klein rereads dwelling as something 
uncanny, an extimate space, always “outside of ourselves” but paradoxically “within us” at the same time. As 
Klein notes “For Heidegger's being-there (da-sein) is ‘closet’ to itself and but also furthest from itself. ‘Heidegger 
tells us that ‘Dasein is not only close to us - even that which is closet: we are it, each of us, we ourselves. In spite 
of this, or rather just for this reason, it is ontologically that which is furthest.’ We can thus surmise that dwelling is 
paradoxically within us and outside of ourselves. What makes the uncanny is so frightening because it refers to 
what is intimate to one, deeply so, but none the less hidden.”   
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Conclusion 
While analysts like Adam Phillips
209
, Richard Klein
210
 and Chris Oakley in their writing and 
lectures elaborate on the excesses that confront people in different ways, they all agree that the 
engagement with excess is needed, but often difficult. It seems that societies throughout the 
world have crafted different rites of passage and rituals to cope with the excesses of humanity, 
what Freud calls the drives. One such attempt to tame the drive is through identification and 
love, another by subduing women to the role of home maker, as has been depicted in a series of 
realist Hollywood films about the 1950s, for example the Hours. Another attempt to manage 
drive satisfaction is to use identifications as a way to drive people to attack those who are seen 
as a threat (to their identifications), as with war, hate crime and sport.  
For Phillips (2011: 2) the twenty-first century is the Age of Excess. For Phillips (2011: 3) 
excess involves an over stepping of limits, an extravagant violation of the norm, simply put, a 
                                                                                                                                                                                        
209 Adam Phillips (2010) in a series of essays on excess draws our attention to the experience of feeling too much 
for ourselves and others, something very evident in relationship, childhood and pre-language usage.  The home 
setting is one in which husband and wife, parent and child are in relationship to that, which is too much, and/or not 
enough, something they all have to somehow survive. And if this were not difficult enough, there is the excess of 
sex, the desires and fantasies in excess of the objects capacity to satisfy. For Phillips, as with Oakley, the 
disappointment, frustration and blame game runs alongside this failed satisfaction.  As such I conclude that the sex 
worker it seems is subjected to the projections that result from these excesses longing, fantasies and desires, as 
well as seen as the reason for disappointment, frustration and the one to blame.  
 
210 Richard Klein (2000) speaks of two psychoanalytic discoveries, the unconscious and that we enjoy in ways that 
are not in our best interest yet deeply enjoyable. As Klein (1997, public lecture) puts it: Our satisfaction is 
paradoxical in it introduces the category of the impossible, the let over excesses. Patients say they are not satisfied 
with what they are, but what they experience in their symptoms involves satisfaction. They are in a state which 
gives little content, but they are nevertheless content hence the reason they do not change...Lacan takes into 
account Freud’s discovery that satisfaction had undergone a change in its value. The superego nourishes itself on 
libido as the death drive bringing its own  kind of satisfaction. The sadistic dimension of the sexual drive is a 
death drive modified under the influence of narcissistic libido and so forced into a relation to the object. It now 
enters the service of the sexual function. 
Without getting into the complexity of the relationship between libido, sadism and the death drive, which changes 
during the course of Freud’s thinking and has been thought about in new ways since Lacan, we can simply note 
that the challenge is not simply bring love and desire together but that love and hate run side by side. Put another 
way, libido and death are knotted, much the same way as in masochism - pleasure in pain. This produces excess as 
well as anxiety.  
In Lacanian theory masochism, sadism, libido and the death drive are linked; hence the need for the concept of 
jouissance
 
and experience of anxiety which encountering that which reduces us to flesh due to a fading of our 
identifications. With the concept of jouissance Lacan links libido and the death drive and introduces us a concept 
of anxiety based less of the absence of something and more on something being too present.  
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departure from what is considered appropriate behaviour, “we abandon the version of ourselves 
we are supposed to be”. The reaction to the excess of the other, argues Phillips (2011), is 
righteous indignation, or rage about the transgression which results in a desire to punish. This 
desire to punish is often an excessive reaction on our part to their excessive behaviour. The 
home, hostel and prison function as a place which establishes ways of regulating excessive 
behaviour. Phillips (2011) asks what is the right amount of love, sex, food or even or belief and 
punishments when the codes of conduct and rules are broken.   
The brothel that allows for the transportation of self can in some ways be placed alongside the 
football coliseum and therapy rooms. What football offers is a much needed ritual
211
. In a 
world drained of spaces where one can escape and reconnect to the world of dreams, play and 
fantasy, football offers the person a space to live out intense emotion. Psychoanalyst Chris 
Oakley (2007) in writing about football and its similarity to therapy, points to the need for 
manageable doses of rapture, delirium and dream space, a place apart, something other that 
allows for self elected madness.   
To think about sex work we need to move from what sex work is for the sex worker to the role 
sex work plays in society. We need to understand the need for spaces like the brothel or 
football match where people can go into a state of trance and live out their contradictions. We 
also need to understand what happens when these much need escape routes are attacked.  
Chris Oakley (2007) makes reference to football as a ritual; it is a means of accessing dream 
space and experience excess. Football is clearly a ritual and a godless religion, as is 
psychoanalysis, in which the football stadium becomes the modern day cathedral
212
. 
                                                                                                                                                                                        
211 Stephen Gilligan (1993) is correct to suppose that rituals are perhaps the oldest form of therapy. Gilligan states 
that rituals are an intense experience involving heightened absorption and the use of non rational archaic language 
that recreates or transforms identity. It is a powerful bodily experience involving altered states of consciousness in 
which participants are deeply immersed in primary processes, such a bodily feelings, inner imagery and automatic 
(spontaneous) process. In the process of undergoing a ritual people are often able to externalize private 
conversations. 
Graham Bull (1996, personal communication) calls for a different conception of therapy from that of seeing it 
embedded in an individual psychiatric or psychological framework and instead to see it as a ritual. Bull is of the 
belief that the use of ritual is common in many communities around the world; in fact, it could be argued that the 
loss of ritual in the modern culture is in and of itself traumatic, as there are no longer forums for people to express 
deep psychic pain with communal support. 
212 Oakley (2007: 162) states that “churches traditionally provided comfort and sanctuary, shelter from the storm 
while football ceaselessly provides sanctuary from the ravages of sexual politics.” Football (Oakley 2007: 34) in 
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Contemporary rituals, like football and rugby
213
  are structured by the legacy of colonization
214
 
even if they may provide a postcolonial dimension.  
                                                          
this regard is a substitute religion, ritual, dream, altered state of consciousness and way to access childhood via 
playfulness; at the same time there is belief, belonging and community which install the notion of group life, to 
lay a claim to an identity that is tribal. In football there is another kind of play that Oakley draws our attention to - 
war games. Football can be a deadly kind of play, a battle, and war. As with children’s play the setting on the 
football field (or analytic couch) is based on an attraction to transgression, exercising oneself in opposing the will 
of the other. The drama that unfolds allows for both the most impulsive and most aggressive dimensions of us to 
find expression simultaneously, disavowed and excessive aspects of self to live our shadow-self vicariously, to 
live by proxy as it were, when we gaze at our heroes or demonise our villains.  Oakley concludes (2007: 42) that 
this freedom is to be deranged is vital because it offers a much needed denial, a defence even, against deadness. 
Does the sex worker, in a similar and different way to the therapist, take up the position of transitional object and 
do the war games of identity and identity confusion express themselves in these spaces?  
The space of football and analysis is like a transitional space, it enables us to negotiate and move between fantasy, 
dream, and so-called reality, the transitional object which is neither a ‘me’ nor ‘not-me’ but something in-between 
and paradoxical. As noted by Winnicott (1971) the transitional an object that can survive intense hate and love.  
The football/transitional-object is part of the football player and fan’s body but also separate from the body. The 
football/transitional-object is both imaginary and symbolic. There is a play with presence and absence and the 
never ending struggle against loss of identity and attempt to find a home. As many a partner of a football fan will 
testify, football not only consumes the home but in fact operates like an extended family home network, this 
giving the expression home advantage another meaning.   
At the same time Oakley tells us football is akin to religion and warand while it is space that allows for the 
possibility to play out some disavowed aspect of self this can turn ugly when this moves beyond play and results 
in a violent attack on the other much like certain clients and those brothels run by people who are exploitative and 
brutal. In football there is another kind of play that Oakley draws our attention to - war games. Football can be a 
deadly kind of play, a battle, and war. As with children’s play the setting on the football field (or analytic couch) 
is based on an attraction to transgression, exercising oneself in opposing the will of the other. The drama that 
unfolds allows for both the most impulsive and most aggressive dimensions of us to find expression 
simultaneously, disavowed and excessive aspects of self to live our shadow-self vicariously, to live by proxy as it 
were, when we gaze at our heroes or demonise our villains.  Oakley concludes (2007: 42) that this freedom is to be 
deranged is vital because it offers a much needed denial, a defence even, against deadness. Does the sex worker, in 
a similar and different way to the therapist, take up the position of transitional object and do the war games of 
identity and identity confusion express themselves in these spaces?  
 Oakley sites homophobia as an example of this. Ritual spaces are not ideologically free and spill over.  
213 Harper and Ntsime (2000) argue that rugby under apartheid lay deep in the heart of the construction of the 
white South African psyche. Playing rugby was never simply sport but about instilling a set of values. It was 
confirmation and belief in some kind of Aryrean ideal and a preparation for fighting on the border. The white male 
was put under a great deal of pressure to conform and identify with those identity-bearing signifiers which were 
the axiomatic form through which male identify was constructed. Rugby was also an initiation ritual into (white) 
manhood. When schoolboys prayed before a match, the manifest content of the prayer was about winning, the 
latent content involved a worshipping of those who fought in the Boer war and in the battle of Blood River. So 
instilled were these values that many a rugby schoolboy would willingly sacrifice himself for the team - to die for 
one's country. 
What happened on the rugby field was no less than a preparation for the army - to fight on the border . It would 
not be surprising to find in a family photo album, childhood pictures, followed by pictures of the school rugby 
team, followed by snapshots taken during military service. Harper and Ntsime (2000) argue that it is not by chance 
that the issue of Mandela needing to go back to court due the SA rugby board taking Mandela to court over the 
Presidents interference into rugby affairs occurred round about the same time as the TRC. What is at play in the 
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"Mandela versus Luyt" saga highlights the manner in which (phallic) power was constructed in the past in South 
Africa. The white South African psyche found its fixity through a particular investment in the construction of the 
white male; a construction which could only be maintained at the expense and negation of the value of the 
Other/difference (blacks, women, homosexuals, etc). white South Africans used to believe they occupied the 
centre of the universe; that they were the chosen race. This belief was confirmed by way of the subjection of black 
female domestic workers and male labourers (referred to as "boy") to the narcissistic whims of white children who 
were allowed to order them around.  
This indulging the child's narcissistic whims is not without effects. Not only do these actions breed a sense of 
entitlement, but in psychoanalytic terminology this could be described as a refusal of lack (vulnerability) and 
negation of Otherness. The child is brought up to believe that s/he has the phallus - that which can fill up the lack 
in the Other - is a law unto themselves and the chosen master race. Yet according the psychoanalytic doctrine, to 
become a subject, a speaking being, involves both a necessary separation and negotiation of lack, so as to 
negotiate otherness.  
By going to court Mandela is making a statement – no subject is above the Law. white South Africans who have 
historically acted as a law unto themselves. Within this phallocentric struggle the old icons become problematised 
and what was previously marginal comes into view - a superegoic code of conduct which imposes a moral through 
acting as a law unto itself, for example the new moral world order and superegoic code of conduct that is above 
and in place of the law.  
In 1995, Mandela's overtures of reconciliation and re-invention involved dressing up (in the Springbok rugby 
jersey) so that good will could be acted out. One wonders (fleetingly) what would happen if Mandela went to the 
court proceedings wearing the famous No.6 rugby jersey, remembering that he wore traditional African atire at the 
Rivonia trial? The ordering of Mandela to court is not surprising, what would be surprising is if SARFU (SA 
rugby board) did not take its case to court, but instead formed part of the TRC hearings, which is where it belongs.  
214 As noted by Gordon Isaacs (2011):  with a history of colonialism and oppression, Afrika is a continent with a 
collective wound. As with all crises of transition, and transformation, a period of vulnerability and anticipated 
healing co-exist. This paradox situates itself in the interlinked themes that make up modern day Afrika: that of 
trauma and gender based violence, HIV/TB, addictions and stigma Isaacs (2011). The historic manipulation of 
communities and associated splintering of family life has impacted upon the countries exponential increase in 
GBV, HIV, and substance abuse.  Social dislocation, poverty, unemployment, homelessness, migration fuel the 
hungry appetite of violence. In addition entrenched patriarchal norms and beliefs form the basis of male gender 
entitlement percolated through social institutions and the socio-cultural scripts for female submissiveness and 
male hegemony. Divisive class structures, racial divides and the loss of a National Identity compound these 
phenomena. As an example consider South Africa which has amongst the highest rates of gender based violence 
in the world. It manifests in many ways: rape, “corrective rape”, sexual abuse, incest, child sexual abuse, and 
intimate partner violence in familiar surroundings. In Gauteng, the Medical Research Council concluded that over 
half of the women surveyed had experienced some form of gender violence, and that despite the statistics of 
reported rape in 2009/10 as over 55,000, it is recognised that only one in 25 rapes are reported annually, and at 
least half of the reported violent episodes are committed by persons younger than 18. [ Kriel – Trauma Unit ]. The 
inextricable link between trauma, violence and substance abuse is clear. The vulnerable conscience and the 
heightened anxiety are key drivers to self- medicate our traumatic pain. In my opinion – stigma- underscores the 
pain and humiliation of persons in the context of trauma and recovery. Stigma is a social virus which mutates in 
the placebo of culture, tradition, morality and fearful beliefs. Stigma is often internalised as self oppression. It is 
this stigma, often compacted into moral injunctions, that we as mental health practitioners are confronted on a 
daily basis, and to echo the words of the late Steve Biko: the liberation from internalised self-oppression – or self-
stigma is seminal for healing. Known as primitive incorporation: we have the confidence and humility to know 
that our symbolic  devoured body and spirit by the legacy of the past – also contains the spirit of resilience and  
has the ability to regenerate, and this calibration sanctions the  all -consuming components of the intervention 
process: providing succour – hence the freedom to be repeatedly incorporated. 
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Ritual spaces are not ideologically free and spill over. Contemporary rituals, like football and 
rugby are structured by the legacy of colonisation even if they may provide a postcolonial 
dimension.  
It seems to me that in order to negotiate extremely complex realities that defy or deeply 
challenge our moral positions on what is right and wrong and what we can and cannot bear 
witness to, simplified realities – ideological positions – are presented. This occurs even 
amongst the sex work activists themselves and the UN. For example, while I concur with the 
UN position that one needs to be eighteen to identify as a sex worker, much like identifying a 
legal age for marriage, it is complicated in terms of how we describe what young people do 
under the age of 18, those who choose to sell sex. While it is easy to speak of this in terms of 
extraordinary conditions, the challenge is that for more and more Afrikan young women (and 
many gay and transgender young people) this is not an extraordinary condition. Of course we 
would like to say that it should not be the norm, that it is wrong, that these children should have 
homes and returned to school, but the reality is far more complicated.  
I concur with Asha Mohamud who argues that our starting point should not be to judge, rather 
to try and understand these situations from different perspectives, as opposed to simply a one 
fit explanation. As noted by Asha Mohamud (2012, personal communication) “Young people 
are choosing to use sex to survive; it is not a choice they necessarily want to make. Most 
importantly these young people’s rights are often negated and not considered of value, many do 
not have safe homes to go to at night, are hungry a great deal of the time and do not have safe 
drinking water.”  
People are quick to say it is wrong, but to what end, if not to make the observer somehow feel 
less helpless and less upset by the situation. Or worse, is it the fear of contamination from these 
unhygienic broken bodies?  
The concept I wish to use to understand the field of complexity is one of ‘living in parallel 
worlds
215’. Young people at risk of sexual exploitation, those engaging in survival sex and sex 
                                                                                                                                                                                        
215 The co-existence of parallel worlds is not confined to sex work. The very taking on of a role which excludes 
other vital dimensions of self when at work for most people is a challenge. More and more people live many lives, 
operate through multiple and conflicting roles and move in spaces which are in opposition to each other.  
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workers live in parallel worlds which do not come together. The construction of a universal in 
which one operates in parallel worlds can be thought about as a necessary strategy to endure 
lived spaces which do not sit comfortably together. While people assume a harmonious and 
consistent progression of self throughout the day this is a fiction. The different, conflicting and 
paradoxical realities and lives that people live, especially in Afrika; result in living in parallel 
universes or experience. This is not a good or bad thing but a different kind of reality. The 
more the person can endure and live with these paradoxes and contradictions, the less 
conflicting are the lived realities. Freud has some understanding of this in the recommendation 
that one free association and allows conflicting realities to exist without the need to negate the 
one reality at the expense of the other.  
For the young person engaging in survival sex from Mozambique, when she goes onto the 
street at night, she walks within a woman’s body; she knows how to be a hustler and learns 
how to compete with sex workers selling a youthfulness they cannot offer. When she goes 
home she returns to a child’s body only to then have to take care of her child. Or the sex 
worker who walks through a door in which as a professional she engages with the excesses, 
absurdity, vulnerabilities, embarrassment and aggression of male sexuality only to then change 
back into her home outfit, walk back home with the fear of being discovered and then to sit 
around the dinner table with her family and her secret.  She belongs to the Fanon’s wretched of 
the earth who stands at the forefront of the revolution, but a revolution as Fanon imagined it.  
In conclusion I have theorized sex work as one example of homelessness. I have used sex work 
as a test case to understand how Freud, Fanon and Foucault embrace homelessness. Freud, 
Fanon and to a lesser extent Foucault could only go so far in imagining a home and 
understanding the homeless condition of the sex worker. Freud enables us to understand male 
libido that the female sex worker has to engage but at time he imposes and speaks for women. 
This limits his engagement with the Afrikan sex worker and restricts how far he can go in 
unpacking how the sex workers engagement with male libido structures her sexuality. Fanon 
understands the lasting legacy of slavery, as with trafficking, but fails to differentiate sex work 
and slavery and understand the liberating potential the black women finds through sex work.  
Michael Foucault (1998: 179-184) ‘corrects’ the work Freud and Fanon with the concept 
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heterotopia - a “place without geographical co-ordinates” and a “different place compared with 
ordinary cultural spaces”. 
Extending the work of Freud, Fanon and Foucault we can turn Casarino (2002: xxvii) who 
following Benjamin is interested in space as a potentiality “in which one may become other 
than what one already is”. Moreover rather than reassuring and reconfirming everything that 
she is, we need to be drawn to a whole other space in which she may live otherwise.  Casarino 
following Deleuze notes that Foucault tried to teach us the indignity of speaking not only for 
others but ourselves as well. To explain this Casarino (2002: xxiii) points out how forms of 
representation have become the commodity form.  He notes that “to the extent to which 
something is representable and nameable it is already part and parcel of history as status quo, 
while the forces that disrupt such a status quo are refractory to any form of representation”. He 
concludes that to “the extent to which representation does take place, it needs to be understood 
and studied as the by-product of a forever incomplete and forever renewed process of 
exploitation of the unrepresentable.”  
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CHAPTER SEVEN 
CONCLUSION 
Introduction 
The subject of the play is genius breaking out in the home and against the home. You needn’t have gone 
to see it. It’s going to happen in your own house. (Joyce, on the play Magda, quoted by Luke Gibbons 
2000).  
“I cannot,” Joyce told Nora Barnacle, “enter the social order except as a vagabond.” (Letter from Joyce to 
Barnacle, 1904, quoted by Emer Nolan, 2000).  
Leading researchers into neuroscience and the brain, in attempting to locate the holy grail of the ‘self’ are 
left with the insight that in essence there is no one ‘at home’, but the stories we tell ourselves. That in fact 
stories reconfigure not only neural networks in the brain but by extension those of the social. Stories 
change society. (personal communication with de Lancey, 2011). 
So the question one obviously asks is what does the machine produce, what is that gigantic installation 
used for and what comes out of it? That nothing at all is produced. Society eliminates by sending to 
prison people whom prison breaks up, crushes, physically eliminates, and then once they have been 
broken up, the prison eliminates them by freeing them and sending them back to society; and there, their 
life in prison, the way in which they were treated, the state in which they come out insures that society 
will eliminate them once again. Like a kidney which consumes, destroys, breaks up and then rejects, and 
which consumes in order to eliminate what it has already eliminated. (Michel Foucault in Attica: An 
Interview, quoted by John K. Simon, 1991). 
By way of concluding, I first revisit the arguments and goals of the work, namely, the 
knowledge production on homelessness and its links with violence and oppression, inequality, 
marginalization. Following this, I build upon how we can use Freud, Fanon and Foucault’s 
ethical engagements as a model of practice with the homeless. I then reflect on the fact that, in 
spite of all their contributions and what they open up together in their arguments, they all have 
a certain blind spot that is gendered. This is linked to a discussion around rationality and taking 
up the position of the father. The question as to homelessness’s material or psychological 
dimension is then discussed via the work of Marx and Nietzsche. I end by making 
recommendations and identifying future projects.  
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Summary 
The specific area of investigation of this work was the emergence of the concept of 
homelessness as it surfaces in the work of three key writers: Sigmund Freud, Franz Fanon and 
Michael Foucault, who all find themselves both 'inside' and 'outside' the canon of Western 
thought. These writers were selected specifically because, in their uncertain relation to Western 
thought within which they invariably operate, a new understanding of homelessness unfolds. 
The aim has been to imagine the homeless community and the relationship between violence 
and homelessness in new and unforeseen ways. This has included, for example, the use of 
torture as an example of homelessness at a limit point, namely that point of being without 
mental or physical space within which to retreat. Two other examples were the emphasis on the 
concept of the uncanny and the presentation of the dimension of homelessness existence as 
having a Nietzschean aspect.  
By way of exploring the lack of space within which to retreat, the thesis explores the meaning 
of colonising in terms of oppression, slavery and torture, as well as colonisation being strongly 
influenced by Western theory, including anthropology philosophy  and theology.  The work 
documents many instances of the impact of theism in the life of Freud. It calls for recognition 
of a gender sensitive approach and a deconstruction of patriarchy. 
Colonial history and its relationship to power, authority and patriarchy, as well as memory 
relating to colonial history were distilled through a dissection of the profiles of Freud, Fanon 
and Foucault. Against the backdrop of Western colonisation of Afrika, the private and public 
spaces of homeless people – with special reference to a case study of sex work in South Afrika 
– was explored. Through this exploration, we meet the contested spaces, race, religion, identity 
and historical wounds that frame a particular aspect of gender: patriarchy and its impact on 
civilisation today.  
This work is a discourse on the individual (body), the collective body (symbolic man) and 
those who have been disembodied by colonialism, manifesting in torture, homelessness, 
displacement and, ultimately, violence. The discourse is linked to personal revelations and 
work experiences which aim to add to the verisimilitude of the study.  
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At the beginning of this work, it was shown that the problem we face is that the theory, 
including history and research, of homeless people tends to be surveyed and recorded by those 
institutions responsible for providing punishment, refuge and ‘cure’ so as to discipline, house 
and ‘save’ the homeless. These institutions approach homelessness from the perspective that it 
is something that can be removed by building houses, providing spiritual and psychological re-
education, and getting people back to work. These responses frame our understanding of 
homelessness as, for example, a housing problem. This work introduced a different 
formulation, one that is not limited to the strictures of therapy and correction.  
To demonstrate my understanding of the relationship between violence and homelessness, I 
have pointed to various symptomatic expressions of this, such as the manner in which 
inhospitable living spaces are grounds for the incubation of disease, as evidenced by the 
intensive farming of animals which helped produce swine and bird flu.  
Extending Agamben’s analysis of refugees and the construction and use of the camp,  the 
homeless were presented as those excluded from humanity: those branded slave, criminal, sick, 
invisible, shack dweller, drug addict, prostitute, asylum seeker, third world or simply animal. 
Giorgio Agamben (1996: 122) states: “Inasmuch as the inhabitant of the camp has been 
severed from the political community and has been reduced to naked life... to a life that does 
not deserve to be lived.” In addition to this, the thesis points out that when the concepts of 
home and violence are presented as mutually exclusive, and when homelessness is presented as 
the binary and opposite of the home, certain taken-for-granted assumptions come into 
operation, replacing a critical examination of the relationship between violence and 
homelessness. Moreover, it was revealed that one can be both homeless and not homeless at the 
same time, and that homelessness, for some, is a way to find a home or dwelling.  
Through looking at the lives and works of Freud, Fanon and Foucault, it became apparent that 
homelessness is a historical event at the same time as it is a geographical space and deeply 
personal experience. It has a material and psychological dimension, but the separation of the 
different dimensions is not clear-cut. For example, as a male doctor, Freud was accepted at 
home but as a Jew, he risked becoming an outcast. As such, he was both at home but homeless. 
To further elaborate upon this tension between being both European and non-European, what 
was ‘foreign’ within the life and work of Freud was unpacked. As put forward by Sander L 
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Gilman (1993), in so doing, Freud’s work can, in part, be seen a response to the history of 
racism (by the medical and scientific establishment), internalised self-oppression and 
homelessness. At the same time, this work shows that Freud’s response to homelessness and 
nationalism is ambiguous. One way of negotiating this ambiguity is to situate the work between 
Partha Chatterjee’s (1993) Nation and its Fragments and Benidict Anderson’s (1991) Imagined 
Communities.  
Fanon’s work – in particular, his elaboration of the convergence of the political and 
psychological – enabled us to understand the experience of having no mental and physical 
space into which one can retreat. The production of places in which the other has no mental 
and physical space into which to retreat, as depicted by Fanon, is a description of homelessness 
at the limit. What is especially helpful in understanding this is the overlap the political and 
psychological. Fanon describes the result of this convergence as the breaking down of a sense 
of belonging or of being rooted in a material, political and psychological way through the 
disconnecting the body, thought and soul from community and ancestors, and the reducing of 
the person to flesh.  
Fanon describes a kind of violence which Achille Mbembe elucidates as the encounter with no 
recognition as an independent self-consciousness being. Mbembe’s (2001: 200) description of 
the reducing of the person to flesh – meat – is particularly illuminating in this regard. The 
killing of the native belongs to the same register as the killing of an animal, but, as Mbembe 
(2001: 167) writes: 
(for) “flesh to become meat, it must undergo a series of procedures. First, it must be cut into pieces or 
quarters. These have to be cleaned .... Like that of the animal whose throat is cut, the death inflicted on a 
human being is perceived as embracing nothing. It is a death of a purely negative essence without 
substance.”  
Mbembe (2001) notes the multiple forms of violence that this can take, for example ceremonial 
punishment, forced labour to everyday forms of torture, harassment, fatigue, and execution. 
Following Foucault the relationship between homelessness and violence is seen as discursive 
field, framed by particular discourses - for example, nationalism, sovereignty, colonisation, 
class, etc - from which homelessness surfaced. It is clear that understanding the alignment of 
these discursive practices is crucial to the way in which we think about the history of 
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homelessness. Moreover, my reading of Foucault’s (2003) Society Must be Defended enabled 
me to assert that sovereignty has evolved into something less obvious, being the home. The 
history of sovereignty involves a transformation of the normal/abnormal divide into property 
owners and homeless.  
The category of the home functions in much the same way that the classification of normal did 
in the past. The norm is having – or wanting to have – a home. Foucault noted that practices 
directly and indirectly related to sexuality, such as the concept of body, home and homeland, 
become entwined in a taken-for-granted manner with the proliferation of identity narratives. 
Thus it is that home becomes saturated not only with nationalist imagery but is a densely 
gendered space, consumed by class aspirations. The net effect, as Gibbons (2000: 164) 
describes, is “the lifeless monotony of domestic routines.” The history of homelessness, like 
madness, is detailed by those maintaining social hygiene by policing the boundaries and 
borders of public and private domains of the social body, what constitutes inside and outside, 
internal and foreign, and heterosexual and perverse. This ‘history’ is a vast and elaborate 
system of surveillance – through record keeping, security checks and other means – to control 
and monitor the social body so that it complies with home rule. 
In this work, it has been shown that homelessness cannot be separated from debates around 
what constitutes the birth of the modern man. She who breaks with the so-called traditional 
orderings of the world is the self-same person organized by the effects of capitalism, 
colonization, slavery, urbanization, patriarchy, nationalism, sovereignty, class, race, gender and 
sexual orientation. Homelessness has taken on a contemporary shape with the radical social, 
economic, political and cultural transformation of the global landscape over the past two 
hundred years. The technological restructuring and proliferation of economical and cultural 
capital across geographic borders and the break with Western and Afrikan traditions, alongside 
war, rape and mass migration, have, for some, brought about a profound sense of dislocation: a 
loss of a sense of location, placement and embodiment.  
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Ethics of engagement 
Freud, Fanon and Foucault offer us an ethical engagement with the world. Following Fanon 
and Foucault this work calls for more work around the question of “who owns the body?” in 
attempting to understand the relationship between violence and homelessness. Stated 
differently, it is the call for an ethical orientation or, in the words of Fanon (1972:31), a body 
that is in “motion towards the world”. Fanon (1972: 48) explains that without this movement, 
we have an “anxious man who cannot escape his body. He goes on to state: “O my body, make 
of me always a man who questions!” (Fanon, 1972: 165).   
My reading of Fanon’s clinical approach, based on what he states about medicine, psychiatry 
and a host of anecdotal information, is that his practice is premised on the assumption that the 
way the practitioner approaches the wretched of the earth, homeless people, is tied to Western 
language games of truth. This in turn reflects the way in which the social bond is constituted 
under the logic of Western capitalism. To expand this argument, psychotherapy within a First 
World Western context has traditionally focused on and benefited those individuals who came 
knocking at our door asking for help. This form of clinical practice rests on the assumption that 
the person is both familiar with and able to benefit from our way of doing therapy. This is, 
however, not the case with many people who are either not familiar with psychotherapy, come 
from cultures that do not practice psychotherapy, or find it difficult to ask for help or adapt to 
the therapeutic framework. 
Fanon (1990) points out that the wretched of the earth do not ask for treatment, be it medical or 
psychotherapy. Instead, they are frightened off by the way in which treatment is conducted in 
the West. This is in part due to the manner in which some practitioners cling to and expect 
people to conform to a particular therapeutic frame. It is also often due to the doctor or 
therapist standing in for the colonizer. The treatment framework can hold the client ransom to a 
particular language game, restricting the client’s capacity to speak and subjecting the client to a 
particular kind of social bond.  
This demand alienates many people in that they are unable to adapt to and comply with the 
therapeutic framework. Furthermore, when people do not immediately and openly embrace 
what is on offer, and instead display indifference or hostility, or, worse, do not get better; they 
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present the practitioner with a challenge. One response is to categorize the person through a 
label such as resistant or borderline. This client group will, in some cases, be forgotten and 
replaced with a more responsive group who openly embrace what is on offer. The same client 
group will also be used as an example of homeless illness and of the native mind’s lack of 
suitability for treatment. In effect, what the ‘hard to reach’, wretched, and homeless person 
does is to put into question the rules of the game – the therapeutic/analytic tie. So saying, the 
taken-for-granted ways in which the social bond is constructed and played out through the 
therapeutic/analytic tie is problematised. 
Fanon’s clinical work argues that a form of clinical practice is needed which reaches out to 
those individuals who exist outside of the social bond and who are confined to the outskirts of 
the society. The major contributing factor to becoming a homeless person, whether an Algerian 
under French rule, a refugee or schizophrenic on the streets, is the experience of occupying a 
nameless position in the world, forgotten and sacrificed through an interplay of various double 
binds which entrap the individual and leave him or her without choice. The person is driven 
crazy in that s/he is a pawn in a puzzle and subjected to the needs of others. S/he is forced to 
play a particular role in a drama constructed by others. 
Having worked with ex-political prisoners, war trauma survivors, torture survivors and the 
street homeless from Western and non-Western cultures, I have developed a supervisor strategy 
which draws on the work of Fanon, placed alongside multiple additional sources: Gordon 
Isaacs’s reading of crisis therapy (2012), Richard Klein’s reading of Lacan (2012), Chris 
Oakley’s reading of RD Laing (2012) and Trevor Lubber’s interpretation of Melanie Klein 
(2011). This has enabled me to co-construct a space within which the work could take place. 
This was based on my assumption that the starting point would be to offer basic recognition of 
the humanity of the other, to engage in a way in which one tries not to impose the presence of 
the practitioner but to gets to know the lived reality of the client, including all those cultural 
resources, such as solution-focused moments, that open up space and ways of framing the 
experience from new perspectives. Fanon was not afraid to talk and listen to so-called mad 
people and to be guided by them. He was open to incorporating different elements into his 
treatment framework, such as aspects of Islamic culture, a coffee ritual as an important element 
in care.  
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Following Fanon, we need to ask if our concepts close down space or open up or open up 
possibilities
216
. This question relates to the ethical use of our methodology. The point is not 
about whether or not the client is resistant borderline or engaged in projective identification, 
but about exploring the ways in which practitioners talk to and about their clients, thereby 
establishing a predetermined identity for the client and the practitioner that leaves clients 
without voice. 
What can be extracted from Freud, Fanon and Foucault is an ethic in which there is an attempt 
to open up space, a clearing, a lichtung
217
, that allow for different possibilities, such as fluid 
spaces not limited by the constraints of the taken-for-granted. It is the spaces in-between, both 
inside and outside, that gives rise to paradoxical positions that Manuel Castells (2004) has 
called a space of flows.  
Paul Gilroy (1996: 22) argues that the “concept of space is transformed when seen less through 
outmoded notions of fixity and place and more in terms of the ex-centric communicative 
circuitry” that has enabled dispersed populations to converse, interact, synchronize and cross 
barriers. The ethic within which this is founded creates a clearing of clutter so as to allow for 
the rhythmic unfolding of particularity. The goal is not to invest one’s needs within this space, 
but rather to take up an ethical position in which one takes one's bearings on a ‘want-to-be’ 
terms, engaging in a witnessing and listening such that “what one enjoys does not interfere 
with what one hears or how one intervenes” (Klein 1996: personal communication). The ‘want-
to-be’ is what Klein (1997) refers to as a lack of being, essence and fixed signifiers. This points 
to adopting a position of being empty, without attributes and not assuming to know what is 
good for another. It involves trust and enduring both what transpires in the work, along with 
not knowing (that which eludes our comprehension), acting with humility and allowing space 
                                                                                                                                                                                        
216 Gordon Isaacs (2012, personal communication) calls for a paradoxical framing of space, “Into the darkness of 
space, where the libido has no name, where guilt was simply a lie, and primal screams were just an inverted 
orgasm. How we converge on space is like a glass of half empty water. You see the glass is actually full, as the 
invisible space fills the rest of the half. So the glass is full. It’s the invisible space, which we occupy, and the only 
way we can capture it, is to make it transparent, which is also a space you can see through! So in fact we are all 
invisible!” 
 
217
 Lichtung means clearing, while licht means light. Heidegger states that to bring light we need must not force a 
light into a dark space but clear away the clutter which will open up space that brings light. I am trying to use the 
term in a spatial way, a means of lighting that is beyond the belvedere, scene. 
 
 
 
 
 
285 
 
for that which lies outside of discourse and does not adhere to the various ‘language games’ 
(Wittgenstein, 1953) of truth. 
 
Ironic statehood 
The key argument of this work is that we need to engage with paradoxes and contradictions 
that can be found in the lives and works of Freud, Fanon and Foucault. One such paradox, 
which is overlooked, is the subversive position that these three took up in relation to medicine 
and colonization. Freud and Fanon become doctors; Foucault’s father was a doctor. But what 
was it to be a doctor in their lifetimes? Each of them offers an answer to this question which is 
subversive of patriarchy – an answer that Lacan (Bracher, M. 1994) calls the discourse of the 
master and which speaks to resistance to authority in the form of patriarchy.  
In his paper The Question of Lay Analysis, Freud (1927) rejects the assumption that one has to 
be a medical doctor to practice psychoanalysis. Everybody needs to humbly submit to analysis, 
lying down in a passive position and speaking from a place of lack, regardless of the titles they 
have. Moreover both the analyst and client need to engage in free association, a different kind 
of listening. The response to Freud’s refusal to uphold the title of medical doctor was 
interesting. In most of the states in the USA, Freud’s recommendations were ignored. 
Alongside this refusal to detach psychoanalysis from the position of medical doctor, two key 
developments took place: the establishment of ego psychology with its demands that the 
healthy ego adjusts to societal demands and the pathologisation of homosexuality. In France, 
the situation was different, thanks to a radical rereading of Freud. Freud’s paper on lay analysis 
offered Lacan the tools to deconstruct the discourse of the master via the discourse of the 
hysteric and analytic discourse. The discourse of the analyst is an ethical position build on a 
lack and on not knowing.  
Fanon tells us in Medicine and Colonialism that the doctor was, in the colonies, an integral part 
of colonization, “proof of the extension of the occupier’s hold on the country” (Fanon, 1989: 
122). The doctor’s approach to the colonized body, as with the colonizer’s more generally, can 
be seen to involve arrogance, contempt, hateful brutality and a pioneering, cowboy attitude. 
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The doctor actively collaborated with the colonial forces and standardized the relations 
between the knowing master and the fearful body that become rigid when examined and told to 
yield by the technician and colonizer. Fanon is clear that Western medical science is part of the 
oppressive system. We can simply state the obvious, which is that Western medical science 
embodies a male and heteronormative chauvinism. 
For Foucault, the challenge is to understand the intersection of some of the different 
discourses that enable a concept to surface (Foucault, 1974: 41). So saying, to arrive at 
the concept of home is to stumble upon a host of interrelated events: relationships, the 
emergence of the nuclear family, the transitions from a territorial state to that of a 
population and nation state, and the politics of health in the eighteenth and nineteenth 
century.  
Foucault presents an extensive critique on medicine but what is of interest to us is the 
link he makes between pastoral care, the home and medicine in the eighteenth century. 
As he shows, medicine from this time onwards takes on an administrative role in 
society and forms part of the machinery of power. Foucault tells us that the doctor’s 
function is that of a hygienist; while the role of each family home is to function as an 
inexpensive hospital (and, we can add, prison).  
This increasingly important role comes about due to a privileging of hygiene and the 
functioning of medicine as an instance of social control or urban space. Foucault 
asserts: “This programme of hygiene as a regime of health for the populations entails a 
certain number of authoritarian medical interventions and controls. First of all, control 
of the urban space in general” (Foucault, 2000: 98 - 99). In order to control urban space, 
a re-organisation of the home – namely the medicalization, education, imprisonment of 
the individual’s body – was needed. The hospital develops a specialized role relative to 
the family. Alongside the medicalization of the individual’s forms, medical procedures 
become part of a complex network used to organize the family home and to administer 
and control the population. The family home is given the linking role between general 
health, and hygiene of the social body and the family members’ need for care. By 
making the family the agent of medicalisation, the control of urban space is further 
extended. 
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It is within their critical engagement of medical science that Freud, Fanon and Foucault offer a 
partnership engagement with feminism. At this point, Lacan’s work is shown to be of value in 
the discussion. In order to go beyond the law in the Name of the Father, Oedipus and phallus, 
Lacan turns to female sexuality. Lacan’s work uses the examples of women like Dora, 
Antigone and Diotima of Mantinea and the female anorexic to illustrate something that goes 
beyond phallic desire. Let us ponder the example of Diotima, who is a ‘prostitute.’ She is not 
just any sex worker, but a high priestess, as well as the teacher of Socrates. Both Socrates and 
Lacan point to the centrality of the wisdom of Diotima in approaching the riddle of love (and 
transference). In Freudian terminology, love shows the division of the sensual and affect 
upheld by the splitting of the images of the whore and the mother. However, as Afrikan sex 
workers continually point out, whores are mothers: they not only have children and mother 
some of their clients but they are often the containers holding marriages together.  
Within the whore/mother division, as with Frege– who unveils the two senses of “morning 
star” and “evening star” as same star – is the same person. The whore is the shadow that falls 
upon the mother that men and many women repress and refuse to grant recognition that the 
mother has a whore in her somewhere (and that the whore is also often a mother). The sex 
worker lives at the centre of the home, love and transference. We can add, that as a mother and 
site of enjoyment, she can also hold together other homes, such as the homes of clients. She is 
that uncanny enjoyment that takes one beyond the naming father. Pushing these analogies of 
mother/whore and morning star/evening star even further, home/homeless, and canny/uncanny 
can be seen to reference the same star. The difference lies in whether it is a morning or evening 
experience.  
 
Rationalist Male Enlightenment 
Despite Freud, Fanon and Foucault offering some alignment with feminism through their 
questioning of the all-knowing doctor, we need to be mindful of the gap, namely that Freud and 
Fanon and Foucault were incapable of fully extricating themselves from this rational, male 
order. The most evident collusion with this ‘rationalized oppression’ is their complicated and, 
at times, oppressive relationship with women and female sexuality.  It is a complex collusion in 
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that Fanon, Freud and Foucault in their day-to-day dealings with women were often enabling 
and supportive. Moreover, and ironically, all three of them were strongly attached to their 
mothers and actively challenged their own fathers, as well as father/patriarchal figures in 
society.  
The slippage seems to arise in the need to occupy the vacant position left by the failed father 
and uphold the Name of the Father, as Lacanians put it. Fanon and Freud clearly attempt to fill 
this void. By occupying the absent place, they incarnated the father of protection and 
guarantee. Following Richard Klein (1999), I argue that the pacifying function, generated by 
the Name of the Father, both produces phallic meaning and upholds what Lacan calls the 
paternal metaphor. The paternal metaphor installs the pleasure principle which is the principle 
of the Oedipus
218
. The Oedipus and the Name of the Father becomes sites of entrapment.  
In the case of Freud, it can be seen that there is something in his work that is simultaneously 
for and against heteronormative morality, racial stereotyping and feminism. Freud’s longing to 
find spaces within which to dwell and belong, allows for the emergence of analytic space with 
its commitment to the ritual (or space) of free association. He is at the same time confined by a 
restricted, male, scientific, masterly gaze that I suggest yearns for middle-class comfort and the 
ability to map the unseen. The stumbling block in the work of Freud emerges out of 
internalized self-oppression, which resurfaces for him as the uncanny (the unheimlich) or 
Ostjuden
219
) that unsettles and haunts the middle-class, assimilated, German male scientist. To 
grasp Freud, we need to understand his humour, which is ironic, saying yes and no at the same 
time. For Richard Klein, this ironic humour pushes us in the direction of Gödel’s logic of 
“incomplete” and “incompletable” elements in which the atypical citizen no longer desires to 
find an Other of guarantee that is complete and consistent, but accepts the “lack in the Other, 
the Other is incomplete and cannot guarantee the truth” (Richard Klein, 1995: 8).  
Fanon takes, as his starting point, Freud’s point of self-restriction and failed attempts to 
assimilate the discovery that one suffers from an unconscious sense of guilt about being black. 
Fanon supplements the Freudian typology of consciousness, pre-consciousness and 
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 As noted by Richard Klein (2012, personal communication) if we translate heim and unheimlich as Oedipal and 
non-Oedipal, we enter a way to expand on the notion of going beyond the father land.  
 
219
 Ostjuden, was the term given to the Jews migrating to Vienna and Germany from Eastern Europe in the 1800s. 
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unconsciousness with a double consciousness, namely Black Consciousness and working-class 
consciousness that needs to be placed alongside established home order and appearance of 
things. This double consciousness places the black man at a border, as something 
‘incommensurable’ that disrupts the attempt to assimilate, fit into the white world, including 
the nation state. It is a fruitless attempt as there is something that resists or simply cannot be 
assimilated.  
Foucault rejected any upholding of the position of the father, or privileging of the Oedipus, but 
none the less, he often wrote as a male. Foucault has been rejected by some feminists on the 
grounds of phallocentrism, Eurocentrism and a crude insensitivity to the women’s struggle. 
Foucault is rejected by others as somebody who fails to understand or support women, in much 
the same way Freud is presented as sexist. Foucault is also rejected by some feminists as 
someone who produced a theory that is anti-humanist (in opposition to the theoretical 
foundations of some feminist theories). Needless to say, there are other feminists who find 
much strategic value in the use of Foucault’s strategies and critical methods, even if ‘his story’ 
is not ‘her story’. What his approach does offer feminists is an embrace of differences as 
opposed to the elision of differences and the enforcing of a homogenized feminist perfectives 
of the world.  
It does appear at times, although not always, that Foucault is indifferent to women’s struggles 
and that he cannot imagine himself in the position of a woman. His work does display a 
phallocentrism and at times he displays a ‘double stand.’ This refers to the fact that he did not 
fully agree with the ideology of the gay rights struggle but none the less supports gay rights. 
The same support is not found when it comes to the feminist movement. 
Moreover, as Bhabha (1994) points out, by way of his analysis of border lives and the uncanny, 
that not only is assimilation disaster-prone but in fact within this zone, sites of resistance open 
up that enable other positions to surface that are neither one nor another, but a cultural hybrid, a 
third space. Homi Bhabha pushes Fanon’s work in this direction towards those figures “written 
out and erased” that “return as disruptive un-homely presences that cannot be articulated 
through existing patterns of representation” (McLeod 2000: 220). Via a reading of Fanon, 
Homi Bhabha gives Freud’s concept of the uncanny a socio-political dimension by noting that 
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it serves as a reminder of those “exclusionary systems of meaning are forever haunted by those 
who are written out and erased” (McLeod 2000: 220). 
Foucault does not introduce another register of consciousness but makes all theory something 
uncanny. He does this by unsettling the established ground of understanding. The early 
Foucault offers us a spatial understanding of constriction that needs to be placed alongside the 
work of Fanon. With the later work of Foucault we feel the full force of Nietzsche’s Dionysian 
wild (festival) experience. As with the later work of Nietzsche, who wants to create (as 
opposed to discover) truth, there emerges something uncanny, perhaps beyond good and evil. 
This ‘truth’ questions a value-free reality and the appearance of things taken for granted.  
In effect, Foucault, following Nietzsche, turns Descartes’ investment in the certainty of 
thought, upside down. The ego/body/place, from which people assume thoughts to surface, 
becomes a site of uncertainty as there is no ‘I’ that thinks as the author is dead. Within the 
work of Freud, Fanon and Foucault, lie the threads of an anti-Oedipal space (Deleuze and 
Guattari, 1989), beyond the all knowing and naming father and without a fixed centre. In this 
space, the nomadic/homeless body moves, thinks and experiences differently due to being open 
to unconventional spatial orientations that can make new connections in keeping with the 
movement of life as it unfolds (Lorraine 2005: 159). As Klein (2012 personal communication) 
states:  
“With Lacan’s concept of the name of the father we discover more about the Oedipus, he completes 
something in Freud that was incomplete. However, as Lacan’s teaching progressed he began to 
decomplete Freud by creating an Other that does not exist and that devalues the name of the father. Lacan 
is providing us with a beyond the Oedipus, he is saying we can do without the Oedipus, but we still need 
the concept of castration (lack).”  
 
The male rationalist body of property  
The world that Freud, Fanon and Foucault occupied was one in which the ‘death of God’ was 
pronounced. Moreover, following the World Wars, economic depressions and advancement of 
colonization, Freud, Fanon and Foucault were confronted with the refutation of a progressivity, 
technological and liberationist understanding of development. The Enlightenment had not 
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given rise to an objective, pure and value-free rationality and empirical science leading to the 
development and liberation of the human race; on the contrary, the rise of technological reason 
was intimately linked to the creation of a male order marked by divisions, destruction of human 
life and unthinkable horrors. As Alphonso Lingis (1992: 1, 2) puts it: 
Not only did the Second World War confront European thinkers with the refutation of their progressivist, 
liberationist Enlightenment understanding of technological development; the extremities of gratuitous 
cruelty and of the self-destruction of European industries and nations seemed to confront Europeans with 
the unthinkable. We have also come to recognize, to our horror, that if the existing arsenal should be 
destroyed through international agreement, and all the industries capable of manufacturing such weapons 
dismantled, and all the blueprints for such industries burned, the power to re-create them, the power to 
bring extinction upon the species, could never be extirpated from the planet as long as the fundamental 
principles of rational science are at large in the minds of men. Henceforth in every society formed by 
contract, when we falter and look to our brother, is it not Sade we see?  
A by-product of the Enlightenment (Age of Reason
220
), modernity and nation state, alongside 
the collapse of feudalism was the rise of liberalism and a new economic order, including 
banking, was slavery and colonization.  The effect of which was that rational and economic 
Enlightenment meant homelessness for many others. The rise of the European middle class and 
the value of commerce and industry, as well as the scramble for Afrika, in the eighteenth and 
nineteenth century brought about the enactment of property and body rights. The scene that 
unfolded was one in which the respect for the rights of property and body of some became law 
alongside the disregard for the land and body of those from the ‘other-world’.  
These rights of body and property were reinforced by the belief that men (sic) are born equal 
and that subsequent inequality is a product of circumstances. This belief system, called 
liberalism, believed itself to be based on a scientific progress that opposed the medieval 
sanctification of what is true and knowable via the authority of the church and king. While 
portrayed as a revolutionary break with tradition, in fact it was a new system of elitism that 
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 The Age of Reason the enlightenment includes a vast range of influences - Baron de la Brède et de 
Montesquieu (1689-1755), François-Marie Arouet (1694 - 1778), better known as Voltaire, Denis Diderot (1713 – 
1784), François Quesnay (1694-1774), Georges Buffon (1707-1788), David Hume (1711 - 1776), Immanuel Kant 
(1724 - 1804), Johann Gotfried von Herder (1774-1803), Johann Wolfgang von Goethe, Edward Burke, Tom 
Paine, Adam Smith, Mary Wollstonecraft and Jean-Jacques Rousseau, etc.   
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supplemented the old system of sovereign power. This was a new way to go about business and 
manage the masses
221
. 
The leaders of this Enlightenment and liberal project
222
 often directly aligned with people with 
direct political and economic power, many of whom, like Kant, Hume
223
, Hegel, Adam Smith, 
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 It was about this time that the origin of modern economic theory came into existence with the work of Adam 
Smith (1723 - 1790) and David Ricardo (1772 -1823). From this time onward the emphasis is on economic growth 
and the machinery needed to bring about greater production and make the nation even richer. Foucault spells out, 
around the time of the new economic order a new definition of poverty came about. According to Foucault the 18-
century discovered that the poor did not exist as a concrete reality, instead a distinction was made between poverty 
and population. Poverty was seen as scarcity of commodities and money, an economic situation linked to the state 
of commerce, of agriculture, of industry. Population in turn was now not seen as a passive element subject to 
fluctuations of wealth, but a force, which directly contributed to the economic situation, to the production of 
wealth, since it is man’s labor, which transmits shifts and multiplies wealth. Population is in itself one of the 
elements of wealth, which was linked to labor actually affected by man. 
 
222 There are two obscure details I want to highlight by way of illustrating the ethics of this new age, liberalism. 
The first detail that warrants attention revolves around Thomas Paine name. Now what is known and spoken about 
is that the publication of Thomas Paine’s book "Common Sense" triggered the American Revolution. It would 
have triggered without that book, but the fact is now, that this was a trigger. What needs to be extract from this 
work is that the author, who gave birth to the common denomination of the expression "common sense" and 
perhaps set in play the great rise of pragmatic philosophy, is that he found it necessary to change his name. His 
name was spelt Pain, and he was a corset maker. He gave the ladies pain. He added the e after he went to the 
American colonies. He added a signifier and went from pain to pleasure. Tom Paine follows the pleasure 
principle. 
 
It was in the 18th century that the pleasure principle was installed.  What do I mean by the pleasure principle? It is 
an ethics, it is a strategy of creating a structure to contain and restrict excess – jouissance (enjoyment, libido) – 
which is incompatible with the system, as with the corset. Jouissance or enjoyment is not pleasure. Pleasure is on 
the side of representation, signifiers and mapping the world. But within language, speech there is an interruption, 
discontinuity, rupture, and a gap that brings about a demand, a demand for enjoyment. It breaks the chain. This 
rupture is like a mythical drive, foreign body that refuses to be tamed, put into words and instead breaks the corset.  
The change in the value of pleasure became manifest in the Enlightenment in the UK through the philosophy of 
Bentham and Mill. The only way to install the pleasure principle is to keep consuming and adding on, that is, to 
create endless signifying chains. That is what Paine did with his own name. 
 
The other obscure detail that needs attention is Voltaire’s consumption of coffee. Voltaire was one of the great 
thinkers of the enlightenment. He was a savage critic of the church who was twice exiled and twice imprisoned 
but he lived to an age of 84 and died from exhaustion after a boisterous party to celebrate the first performance of 
his tragedy Irene. Voltaire’s last words "I am dying of 250, 000 cups of coffee" and life speaks of residue of 
excess that refuses the right of any man to govern another. This residue of excess will be that which haunt our 
modern day and age in which there is the grappling with the same old question that found this so-called new 
tolerance where should the line be drawn between the power of government and the liberty of the governed? It 
was thought that the drawing of lines, boundaries and grids of specification came about through a new political 
order - the West - in which the authority of the government comes from the consent of the people; a consent based 
on a social contract between the rulers and ruled. This new age found upon the wars of the 1700s, the industrial 
revolution and the beginnings of modern medicine. 
223
 The mapping of the surfaces of the world, as evidenced by the writings on race by Hume, Kant and Hegel, was 
a way of explaining difference, institutionalised Western scientific and philosophical perceptions of European 
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held racist beliefs. They believed they were bringing light to the world, leading the world 
toward progress out of the dark ages of irrationality, tyranny and superstition. Rationality, 
while presenting a progressive, liberal and scientific movement, needs to simultaneously be 
seen as the means through male colonising project could advance. Knowledge becomes power, 
at first in the hands of men, and is institutionalized with the emergence of history, geology, 
zoology, anthropology and economics and other disciplines of academic study through the very 
fetish with taxonomy that Foucault (1994) speaks of in The Order of Things. 
One can summarize the Enlightenment as a movement from the authority of the Bible to that of 
the encyclopaedia in which new systems of representation come into effect. Put another way, 
the Enlightenment was a marriage of the production of male ideas that are directly informed by 
sexism, revolution – the American War of independence224 and the French Revolution – 
slavery and race wars, which would latter give rise to nation states. The ‘knowledge base’ that 
arose out of this bloodshed was the American Constitution
225
 as well as French encyclopaedists 
and institutionalization of the transmission of knowledge as the universal standard and 
yardstick of normality.  
We need to remember that nation states were said to be controlled by citizens as opposed to 
feudal lords. The non-citizen, without representation and un-representable, needed containment 
                                                          
cultural and racial supremacy and thereby introduced theories of degeneracy. See (Mohanram 1999:36, 37). 
 
224
 American declaration of Independence - as formulated by its leading thinkers such as Tom Paine, Thomas 
Jefferson and Benjamin Franklin - was greatly influenced by the so-called division of power into a legislative, 
executive and judicial authority. It was declared that subscription to this new-world order would bring about a life 
of liberty and the pursuit of happiness. What does need to be noted that in the first draft of the declaration of 
Independence the word property was used in the place of happiness. 
 
225 Some of the first and noted statements of the liberal age came from the work of Locke and Le Montesquieu. Le 
Montesquieu developed Locke’s ideas by propagating that the power of any state could be divided into a 
legislative power to make laws; executive power to enforce the laws; and a judicial power to judge when the laws 
had being broken. The American declaration of Independence - as formulated by its leading thinkers such as Tom 
Paine, Thomas Jefferson and Benjamin Franklin - was greatly influenced by this division of power into a 
legislative, executive and judicial authority. Not only was it declared that subscription to this new-world order 
would bring about a life of liberty and the pursuit of happiness, but in the first draft of the declaration of 
Independence the word property was used in the place of happiness. Thomas Jefferson took a little editorial liberty 
with the phrase "Life, Liberty and the pursuit of Happiness." Jefferson took the editorial liberty of changing 
"property" to "pursuit of happiness," Jefferson so undid the work of the Quakers, for example people like George 
Keith - who published the first American antislavery publication (1693) - and George Fox, William Penn, John 
Woolman  who preached about the religious and moral wrongs of slavery. In the original draft of the Declaration 
of Independence Jefferson devised a mathematical formula to determine Negro blood.  
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so as to maintain order. With the Enlightenment and modernity, an obsession with the Western 
male present
226
 as a representation of the patriarchal map of the ‘other-world’ takes place. The 
representable becomes a form of patriarchal politics, subject to political reproduction through 
colonization of the ‘other-world’. With the advent of modernism as the present, there is an 
escape from the savage Western past as projected onto the other-world. Following Gayatri 
Spivak (1996), we can speak of this process as a form of narcissism, informed by a Western 
ego (Freud) and Western mind (Hegel) that takes itself as aporia and that separates itself from 
knowledge of what is ‘other-world’.  
This narcissism (or homeland) is located in European knowledge systems, the Enlightenment 
thinkers of the seventeenth century who sought to map out the geographical landscape of 
humanity and cast out those marked as outcast– seen as to be dirty, unhygienic, and infectious 
and as a bestial subspecies.  To be outcast as noted by Richard Klein (1999, personal 
communication) involves a “drop function”; a body that has been left in the lurch and which 
struggles to achieve self-representation. The marked and outcast body is dropped from the 
stage of language ending up as a no-body without a name and shamed (no place to hide).  
Following Fanon, I conclude that violence is what produced the Western European homeland 
and the ‘other-world’ of the homeless. In expanding this thesis that the modern state, the 
Western homeland is build upon violence and exclusion, we can read Lefebvre and Fanon 
alongside Agamben and Mbembe. Lefebvre (1991: 277) argues that “the space of history, of 
accumulation, of investment” is the basis of imperialism “by means of which the economic 
sphere would eventually come into its own. Violence is in fact the very life blood of this 
space”. 
For Lefebvre (1991: 23), the modern state is that which ‘weighs down on society’ and ‘crushes 
time’ by imposing itself as ‘the stable centre.’ The stable centre is maintained through a 
process of exclusion, as is the camp which supports this process. For Agamben (2000), the 
camp truly is the inaugural side of modernity: it is the first space in which public and private 
events, political life and biological life, became rigorously indistinguishable. Agamben (2000: 
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 Everything within the present is present(ed) as (re)present(able). 
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42) points out that the birth of the camp marks in a decisive way how the political space of 
modernity gets constructed:  
This birth takes place when the political system of the modern nation state – founded on the functional 
nexus between a determinate localization (territory) and a determinate order (the state), which was 
mediated by automatic regulations for the inscription of life (birth or nation) – enters a period of 
permanent crisis and the state decides to undertake the management of the biological life of the nation 
directly as its own task. 
Agamben (2000) tells us that the first camps were built in Europe as spaces for controlling 
refugees, and that the succession of these camps was the concentration and extermination 
camps that represent a perfectly real filiation. “One of the few rules the Nazis constantly 
obeyed throughout the course of the ‘final solution’ was that Jews and Gypsies could be sent to 
extermination camps only after having been fully denationalized”(Agamben2000: 22). He goes 
on to state that: 
 “historians debate whether the first appearance of camps ought to be identified with the campos de 
concentraciones that were created in 1896 by the Spaniards in Cuba in order to repress the insurrection of 
that colony’s population, or rather with the concentration camps into which the English herded the Boers 
at the beginning of the twentieth century. What matters here is that in both cases one is dealing with the 
extension to an entire civilian population of a state of exception linked to a colonial war” (Agamben 
2000: 38).  
The camp is ‘a piece of territory that is placed outside the normal juridical order,’ as Agamben 
(2000: 40, 41) underlines, the “camp is the paradigm itself of political space at the point in 
which politics becomes bio-politics and the homo sacer becomes indistinguishable from the 
citizen.” 
In response to Henri Lefebvre’s (1991) contention that violence is the ‘midwife’ of the modern 
state and Agamben’s (1942) pronouncement that the camp truly is the inaugural side of 
modernity, we can add Achille Mbembe’s (2001) contributions. I argue that the homeless 
concept functions as the disavowed double of the Western ego and Western history. The 
modern, Western, middle-class home and nuclear family, was constructed through a vulgar and 
brute force where, as Mbembe (2001: 163) notes, ‘there are virtually no limits to what he may 
do. Nothing to stop him except other brute forces….’ This is what Mbembe (2001: 12, 13) 
refers to as the uncompromising nature of the Western self and its active negation of anything 
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not itself and which exhibits itself as a sovereign right to arbitrarily give death anytime, 
anywhere, by any means, and for any reason. It was a regime of privileges, impunity, social 
complicity and indifference, as seen under apartheid. 
In summary, the modern Western middle-class home, nuclear family, was constructed during 
the seventeen and eighteen hundreds, a time period in which colonialisation operated upon both 
those in and outside Europe, but in different ways. Oppression of women and the working class 
occurred alongside the slavery and land occupation. The rise of a new middle class, spread of 
print publication, birth of philosophical ideas, establishment of capitalism and banking, and the 
mimicry of the manners of kings and queens are all intertwined and cannot be separated from 
slavery. For example, the revision of the philosophical problem as to the distinction between 
observational material and the descriptions of the observational material (can we distinguish 
between the description of the object and the object we attempt to describe?) cannot be 
separated from the way ‘men of breeding’ look upon women, the working class and the savage, 
seen as objects of scrutiny subject to the masterful, scientific and objective gaze that organises 
the field or perception. The object of perception is always known under particular conditions, 
and subject to a particular male, class and Western description which is clearly not neutral. 
 
Homelessness at the material and/or psychological limit point 
One staging of homelessness as presented in this work is in terms of shifting boundaries and 
the foreclosure of spatial possibilities as noted by Trevor Turner (1997), who in speaking about 
globalization and the psychopathology of everyday cyber-life, directs our attention to the 
difficulty, perhaps even impossibility, of drawing a boundary between personal and social 
experiences. Turner (1997: 28) argues that while many have come to accept this blurring of 
personal and social boundaries as a “natural, a version of progress, the way things are”, this 
acceptance is to skirt over “a distinctive loss - the loss of the notion of home.” This argument is 
based on the belief that the loss of the notion of home is related to the loss of local practices 
that promote social cohesion
227
. 
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 Turner notes how “under the impact of the global eye”, local practices, including cultural-bound expressions, 
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Homelessness presents us with the production of places in which people are acted upon, 
resulting in denaturalized citizens, marked and fixed as a sub-species. When homelessness is a 
choice, we move towards another limit point, we have the reterritorialization of space. This is 
the space of the subaltern within which the “atypical citizen” (Klein 2008) and “secular critic” 
(Said 2000) operate.  
Reading Freud, Fanon and Foucault, we are able to deconstruct the binary of home and 
homelessness. It is upon this binary home and homelessness that the nation state is build, a 
binary opposition that is needed to maintain the architecture of the nuclear family setting. Not 
only does homelessness lurk as something uncanny within the home, but within homeless 
settings, there is the uncanny resemblance of features of family and home. The home structures 
itself by concealing and exposing the possibility of homelessness within the home. In this 
regard, we are reminded of the threats out there, for example, the television screen in the 
London home warning of the threat of animal/human hybrid influenzas from Asia
228
. 
                                                          
that promote social cohesion fall away. For example cultural-bound symptoms that are local, “distinctive, 
acceptable and self-limiting forms of expressing distress”, like Dhat, specific to India and Koro, specific to China 
are disappearing. Dr. Turner reminds us that while DSM-4 (the American classification of disorders) now consists 
of 330 disorders compared with 100 in the first edition. He concludes that today we observe the mutation of 
strange symptoms, hybrids that seem to be emerging out of the appropriation of indigenous space as part of the 
global market.  
Trevor Turner ponders if doctors interested in psychiatry, once referred to as alienists (in the eighteenth and 
nineteenth-century) should return to the term as a contemporary diagnostic category. He argues that cultural bound 
symptoms in the West can both be approached from the perspective of nostalgia. For example, he argues that the 
anorexic is nostalgic for herself as a child - small, thin and cared for. The over doser longs for the hubbub - the 
family - of the hospital. For Dr. Turner these people are postmodern 
casualties. They suffer when they contrast their disrupted sense of home with some longed for place to dwell. 
Trevor Turner concludes that with the advent of the global village traditional notions of home are put into 
question, something that leads him to ponder if the home of the future will be the mobile home. The answer, it 
seems, is that it is the mobile (cell) phone, functions as the home. 
 
228
 Take the much publicised fear in the West of pedophiles having access to our children via the use of mobile 
(cell) phones and the internet. Within this fear two things happen - the sanctity of the home is put into question but 
at the same time, child sexual abuse is once again seen to occur outside the home. Alongside this we find that 
middle class children in London are afraid to go outside due to fear of terrorists, run away drug warlords, 
paedophiles, gangs and viruses from the East. Not only is the sanctity of the home put into question, but there is an 
alarm (and probably a repressed delight) that nothing is off limits. Everything - dreams, genetics, body parts, 
children, memory, sacred land, green zones, etc. - has a price, and can be accessed via our new technologies. 
When nothing is off limits, when there are no apparent hiding places that cannot be impregnated, nothing is 
sacred, the challenge, it seems, is to find new virgin soils, bodies, minds, to appropriate - is this the reality TV 
which occupies the space of the home? Youth has become both the target of consumer demands and site of 
demand. It is a demand premised on updates, that is to say, eternal youthfulness. The global economy does not 
question this desire for Peter Pan. 
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Is homelessness material or psychological? Put another way, do we go with Nietzsche or 
Marx? The backdrop to Fanon and Foucault is the works of Nietzsche and Marx. This thesis 
moves between a materialist Marxist framework and a more abstract Nietzschean position. Karl 
Marx’s homeless location was not the same as Nietzsche’s; and no doubt he would have 
wanted both his psychological and physical state of exile to be understood from the viewpoint 
of historical materialism. A revolutionary intellectual, Marx died a stateless pauper, while 
Nietzsche spent the last years of his life locked up in a mental asylum. In Fanon’s (1990) 
Wretched of the Earth, we find the echoes of Marx. The point of crossover from Marx to 
Nietzsche is the body and space. This thesis argues that to understand the relationship between 
homelessness and violence, we need to apply both the work of Marx to Nietzsche and use a 
spatial analysis in which the body becomes our central concern. This spatial analysis can be 
understood in terms of materiality or as a mental state, bodies in physical or psychological 
exile. This exile can be either forced as with a displacement from one’s country, or else chosen. 
It is limiting to try to arrive at a final conclusion around whether we have a chosen or forced 
state of homelessness, as sometimes exile is both forced and chosen.  
In this thesis I have boldly presented homelessness, for some people, as the pursuit of 
anonymity, as found, for example, with Foucault, in the bath houses and through his writing in 
which he asks to write in order to have no face and not remain the same: “leave it to our 
bureaucrats and our police to see that our papers are in order” (Rajchman 1991: 17). In this 
regard, the challenge for Foucault is not to discover who we are but to refuse who we are and 
to promote “new forms of subjectivity” through the refusal of a preset individuality that has 
been imposed on us for several centuries (Rajchman 1991: 12). 
For some, homelessness becomes a voyage, the only home being the experience of being 
beyond a limit, a transcendence, in which thoughts are laid bare. For these individuals 
homelessness is a strategy to break free of customary identifications, prohibitions, opening up 
new spaces and possibilities due to taking experience to the limit. At certain moments, there is 
an obliteration and breaking of the rules of the games and our fictions of the world. In its most 
exaggerated form, what spreads out before us is a life as a drunken, intoxicated orgy. As 
Bataille (1954: 3) states: 
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I wanted experience to lead where it would, not to lead it to some end point given in advance. And I say 
at once that it leads to no harbour (but to a place of bewilderment, of nonsense). 
For Bataille (1954: 3, 5), this breaking down of the narrow limits of identity introduces a state 
of ecstasy and rapture that challenges and puts into question, “without permissible rest”, that 
“turns everything within us like a violent wind.” If this intoxicated existence is tragic, it is not 
the tragedy of the sad and pathetic but a reawakening of rhythmic spaces that are in-between 
without fixed coordinates that interrupt the game of mapping. Mapping probably lies at the so-
called beginnings of Western thinking, starting with “Plato’s passionate assault on poetic 
experience”, which, as Barbara Engh (1999: 162, 163) notes, Plato denounces in the most 
extreme terms as a “femme fatale, a siren that seduces”, then poisons and cripples the mind. 
Mapping is a male project. The tragedy of the homeless upsets the mapping of the nation state, 
the pedagogy of homeland/family and technologies of self that map space and write themselves 
on the body, that is, colonize the body as public property. As noted by Engh (1999), for any 
mapping to be successful there needs to be an element of consent, the pedagogical factor, 
which is, in our terms, in opposition to the dancing body, poetic experience and the savage cult 
of the homeless. It is a form of human engineering which, often in the name of care, attempts to 
mould the flesh through the inscription of good habits. 
Homelessness placed into a Western context can find another site of beginning, one which 
unfolds into being from the unbound and unlimited, found in the work of Anaximander who 
proposed that the primal substance of which everything is modelled is an underlying, 
changeless essence (from the Greek word, apeiron). Apeiron can be seen as something 
transcendental and incomprehensible, perhaps akin to Freud’s uncanny and Lacan's real229, as 
well as the movement from gender to enjoyment, from the scene to the “other-world”, to the 
atypical citizen (Klein 2011). For Foucault, it is a Dionysian abandonment, perhaps a Faustian 
                                                                                                                                                                                        
229 The real is a brute ever-present physical force and a reality which cannot be apprehend. It is that thing which 
cannot be known and which cannot be symbolised yet at the same time it affects the subject’s entire being. When 
the subject is over-stimulated, at the mercy of an excessive unbound endosomatic source of excitation there is an 
encounter with the real. This is a constant force which drives the subject to find a means of discharge of the 
excess. This is what Freud refers to as ‘summating Q’ in the Project and re-emerges in the Lacanian topology as 
an encounter with the real. The real is the category of the impossible, it is also trauma in that it is the unassailable 
but that which is an insistence. The real is unassailable, some kind of left over, absent presence, in absentia but 
never absent. It is a presence without an absence. The real in Lacanian analysis is deduced from what is 
impossible to say and as such the real is not attainable as such. 
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pact that involves an uninhibited exploration and transgression of limits. The homeless are at 
home in this no-man’s-land of what Foucault calls the “space of untamed exteriority” (Miller 
1994: 30). Effacement of subjectivity is self-inflicted, leaving them in the wilderness of 
exteriority, yet at the same time at home in this wilderness.  
This liberation of the ‘docile body’ is a Dionysian becoming, overcome with the spirit 
intoxication; it is a passage from self to anonymity through abating the burden of thought. In 
the spirit of Nietzsche and Bataille (1988: 3), this is the song of the Overman who attempts to 
create oneself anew and smash all images of man by laying “experience bare, free of ties, even 
of origin, of any confession whatever”. As David Halperin (1995: 94, 95) puts it, when 
Foucault speaks about intense pleasure, he points to its performative function of decentring the 
subject and fragmenting personal identity. It thereby goes a certain way towards: 
...providing Foucault with what he had previously sought in the writings of Nietzsche and Bataille: 
namely, answers to such questions as ‘Can’t there be experiences in which the subject, in its constitutive 
relations, in its self-identity, isn’t given any more? And thus wouldn’t experiences be given in which the 
subject could dissociate itself, break its relationship with itself, lose its identity?’ (Halperin,1995: 94 - 95)   
In this regard, some homeless people and certain dimensions of homelessness existence can be 
seen as what Bataille (1984: 3) calls a critique of dogmatic servitude and a form of religious 
mysticism. The homeless as presented here are a long, long way from the damaged goods 
scenario presented in Chapter One of this work. Here homelessness
230
 bring the focus onto 
moments of excess, transgression, going beyond, and the nonsense of the real that is outside the 
field of representation.  
This is not to negate the infliction of childhood trauma, but rather to seek out the potential for 
an agency within homelessness. In so doing. I wish to trace out another limit point.  
                                                                                                                                                                                        
230
 A less heroic readings, but still within the Nietzsche, Foucault project would simply be to see this intoxication 
as one that involves a different kind of aesthetic and as such a very specific kind of space. In The Birth of Tragedy 
Nietzsche opens up the possibility of having aesthetic moments in which art and life are one, experiences in which 
there is no distinction between subject and object. The homeless live in dreams of Dionysian intoxication 
experienced in song and dance and enchantment, feeling herself as a god; the ancestors dance through her, 
cleansing her dreams in the absolute space of what Nietzsche in The Will to Power calls a play of forces and waves 
of forces, a force field generated by bodily movement. What a wonderful way to describe the space of intoxication 
when drinking on a street corner. It is a space in which the overbearing suffocation of many forces, societal 
demands, is pushed back by the scream of a single overriding force opening up a breathing space for the person, a 
breath taking moment in which everything else, but this single force, drive, ceases. 
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For those ‘drunks’ and ‘junkies’ who follow the path of Zarathustra, there is love of the 
unforeseen event, rather than with tradition or habit. Following Klein (2000), I argue that the 
home is on the side of tradition and habit. For those who have never felt at home within the 
family or who have left the comfort of the nest, when inserted into the family discourse, like 
the Christmas lunch, they will pretend that “I am their son, their brother”, since it is observable 
that they are no longer these things. The belonging to a home and family is reduced to a trace 
on the body: you have your father’s nose, nothing more. But few are totally outside the field of 
tradition and habit and even socially marginalized practices become a habit or tradition. It is 
more realistic to talk of being torn between routine and invention. Routine is defined by 
tradition, heritage, the home, family values, religion, nationality, race, and even Aristotelian 
ethics. The home is a privileged and taken-for-granted place where a ritualised ordeal can 
unfold. Seldom does it include invention. 
I accept that, for some, this argument, as Chris Oakley (2007, personal communication) puts it, 
is like the work of R D Laing: it is a romanticization of psychosis, homelessness and of the 
'authenticity' of the madman:  
Lionel Trilling wrote a spirited critique of the Anti-psychiatry movement claiming it was as callous form 
of indifference.  When most people see a homeless person they see some poor soul slumped in a doorway 
and find the thought that this refugee is in the spirit of Nietzsche to be totally absurd. What is striking for 
them is that thoughtfulness has flown out the window, there is no 'worshipping of trance' but simply 
oblivion and any reference to trance is a failure to distinction between trance and oblivion. (Chris 
Oakley, 2007)  
A similar criticism is found in the work of Benita Parry (2004), who, quoting Lazarus, argues 
that:  
Edward Said’s ... meditations on the loss and satisfaction of exile have been appropriated for both a 
sanguine representation of the diasporic condition that appears unaware of its own elitism, and mindless 
celebration of nomadism which occludes the experiences and aspirations of those - the majority of the 
world’s population – who cannot or would not choose displacement and deracination. Parry (2004: 59) 
David Cunningham (2004: 48) engages in a similar critic of Lefebvre’s concept of l’habiter 
with reference to urbanisation. L’habiter , translated as inhabiting, risks drifting into a naively 
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ahistorical appeal to the “durable primacy” of a certain “lived experience” that underlines and 
resists the various “homogenizing” practices inflicted upon it.”  
The picture of Dionysian becoming and overcoming limits presented above is, of course, an 
exaggeration but one which reduces the homeless, mad and sex workers to a state of being 
fearful, unhygienic, pathological and in need of rescue and confinement. The ‘truth’ within the 
presentation of Dionysian becoming is the attempt to open up space in opposition to 
confinement and restrictions. In light of this, I am ready to risk the allegations that this work is 
callous, elitist, a mindless celebration of nomadism and naively ahistorical. My attempt is to 
offer a rereading as opposed to ‘rehabilitation’ of the term homeless. Again, let it be stated that 
the homeless, like sex workers, need space to be and to explore. They do not need rescue or 
values and ethics that come from elsewhere. Again I will claim that homeless spaces have the 
potential to function in a similar manner to the heteropias, and as such can be described as the 
space of outside, “by which we are drawn outside ourselves” (Foucault 1998: 177).We speak of 
these places as crisis heterotopias:  
“privileged or sacred or forbidden places reserved for individuals who are in a state of crisis with respect 
to society and the human milieu in which they live. Adolescents, menstruating women, women in labour, 
old age, and so on. In our society these crisis heterotopias have all but disappeared” (Foucault 1998: 
179). 
 
Between limit points 
A minute opening, an in-between space that is more than a hybrid so that it has taken from both opposites 
to create a new, a middle that has no fixed points. (Deleuze, G and Guattari, F 1987) 
Lines of flight, for their part, never consist in running away from the world but rather in causing runoffs, 
as when you drill a hole in a pipe. (Deleuze, G and Guattari, 1980: 225)  
A line of becoming is not defined by points that it connects, or by points that compose it; on the contrary, 
it passes between points, it comes up through the middle, it runs perpendicular to the points first 
perceived, transversally to the localizable relation to distant or contiguous points.... A line of becoming 
has only a middle. The middle is not an average; it is fast motion, it is the absolute speed of movement. A 
becoming is always in the middle; one can only get it by the middle. (Deleuze and Guattari 1980, 323) 
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A flight is a sort of delirium. To be delirious is exactly to go off the rails (as in deconner - to say absurd 
things, etc.). There is something demoniacal or demonic in a line of flight. Demons are different from 
gods, because gods have fixed attributes, properties and functions, territories and codes: they have to do 
with rails, boundaries and surveys. What demons do is jump across intervals, and from one interval to 
another. (Deleuze and Parnet, 1977, 40) 
Having presented a picture of Dionysian becoming as a way of pushing up against a picture of 
homelessness as something fearful, unhygienic and pathological, I nonetheless need, again, to 
highlight the brutal material reality that many homeless people face. Homelessness is obviously 
a situation of extreme hardship in some situations and is often the effect of direct and indirect 
violence. It is consumed by a lack of the resources needed to move from a state of engaging in 
basic daily survival. Yet, in spite of this, some people, like the young person selling sex and 
hustling, engage in strategies and lifestyles that are not easy to plot. There is something deeply 
tragic and heroic in these strategies. These young people are in a state of flight, on the run from 
starvation and violence, and negotiating positions where they function as both adults and 
children. They exist outside the parameters of what is called normal or acceptable, while in 
their own frame, this behaviour is quite normal. Put another way, for many destitute people, 
surviving on the streets of urban Afrikan ghettos is something that brings pride, self-respect and 
street credibility. While many harshly judge they have in effect moved from the negative 
deterritorialization of the body, becoming-animal, without a face to find agency through sex 
work.  
By way of the example of sex work I have attempted to show how sex work as a homeless 
example merges with Fanon and Foucault’s treatise of homelessness. In particular, the term 
heterotopia assists the reader in co-exploring the space of outside and the paradox of a space 
“where I am not” – in other words located in one space, but simultaneously searching for 
another. The direct challenge of patriarchy frames sex work within a dichotomy of desire, on 
the one hand, and victims of violence and poverty on the other.  
At the same time there is another, more existential face to homelessness: the desire to have no 
face, to be anonymous and to be left alone. Following my engagement with the ideas of Klein 
(2011) and Mwaniki (2011), I argue a more sober reading to see this kind of travelling 
homelessness as a state of trance or a condition of fugue. I further argue that fugue is akin to 
what Deleuze and Guattari (1987) call the line of flight. With homelessness, there is leaving of 
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the scene for the world, what can be called a fugue and line of flight. Such a traveller is 
suffering from a dissociative disorder, according to the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of 
Mental Disorders ( DSM). It was at one time considered a hysterical phenomenon, to wander.  
It was a categorization cast onto the wandering Jew or Afrikan considered to be without history 
or the poor without the identity bearing attributes needed to cover oneself. In this work, 
following Klein (2011), I do not see fugue as a mental disorder, but rather as a postcolonial 
orientation. 
The homeless, as noted by Jill Sloan (2012, Personal Communication) can be seen as fugitives, 
hiding from the super-ego law and thereby beyond the law. They hide from the guilt imposed 
upon them but, sadly, this results in what Freud refers to as an unconscious sense of guilt in 
which the person acts out a crime to confirm a sense of guilt that preceded the crime.  
What I am attempting to do is reframe the meaning of the term fugue. Ian Hacking (1996: 425) 
uncovers the dissociative fugue flourished in France for more than a decade but faded by 1910: 
“It was closely associated with vagrancy as a social problem.” Fugue was seen as flight, a 
deviation from customary behaviour and resulting in unexpected travel. The person became a 
fugueur. Hacking (1996: 427) tells us that fugue became “a medical entity in Bordeaux in 
1887, following in the footsteps of the multiple personality, dedoublement de la personnalite as 
the companion disorder.” It was a form of degeneracy connected to vagabondage, suicide, 
prostitution, homosexuality, insanity and vagrancy. Hacking further elaborates:“Jean-Claude 
Beaune argues that the medicalization of fugue was part of a strategy to get rid of vagabonds; 
he goes so far as to speak of genocide – the elimination of a class of people, occasionally by 
actually killing them, but usually by putting them in institutions” (Hacking 1996: 428). 
Hacking (1996) further notes that the most celebrated of fugue cases was the wandering Jew.  
Wikipedia speaks of fugue as having two dimensions, a psychological and musical meaning. A 
fugue state describes a state of mind where a person experiences a dissociative break in identity 
and attempts to run away from some perceived threat. They may disappear and assume another 
identity. The term fugue also refers to the state of mind attained by a gifted musician or athlete 
where the person attains a high degree of focus and attention to their art or actions. This is also 
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dissociation from one's surroundings, involving concentration on the work at hand. It can also 
refer to a musical form that is repeated
231
.   
When fugue is linked to the concept of the line of flight, as Mwaniki (2012, personal 
communication) argues, it drills a hole into the coded practices and habits presented as 
commonsense and opens up creative possibilities. Mwaniki (2012) presents the line of flight as 
a delirious moment in which the person goes off the rails and no longer follows common sense, 
an act which can be seen as demoniacal or pathological. Homelessness seen as a state of fugue, 
the expression of the line of flight, enables us to move away from an either/or approach. The 
result is that we find that homelessness is both symptom and cure. This is not to imply that the 
symptom is the cure, but that in the retreat and disengagement from the scene via so-called 
trance states, there is in a state of fugue a refuge - the person leaves home to create a new life, 
the possibility of invention and a state of agency.  
For most homeless individuals, the presentation is less heroic and less tragic or pathological 
than is assumed by others. It is play between what Lindia Curti (1996: 132, 133), talking of 
travel with application to homelessness, calls the “unresolved tension between the necessity 
and the impossibility to leave everyday life” and the rupture – between the “acceptance and the 
refusal of the journey, between heterosexual and homosexual love, and between other 
indistinct, in expressible contradictions.” For Curti (1996: 130, 131) it is a state of operating 
between two shores. It is a contradictory impulse, as seen in travelling, the pull towards the loss 
of identity, mystery and its refusal. Curti states: “It is a spiral movement, like that of Don 
Quixote, the baroque hero – rather than the linear progress of most accounts of travel. The 
wanderings of the subversive and the rebel, of the sick and the mad have always been placed 
outside the genre.” She continues that most are “torn between the desire to go and the need for 
stability, between the necessity and hate of travel.” The urge to go and the need to stay will tear 
people apart as they find themselves caught in the rupture between the acceptance and the 
refusal of the journey. 
                                                                                                                                                                                        
231 What is interesting in the above is the cross-over of medical and music, something that does not seem to have 
occurred in the West since the good doctor’s discussion of love (harmony) in the Symposium. 
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To explore homelessness as a state of fugue and line of flight that answers back, I turned to the 
example of James Joyce. Following the work of Richard Klein (2000, lecture), I argue that 
Joyce not only endured material homelessness, but embraced transcendental homelessness 
through placing himself outside of the state, religion, race and most of all, language. Like many 
homeless people, Joyce did not want to be regulated by anyone, and least of all by the English 
language He drilled a hole into language. In occupying a position at the limit, Joyce achieves 
the status of atypical citizen, a body in motion towards the world (Klein, 2000). 
 
Recommendations 
In reflecting on the way forward for re-theorising homelessness, I would make two 
recommendations on how we may revisit the three bodies of work that I have put in dialogue 
with homelessness. I suggest the need to reread Freud from the perspective of the uncanny. 
Further, I would call for more work on the effects of assimilation undertaken by any 
marginalized group that draw on critical psychoanalytic frameworks. What needs exploring is 
the manner in which the assimilated person will adopt certain values which result in the 
exclusion of other values previously held onto by persons from a similar background, while 
also discriminating against people from that background. The example cited in this work is 
Freud’s identification with the middle-class assimilated German Jew. As another example, a 
mixed-race gay man in Cape Town will subscribe to heteronormative values – marriage, 
adopted child, dog and cat – and discriminate against gay men. Similarly, a Indian middle-class 
family originally from Kenya who will be the first to identify with racism but will in turn treat 
their nanny as a slave and make her work under conditions of debt bondage.  
The first recommendation around Fanon is the need to come up with a collective body of work 
that includes the archival material of his psychiatric work. The second recommendation is to 
draw on psychiatric work undertaken by Fanon and apply the lessons of this in work with the 
homeless.  
With reference to Foucault, I reiterate the importance of extending the analysis begun in this 
work, for example replacing the word mad with homeless, prisoner with homeless, order of 
things with home to see what surfaces out of this project. The second recommendation is to 
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apply the Foucaultian method via the placement of a new set of terms alongside each other, for 
such as habit alongside mourning. New spaces will hopefully open up.  
In summary, in this work I call for a rereading of old terms and new key words. One possible A 
to Z could read as follows - alienation, atypical citizen, body, black body, camp, colonization, 
deviance, European fortress, fremdworter, fugue, fold, gypsy, habit, habitus, homeland, house, 
indigenous, James Joyce;  killing,  life that matters; line of flight, mourning; nomads, outsider; 
psychiatrist, queer longings, religious mystics, slut, scene, sex worker, shanty town, slum, 
space, torture, transitional space, uncanny, urbanization, violence, working class, xenophobia, 
yob and zoo.  
Foucault in a similar and different way offers us another way to think about the opening up of 
space. For Foucault the challenge is to rethink the ancient question of ethos: how to be ‘at 
home’ in a world (Rajchman 1991). For Foucault there are three kinds of bonds – the given 
community; the kind of community people think they have with one another that arises from 
identification; the tacit community; the ways people devise to identify themselves and the 
critical community (Rajchman 1991:102). Rajchman (1991) informs us that Foucault  wants to 
establish a “new erotic” to resist, deform, depart from the taken-for granted history presented 
as a universal, timeless given about who and what we are. Rajchman (1991: 99) tells us that the 
“critical community was a central question to his ethics, it was about the bonds we have with 
one another, affective and political; it was about who we are and may be.” Rajchman informs 
us that, through the invention of new relationships, new forms of community, co-existence, and 
pleasure, Foucault wanted to find sites not yet governed by law, rule or habit. Foucault wanted 
to restore to Eros its sense of innovation. 
As regards policy with respect to the homeless, a number of recommendations are generated 
through this work.  
The first is a call for a greater link between the donor, NGO, university and client group. A 
contemporary ideal model is represented by the engagement of shack dwellers in Durban with 
academics. This interaction has resulted in boycotts, weekly emails and articles for publication 
in journals like Radical Philosophy. There is the need for far more work that brings together 
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the privileged space of academia to work in collaboration with grassroots and civil society 
organizations that bridges the current hiatus between scholarship and activism.  
In this respect, it is important for donors and NGOs and academics to continue to take up the 
challenge of creating partnership projects with marginalised homeless people, for example 
Afrikan youth leaders engaged in survival sex. These projects are not straightforward and often 
take a few steps forward and then back again before further progress can be made. They call 
for mentoring, building capacity, listening, reflection and patience.   
The placement of the shadow of Afrikan sex workers alongside Freud, Fanon and Foucault 
allows for the echo of the cry of witches drowned and burned, and hysterics subjected to shock 
therapy. We are witnessing mass murder (arguably genocide) of sex workers and indifference 
to the plight of young people engaged in survival sex throughout Afrika
232
. When Afrikan sex 
workers united and formed sex worker led alliances, their vision and mission become a small-
scale revolution of independent women demonstrating an embrace of sexual diversity in the 
face of erasure, rescue and murder, thereby creating a home for those living in the other/world 
and excluded from the accepted sites. This points to the fact that homelessness is not a singular 
experience; on the contrary, it surfaces as a montage of different and conflicting stories, giving 
rise to a host of new terms. 
 
Project for the future 
The projects of Freud, Fanon and Foucault as was elaborated, cannot be understood outside 
these technological changes and the urbanization and colonization of the planet. During the life 
of Freud, Fanon and Foucault towns quickly expanded developing into cities while rural areas 
collapsed.  With business coming under the control of industrial capitalism and latter finance 
capitalism people were pushed from the rural areas into cities. Urbanization
233
 dramatically 
                                                                                                                                                                                        
232
 Interestingly it was sex workers who have tried to support and engage youth involved in survival sex, as many 
of them understood their plight. 
233
 As a result of ongoing urbanization and globalization close to 50 per cent of the world’s population now inhabit 
urban space. Moreover, in 2003 the UN-HABITAT Global Report on Human Settlements - estimates that nearly a 
billion people – close to 32 per cent of the global urban population - are living in slums. In sub-Saharan Africa the 
estimate is close to 72 per cent. It is further estimated that the overall figure may well double within thirty years.  
Today 70/80% of the world’s population live in urban areas, moreover, we now have 21 mega cities - a city with a 
 
 
 
 
309 
 
increased during their lives with the result that city life vastly changed during the life of each of 
these men. With the changing structures of the urban environment, Njoki Mwaniki (2005, 
personal communication) points out that what lay within the city became a site of danger as 
much as that which lay outside the city. As such new boundaries and divisions needed to define 
what constituted life inside and outside the city, as well as what consisted public and private 
space. One such boundary coming into being during the life time of Freud, according to 
Mwaniki (2005), was the creation of the park, green space, into which one can retreat and find 
a health sanctuary, the other confession of one’s needs to the good doctor. To confess one’s ills 
and complaints to the good doctor was seen as cleansing. In this regard cleansing is linked to 
catharsis in which the accent is on purification. 
Freud hated the US while Foucault loved the US. For Freud Afrika was a dark continent akin to 
female sexuality, for Fanon Afrikan liberation was what he was prepared to die for. Going into 
certain Afrikan and American cities is like going to the end of the scene, the world as we know 
it and entering the other-world of the future.  
With the colonial, capitalist and nation state apparatuses a deterritorializing of local places and 
culture took place. These deterritorialized spaces are enveloped by the global hegemonic 
machine, which displays crude indifference, enforces segregation as well as a subtle demand to 
assimilate.  By way of illustration and outlining future areas of work, I call for the 
consideration of very different kinds of cities: the American
234
 and Afrikan city.   
One of the most important things to note about the American city’s existence235 is the level of 
alienation, disconnection and fundamentalism. What people living outside of the US don’t get 
                                                          
population over 10 million. 
 
234 One has to be careful how one speaks of the cities of the USA. It is a large complicated country; there are 
paradoxes, which the American has to live in, more than in the UK. We can begin by pondering the term 
American, as opposed to US citizens. It is off course extremely arrogant to assume that US citizens have patent 
rights on the usage of this term, yet at some level it is true in that the US does attempt to speak and think for the 
other, it does this to its own citizens, so why not subsume everybody else under its universal categories as 
generated in the control over what imagery gets observed on the TV screens throughout the world.  
235
 On arriving in the US city one soon realizes that one is entering a huge giant machine in which almost 
everything is regulated via a system of coding - be it ordering coffee, a telephone call or 16 rules as to what to do 
with a bike on the Bart train. One cannot but wonder if the Hollywood fascination with cracking the code reflects 
this, people trying to escape a system, which is over-determined by regulation. At the same time one discovers that 
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about America is that if this great machine, perhaps the most powerful machine in history, 
which has conquered most of the planet, has also crushed ordinary US citizens. It is the land of 
the machine, in the broadest sense of the term, a country dependent on the continued 
functioning of the machine. What is the machine? It is a great industry; in fact the US is not a 
country but an economy that has ‘perfected capitalism’, or to be more precise, capitalism has 
mastered the USA and produced another Hollywood fascination: a run-away machine. The 
strength of this machine is the global homogenization of a politics, that is, the ethics of 
consumerism as the basis of the social order and creating a packaged reality.  
At its most simple level there is a co-dependency – for example the car is central to the 
American way of life. Moreover, these cars are large and while this makes sense when it 
snows, it does not make ecological sense why they are driven by one person. The US is a land 
of waste and excess driven by a demand and need to consume more and more in the fear that 
something may have been left out. For example, when ordering a meal and consuming all these 
different taste sensations, the person may feel cheated as she was unable to experience the 
essence of the meal. To have as much as possible may come from a fear of famine. 
How do people cope living at the epicentre of the machine? Contrary to the stereotype about 
Americans being stupid there are deeply distressed people who want to talk about what is going 
                                                          
alongside this regulation there is in fact a ‘Wild West’ attitude in which there is a total disregard of the law, one of 
the many paradoxes in the US.  
The US is a very beautiful country with remarkable and dramatic landscape. Alongside the landscape there are a 
few great cities, like Chicago. Walking down Michigan Avenue and looking up the river with the tall sky scrapers 
is a phenomenon fitting for any travel guide supplement. At the same time there are incredibly ugly spaces. 
Everybody who goes to the movies knows about the American highway, the great open road, but less well known 
are streets like Colfax in Denver. In fact this street is one of the longest and ugliest commercial streets in the 
States. It is made up of fast food and motor vehicle supplies. There are not only many drive-by food stores, even  
drive-by coffee shops, ensuring that you don’t have to leave your car or the mall, the epitomes of contemporary 
existence and its attempt not to have to engage the other/world. 
Probably every city in the US has a Colfax Street. It is part of the initial small town rural mentality where shops 
and service places were built out of necessity. This probably began after the depression, and then really took hold 
in the fifties, then covering the land with concrete, perhaps many people's visions of America. It is surely a land of 
paradoxes as for example the segregation seen in some cities is very evident. Florida is the model for it. There you 
have little cities of the rich off the express highways with gates and guards. In London by contrast people still live 
with the beggars, the poor and the criminals.  
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on in the United States. At the same time people seem overwhelmed and in response to this 
they demand a reality that is manageable, packaged. Stated differently, there is a simplification 
of complexity, so the challenge of thinking outside the box, while appealing, is to think beyond 
a narrowly demarcated ‘safe’ space. The result of living within manageable limits is that 
Americans are often indifferent to what falls outside these known limits.  
One of the effects of this is isolation. If the USA is the centre of the universe, then of course a 
sense of entitlement prevails. But while feeling entitled, people feel alone, isolated and cut off 
from the rest of the world. So they are both at the centre of the universe but exist nowhere, 
isolated and cut off
236
.  
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 It is for this reason that many Americans, including liberals, found the coming together after September 11 so 
meaningful. Yes, the coming together arose out of the fear, an encounter with the unimaginable, namely, that an 
attack could take place on American soil, but at the same time it speaks of a major sense of disconnection and 
anomie that prevails. In fact one of the first thoughts after the attack, and subsequently with the anthrax scare, was 
if the attack from within.  
Now some of the most interesting critiques to come out of the US come from the adolescents who are acutely 
aware of the prevailing disconnection. A common sentiment amongst adolescents is that adults have stopped 
thinking and questioning, that they are on a treadmill and only notice the world around them, in particular their 
children, when something goes wrong. So saying the so-called bizarre events, constructed by the American youth, 
that the world comes to know about, for example shootings at school, are an attempt to decipher and describe the 
underlying structures of this society. The lack of connection prevails not only within the scope of thinking space 
but also everyday interaction. For example the work ethic in the US can be re-read as people spend long hours in 
the work environment as an excuse not to go home as it is unknown where home is despite the fact that home is 
the taken for granted beginning from which people operate.  
Americans want things to fit into manageable parameters, a pre-packed reality, something that produces consensus 
and remains within manageable parameters. In fact the political system, with its checks and balances – for 
example the way local state legislation will argue over the same issues year after year, speaks of a desire to avoid 
complexity at all costs. What one finds is that in spite of the predominance of ‘good educations’ there is a 
systematic production of non-thought or put another way, consensus ideas. The production of non-thought or 
consensus ideas is a way to simply complexity and creates uniformity. Moreover, decisions get made on the basis 
of stimulation of the sense as opposed to sitting with and contemplating complexity. In fact decisions are the 
product of a hyper reality, like an advert, that leads to instant revelation. For example when an event happens there 
is the media construction of the event, the sit com, film rights and so on. The event becomes a super-imposed 
reality imposed the original and outdated trauma. The irony of this super real and hyper reality came to life with 
September 11, a product of the mind of Hollywood.  
Anti-intellectualism and deep distrust of the ‘smart guy’ prevails. This slumber of non-thought is contagious. 
After living in the US for a few months one can become immune to what is happening around one .There is 
simply too much to think about so you stop thinking. Alongside the production of non-thought is the need for 
constant distraction. This need for constant distraction, an influx of noise, again the machine, may well be the fear 
to actually contemplate something, to avoid thinking too deeply about things because of the need for comfort; 
rather have purgatory or a shallow ring in hell than the loss of comfort. The loss of comfort starts to happen when 
the connections are linked up. In the place of linked-up-thought there is a process of labeling which is a way to 
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Of course there are many people who are marginalized or in isolation, to some degree, for other 
reasons. Not everyone in isolation is a fundamentalist. These others tend to carry some obvious 
mark of unacceptability: they think too much or talk funny or look different or whatever. 
Difference from society is what marks them, rather than a collective identity. But they are 
different from fundamentalists too, in that they are constantly trying to gain re-entry into the 
scene
237
. 
Individuals inhabiting Western cities, for example London, as noted by Mwaniki (2012, 
personal communication) find themselves caught up in:  
the relationship between the city as a codifying system that is constantly trying to capture, seize and 
control through territorialisation and the public attempt to be ‘desiring machine’ who are constantly 
trying to dismantling the stratification and codes. I observed different types of interstitial spaces. The 
attempt to permanently change and deliberately challenge the codifying system and another interstitial 
space was more temporal and only about the individuals creative expression. 
The line of flight into homelessness as such can either be an attempt to establish one’s own 
community with codes of conduct that challenge the space, for example a squatter community 
or else it can be a momentary act of individual expression, going off the rails yet in doing so 
finding mental space and relief from a place that is experienced as maddening. With reference 
to the first example, establishing informal communities, deemed to homeless sites needing to 
be bull dozed down, we can turn to Afrika.  
As with America, we see extreme contrasts in Afrika. In fact, there is not a singular one Afrika 
but many. What is Afrika?
238
 Ali Mazrui (1986) ponders if Afrika is able to represent itself or 
                                                          
create certainty by creating a false sense of control over the world. People respond to the label, categorize and 
make events fit some pre-established framework, which is filed away. Why the need for control? Is it the need to 
feel safe and live with a level of certainty? The USA attempted to function as the other of guarantee via the 
illusion of invulnerability. The most common examples of this looking for safety are the belief the scientific 
method and religion which sit comfortably side by side. There is also the zoning out and creating an ordered 
universe through – isms, first the terrible communists, now the Muslims. What we see is a policy of isolation, 
linked to a fundamentalist world view, a need for some certainty.  
237
 These two dimensions - isolationism and fundamentalism - are to some extent of a geopolitical nature in that 
they do not include the two coasts, not the North East Coast, not the West Coast. Going West beyond the East 
Coast or East beyond the West Coast, you discover what is called in French l'Ameriqueprofonde, deep America. 
The blacks and the Latinos disturb deep America, but there is a mutual influence towards fundamentalism and 
isolationism. 
238 A large urban mass made up of islands of rural existence. We have ruthless capitalism and a sea of 
indifference, impunity and brutal cruelty alongside wonderful acts of compassion, ubuntu and tolerance of 
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will always be represented by others. Mazrui notes that Europe is north of Afrika yet the planet 
is round, so how come Europe is situated above Africa? We can include within this the 
observation that the size of Africa on the map usually is portrayed as smaller than it is. Mazrui 
(1986) draws our attention to the name Africa which he tells us can be traced by some to the 
Berber, while others trace it to Greco-Roman ancestry. The location that was referred to was 
present day Tunisia, not the whole of Afrika. From the Latin, aprica (sunny); Greek aphrike 
(without cold), a local Berber or Phoenician word, or from the Semites in which the word 
sounding like Afrika meant ears of corn, referring to the productive and fertile soil of Tunisia. 
Then there is the Arabic name, ifriqiya. He concludes by underlying that the application of the 
term Africa only came about in the fifteenth century with slavery and Western European 
expansion. The discovery of dark-skinned people resulted in Europeans thinking about Afrika 
as the land of black people, as the Dark Continent, and no longer as a province of Europe. With 
the introduction of the term Africa to define the whole continent and interesting racial 
categorisation occurred. The term African was only used for those people living south of the 
Sahara as Africans. Africa now becomes a race, black. At the same time, he observes that 
                                                          
difference. A continent which has both in its past and present referenced some of the greatest sites of diversity 
seen by those open to looking beyond the mythical and timeless Western presentation of Africa as a singular and 
homogeneous. Is Africa the symptom of European and Western contradictions and brutalities? The result of these 
contradictions is one of the ‘purest’ manifestations of unchecked capitalism, self righteous religious and 
patriarchal rule.  Nation states made up of an influx of refugees and desperately poor people cross borders and 
exodus of skilled labour that are bought and brought into the West as cheap labour. Nation states who are no better 
than in their hatred of the other than the European fortress, for example xenophobic hatred in South Africa and 
large scale attack on the ‘homosexual’. Africa has learned from Europe that you create community through a 
shared crime, hate crime. Europe has the Muslim; Africa has the ‘Homosexual’ but let’s not forget it was the 
British how brought us laws and religions that patholigised men having sex with men. Let us not forget the 
Americans who continue to flock to Afrika and offer donor support providing consenting sex is thought about in 
fundamentalist Christian terms. Afrika needs to move between the donor demands of the Christian right and 
human rights groups that demand ‘Out’ Western models of sexual identity are the norm.  
Afrika is the land of female resilience in the face of male and capitalistic violence: the independent business 
woman by day and business of the night.  Afrika is best spoke about as the space and place of many Afrika’s – as 
with philosophy from this continent, there is so-called traditional cultural/philosophical systems and meaning 
making shared across borders, belief in the wise elders and prophets, sagas, teachers, the philosophy of liberation 
(with large doses of Marxism), the philosophy of the god fearing people and the modern, postmodern and global 
village philosophy thought by people identifying as Afrikan or living on the continent called Afrika.  There is also 
‘township’ philosophy said to be opposite and of a different order to the bourgeois ‘philosophy/morality’ of the 
educated middle classes.  
Is Africa a coconut, in a nutshell the emerging middle class - called upon to drive and hold together the African 
economy - while Afrika is the kernel presence of the absence of these Western and capitalist promises in which 
some Afrikans learn to speak and engage in the power a double consciousness  - brown and white, Western and 
non-Western.  
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Afrika is multicoloured and multicultural with greater diversity than any other continent but 
there was no embrace of diversity and instead everybody was seen as simply black.  
I read urban Afrika as capitalism with a safety net. I find the descriptions of the Afrikan city 
offered by Sarah Nuttall and Achille Mbembe particularly illuminating. Nuttall and Achille 
Mbembe (2008: 6, 7) present us with four attempts to understand the Afrikan city. For Jane 
Guyer, Afrikan cities are growing along unknown pathways and “generating quite new 
institutions and forms of social organization, practices of everyday life that encompass systems 
of employment, housing and urban transport, income earning opportunities, and meaning 
making – creativity of practice of at times impressive magnitude and relentless resilience.”For 
Abdou Maliq Simone Afrikan civil life is “an inchoate mix of ruthlessness and kindness, 
cruelty and tenderness, indifference and generosity. Faint signals, flashes of creativity in 
otherwise desperate manoeuvres, and small eruptions in the social fabric all provide the texture 
to the city life.” Nuttall and Mbembe (2008: 7), following the work of Simone, conclude that 
the framing notions of this analysis are “informality, invisibility, spectrality, and movement.” 
The third view is that of Flip de Boeck who points out that Afrikan cities constantly undergo 
“the effervescent push and pull of destruction and regeneration” Nuttall and Mbembe (2008: 
7). De Boeck points out that the city, in a way, exists beyond its architecture: “The built form is 
not, or is no longer, the product of careful planning or engineering of urban space. It is, rather, 
produced randomly as a living space more and more reduced to its most basic functions, that of 
shelter, the heterogeneous conglomeration of truncated urban forms, fragments and reminders 
of martial and mental urban elsewheres.” (Nuttall and Mbembe 2008: 7). 
Lastly we have Rem Koolhaas who sees the city in West Africa as the cities of the future, as 
these cities embody the values of contemporary global capital in a prophetic way. As noted by 
Nuttall and Mbembe in their reading of Koolhaas, “the city in West Africa is an inversion of 
every essential characteristic of the so-called modern city. It forces the reconceptualization of 
the city itself.” (Nuttall and Mbembe 2008:8). 
Nuttall and Mbembe offer these readings as an inversion of the long standing readings of 
African city life in which the defining feature of Afrika is the slum. Nuttall and Mbembe 
(2008: 5) note, that what is underestimated is the “extent to which major Afrikan cities have 
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been able to attract and seduce, in their own ways, certain forms of colonial and now global 
capital. That such forms of capital are, for the most part, predatory is without doubt.” Nuttall 
and Mbembe(2008: 5) conclude, following the work of Ferguson (2006) that this process, at 
least partly, is “what globalization is about: a set of processes that are refracted, splintered and 
cracked” and that it is a question of extremely selective and spatial encapsulated forms of 
connection combined with widespread disconnection and exclusion. “Cities are not simply 
made of social black holes.”  
The contemporary Afrikan city not only forces us to rethink the European city but concept of 
home. Koolhaas’s thesis that West Africa gives us a glimpse into the future structure of cities 
globally can be used in an analogous way to think about home and homelessness. The homes 
that the homeless construct, even if not deemed a home by Western standards, offer us a vision 
into the homes of the future. Moreover, looking at the US landscape in which the modern home 
finds itself consumed by the machine, the boundary between home and homeless get blurred. 
Homelessness cannot be kept outside the boundaries of the home nor can the homeless be fully 
assimilated into the homeland as something within the home is irreducible to any ordering of 
things, be it through language or historical systems of thoughts or internalised ‘good habits’ 
that demand subscription to some ideal, else the superego effects shame and guilt.  
The border, boundary and intersection of home and homelessness is blurred, forever 
incomplete as the home finds itself ceaselessly stained and crossed with the uncanny, that is un-
homely. In the Afrikan, as with Afrikan sex worker we encounter the uncanny presence that 
disrupts the exclusive binary logic on which nationalist, colonialist and patriarchal structures 
depend by taking on the task of un-housing received ways of thinking about form and informal 
structures. We are discovering the hybridity, the difference that exists within and beyond 
representation, and is incommensurable (McLeod 2000: 220). Home and homelessness unfold 
as a fold within folds, opening and closing at the same time much like a Moebius strip. 
While the comparisons of forced and chosen, material and physical homelessness are of same 
value we soon come up against a wall of binary oppositions that create the division of home 
and homeless, normal and abnormal. The oppositions between home and homelessness, even 
when added by the concept of forced or chosen, are limited or worse, unhelpful. What we 
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imagine as a home and homeless site is filled with nuisances that are often not understood or 
simply generalised to all situations that appear to be the same.  
What we imagine to be a home and homeless place is a network of complex bodily 
engagements and spatial arrangements, socio-political and economic struggles, which in turn 
are linked to host of overlapping local and international influences and re-configurations. 
Consider the attempts to differentiate the Afrikan slum, informal settlement, inner city ghetto, 
homeland and township. People occupying these spaces will often make rigid distinctions, and 
tell you cannot compare Soweto with Hillbrow. Moreover, the ‘slums’ are vastly different, 
even within a location like Nairobi in which some slums have some kind of infrastructure while 
in others drinking water and police brutality are life threatening risks. Some might argue, 
including some of those living within these spaces, that there is in fact more communality in 
these ghettos, slums, informal high density locations, than the sense of feeling excluded from 
life enriching resources, alienated and stigmatized. The distinctions are considered unhelpful 
and break unity in the struggle to obtain drinking water, sanitation and electricity.  
 
Concluding comments 
When I began this work, while reviewing the literature, I came across a study that found that 
the life expectancy of a poor black child growing up in certain parts of New York or Chicago is 
comparable with that of a child growing up in Calcutta. The child from New York grows up 
displaying symptoms like numbness and hopelessness, as a result of exposure to violence, 
which is comparable to children who live in countries at war.
 
As I work more and more on this 
thesis, the question for me was not trying to determine who is homeless in this scenario, the 
child in the New York housing project or the street kid in Calcutta, but how each of these 
children determine home and homelessness and the way these spaces fold into each other.  
While undertaking a life skills retreat with young people from different inner cities (Nairobi 
and Mombasa ghettos), what became apparent is that the overriding theme for these young 
people who sell sex in order to survive is violence. In a group of twenty four young people 
almost all of them had been raped and witnessed other young people being assaulted or 
murdered. Their daily existence involves deprivation, the inability to fulfil basic needs like 
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secure shelter, food, water and they live with constant hunger. All of them only eat one meal a 
day while many of them had endured two days without food and either thought about or stole 
when starving. Most of them came from single parent family backgrounds, absent fathers, in 
some cases a lack of secure attachment and child abuse. Drinking and drugs were another 
concern, but need to be contextualised, namely, in an environment where there is no clean and 
uncontaminated drinking water and in which alcohol enables people in the community to self-
medicate or sedate themselves. All of them spoke about the crippling effect of stigma. This 
stigma is due to the fact that they come from the ‘slums’ or their sexual orientation or the use 
of sex as a means to survive.  
Having spent twelve years working with war trauma and torture, I have witnessed similar 
symptoms of trauma – flash backs, inability to sleep, numbness, depersonalization, etc-  
however, what makes this situation particularly shocking, is its framing. They do not come 
from a war context, yet find themselves brutalized. In war the violence is either self protective 
or malicious. It is self protective when the person’s life and integrity are under threat 
.Malicious violence is of another order and is often linked to sadism via the mechanisms of 
power, control and pleasure. The young people from the ghettos of Nairobi and Mombasa find 
themselves victims of calculated malicious acts of cruelty in which there is no sense of remorse 
and concern for the victim/young person. It is as if the perpetrators cannot or refuse to see that 
the other person has feelings and simply treats them as an object, flesh, meat. Many of the acts 
of violence involve calculated manipulation in which the act is an attempt to manipulate, often 
through the use of power, and use the child to meet the abuser’s needs. Young people are seen 
as more easy to manipulate and do with as one pleases, particularly if the person is homeless. 
The act is an imposition, in which there is a taking away and undermining of the young 
person’s capacity to experience themselves in terms of their own frame of reference and at a 
particular moment in time. 
The situation is made worse by the fact that these acts include violence committed by trusted 
persons in positions of authority, thereby breaking down basic trust in the world and leaving 
the person in a state of fear. For example in Namibia I heard similar stories of betrayal from 
trusted adults; for example, the fifteen-year old who escapes a rape scenario and in seeking out 
police protection only to then be raped by the police officer. In this context one might ask who 
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this young person will turn to in developing their moral code of conduct as they will struggle to 
find adult role models to identify with as models in authority routinely abuse power
239
. 
What is also of particular concern is the fact that these young people do not have safe spaces to 
which they can retreat. This experience is one of a ‘brute ever present reality’ permanently in 
their face, a pure presence without an absence. Without safe spaces within which to retreat, 
sanctuary, the place from which one comes into the world, the person is swallowed up by the 
impact of direct and indirect (structural) violence. There is forced removal, a taking away of 
the space to find, to live a personal rhythm, voice and from which to feel safe to enter into the 
world. Put another way, to get through the day people need to screen out excessive stimuli so 
as to create a coherent organised reality or perceptual map of the world. When overloading the 
mental system with unscreened stimuli the person feels under attack, without agency, 
intentionality is removed. Life in these situations becomes a reactive as opposed to a proactive 
form of existence.  
In hearing the stories and experiences of young people in these conditions it becomes clear that 
each day is a struggle to survive; they exist with hunger and the threat of death, be it from 
violence, polluted water, disease, risk of engaging in unsafe sex to get money, or simply 
outright starvation. Some of these young people fear to closing their eyes at night, while yet 
others suffer from night terrors. Yet each of these young people took on the challenge of youth 
leadership and role modelling very seriously and wanted to ensure that not only their voice, but 
the voices of the voiceless from the ghettos are heard. The ghetto is both a home and not a 
home. It is within this paradoxical space that we need to think.  
If Freud is to offer us a postcolonial project that is not male in its construction, it is through 
creating a space, other-world, for the atypical citizen. But more than this psychoanalysis needs 
to move from gender to enjoyment (Klein 2001, personal communication) and in so doing the 
call, ethics, of Antigone. Antigone who lived as an independent homeless woman outside the 
walls of the state, could find sisterhood with those witches and whores and ordinary women 
                                                                                                                                                                                        
239 The potential exists that this young person will, as theorized by object-relations psychoanalysis and the 
Portman Clinic in London, internalize and construct a distorted internal mental representation of authority and 
moral conduct. The young person internalizes external authority out of fear as opposed to out of love and positive 
role modelling. In this state of confusion, turning to alcohol as a form of self medication, often occurs.  
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sometimes labelled hysterical, neurotic or simply ‘too much’, and deemed to be in need of 
medication.  
If Fanon is to offer us a postcolonial project that is not male in its construction it is found in 
those spaces in which he humbly co-constructed healing spaces with the female borders
240
. In 
this co-construction, we find the echo of a Beloved (Toni Morrison 1987) enjoyment of black 
music, dance and voice, a reterritorialization of the Atlantic crossing and discourse of the 
master.  
If Foucault is to offer us a postcolonial project that is not male in its construction it is found in 
this, critical communities and heterotopias and Deleuze and Guattari’s “becoming” a 
multiplicity of forces comprised of the interplay of the formal and informal counter-bodies 
without organs, fluid, humbly castrated by a pure nomadism and passionate-becoming.  
The history of home and homeless is what Foucault calls “a history of bodies”, a body 
condemned to subjection. On the one hand, the body is invested with political meaning, for 
example, the sex worker, bound up in complex relations of power and domination; but on the 
other hand, it’s defined by its constitution as labour power and only becomes useful when it is a 
productive body, that is a subjected body. Foucault, and for that matter Lacan and Adorno, both 
argue against being a totally subjected and useful body, through the notion of excess, that 
which transgresses normalization, symbolization and representation. As both Foucault and 
Lacan point out, no matter what the state does, symbolic inscription and forced assimilation 
fails.  
For Richard Klein (1997) the challenge is a movement from gender and identification to 
enjoyment. The body, in Klein’s (2007) reading, is as such without gender. There is a 
remainder, a surplus enjoyment, those sites of non- representation that cannot be 
signified, codified and tamed. The body can never be totally normalized, symbolised 
and subjected. For Deleuze and Guattari it is a body without organs.  
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 A term he used to describe his patients, seen as fellow borders, thereby offering hospitality. 
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Within any home setting lurks the uncanny
241
, what cannot be housed, likewise within any 
homeless setting a becoming at home is possible. Both home/homelessness offer a terror as 
well as comforting and exciting retreat and escape. It is a scene/other-world made up of smells, 
sounds, touch, sensations that go beyond the universal representations, identifications. This 
involves a movement from gender to enjoyment, from scene to the other-world, a fluid and 
unfolding space. Home in this reading, as pointed out by art critic Delia Vekony (2008, 
personal communication) is that which nurses the particularity, a site of hospitality, proximity 
and neighbourhood to the other (Vekony 2008), in Klein’s (2011) terms, the other-world.  
I concur with Njoki Mwaniki (2012, personal communication) who argues that the idea and 
understanding of homeless is “irreducible to a fixed notion about the community but rather 
should be seen to produce multi-faceted, multi-cultural sites that are in a continual process of 
becoming”. In speaking to Mwaniki who is currently working with Somalis, a group I have also 
worked with extensively, I was struck by her observation of a khat chewing restraint in East 
London. She observes that the use and sale of khat has been demonized, although it is a legal 
substance in the UK. For Mwaniki understanding the chewing of khat in this site, it is limiting 
to think of it solely as a drug, as we need to bring into play the ritual dimensions, much like 
traditional working-class pub culture in the UK. In this regard consider her observations of a 
khat chewing site in East London. 
“The Mafrish at Upton Park is located on a residential street and is neighbour to a primary school. 
Located on the ground floor, the shop during the day is identifiable only by the blue metal shutters that 
protect the windows and the entrance. No 'ordinary' business as there is no name or description to identify 
type of business or opening times and the only maker is number 41a above the entrance. It's usually 
during the evening that the corner of Fourth Ave and School Road comes to life, where a group of Somali 
men and women come together to socialise while chewing khat, drinking tea, soft drinks and smoking. 
This unassuming 'shop' that is very exclusive as one would only go if they are invited or are familiar with 
                                                                                                                                                                                        
241 The structure of uncanniness for Martin Heidegger can occur at any moment, often, perhaps always, taking us 
by surprise. For example to fall (“befall”) into a state of dread “in the midst of the most familiar environment. 
What threatens us is nothing definite and wordly...Indeed, what threatens in this indefinite way is now quite near 
and can be so close that it is oppressive...we can then say: one feels uncanny (or in more idiomatic English: 
‘Things look  so weird all of a sudden’ or ‘I’m getting this eerie feeling. ‘One no longer feels at home in his most 
familiar environment, the one closet to him, but this does not come about in such a way that a definite region in 
the hitherto known and familiar world breaks down its orientation, nor that one is not at home in the surroundings 
in which one now finds himself, but instead in other surroundings. On the contrary, in dread, being-in-the-world is 
totally transformed into a ‘not at home’ pure and simply” Heidegger (1992: 283). 
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it, is ‘more than’ a conventional shop or business involved  in the sale of goods or a service. After a few 
visits to the cafe I was allowed to bear witness to their attempts to ‘theatricality’ perform a sense of 
Somali identity within the urban setting of East London. In this space I was made to feel at home and also 
witness others find a sense of home from home. It is very much a social setting, a social scene which 
starts from late afternoon till closing, early hours of the next morning. All that is visible from the street is 
the light that penetrates from the perforated metal shutters and the smidgen and glimpse of the activities 
inside offered when the curtain nailed to the door dances in the breeze. Life of activity flows from 
number 41a when some of the 'customers' go outside separating themselves momentarily from the 
interior conversations and this corner in East London is animated further with laughter and conversations.  
The corner of Fourth Ave and School Road becomes a site of continual play between the Mafrish and the 
urban theatre, whereby from late afternoon to early hours of the morning the Mafrish imposes its own 
drama, a foreign performance while the street prepares to sleep. In the presented hours of daylight the 
activities of the Mafresh die out leaving this corner once again to be reclaimed by the urban theatre to be 
subsumed into the fixed form of the city, becoming a backdrop to the norms of daylight street activities.  
Mr A is one of the customers that I interviewed at the Mafrish. Like others who visit this 'chewing shop' 
he left Somali escaping the civil war that had crippled the country and arrived in the UK as an asylum 
seeker in search of a better life. The unapologetic bureaucracy that surrounds the politics of asylum 
seekers meant that the identity of Adam as a Somali was scrutinised and denied to him and he was left in 
limbo waiting for 10 years acknowledgement of his existence. This state of uncertainty and the 
experience of being cast aside into a condition of non-national, without identity, trapped in the waiting is 
not just expressed by Mr A but is a familiar story at the Mafrish. This space becomes a sort of refuge so 
that the momentary escape from the state of limbo is through familiarity of those who come from the 
same culture, community and experiences. The Mafrish cafe has a twin function, it provides people with 
access khat – a form of self medication – and at the same time enables people to co-exist and be in 
relationship to others. This ritual space enables them to live with their pain, something that is especially 
difficult when people feel homeless. The entrance to the Mafrish is partially veiled by a curtain so as that 
the interior is partially secluded but still retains permeability to the 'regulars'. The ownership of this space 
and place doesn't just rest on the owner but seems shared also by the rest of the users and customers. This 
is evident when I am welcomed into the space by the first person who sees me as I enter the space, the 
same generosity is extended when I am offered a seat or a cup of tea makes this space different in 
comparison to Somali restaurant where greeting and assigning seating falls on the owner, waiter or chef. 
Salado's Mafrish is not just a business but also a site and space for socialising and has a nature that is 
welcoming and 'homely' not just from everyone in the space but which also includes the seating. In this 
site identity is a  performance, one that involves  a continual 'opening out', remaking and re-sitting of the 
subject between boundaries (reference) but also one that ‘closes down’ and shut out possibility. It both 
veils and unveils, or put another way, a  performance is a process of negotiation and regulation of spaces 
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where by difference is exposed as limiting notion referring to a fixed point of departure but also a show 
in which people act out pre-existing scripts with set roles and characters and predetermined dramas. 
Instead of simply focusing of the negative images and stereotypes of Somalians I have found something 
quite wonderful in their transgression, what can be understood by the concept of the flaneur. The 
transgressional magic of the flaneur is to make the interior appear on the “wrong side” of its bounding 
wall, the wrong side of the façade.” 
 For Njoki Mwaniki (2011, personal communication) we have two senses to the movement 
between home and homeless, firstly that which can be referred to as the operation of machine, 
as defined by Deleuze and Guattari, that which generates and expends power by operating on 
the bodies of those who move in these spaces. Power that is in relation to the global scene and a 
governing space – colonisation and territorialisation – that already exists, a reality that is the 
everyday where everyone knows the rules, the ‘judgements of God’, the coding system which 
is the governing body and space, the common sense knowledge. For Mwaniki (2012, personal 
communication) this includes “the external re-imagining of the homeless community through 
the dominant culture - an exercise of othering (alterity) and homogenising of the minority 
group”.  When the particular local sites are understood they “reveal common place 
contradictions, ambivalence through the cultural practices that are performed in the sites”. The 
homeless are not simply passive but active agents, what Mwaniki (2012, personal 
communication) calls as “the generators of the different sites”, understood “to be continually in 
a process of transition and continual transition and becoming, which as mentioned by Homi 
Bhabha with his concept of functions as a third space”. This refers to the other movement 
between home and homeless, which following Deleuze and Guattari, as Mwaniki (2011) points 
out is in the direction of the interstice. 
Within this intertwined relationship and movement between home and homeless spaces there are 
moments, described by Deleuze and Guattari, as line of flight that involves the exciting energy that is 
built up in us and moves us to be creative. So to go off the rails can be a kind of the homeless demonic 
delirious state that forms part of the interstitial. It is the middle that has no fixed points, but which jumps 
across intervals, and from one interval to another. I think the movement between home and homeless 
experience occurs within the minute gap or crevice where things pick up speed and what lies between 
things does not designate a localizable relation going from one thing to the other and back again, but a 
perpendicular direction and transversal movement. 
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